Soviet Union and Afghanistanóbecame very clear by the end of the 1980s. Since Tajik poets and writers could not sympathize with Afghanistan politically, they focused on Afghan cultural figures such as poets and singers. Farzona, a poetess who in the late 1980s joined the opposition movement, writes in one of her poems, ìTo the Nation that Gave Birth to Ahmad Zohirî:17
O Afghan nightingale of Vatan,18 Motherland doesnít die,
Your singing restores life of her essence,
Still the song is coming from your bleeding throat
You are in me, until the end of times, until the end of times, until the end of times Ö 19
And in another poem:
Fostered by one melody,
We are not silent and we donít cry,
The voice of Zohir has to remain in the heart, For the blood to rise warm and seethe Ö
It is the spring of life Ö
Ö Which will wake us up. 20
During the glasnost period, Bozor Sobir, a famous Tajik poet and politician, gave a speech in parliament on penitence, arguing that it is shameful to wear medals won from killing your brothers. However, overtly anti-Soviet/Russian poetry did not appear until February 1990, when Soviet troops were deployed in Tajikistan to stop ìanti-Armenianî demonstrations, which resulted in death and injury to many Tajiks demonstrating against Kahar Makhkamov, the first secretary of the Tajik SSR. Bozor Sobir later wrote a poem called ìKneads the paste with blood,î dedicated to a Tajik youth killed during the February 1990 event in which two anti-Russianónot only anti-Sovietósentiments were clear:
Is the friendship of a wolf-killer with a sheep Ö
Her treachery should be exterminated, exterminated! I remember her words about brotherhood,
These words were about captivity Ö
Ö In todayís world,
Blood of Armenians, blood of Georgians,
Blood of Moldavians, blood of Lithuanian
Blood of Azerbaijanis, blood of Tajiks Ö
Red communist tails crawl following her Duma Ö Ö Russia as a government,
As a state
As a policy
More than any other peoples,
More than any other nation,
Creating an ocean
From the blood of Russian children
From the tears of Russian mothers,
Creating an ocean Ö
Ö While Russia was writing the red Leninist history, A Russian was left without his past Ö 21
This poem, which is quoted here only in part, illustrates a tendency to equate ìRussianî with ìSoviet.î Sobir does not make clear which of the two ìRussiasî he means until the end of the poem where he accuses ìRussia as a government, as a state, as a policyî which violated the rights of not only peoples of the USSR, but of Russians themselves. However, one can assume that the first part of this poem could have been used as an anti-Russian slogan, which drove the Russian speaking population out of Tajikistan.
UZBEKISTAN AS ìEVIL STEPFATHERî
The mythological image of the ìotherî in the case of Uzbeks and their ancestors was constructed by the Tajik literary and academic elite in the 1970s and 1980s, and was derived from the history of tensions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the course of the 20th century. Uzbekistan as the ìevil stepfatherî was portrayed trying to prevent the ìbirthî of Tajikistan and deny its exist- ence as a nationóin other words, depriving Tajiks of what Yael Tamir has called the ìpromise of immortality.î22 In addition, the ìevil stepfatherî kept the two cities of Samarqand and Bukhara, which Tajiks considered theirs when the two Soviet republics were established in the 1920s.
After long debates about the controversial status of cities where both Tajik and Uzbek speakers lived, Uzbekistan sacrificed Khujand in order to keep Samarqand and Bukhara. With Tajik independence, the focus shifted from unresolved political issues between the two republics to cultural questions related to national myths. Extending Kaufmanís analogy of the nation as ìa
jealous godóto whom one pays homage, venerating its temples (monuments), relics (battle flags) Ö theology (including a mythical history),î23 poets and writers became the priests of both republics whose prayers (nationalistic literature) enticed its believers to a national ìjihad.î
Samarqand and Bukhara became an essential theme in Tajik literary mourning over the glorious past of the nationís lost cultural centers. The Uzbek elite, meanwhile, attempted to prove their right to the two cities. Debates over these themes were accompanied by acrimonious arguments about the national (Uzbek or Tajik) origin of famous historical figures such as Avicenna.
Four years before perestroika Bozor Sobir wrote a poem called ìMother Tongueî that mourned the lost national values of the Tajiks.
