The Pentagon papers

 

News Desk
The Untold Story of the Pentagon Papers Co-Conspirators
Speaking publicly for the first time, a historian reveals the crucial role that he and a small band of others played in helping Daniel Ellsberg leak the documents to journalists.
By Eric Lichtblau9:34 A.M.

In 1971, Gar Alperovitz played a vital, clandestine role in making the Pentagon Papers public.Photograph by Sharon Alperovitz
In June of 1971, Gar Alperovitz, a thirty-five-year-old historian, sped through suburban Boston, looking for an out-of-the-way pay phone to use to call a reporter. Alperovitz had never considered himself much of a risk-taker. The father of two ran a small economic think tank focussed on community-building. He had participated in demonstrations against the Vietnam War and rung doorbells with Martin Luther King, Jr., in Boston, as part of an antiwar campaign. But what he was doing on this day, propelled by his desire to end the conflict, could lead to federal prison.
He pulled his old Saab up to a phone booth on the outskirts of Harvard Square, and rang a hotel room nearby. When the reporter picked up, Alperovitz identified himself with the alias he had adopted: “It’s Mr. Boston.” Alperovitz told the journalist to open the door. Waiting in the hallway was a cardboard box, left minutes before by a runner working with Alperovitz. Inside were several hundred pages of the most sought-after documents in the United States—the top-secret Vietnam history known as the Pentagon Papers.
The handoff was one of about a dozen clandestine encounters with journalists that Alperovitz orchestrated over the course of a three-week period, when he and a small group of fellow antiwar activists helped Daniel Ellsberg, a former military analyst at the rand Corporation, elude an F.B.I. manhunt and distribute the Pentagon Papers to nineteen newspapers. Ellsberg, who had smuggled the documents out of rand’s Santa Monica office two years earlier and copied them with the help of a colleague, has long been the public face of the leak. But Ellsberg was aided by about a half-dozen volunteers whose identities have stayed secret for forty-six years, despite the intense interest of the Nixon Administration, thousands of articles, books, documentaries, plays, and now a major film, “The Post,” starring Meryl Streep and Tom Hanks, about the Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg told me that the hidden role of this group was so critical to the operation that he gave them a code name—The Lavender Hill Mob, the name of a 1951 film about a ragtag group of amateur bank robbers. He has referred obliquely to his co-conspirators over the years. But he held back from identifying them because some in the group still feared repercussions.
Now, Alperovitz, who is eighty-one, has agreed to be revealed for the first time. “I’m getting old,” Alperovitz told me, with a laugh. Several other members of the group told me that they still wished to remain anonymous, or declined interview requests. One former Harvard graduate student who also played a major role—she hid the papers in her apartment and organized hideouts for Ellsberg—considered coming forward in this piece, but she ultimately decided not to, after conferring with lawyers. As a green-card holder, she worried that her involvement could lead to her deportation by the Trump Administration. Still, she remains proud of her role. “Those were extraordinary days,” she told me. “It was about questioning the government and being against the government. I was very, very angry about what was happening in Vietnam.”

Alperovitz said that the renewed interest in the Pentagon Papers, brought on by “The Post,” pushed him to finally acknowledge his role, but he also alluded to the “very dangerous” climate under President Trump. A historian and political economist, whose writings have focussed on the dangers of nuclear war and economic inequality, Alperovitz said that Trump’s “outrageous and destabilizing” rhetoric on North Korea compelled him to tell his story and “to suggest to people that it’s time to take action.”
“We were trying to stop the war,” Alperovitz told me, in an interview in his home near Washington. “I’m not heroic in this, but I just felt it important to act,” he said. “There were lots of people dying unnecessarily. There were lots of people who were taking risks to try to end the war, and I was one of them.”
Ellsberg told me that Alperovitz, in particular, was “critical to the way this thing worked out,” organizing the broader distribution of the papers. Ellsberg had initially turned over the documents only to Neil Sheehan, a reporter at the Times, which published the first front-page article on the Pentagon Papers, on June 13, 1971. (The Nixon Administration quickly secured an injunction to halt the Times from continuing to publish the documents.) But it was Alperovitz who devised the strategy of distributing the papers to as many news organizations as possible, including the Washington Post, an approach that later proved to be crucial from both a legal and public-relations standpoint. And it was Alperovitz who came up with the elaborate techniques for slipping the documents to reporters while evading the authorities. “Gar took care of all the cloak-and-dagger stuff,” Ellsberg said.

The danger to the Lavender Hill Mob could hardly be underestimated. Alperovitz “would’ve been indicted in a heartbeat” if he had been identified, Ellsberg said. Senior officials in the Nixon White House had become obsessed with arresting and discrediting Ellsberg and any of his accomplices. They created a group of Nixon campaign operatives, who became known as “the plumbers,” to break into the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, in what would be a precursor to the Watergate scandal. In a 2010 documentary “The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers,” Egil Krogh, one of the operatives, says that the Administration was obsessed with identifying who else was involved in the leak. “Did Daniel Ellsberg work alone? Was he working with some other people? Was he part of a conspiracy?” Krogh, who was imprisoned for his role in the Watergate break-in, says in the film. F.B.I. agents—and Nixon’s plumbers—tracked leads from Los Angeles to Paris. The perpetrators, it turned out, met less than a mile from Harvard Square, the epicenter of the liberal, Ivy League élitism that Nixon so detested.

Shortly after surrendering to federal authorities, in June, 1971, for his role in leaking the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg spoke to reporters.Photograph by Bettmann / Getty