Everything he [the Tajik] had in this world he gave away
The lands of Balkh and Bukhara he had, he gave away
Honorable customs and collections of poems he had, he gave away, Throne of Samanids he had, he gave away.
His enemyóbeggarly in knowledge, ìDonishî of Sino took away,
His enemyódevoid of [his own] traditions, divan24 of Mavlono took away, His enemyóart dealer, the art of Behzod took away,
His homeless enemy took his place in his house.25
The enumeration of lossesónot only the territorial demarcation that gave Bukhara to Uzbekistan and Balkh to Afghanistan, but also the fall of the Samanid state in the 10th cen- tury26óreinforces the misery of the Tajiks. Their lands and cultural heritage (ìDonishî of Avicenna, the mystical poetry of Djalolidin Rumi, and the art of Behzod)27 were misappropriated by the ìother,î while ìhis homeless enemy took his place in his house.î Sobir then uses the heroic warriors of Iranian epic, Rustam and Suhrob (from Abulkhosim Firdousiís Shahmane, written at the end of 9th and beginning of 10th century), to remind contemporary Tajiks about the unbreakable links with their famous predecessors whose ìclubî they had let out of their hands:
He let the club of Rustam and Suhrob out of his hands Useless barbarians he made strong,
His own name as the grave of Rudaki was forgotten,
He glorified his assassins in the whole world,Low height of Mangit
Rose above the minaret of Khorasan,
Low steppes of Kipchak,
Became higher than the mountains of Badakhshan.
Ö In the eyes of those whose eyes are narrow, Years of oppression he saw
At times in flames,
At times in water,
Layer by layer with the burned [ruins] of Sogdian minaret he burned, burned, With collapsed walls of the Afrosiyab 28 gates he collapsed.29
In addition to the increasingly pejorative image of the oppressed Tajik who ìforgot his name,î burned with the Sogdian minaret, and collapsed with the gates of Afrosiyab, the image of the Uzbek seen as a ìMangit,î an ìassassin,î and a ìuseless barbarianî emerges.
The last dynasty of Uzbek emirs, the Mangit Dynasty (1753ñ1920) was, according to Tajik historians in the Soviet period, a ìcenter of religious obscurantism and political reaction.î30 Thus, Bozor Sobir primordializes the conflict, claiming that Tajiks had been oppressed by Uzbeks for at least two centuries. The idea of continuous conflict with Uzbek oppressors was explored in many literary works of this period, encouraging Tajiks to ìwake upî and pick up the ìclub of Rustam and Suhrobî against the oppressor.
Elaboration of this mythical ìotherî31 can be found in the short story, ìA Song of Some- one, Who Has a Noose Around his Neck,î32 by Bahmanyor, one of the most famous writers of the 1980s and 1990s who was a member of political club Darafshi Kovien (ìThe Banner of Kovaís Sonsî33) as well as the national patriotic movement Rastokhez. The story is of Abdulkadir, a musician and narrator of Tajik folk tales, who stands against the great conqueror Timur (ìthe iron lame manî), the Uzbek national symbol of might and glory. It is a perfect illustration of the ìevil stepfatherî myth. The story takes place on one of Samarqandís squares where the execution of Abdulkadir and the poet Kuhistani34 is about to take place. Timur, who sentenced them to death, comes to watch the execution but is irritated by the large number of people gathered on the squares of Samarqand. He interprets this as a sign of sympathy for two condemned, ìas if these charlatans are brothers to all Samarqandies.î35 Abdulkadir plays his last
song, reviving Timurís memories of peace and happiness as a child. He asks Abdulkadir what the name of the song is and the singer replies that it is a song of someone who has a noose around his neck:
The emir did not think some despicable street singer would dare to answer him in such a disrespectful way Ö him Ö Timur the Unconquerable. But he already perceived one truth: no matter how many people of this tribe he killed, how many pyramids he built out of their bodies, how many cities and villages he razed to the ground sowing with barley, these people would revive like steppe grass comes to life in the spring Ö He was about to order the release of the prisoners, but came to his senses and made a hand gesture to hang them!36
Thus Bahmanyor confirms and maintains the myth of the ìcultured, peace loving and poorî Persian-speaking Tajiks, who are opposed to the ìbarbarian, aggressive, and richî Turks. Like Bozor Sobir, Bahmayor uses a historical event to show the long history of the conflict. The author recognizes Timur as a great warrior, but then suggests that it is only when faced with great conquerors that Tajiks give in. And of course, in the end Tajiks regain their strength ìlike steppe grass comes to life in the spring.î As was typical of Tajik authors of this period, Bahmanyor also stresses discrimination against Tajik culture in Samarqand: ìPeople throng from all over the place, as if he [Abdulkadir] intended to distribute bread among hungry men and not sing.î37 Bread, one of the sacred symbols, is equated with the Tajik music that Samarqandies are ìhungryî for.