In early June of 1971, Ellsberg, who had left rand and was working as a senior research fellow at M.I.T., hosted a small dinner party at his home in Cambridge. Ellsberg, who was then forty, had never met Alperovitz but invited him after a colleague said that they shared an intense opposition to the war. The Harvard graduate student was there as well.
Alperovitz had worked in the U.S. government on foreign affairs from 1961 to 1966—first in Congress, then at the State Department—and it was there, as an insider, that his opposition to the war hardened. As a Senate aide, in 1964, Alperovitz worked unsuccessfully to stop what he still calls the “phony” Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which allowed President Lyndon B. Johnson to escalate America’s military involvement in Vietnam. More than anything, the congressional vote confirmed his view that the war was a fraud perpetrated on the American public.
At the dinner, Alperovitz and Ellsberg, a former Marine and Pentagon analyst, talked about Nixon, liberal activism, nuclear weapons, and, of course, Vietnam. The top-secret papers never came up. But, as the party wrapped up and Alperovitz walked to his car, the Harvard graduate student pulled him aside and made a cryptic comment about some sensitive material on Vietnam and “boxes and boxes of papers,” Alperovitz recalled.
A day or two later, the graduate student arranged to meet Alperovitz at a park, she told me in an interview. She explained to Alperovitz that Ellsberg had entrusted her with thousands of pages of the documents, and that she had stashed them in cupboards in the pantry of her small apartment. Ellsberg had given copies of the papers to a Times reporter several months earlier, but had not heard from him since. She and Ellsberg didn’t know when the newspaper might run the story, or if it even intended to do so, and were eager to distribute more of the papers to other news outlets. “I needed help to do this work,” the woman told me, and Alperovitz seemed like “exactly the right person.”
When she asked Alperovitz if he would help, he immediately agreed. Decades later, Alperovitz said that his eagerness, despite the obvious risks, still puzzles him. “I’m a very cautious person, but I didn’t blink—which I don’t understand,” he told me. “I’m surprised I didn’t just say, ‘Whoops, I’m busy tomorrow.’ It was out of character.”
In a subsequent meeting with Ellsberg, Alperovitz mapped out a strategy. Ellsberg, who had tried to leak the secret papers to members of Congress but had been rebuffed, wanted to get all seven thousand pages of the papers out at once, if not in the Times then in the Washington Post or somewhere else. “My nightmare was that the F.B.I. would catch me and capture all the papers first,” Ellsberg recalled. He even considered using the Harvard Crimson’s presses to print the documents himself. Alperovitz talked him out of it. “I said to Dan, ‘Look, this is seven thousand pages of material, you’ll get one story, maybe two,’ ” Alperovitz said. “If you really want to get this out to the public, you’ve got to break it up and keep the story going.”

To Ellsberg’s surprise, the Times ran its first story on the papers several days later. The Nixon Administration quickly secured an injunction to halt publication. By then, Alperovitz was already working the pay phones around Cambridge and Somerville to contact a reporter from the Post and get more coverage. Days later, with Alperovitz acting as an intermediary, Ellsberg met with a Post reporter in a local motel room and gave him the entire secret report. After the reporter left, Ellsberg and his wife, who were hiding out in the motel, saw on television that F.B.I. agents had descended on their home to question him. For the next two weeks, the Ellsbergs remained holed up, with the Harvard graduate student taking the lead in finding new places to stash them. “I moved them every few days,” she recalled. “I’d call friends and say, ‘I need your apartment for two days, and I just want you to go somewhere else. Just don’t ask me any questions.’ ” Each time the couple moved, she crammed boxes of the secret history into her small Volkswagen and moved them along with the Ellsbergs.
The one time that Ellsberg knew whose apartment he was using, he said, was during weekend that he spent in Cambridge with a friend, Jeffrey Race, a fellow Vietnam veteran. Race recalled watching a television news report with his fiancée about the F.B.I. searching for Ellsberg. “They can’t find him,” Race told me, “and we joked that, ‘Hey, he’s lying right here in his underwear on the floor taking a nap in front of the TV.’ ”
It was at Race’s apartment that Ellsberg had his closest brush with arrest. At Ellsberg’s request, from a pay phone outside of Race’s apartment, Alperovitz called a friend of Ellsberg’s in Los Angeles to arrange a way for him to speak with his children and let them know that he was all right. As Ellsberg watched from the window, Alperovitz hung up and walked away. Minutes later, police cars converged around the phone booth. Ellsberg guessed that the F.B.I. must have been tapping his Los Angeles friend’s phone, or perhaps the pay phone, in their effort to find him. “We ducked behind the window,” Ellsberg recalled. “I’m thinking, Oh my God!” He and his wife left that same night for a different hiding place.
Alperovitz asked the administrator of the Cambridge Institute, the think tank he ran, to vacate her apartment for the Ellsbergs for several days. “It was a very matter-of-fact thing,” the administrator, Nancy Lyons, who is now retired and living in Concord, Massachusetts, said in an interview. She immediately agreed—she saw it as an opportunity to be involved in something larger than herself. “I might have just been naïve, but I didn’t have any hesitation.” The one concern she had, she told me, was that she had waited a long time to get the rent-controlled apartment, and she didn’t want to lose it if someone found out. (No one did.)
Alperovitz’s primary task was devising how to distribute the papers to as many news organizations as possible. Ellsberg usually told Alperovitz which newspapers to contact—the Boston Globe, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, the Los Angeles Times, the Christian Science Monitor, and the Detroit Free Press, among them—but he left it to Alperovitz to figure out the logistics.
Alperovitz told me that he improvised the elaborate handoffs. “I invented this stuff as I went along,” he said. “I don’t know how.” Getting journalists interested in the papers, then the most sought after documents in the United States, was easy. He would call a newspaper’s city desk from a pay phone, identify himself as Mr. Boston­—a code name that got a few references in “The Post”—and then offer to share some of the papers. “They were very happy to take them. Everyone wanted to be in on it,” he said.
The trickier part was handing off hundreds of pages of documents without being detected. Alperovitz and the Harvard graduate student recruited a handful of college students—all ardently opposed to the war—to help not only with mundane tasks, like getting the Ellsbergs’ groceries, but also to act as runners who delivered the papers.

During the frantic three weeks it took to distribute the documents, Alperovitz typically didn’t have time to even read all the papers before parcelling them out to reporters. He simply grabbed a few hundred pages, boxed them up, and sent the runners on their way. Alperovitz usually found out what was in each stack only when he read the news stories. The pace was so hectic that he and other participants have trouble remembering the exact sequence today. Alperovitz can’t remember, for instance, which reporter he called at the Cambridge hotel with instructions for finding the papers in the hallway. The former Harvard graduate student recalls a nighttime handoff of papers at an acquaintance’s home, but the details are hazy.
There were also furtive meetings at Boston’s Logan Airport, chosen by Alperovitz because it was a convenient place for out-of-town reporters to blend in. One student helping with the operation was dispatched to Logan to meet a Newsday reporter whom Alperovitz had summoned from Washington. Posing this time as Sam Adams, Alperovitz had the airport page the reporter over the public-address system; the student then handed the reporter a note with directions to find a green plastic shopping bag on a seat in the terminal. Inside

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Sugar. 2017

UKRAINE: Largest sugar producer buys ag insurance company: Astarta-Kyiv, Ukraine’s largest agricultural holding, has purchased the Ukrainian agrarian insurance company worth UAH10.5 million (US$394,181), the National Association of Sugar Producers of Ukraine reports, according to Interfax-Ukraine. The holding said in its financial statements over January-September 2017 posted on the Warsaw Stock Exchange: “The acquisition of 100% of the shares of the insurer has been completed this year”. The Ukrainian Agro-Insurance has been operating on the market since 1995. This is one of the four insurance companies in Ukraine that acted as the founders of the Agrarian Insurance Pool. The insurance company completed 2016 with a net profit amounting to UAH10.2 million, while in 2015 – its net loss reached UAH33.4 million. The company’s assets over the year increased by 24% to UAH58 million, equity capital grew by 25% to UAH 51 million. The company’s authorized capital totals UAH12 million. Astarta-Kyiv is one of Ukraine’s largest vertically integrated agricultural holding specializing in sugar and agricultural production. Its production share totals about 25%, the land bank is 245,000 hectares. The company also produces milk and processing soybeans. The company operates in Poltava, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytsky, Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Cherkasy and Kharkiv regions.