Besides mourning the loss of their cities, the Tajiks of Samarqand and Bukhara are portrayed as having lost their national identity. In the following poem by Loik Sherali (ìWhere the grave of Donish is?î38) the Tajiks of Bukhara are questioned about the grave of their famous Tajik predecessor:
In Bukhara, where sons of high ranking officials Are born by those who lost their path,
Are born by those who have stopped existing, Some are still deprived of their mother tongue,
To what extent are they deprived of their memory?
In Bukhara, where the Tajik lost his kinsmen, How much of memory of Donish is left?39
A similar theme is expanded in Bozor Sobirís poem ìBukharaî: Bukhara, with bitterness and regret I see,
That places of many of those who are dear to you,
As the place of Sino are empty in your arms.40
Language use for Samarqand and Bukharaís mixed population was a determining factor for oneís nationality. To continue speaking oneís ìmother tongueî under the rule of the ìevil stepfatherî meant keeping oneís national memory alive, according to Loik Sherali. By forgetting about Donish, one of the first pro-Russian enlightening thinkers, the poet accuses the citizens of Bukhara of forgetting who they are (They have ìlost their pathî) and what they represent. After being ìUzbekised,î in Loik Sheraliís terms, they ìstop existingî (line 3)óthat is, they have died as Tajiks.
In the process of reinforcing national identity based on historical accomplishments, elites of both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan debated the redistribution of not only their cities, but also of their mutual cultural heritage. Heated arguments around Avicennaís (Abuali Ibn Sino) national- ity, for example, took place during the celebration of his thousand-year anniversary in Bukhara in 1980. The idea that Sitora, the mother of the famous scientist and poet, was Uzbek was re- flected in the poetry and then the historiography of Uzbekistan. Tajiks responded in kind, as exemplified by Bozor Sobirís poem ìSinoís Scalpelî:
This one and that claims Sino is theirs
In order to lean a ladder against the roof of fame
But Sino has raised this roof so high,
That neither this nor that is able to lean his ladder against it Ö
The time, [when] Sejukid was riding his horse hard towards Kofien, Was riding his horse with an arrow and a deadly knife on his belt, The Tajik people Sinoís life-saving scalpel took in their hands, Life-saving knife the whole world took [in its hand].41
Loik Sheraliís poem echoed the same theme:
All lay claim ìHe belongs to our nations
S- an- so mother in such-and-such year gave him birth,
Another nation to the world of civilization
Did not give someone as omniscient as Sino Ö î
What are all these claims and cries for?
What are all these evidences and arguments for? Neither Arab, nor Uzbek he was,
But an all-knowing person he was.
Bukhara was the capital of Tajiks,
Buali [Sino] was born there.
Dari was his language, but he learned, Languages of all times and all peoples.42
Both poets begin with a humanistic reasoning that portrays Sino as an ìall-knowingî individual who belongs to the whole world. They both mock those who try to ìnationalizeî him. However, Bozor Sobir in the second quatrain and Loik Sherali in the third quatrain formulate their views on the national origin of Sino quite clearly. Sobir opposes Tajiks as life saviors and followers of Sino to the nomadic Seldjukids with their ìdeadly knifesî (line 6), while Loik Sherali states that Sino was born in ìBukhara, capital of Tajiksî and that his first language was Dari.
This construction of the ìotherî in the Tajik literatureóthe ìevil stepfatherî Uzbekistanówas reinforced in the late 1980s during the rise of the ethno-nationalism movement promoting the recognition of Tajiks in Uzbekistan. A public service cultural association of Tajiks and Tajik-speaking people, named ìSamarqand,î emerged in 1989 in Uzbekistan as a group devoted to the preservation of the Tajik language and advocacy of ìelementary equal rights not only for Tajiks but for everyone in the area.î43 They claimed that Uzbek authorities deprived Tajik Samarqandies the right to have the nationality ìTajikî as opposed to ìUzbekî designated in their passports. As a result of a five-day hunger-strike by Hayot Nemat, a poet and co-chairman of the organization, local authorities made an exception and allowed Tajik-speakers to change their nationality in their passports to Tajik. Two deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR supported ìSamarqand,î two of whom were the Tajik poets Loik Sherali and Gulrukhsor Safieva. Their proposal, ìOn Appointing a Parliament Investigation Commission to Study the Situation of
Tajiks and Tajik-speaking Peoples of the Uzbek SSRî was never discussed by the Congress of Peopleís Deputies. By that time, the rise of nationalism and ethnic conflicts around the USSR had convinced Gorbachev that ìnationalism and ethnic violence were products of elite manipula- tion rather than manifestation of genuine popular grievances or fears.î44 ìOn the edge of an abyssî45 military force had become the main device of control.
ON THE CROSSROADS OF SOVIET NATIONAL IDENTITIES: KHUJAND OR THE ìHALF-BROTHERî
Among the regions of Tajikistan, the city of Khujand (formerly known as Leninabad) and the Khujandis were considered yet another ìotherî for two reasons. First, they were the ethnic kin to the Uzbek ìevil stepfather,î and as a result the ìhalf-brotherî Khujand had been able to monopo- lize political power in Tajikistan during almost all of the Soviet period. The people of other regions saw Khujand, which was not committed to full independence from Uzbekistan, as inca- pable of representing the interests of ìrealî Tajiks. Political dissatisfaction with the rule of this ìhalf-brotherî among elites of other regions (Zarafshan, Karategin, Khatlon, Badakhshan) was reinforced by the fact that Tajikistan was the poorest and weakest of the fifteen Union republics of the USSR. Second, during his rule, the ìhalf-brotherî had influenced cultural preferences by ìUzbekisizingî Tajikistan, even going so far as to impose an ìUzbekî dialect, as well as music, on the rest of the republic.
Thus Khujand, sacrificed by Uzbekistan in order to keep Samarqand and Bukhara, re- mained at the crossroads of national identities by legally being part of Tajikistan but at the same time closely related culturally to Uzbekistan.46 Throughout the Soviet period, representatives of the region occupied key political positions in Dushanbe. However, at the same time, it con- structed a pyramid of power in which ìeach ethno-regional group had its own economic, social, and political niche.î47 At the top of this pyramid was Khujand. In the 1970s, disruptions in the Soviet education system and economy, as well as a flourishing of corruption in Tajikistan, madej
almost impossible for representatives of other regions to affect the way the republic, and even their region, was ruled.
The first region that reacted against this system was the Khatlon (Kulyab) region, one of the poorest in the republic. In the beginning of the 1970s, Kasimov, a Khujandi, was appointed first secretary of the regional Party committee of Khatlon. A few days after his arrival in Kulyab, the capital of the region, his body was found hanging on a rope in one of the cityís hotels. As a result, the next first secretary appointed to Khatlon was of Kulyab origin. In the 1970s and 1980s, economic problems in most of the regions of Tajikistan, including parts of the mountain- ous Leninabad region, were increasing. Dissatisfaction with the government was transformed into a strong opposition, which by the end of the 1980s formed a variety of political movements. The political movements Oshkoro48 (established at the beginning of 1989 in Kulyab) and Bokhtar49 (Khovalin, 1989) wanted to unite the other regions of Tajikistan against the ìhalf- brotherî Khujand who ìasserted the interest of one region and prejudices against the others.î50 Bokhtar and Oshkoro characterized the Khujandis as ìhalf-Uzbeksî who were not able to repre- sent the interests of the majority of ìrealî Tajiks. ìIf justice will not be rendered in other words, if Party and governmental leadership will not be changed in favor of the majority of Tajiksí collisions, which ample evidence show are already taking place will increase.î51
The same processes were underway in the academic world. Over the course of glasnost, when some archives became accessible to the public, the process of revising and rewriting modern Tajik history began. Much of what was written during this time was based on archival documents that described the roles the ìheroesî and ìantiheroesî of the Tajik nation had played during the delimitation of the borders during 1920s. These new historical interpretations52 were contrary to the ìofficialî ìhalf-brotherî version. At the time, some of the Khujand elite (A. Rakhimbaev, F. Khodjaeva, A. Fitrat) were partisans of the ìGreat Turkestanî idea, while the representatives of other regions and cities (N. Makhsum from Karategin, Ch. Imamov from Zarafshan, Sh. Shotermurov from Badakhshan, and A. Mukhiddinov from Bukhara) wanted independence for Tajikistan. The culmination of this rediscovery of the past was a book by
Rahim Masov, History of the Crude Division,53 which revealed an anti-Khujand view of the events in the 1920s and which became an instant best-seller in Tajikistan.