BRAZIL: RenovaBio should prompt new wave of M&A in sugarcane sector: Brazil’s sugarcane industry is expected to go through an intense wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) once RenovaBio, a governmental program to encourage use of biofuels in the country, is launched, says Alexandre Figliolino, partner at MB Agro consultancy firm, according to Brazil’s Infomoney news website. “If RenovaBio comes through, I have no doubt that we will have a consolidation movement in the sugar and ethanol sector as we have never seen before,” said Figliolino, during this week’s XP Datagro’s Agrifinance Brazil conference. RenovaBio aims to expand biofuel production in Brazil by adopting predictable rules for development of the sector, in line with economic, social and environmental sustainability. The program also aims to contribute to Brazil’s goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to Figliolino, the sugarcane industry is experiencing five years of stagnation, and has a “huge disparity” in terms of operational efficiency of mills, opening up a scenario in which the most efficient tend to acquire others. Currently, there is a process of “silent consolidation” in the sector, according to Figliolino, in which small acquisitions are occurring with mills taking over cane fields of neighboring producers. Guilherme Nastari, director at Datagro consultancy firm, says RenovaBio’s approval may be the trigger for the next big wave of production in the industry. Felipe Vicchiato, financial director of São Martinho mill, said RenovaBio’s launch may also encourage more companies in the industry to seek initial public offerings (IPO).

BRAZIL: INTL FCStone sees centre-south cane crush at 587.5 million tonnes: Consultancy firm INTL FCStone estimates that mills in Brazil’s centre-south will crush 587.5 million tonnes of sugarcane in the 2018/19 harvest, up 0.6% from the the 2016/17 season forecast (583.8 million tonnes), according to Brazil’s Estadão Conteúdo. An improvement in weather conditions and a higher rate of sugarcane field renewal in 2015 and 2016 should contribute to the slight increase in cane crush next season. The 2018/19 harvest officially begins in April 2018. “As for the harvested area, as opposed to the 1.5% decline projected for 2017/18, we expect it to advance 0.3% in the next harvest. This slight increase comes as a result of less reserved areas for sugarcane reforestation,” said analyst João Paulo Botelho. About 8.03 million hectares of sugarcane are expected to be harvested in the region in 2018/19. “It should be noted that greater humidity resulting from a less dry climate tends to reduce the average ATR (Total Recoverable Sugar) of the crops,” he said. INTL FCStone expects ATR at 135.4 kg/tonne, down 0.5% from the projection for the current season. The consultancy firm also estimates that 56% of the sugarcane will be destined to ethanol production in 2018/19, up from 53.4% this year. This should contribute to an increase of 5.1% in ethanol production, to 26.3 billion litres. Hydrous ethanol output should total 15.4 billion litres in 2018/19, up 8.9% from the current year, while anhydrous ethanol production would remain stable. The group’s estimate for sugar production is at 33.3 million tonnes, down 5.5% from 2017/18.

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Mewar state…krishna

http://www.thefridaytimes.com/tft/a-real-rajput-princess-in-a-time-of-war/

A real Rajput princess in a time of war
altParvez Mahmood TFT Issue: 16 Feb 2018
Parvez Mahmood writes about Princess Krishna Kumari: a tale of conflict and disempowerment of women – a far cry
from Bollywood depictions

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A real Rajput princess in a time of war
A Rajput royal procession

 

The old name of ‘Mewar state’ has become familiar with the recently released popular Indian film Padmaavat, associated with the siege of Chittorgarh Fort by Alauddin Khilji in August 1303.That story, as has been repeated by commentators time and again, is based not on authentic history but on a poem written in 1540 AD by Awadhi language Sufi poet Malik Muhammad Jayasi. It also gives me an opportunity to write the tragic story of a 16-year-old Mewari princess that occurred in July 1810 during an age of chaos and breakdown of central authority in Central India.

I must forewarn that any reading of the history of the region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries is perplexing because of an abundance of fluid states, a host of shifting alliances and a swarm of scheming local rulers. I will therefore stick to the very essentials of the story, lest the narrative becomes unreadable. The story that I narrate here revolves around the neighbouring princely states of Mewar, Marwar and Amber with their capitals at Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur respectively, and I will refer to them by the latter, comparatively familiar and modern names.

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Critics accuse film ‘Padmaavat’ of glorifying the self-immolation of Rajput women
Udaipur, encompassing Chittorgarh Fort and Udaipur city, held a unique position amongst the states of Rajputana. It was the only Rajput state that had accepted the suzerainty of the Mughals without having to marry a princess of theirs to a Mughal royal.

On the other hand, the princesses of jaipur and Jodhpur were frequently given in marriage to the Mughals. Mariam-uz-Zamani Begum (often associated with the figure of Jodha Bai), the powerful wife of Emperor Akbar and mother of Emperor Jahangir, is believed have been from Jaipur. The first wife of Jahangir, Manbhawati Bai, the mother of his eldest son Khusrau, too, was a princess of Jaipur. Similarly another wife of Jahangir, the mother of Emperor Shah Jahan, was Jagat Gosain, renamed as Bilqis Makani at the Mughal imperial court, from the royal family of Jodhpur. The last Rajput princess linked matrimonially to a Mughal Emperor was also from Jaipur – when Princess Indira Kanwar was forced to wed Emperor Farrukhsiyar as part of a peace treaty. This means that Jahangir had 50 percent Rajput blood while Shah Jahan had 75 percent – disregarding any blending on the side of their mothers.

The intent for tracing out this ancestral trail is to show that the players involved in this tragic tale were all related, in one way or the other to the Mughal imperial household, except of course, the unfortunate princess, the antagonist of this story – whose ancestors had refused the hands of their girls in marriage to the Mughals and for this reason regarded themselves as more honourable than their fellow Rajput chieftains. By the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, however, all these states in Central India, as everywhere else in the Subcontinent, had become independent but their rulers, lacking maturity and farsightedness, were constantly feuding with each other.