In close relation to politics, the cultural life of Tajikistan before perestroika was strongly affected by the preferences of the ìhalf brother.î Khujand music and dancing, traditionally similar to Uzbek, were prevalent on Tajik radio and television and were a source of cultural frustration for Tajiks of other regions. Most officials spoke a Khujand dialect of Tajik which was grammatically and lexically affected by Uzbek. After perestroika, public speeches by Khujand officals in the republicís capital were continuously criticized and mocked in the opposition press. A journalist Safar Abdullo, for instance, claimed that
it is an open secret that there is a category of local party governmental officials who do not know their own language at all, and even when they do, their vocabulary is limited to a few expressions from their home lexicon. Oh, how many false Tajiks have I seen who read our literature in Russian translations! They consider them- selves cultured and hurl reproaches and false accusation at others.54
The former prime minister of Tajikistan, Djamshed Karimov, did not speak any Tajik, while the first secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, Khakhar Makhkamov, was mocked by the press for the use of Uzbek words in his Tajik. During plenary sessions of the Supreme Soviet broadcast on Tajik television, the first secretary repeatedly used the Uzbek word kim (who) instead of the Tajik ki in his question, ìwho is for and who is against?î
For the most part, however, poets and writers opposed to the government did not openly identify the ìinner enemyî until the early 1990s. The poetry of the pre- and early perestroika periods was not anti-Khujand but rather pro-regional. Thus the Badakhshani poet Lidush refers to Badakhshan in this way:
I believe the time will come when my homeland turns into a flower garden
I believe the time will come when my Badakhsan becomes a garden of hope Ö 55
Similarly, Gulrukhsor Safieva wrote about a little village, Yakhch, where she had spent her childhood:
In the end you will fall in love With Yakhch and its mountains, With the streams of its waterfalls, With secrets of its springs.56
Poets who were elected as deputies to the parliament in Moscow such as Loik Sherali, Mumin Kanoat, and Gulrukhsor Safieva, or who worked in the republican parliament of Tajikistan, like Bozor Sobir, were opposed to the government. Their attempts to solve a variety of problems in their regions by means of reforms brought them into direct conflict with the Khujand majority and communist conservatives. The conflict led one of the most radical repre- sentatives of the opposition, Bozor Sobir, to give away his deputyís mandate, which prompted him to write a scandalous poem that exposed Khujand as the ìotherî:
I read ìmarsiaî57 for Samarqand and Bukhara, For ìkiblaî58 of Zoroaster and cradle of Sino, From khoji Kamoliddin and his city Khujand, Khujandism is left to us and the owners Ö
Though the light of [electricity] sparks from the summit of Nurek, The life of Tajik in this light did not become worthy.
Ever since, another light is gleaming from Ragun,
He is told: ìGet out of your hovel Ö !î59
Depicting the loss of Zoroastrian values as a consequence of the Arab conquest and of Islamization, as well as the losses of more recent times (Samarqand and Bukhara, debates about Avicennaís origin), the poet concludes with the theme of the ìinner enemy.î He writes that the legacy left for contemporary Tajiks by Kamoliddin Khujandióone of the famous poets born in Khujandóis ìKhujandism,î the ideology behind the rule of Khujandis in Tajikistan. In the second quatrain, Sobir elaborates upon this subject with concrete examples of the consequences of Khujand rule. The poet mentions the flooding of villages in Ragun, a seismically dangerous zone, to build a hydraulic station which was the cause of dispute between the Tajik government and its opposition.
In this paper I have analyzed three types of ìthe otherî that appear in Tajik literature in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Russia was seen as both a motherly figure and an evil step-mother. Russia had established Tajikistan as a state and nourished it socially and economically, but at the same time it had deformed its identity. Uzbekistan was portrayed as the evil step-father because of the demarcation during the 1920ís and the ìlossî of Samarqand and Bukhara. Khujand was seen as a half-brother because it monopolized political power in Tajikistan and imposed its half- Uzbek, half-Tajik culture upon other regions of Tajikistan. These images of ìthe otherî were constructed by Tajik poets and writers who borrowed images from stereotypes, popular beliefs, and myths about Russian, Uzbekistan, and Khujand. They used them to advance their own nationalist dream of an independent Tajikistan. Nationalist mobilization spurred by the literary elite would take on a dynamic of its own during the vicious civil war that broke out in 1992, civil war that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Tajiks, the departure of hundreds of thou- sands of Tajik, Uzbek and Russian speakers from the country, and the change of power in the capital of the new state.
Negative images of Russia and Khujand in the post-war Tajikistan lost their topicality and slowly disappeared from the Tajik literature. In the process of Tajik nation building, con- struction of the ìotherî image is mainly concentrated on Uzbekistan due to continuous political tensions between the two countries.
1 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 206.
2 Victor Zaslavsky, ìNationalism and Democratic Transition in Postcommunist Societies,î in Daedalus 121:2 (Spring 1992): 107.
3 See S. Lounev and G. Shirokov, ìCentral Asia as a New Region of World Politics,î in Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change (Maryland: The Eisenhower Institute, 1995), p. 304.
4 Sharif Shukurov and Rustam Shukurov, Centralnaya Aziya. Opit istorii dukha (Moskva: CSP Orengburskoi oblasti, 2001), p. 114.
5 Ibid., p. 114.
6 See Gesu Jahangiri, ìThe premises for the construction of a Tajik National Identity, 1920ñ1930î in Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence, ed. Mohammad Reza Djalili, Frederic Grare, and Shirin Akiner (Great Britain: St Martinís Press, 1998), pp. 14ñ41.
7 M. Mukhiddinov, ìMardumi shahr va atrofi Bukhoro Tojikand yo Uzbekand?î in Rohbari Donish 8-9 (August-September 1928): 2.
8 See, for instance, Iosif Braginskiy, ìTadjikskaya literature,î in Literaturi Srendeni Azii (Moskva: Nauka, 1960), pp. 21ñ85.
9 See http://cccp.narod.ru/gerb.html.
10 Such as Kutbi Kiromís ìSiberian Man,î ìTo Russian Poet Victor Bokov,î ìTo Sergey Eseninî; and Mumin Kanoatís ìThe Waves of Dnepr,î ìThe Song of Stalingrad,î translated by Maksim Rilskiy.
11 Such as Bozor Sobirís ìTo Stanislav Kunyaev; ì Gulrukhsor Safievaís ìEaster Poem, ì ìEpistle to Svetlana Aleksievichî; and Timur Zulfikarovís ìAndrey Rublev,î ìMamai,î ìChurches Swans,î ìChrismasî; and ìDmitriy Donskoyís Prayer on the Kulikov Field.î
12 Loik Sherali, Varaki Sang (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1980), p. 66.
13 In April 1928, the Decree on Romanization was adopted and published; it worked until 1940, when Cyrillic letters replaced the Latin alphabet. See, for instance, Gesu Jahangiri, ìThe premises for the construction of a Tajik National Identity,î pp.14ñ41 and M. Bazarov, ìSovetskaya religioznaya politika v Sredney Azii 1918-1930gg.,î in Etnicheskie i regionalnie konflikti v Evrazii (Moskva: Ves Mir, 1997), pp. 46ñ72.
14 Sharif Shukurov and Rustam Shukurov, Centralnaya Aziya: Opit istorii dukha (Moskva: CSP Orengburskoi oblasti, 2001), pp. 125ñ129.
15 The percentage of Tajiks living in Afghanistan significantly increased after the establishment of Soviet ruling in Tajikistan during the 1920s and in the winter of 1992 after the outbreak of civil war.