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Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, in India (1804)
Krishna Kumari was born in Udaipur on the 10th of March 1794 to Bhim Singh, the 25th Maharana of Mewar, whose dynastic rule over the state extended back to 1324 when the last of the Khilji rulers were being replaced by the first of Tughlaq sultans.

In 1799, at the age of five, Krishna Kumari was engaged to his father’s namesake, Bhim Singh of Jodhpur. The exact age of her suitor is not known but considering that he had been involved in acquiring and preserving his seat of power since 1793, he must have been a mature man, much older than the Princess – but this was in keeping with the times. The readers are also reminded that the year of betrothal is the same as of Tipu Sultan’s heroic last stand at Seringapatam against the overwhelming forces of Brigadier Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington.

Unfortunately – and fate always seems to intervene at the most calamitous time – Bhim Singh, the bridegroom-to-be, suddenly died in October 1803, taking his wives with him to the funeral pyre. Remarkably a month after the battle of Assye where the British under Arthur Wellesley – Major General by now – decisively defeated the Marathas. These were troubled times for India when the local rulers were engaged in infighting over trifling matters and the British were liquidating them piecemeal.

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A noblewoman prepares to sacrifice her life through ‘Jauhar’
The dispute over Princess Krishna Kumari was being closely monitored by the East India Company

Our princess became a victim of these troublesome times. This was also the year when the first British resident at Delhi was appointed, effectively putting the Mughal Emperor under a Company protectorate. Two years earlier in 1801, Maharaja Ranjit Singh had been crowned at Lahore. The great land of the Subcontinent was changing hands.

Following the death of the bridegroom-to-be, a 20-year-old cousin of his, Man Singh, assumed power. One of the first acts of the new ruler was to cancel an estate granted to a close relative of Krishna Kumari’s father, creating bad blood between the two – though the cancellation was the result of a prior rivalry between the new ruler and the relative and was in no way meant to offend the father of the princess. This, however, triggered a chain of events that resulted in bloody mayhem in the region.

Man Singh, the new ruler of Jodhpur, expected that as the princess was betrothed to his predecessor, her hand would now be offered to her. Her affronted father countered by announcing her engagement to Jagat Singh, the 17-year-old ruler of Jaipur. Now, Man Singh had a feud with Jagat Singh too, because the latter had supported a rival of the former for the throne of Jodhpur.

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Bhim Singh, father of princess Krishna Kumari
I had warned at the outset that this tale is a bit confusing but stay on because it is reflective of the time and will demonstrate the remarkable petty-mindedness of the various state rulers of that time. One can thus actually gauge how they all played in to the hands of British, losing the entire Subcontinent to them. This was a time of a great transition.

Man Singh wasn’t the one to take this humiliation lightly and moved to take some impetuous actions. This is not surprising – since the gentleman turned recluse and lost his wits by the end of his life. On hearing of – or perhaps being invited to – the upcoming marriage, the jilted suitor threw the gauntlet and began preparations for war. The marriage was cancelled, or at least postponed.

Jaipur state, of the new prospective bridegroom, signed a treaty of friendship with the Company in 1803. He now sought their help in the matter but the latter decided to stay neutral and dissolved the treaty. According to Giles Tillotson in his Jaipur Nama, Jaipur’s Ambassador to the British C-in-C in India observed, “This was the first time, since the English government was established in India, that it had been known to make its faith subservient to its convenience.” But Jaipur should have known that the British were not about to go to war over the marriage of a girl.

The proud royal household of Mewar also preferred that the princess depart for the next world rather than bear the humiliation of being wedded to the prince from Jodhpur

Now is the time to introduce a fresh player in this intriguing story.

The Marathas had lost considerable power in their wars against Ahmed Shah Abdali and the British, but were still formidable in the field and had powerful states in the vicinity where our tragic princess lived. Daulat Rao Scindia of Gwalior and Holkar of Indore, now part of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, also interfered in the matter of this marriage.

As the armies of rival suitors marched to Udaipur to claim the hand of the princess, Man Singh invited Scindia to assist – by offering a tribute and agreeing to follow his council. Scinida defeated Jagat Singh and effectively took control of princess’s home state of Udaipur. He now tried to impose his crude solutions to the entrenched problem.

He first proposed that one of the several sisters of Krishna Kumari be given in marriage to Jodhpur as well, but Krishna’s father refused. Scindia then offered to marry the princess himself but the Rajputs considered the Marathas inferior and this proposal was rejected too. According to historian R.S. Chaurasia, Scindia was a promiscuous man and suffered from a painful venereal disease. Scindia finally vacated Udaipur without resolving anything. The princess was spared the affliction of an untreatable malady but she was being pushed to an early demise.

At this juncture, Holkar of Indore decided to increase his influence in Rajputana and offered to meditate the issue. He proposed that Krishna be married to some other person and Jagat Singh should marry a sister of Man Singh to conciliate the two. Jagat, however, refused this proposal as he considered his marriage to the princess as being sacred. He got Holkar’s promise of support against Scindia, and of Scindia by promising to pay him a million rupees. He then invaded Jodhpur in late1806 along with forces from Krishna Kumari’s home state of Udaipur and of Bikaner – a sparsely populated allied state in the neighbourhood. Man Singh left Jodhpur and took shelter in the Mehrangarh fort. The siege continued for six months but the fort held till May 1806 – when, due to scarcity of water and provisions, the besiegers left. Jagat Singh was additionally humbled as he is believed to have paid Rs. 200,000 to secure safe passage back home. Man Singh built a massive gate named Jai Pol in Jodhpur to commemorate the victory. The gate survives to this day.

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Jai Pol in Jodhpur
The dispute over Krishna was being closely monitored by the East India Company. Edward Thompson writes in his 1943 book titled The Making of the Indian Princes that the Company’s Accountant General, in a March 1806 letter to the chairman of East India Company, had mentioned that the Rajput kings were about to “take up arms for the purpose of deciding their claims to the fair hand of the Princess” and expressed the possibility of a conflict involving the Rajput states, as well as Scindia and Holkar, which would “make a very desirable diversion” in the favour of the Company.

At this stage of the events, more players get further involved.

The name of Amir Khan of Tonk often appears with the suffix of ‘Pindari’. Pindari refers to irregular horsemen that plundered and foraged with the Maratha armies in central India during the 18th century. I intend writing a separate column on this fearsome and fearless soldier of fortune, therefore, I will resist from delving into his story any further. However, his entry into our current story also heralds the end for our princess.