16 Interview with Gulrukhsor Safieva dated October 24, 1999.
17 An Afghan singer famous in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, who died in a car accident in 1979. 18 Vatan means ìhomelandî in Tajik and Dari.
19 Farzona, Shabokhuni Bark (Dushanbe: Adib, 1989), p. 16.
20Ibid., p. 17.
21 Bozor Sobir, Charogi Ruz 5 (February 1992): 3.
22 Tamir Yael, ìThe Enigma of Nationalism,î in World Politics XLVII (April 1995), p. 437, as quoted by Ronald Grigor Suny, ìWhy We Hate You: The Passions of National Identity and Ethnic Violence,î (Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series, Spring 2004), p. 10.
23 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p. 25.
24 Divan is Persian for ìcollection of poems.î
25 Bozor Sobir, Oftobnihol (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1982), p. 15.
26 In the post-Soviet era, Ismail Somoni became the symbol of Tajik historical glory.
27 A famous miniaturist from Hitar (15thñ16th century).
28 Architectural monument in Samarqand.
29 Bozor Sobir, Mijgoni Shab (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1981), p. 34.
30 Y. S. Ashurov et al, Bukhara (Moskva: Nauka, 1968), p. 17.
31 The same motif can be found in another short story by Bahmanyor, ìThe Price of Life.î See Bahmanyor, Pesn idushego v petlu (Dushanbe: Adib, 1991), p. 12.
32 Ibid., pp. 5ñ11.
33 Legendary hero of Firodusiís Shahname.
34 Both Abdulkandi and Kuhistani are historical figures who lived during Timurís ruling.
35 Bahmanyor, Pesn, p. 8.
36 Ibid., p. 11.
37 Ibid., p. 5.
38 Ahmadi Donish, a Tajik pro-Russian enlightening thinker of the 19th century.
39 Loik Sherali, Faryodi befaryodras (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1997), p. 21.
40 Bozor Sobir, Mijgoni Shab (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1981), p. 33.
41 Ibid., pp. 24ñ25.
42 Loik Sherali, Varaki Sang (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1980), p. 99.
43 Obrashenie OKO ìSamarqandî k Prezidiumu II sezda narodnikh deputatov SSSR (12.1989).
44 Edward W. Walker, Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Break up of the Soviet Union (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press, 2003), p. 67.
45 Ibid., p. 67.
46 During the post- Soviet period, in response to accusations of political and economic corruption, the cultural elite of Khujand were constantly discussing the idea of annexation to Uzbekistan.
47 M. Olimov, Mejtadjikskiy konflikt: put k mir (Moskva: Rossiyskaya akademiya Nauk, Institut etnologii I antropologii im. Miklukhi Maklaya, 1998), p. 36. Also see A Niezi, ìTajikistan: regionalnie aspekti
konflikta (1990-ie godi),î in Centralnaya Azia I Kavkaz. (Shveciya: Centr socialnikh i politicheskikh issledovaniy, 1997), p. 62.
48 The word oshkoro is a literal translation of perestroikaís glasnost slogan.
49 ìBokhtarî Bactria corresponds to the pre-Islamic state, whose territory included lands of the present
50 U. G. Kulchik and others, ìProgram of ëBokhtar,î in Grajdanskie dvijeniya v Tadjikistane (Moskva: CIMO, 1990), pp. 62ñ66.
51 Ibid., p. 64.
52 See, for example, M. Shukurov, ìDurustiho asosi oshnoist,î in Sadoi Shark, no. 2, (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1990), p. 109.
53 Rahim Masov, Istoriya topornogo razdeleniya (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1991).
54 N. Abdullo, ìNiholi dushmani barkan,î in Sadoi Shark, no. 2 (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1990), p. 90. 55 Habib Lidush, Daryota tizd (Khorug: Khorug, 1991), p. 33.
56 Gurlrukhsor, Ruhi Bokhtar (Dushanbe: Irfon, 1987), p. 79.
57 Traditional poetry, read at funerals.
58 In this context, kibla refers to the Zoroastrian sacred ìfire.î
59 Bozor Sobir, Chashmi Safedor (Dushanbe: Adolat, 1991), pp. 9ñ10.