Amir Khan usually did some dirty work – plundering, threatening, assassination – for Maratha chieftain Holkar, but he wasn’t averse to do some side business for quick cash. As Holkar was on the side of Jagat Sigh, who was still betrothed to our princess, Amir Khan too was on the side of her father. Amir Khan had participated in the siege of Mehrangarh and stayed on during the plunder of Jodhpur but deserted when victory eluded the besiegers.

In that environment of fickle alliances, Amir Khan had become independent of Holkar and in 1810, raided Udaipur, the hometown of the princess, on the behest of Man Sigh, her jilted suitor – for better money, of course..

It is reported that Amir Khan occupied the state and plundered the towns. He then decided that as long as Krishna Kumari lived, there could be no peace in the region. He swaggered into the courtroom of Udaipur and announced that either the princess be married to his client Man Singh or be killed. It was made clear to her father that in case either of these conditions was not met, it was Mewar that would become the battleground and suffer consequences..

Wistfully, with his back to the wall, Krishna Kumari’s father reached the same conclusion. The proud royal household of Mewar also preferred that the princess depart for next world rather than bear the humiliation of being wedded to the prince from Jodhpur.

There have been eulogies about how the princess died. It is said that she herself was convinced that her death was the only solution for the miseries of her family and people. Reportedly, her aunt administered the lethal opium-based drink to her – which, it is said, she accepted and drank with a smile on his face. The truth is that she had no choice in life or in death.

She represents the hundreds of thousands of girls and women who have no choice in their lives and who become silent victims of politics, wars and strife.

The struggle for central Rajasthan continued unabated after this tragic death. The British overcame the Napoleonic threat by June 1815 and turned their attention to consolidate their rule in India. Within the next five years, Udaipur, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Scindia, Holkar and Amir Khan, as indeed all other states in the Subcontinent, came under the protection of the British and, as all stories end, lived peacefully thereafter as autonomous states for next century-and-a-half without causing any mischief, until their absorption in independent nations of Pakistan and India respectively.

Shall we not shed a tear for the innocent princess?

Parvez Mahmood retired as a Group Captain from PAF and is now a software engineer. He lives in Islamabad and writes on social and historical issues. He can be reached at parvezmahmood53@gmail.com

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Sore throat remedies

Sore Throat Remedies
Mix 1 teaspoon of lemon juice with 1 cup of hot water. The astringent juice will help to shrink swollen throat tissue and create a hostile (acidic) environment for viruses and bacteria.

2. Salt and Water

Make grandma’s effective sore throat remedy by mixing ¼ teaspoon salt in a cup of warm water. Use the hottest water that you can tolerate as cold gargles are completely ineffective. If you have some, add a tablespoon of Listerine for some germ-killing power. This briny solution helps to wash away and neutralize acids in the throat, relieving the burning sensation and promoting fast healing of irritated mucous membranes.

3. Ginger, Honey, and Lemon in Water

This sore throat remedy mixes 1 teaspoon each of powdered ginger and honey, ½ cup of hot water, and the juice of ½ a squeezed lemon. Pour the water over the ginger, then add the lemon juice and honey, and gargle. The honey coats the throat and also has mild antibacterial properties.

4. Sage and Water

Sage can help soothe a sore throat and ease painful or swollen nasal passages. The traditional home remedy calls for 1 teaspoon sage, ½ teaspoon alum, ¼ cup brown sugar, 3/8 cup of vinegar, and 1/8 cup water.

5. Hot Sauce and Water

Sore Throat Remedies
The capsicum in hot peppers helps to alleviate pain and fights inflammation. Add five shakes of ground cayenne pepper to a cup of hot water for sore throat relief. It’ll burn for a bit, but try this gargle every 15 minutes and see if it helps.
6. Turmeric and Water

This tasty yellow spice is a powerful antioxidant. For a sore throat remedy, mix ½ teaspoon of turmeric with ½ teaspoon of salt into 1 cup of hot water and gargle.

7. Wheatgrass Juice

A quick rinse and spit with this chlorophyll-rich liquid helps prohibit bacteria growth and ease throat pain. Wheatgrass juice is said to help stop toothache and revitalize weakened gums when held in the mouth for five minutes.

mumbai is the 12th richest city

Mumbai Is The Twelfth Richest City In The World With Total Wealth Of $950 Billion

Mumbai is said to have the richest Municipal Corporation in the country, and also the city of opportunities. India’s financial capital Mumbai, with a total wealth of USD 950 billion, has now been named among the top 15 wealthiest cities globally, while New York topped the list, says a report.
According to a report by New World Wealth, the economic hub of India is the 12th wealthiest city, followed by Toronto with a total wealth of USD 944 billion, Frankfurt (14th, USD 912 billion) and Paris (15th, USD 860 billion), reported PTI.
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Total wealth refers to the private wealth held by all the individuals living in each city. It includes all their assets (property, cash, equities, business interests) less any liabilities. Government funds are excluded from the figures, also features among the top 10 cities in terms of billionaire population. The city is home to 28 billionaires, individuals with USD 1 billion or more in in net assets.
Regarding Mumbai, the report said, “total wealth held in the city amounts to USD 950 billion. Mumbai is the economic hub of India. It is also home to the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the 12th largest stock exchange in the world. Major industries in the city include financial services, real estate and media”.
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Going forward, Mumbai is expected to be the fastest growing city (in terms of wealth growth over the next 10 years), it added. The list of 15 wealthiest cities was topped by New York with a total wealth of USD 3 trillion. “Home to the two largest stock exchanges in the world. Areas around New York such as Connecticut and Long Island also contain a large amount of wealth that is not included in this figure,” the report said.
London ranked second in the list with USD 2.7 trillion, followed by Tokyo (USD 2.5 trillion), and San Francisco Bay area (USD 2.3 trillion). Others in the list include Beijing (USD 2.2 trillion), Shanghai (USD 2 trillion), Los Angeles (USD 1.4 trillion), Hong Kong (USD 1.3 trillion), Sydney (USD 1 trillion), Singapore (USD 1 trillion) and Chicago (USD 988 billion).
Among the 15 cities listed, San Francisco, Beijing, Shanghai, Mumbai and Sydney were the fastest growing in terms of wealth growth over the past 10 years, the report said. Notable cities that just missed out on top 15 include: Houston, Geneva, Osaka, Seoul, Shenzhen, Melbourne, Zurich and Dallas, it added

Gemstone papers The American white Gold 1934 Onassis

———————————————– Part 1: **** The GEMSTONE FILE *** July, 1986 This is a verbatim transcript from a photo-copy that some person gave me. He said that part of this document or related documents were published in serial form in the late 1970’s in some kind of men’s magazine (Penthouse, Ramparts, After Dark?, I can’t remember, but I know it wasn’t Playboy as that would have stuck in my mind). I got this in 1984. Punctuation and grammer errors are included (there are plenty of punctuation errors and I think this guy’s horrible use of commas and parentheses is rubbing off on me.) A SKELETON KEY TO THE GEMSTONE FILES MAY 1, 1975 The gemstone file was written in many segments over a period of years by an American man named Bruce Roberts. Parts of the file were released to certain Americans beginning in 1969. The number of handwritten pages is well over a thousand, of which I have read about four hundred. I do not have the time of the research facilities to verify the entire story. Perhaps others can help. Since the scope of the work is so large, and the events described so complex and interlocking, it may be more easily understood with this skeleton outline of the gemstone thesis. Individual papers can then be read with greater comprehension. 1932: Onassis, a Greek drug pusher and ship owner who made his first million selling “Turkish tobacco” (Opium) in Argentina, worked out a profitable deal with Joseph Kennedy, Eugene Meyer, and Meyer Lansky. Onassis was to ship booze directly into Boston for Joseph Kennedy. Also involved was a heroin deal with Franklin and Elliott Roosevelt. 1934: Onassis, Rockefeller and the Seven Sisters (major oil companies) signed an agreement, outlined an oil cartel memo: Beat the Arabs out of their oil, ship it on Onassis’s ships; Rockefeller and the Seven Sisters to get rich. All this was done. Roberts, studying journalism and physics at the University of Wisconsin learned these things via personal contacts. His special interest was in crystallography — and the creation of synthetic rubies, the original Gemstone experiment. 1936-1940: Eugene Meyer buys the Washington Post, to get our news Media; other Mafia buy other papers, broadcasting, T.V., etc. News censorship of all major news goes into effect. 1941-1945: World War II; very profitable for Onassis, Rockefeller, Kennedys, Roosevelts, I.G. Parben, etc. Onassis selling oil, arms and dope to both sides went through the war without losing a single ship or man. 1949: Onassis buys U.S. surplus “Liberty Ships” in questionable (illegal) purchase. Lawyer Burke Marshall helps him. 1956: Howard Hughes, Texas millionaire, is meanwhile buying his way toward his own personal gain. He buys senators, governors, etc. He finally buys his last politician: newly elected V.P. Nixon, via a quarter-million dollar non-repayable loan to Nixon’s brother Donald. Early 1957: V.P. Nixon repays the favor by having IRS Treasury grants tax- free status (refused twice before) to “Hughes Medical Foundation”, sole owner of Hughes Aircraft, creating a tax-free, non-accountable money funnel or laundry, for whatever Hughes wanted to do. U.S. Government also shelved anti-trust suits against Hughes’ T.W.A., etc. March 1957: Onassis carried out a carefully planned event: He has Hughes kidnapped from his bungalow at the Beverly Hills Hotel, using Hughes’ own men (Chester Davis, born Cesare in Sisily, et al). Hughes” men either quit, get fired, or stay on in the new Onassis organization. A few days later, Mayor Cannon of Nevada (now senator Cannon) arranges a fake “marriage” to Jean Peters, to explain Hughes’ battered and brain damaged in the scuffle, is taken to the Emerald Isle Hotel in the Bahamas, where the entire top floor has been rented for thirty days and later dragged off to a cell on Onassis’s island, Skorpios. Onassis now has a much larger power base in the U.S. (the Hughes empire), as well as control over V.P. Nixon and other Hughes purchased politicians. L. Wayne Rector “Hughes” double since 1955, becomes “Hughes”. September, 1957: Onassis calls the Appalachian meeting to announce to U.S. Mafia head his grab of Hughes and his adoption of Hughes game plan for acquiring power: buying U.S. senators, congressmen, governors, judges to take control legally of the U.S. government. Onassis’s radio message to Appalachia from a remote Pennsylvania farmhouse intercepted (reluctantly) by FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover, on the basis of a tip-off from some Army Intelligence guys who wern’t in on the plan. Also in 1957: Joseph Kennedy takes John F. and Jackie to see Onassis on his yacht, introduced John and reminds Onassis of an old Mafia promise: the presidency for a Kennedy. Onassis agrees. 1958: Hordes of Mafia-selected, purchased and supported “grass roots” candidates sweep into office. 1959: Castro takes over Cuba from dictator Battista, thereby destroying cozy and lucrative Mafia gambling empire run for Onassis by Meyer Lansky. Castro scoops up 6$ million in Mafia casino receipts. Onassis is furious, V.P. Nixon becomes operations chief for CIA-planned Bay of Pigs invasion, using CIA Hunt, McCord, etc., and Cuban ex-Battista strong-arm cops (Cuban freedom-fighters) Martinez, Consalez, etc., as well as winners like Frank Sturgis (Fiorini). 1959: Stirring election battle between Kennedy and Nixon. Either way Onassis wins, since he has control over both candidates. 1960: JFK elected. American people happy. Rose Kennedy happy. Onassis happy. Mafia estatic. Roberts brings his synthetic rubies–the original gemstones to Hughes Aircraft in Los Angeles. They steal his rubies — the basis for Laser beam research, laser bombs, etc., because of the optical quality of the rubies. One of the eleven possible sources for one of the ingredients involved in the Gemstone experiment was the Golden Triangle area. Roberts was maried to the daughter of the former French consul in Indochina. In that area, Onassis’s involvements in the Golden Triangle dope trade was no secret. Roberts investigation revealed the Onassis-Hughes connection, kidnap and switch. “Gemstones”–synthetic rubies and sapphires with accomplished “histories”–gemstone papers–were sold or given away to consulun offices– in return for information. A world-wide information network was gradually developed-a trade of the intelligence activities of many countries. This intelligence network is the source for much of the information in the Gemstone File. January 1961: Joseph Kennedy has a stroke, ending his control over John and Bobby. The boys decide to rebel against Onassis’s control. Why? Inter-Mafia struggle? Perhaps a dim hope of restoring this country to it’s mythical integrity? They began committing Mafia no-no’s: Arrested Wally Bird owner or Air Thailand, who had been shipping Onassis’s heroin out of the Golden Triangle (Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam), under contract with the CIA (Air Opium): arrested teamster Mafia Jimmy Hoffa, and put him in jail. Declared the 73$ million in forged “Hughes” land liens, deposited with San Francisco Bank of America, as “security” for the TWA judgement against Hughes, to be what they are: Forgeries. April 1961: CIA Bay of Pigs fiasco. Hunt, McCord, CIA Battista’s Cubans and Mafia angry about JFK’s lack of enthusiasm. Mafia Onassis has his right-hand man “Hughes’top aid” former FBI and CIA Robert Maheu (nicknamed “IBM” for Iron Bob Maheu), hire and train a Mafia assassination team to get Castro. The team of a dozen or so includes John Roselli and Jimmy (The Weasel) Prattiano, expert Mafia hitmen, assisted by CIA Hunt and McCord and others. This was reported recently by Jack Anderson, who gets a lot of his “tips” from his friend, Frank (Fiorini) Sturgis–also on the Castro assassination team. The team tries five times to kill Castro with everything from long-range rifles to apple pie with sodium morphate in it. Castro survives. 1963: Members of the Castro assassination team arrested at Lake Pontechartrain, La. by Bobby Kennedy’s justice boys. Angered, Onassis stops trying to kill Castro. He changes target and goes for the head: JFK, who, according to Onassis, “welched” on a Mafia deal. JFK sets up “Group of 40” to fight Onassis. August 1963: Two murders had to occur before the murder of JFK, or people who would understand the situation and might squawk: Senator Estes Kefauver; whose crimes commission investigations had uncovered the 1932 deal between Onassis, Kennedy, Eugene Meyer, Lansky, Roosevelt, et al. Kefauver planned a speech on the senate floor denouncing Mafia operations; instead, he ate a piece of apple pie laced with sodium morphate (used in rat poison), and had a sodium-morphate-induced “heart attack” on the Senate floor. Phillip Graham: Editor of the Washington Post. Phillip had married Katherine Meyer, Eugene Meyer’s daughter, who had inherited the Washington Post and allied media empire. Graham put together the Kennedy-Johnson ticket and was Kennedy’s friend in the struggle with Onassis. According to Gemstone, Katherine Meyer Graham bribed some psychiatrists to certify that Phil was insane. He was allowed out of the nuthouse for the weekend and died of a shotgun wound in the head in the Graham home in Washington; death ruled “suicide”. November 1, 1963: The hit on JFK was supposed to take place in true Mafia style: a triple execution, together with Diem and Nhu in Vietnam. Diem and Nhu got theirs, as scheduled. Onassis had invited Jackie for a cruise on the Christina, where she was when JFK got tipped off that big “O” planned to wipe him out. JFK called Jackie on the yacht, from the White House, hysterical: “Get off that yacht if you have to swim”‘ and cancelled his appearance at a football stadium in Chicago, where this CIA-Mafia assassination team was poised for the kill. Jackie stayed on board, descended the gangplank a few days later on Onassis’s arm, in Turkey, to impress the Bey, Mustapha. Madame Nhu, in the U.S. bitterly remarked whatever has happened in Vietnam. One of the assassination teams was picked up in Chicago with a rifle and quickly released by the police. Three weeks later the Mafia’s alternate and carefully arranged execution plan went into effect: JFK was assassinated in Dallas. A witness who recognised pictures of some of the people arrested in Dealey Plaza as having been in Chicago three weeks earlier told Black Panthers Hampton and Clark. The JFK murder: Onassis-Hughes’ man Robert Maheu reassigned the Mafia-CIA Castro assassination team to the murder of JFK adding Eugene Brading a third Mafia hitman from the Denver Mafia Amaldones “family”. Two months earlier Brading on parole after a series of crimes applied for a new driver’s license explaining to the California DMV that he had decided to change his name to Jim Brading. Brading got his California parole the first time to look things over and the second time when JFK was scheduled for his Dallas trip. Lee Harvey Oswald CIA with carefully planned links to both the ultra right and to the Communists was designated as the patsy. He was supposed to shoot Governor Connally and he did. Each of the four shooters, Oswald, Brading, Frattiano and Roselli had a timer and a back up man. Back up men were supposed to pick up the spent shells and get rid of the guns. Timers would give the signal to shoot. Hunt and McCord were there to help. Sturgis was in Miami. Frattiano shot from a second story window in the Dal-Tex building across the street from the Texas School Book Depository. He apparently used a handgun-he is an excellent shot with a pistol. Frattiano and his back-up man were “arrested”, driven away from the Dal-Tex building in a police car and released (without being booked). The Dallas police office is in the Dal-Tex building. Roselli shot Kennedy once hitting the right side of his head and blowing his brains out with a rifle from behind a fence in the grassy knoll area. Roselli and his timer went down a manhole behind the fence and followed the sewer line away from Dealey Plaza. The third point of the triangulated ambush was supplied by Eugene Brading shooting from Kennedy’s left fram a small pagoda at Dealy Plaza across the street from the grassy knoll. (Brading missed because Roselli’s and Frattiano shot had just hit Kennedy in the head from the right and the rear nearly simultaneously). Brading’s shot hit the curb and ricocheted off. Brading was photographed on the scene stuffing his gun under his coat. He wore a big leather hat, its hatband marked with large conspicuous X’s. (Police had been instructed to let anyone with an X-marked hatband through the police lines. Some may have been told they were Secret Service). After his shot, Brading ditched his gun with his back-up man and walked up the street toward the Dal-Tex building. Sheriff rushed up to Brading, assuming he was “Secret Service” and told him he had just seen a man come out of the Book Depository and jumped into a station wagon. Brading was uninterested. Brading walked into the Dal-Tex building to “make a phone call”. There he was arrested by another deputy sheriff, showed his “Jim Braden” driver’s license and was released without being booked. Oswald shot Connally twice from the Texas School Book Depository. He split from the front door. His back-up man was supposed to take the rifle out of the building (or so Oswald thought); instead he “hid” it behind some boxes, where it would be found later. Three men dressed as tramps picked up the spent shells from Dealey Plaza. One was Howard Hunt. Then they drifted over to an empty boxcar sitting on the railway spur behind the grassey knoll area, and waited. A Dallas police officer ordered two Dallas cops to “go over to the boxcar and pick up the tramps”. The three ‘tramps’ paraded around Dealey Plaza to the Police Department in the Dal-Tex Building. They were held there until the alarm went out to pick up Oswald; then they were released, without being booked. In all, ten men were arrested immediately after the shooting; all were released soon after; none were booked; not a word about their existance is mentioned in the Warren Report. Regarding Lee Harvey Oswald: Officer Tippitt was dispatched in his police radio car to the Oak Cliff Section, where Oswald had rented a room. Tippett may have met Oswald on the street. He may have been supposed to kill Oswald, but something went wrong. Tippett was shot by two men using revolvers. The “witness”, Domingo Benavides, who used Tippitt’s police car radio to report “we’ve had a shooting here”, may have been one of the men who shot him. (A Domingo Benavides” appears in connection with the Martin Luther King shooting also.) Oswald went to the movies. A “shoe store manager” told the theatre cashier that a suspicious looking man had sneaked in without paying. Fifteen assorted cops and FBI charged out to the movie theatre to look for the guy who had sneaked in. Oswald had a pistol that wouldn’t fire. It may have been anticipated that the police would shoot the “cop-killer” for “resisting arrest”. But since that didn’t happen, the Dallas police brought Oswald out for small- time Mafia Jack Ruby to kill two days later. Brading stayed at the Teamster-Mafia-Hoffa-financed “Cuban Hotel” in Dallas. Ruby had gone to the Cabana the night before the murder, says the Warren Report. The rest, as they say, is history. Onassis was so confident of his control over police, media, FBI, CIA, Secret Service and the U.S. Judicial System that he had JFK murdered before the eyes of the entire nation; then systematically bought off, killed off, or frightened off all witnesses and had the evidence destroyed; then put a 75 year seal of secrecy over the entire matter. Cover up participants included among many: Gerald Ford on the Warren Commision (a Nixon recommendation): CIA attorney Leon Jaworski, of the CIA front Anderson Foundation, representing Texas before the Commission to see that the fair name of Texas was not besmirched by the investigation; CIA-Dallas Chief John McCone, his assistant; Richard Helms; and a passle of police, FBI, news media, etc. WHERE ARE THEY NOW? Johnny Roselli received part of his pay off for the head shot on JFK in the form of a $250,000 “finder’s fee for bringing “Hughes” (Onassis) to Las Vegas in 1967. Jimmy Frattiano’s pay-off included $109,000 in “non-repayable loans”, from the S.F. National Bank (President: Joe Alioto). Credit authorization for the series of loans from 1961 to 1965, came from Joe Alioto and a high Teamster official. Dun and Bradstreet noted this transaction in amazement, listing how Frattiano could explain so much “credit” as his only known title (listed in D&B) was “Mafia-Executioner”. Frattiano went around for years bragging about it: “Hi there, I’m Jimmy Frattiano, Mafia Executioner….” A bank V.P. told the whole story to the California Crime Commission, where Al Harris, who later shot off his mouth a little too much–“Heart attacked”. When last seen March, 1975, Frattiano was testifying before a S.F. Grand Jury in regard to his participation, with East Coast Mafia Tony Romane, in the Sunol Golf Course swindle (which cost S.F. somewhere between $100,000 in “non-repayable loans” to start a trucking company in the Imperial Valley, where he engaged in a lot more swindling–involving U.S. Government member explained, “The Mafia is doing business directly with the U.S. Government now”. Brading was questioned by the FBI two months after his arrest and released in Dallas as part of the Warren Commission’s determination to “leave no stone unturned” in its quest for the truth about the JKF assassination. In spite of the fact that Brading was a known criminal with an arrest record dating back about twenty years, the FBI reported that Brading knew nothing whatsoever about the assassination. Brading became a charter member of the La Costa Country Club, Mafia heaven down near San Clemente. He also became a runner for the skim money from the Onassis “Hughes” Las Vegas casinos to Onassis’ Swiss Banks. GERALD FORD; of the Warren Commission went on to become President by appointment of Nixon, then in danger of even further and more serious exposure–from which position of trust Ford pardoned Nixon one month later, for “any and all crimes he may have committed.” That covers quite a lot but Ford is good at covering things up. McCONE; the head of CIA-Dallas, went on to become a member of the ITT Board of Directors sitting right next to Francis L. Dale, the head of CREEP. RICHARD HELMS; McCone’s assistant at Dallas, ultimately has been rewarded with the post of CIA Director. LEON JOWARSKI; CIA Attorney, became the Watergate Prosecuter, replacing Cox, who was getting too warm. Jowarski turned in a startling performance in our “government-as-theatre” the honest, conscientious investigator who “uncovered” not a bit more than he had to and managed to steer everybody away from the underlying truth. Dr. “RED” DUKE; the man who dug two bullets out of Connelly and saved his life was shipped off to a hospital in Afghanistan by a grateful CIA. JIM GARRISON; New Orleans D.A. who tried to get Eugene Brading out of L.A. (but used one of Brading’s other aliases, Eugene Bradley, by mistake), had his witnesses shot out from under him, and was framed on charges of bribery and extortion. FBI officers “confiscated” photos of Brading taken on the scene, etc. After JKF’s death, Onassis quickly established control over Lyndon Johnson through fear. On the trip back to Washington, Johnson was warned by radio relayed from an air force base; “There was no conspiracy, Oswald was a lone nut assassin. Get it Lyndon? Otherwise, Air Force might have unfortunate accident on flight back to Washington.” Onassis filled all important government posts with his own men. All government agencies became means to accomplish an end: rifle the American Treasury, steal as much as possible, keep the people confused and disorganized and leaderless; persuade world domination. JFK’s original “Group of 40” was turned over to Rockefeller and his man, Kissinger, so that they could more effectively take over South America (Onassis was one of the first to console Jackie when she got back from Dallas with JFK’s body.) Silva, a S.F. private detective hired by Angelina Alioto to get the goods on philandering Joe, followed Joe Alioto to Vacaville, to the Nut Tree Restaurant, where Joe held a private meeting with other Mafioso to arrange the details of the JFK assassination pay off to Frattiano. 1967: Onassis has always enjoyed the fast piles of money to be made through gambling (in Manaco, in the 50’s and in Cuba under Battista). Onassis took over Las Vegas in 1967, via the “Hughes” cover. U.S. Governmet officials explained that it was alright because “at least Hughes isn’t the Mafia.” Mafia Joe Alioto had Presidential ambitions, shored up by his participation in the Dallas pay-off. Everyone who helped kill JKF got a piece of the U.S. pie. But J. Edgar Hoover, FBI head, blew his cover by releasing some of the raw FBI files on Alioto at the Democratic National Convention. Joe was out of the running for V.P. and Humphrey had to settle for Muskie. Humphry planned to come to S.F. for a final pre-election rally, sparked by Joe Alioto. Roberts threatened to blow the hit-run story plus its Mafia ramifications open if Humphrey came to S.F. Humphrey didn’t come; Humphrey lost in San Francisco, California and the election. October 1968: Jackie Kennedy was now “free” to marry Onassis. An old Mafia rule: if someone welches on a deal, kill him and take his gun and his girl: in this case, Jackie and the Pentagon. July, 1969: Mary Jo Kopechne, devoted JFK girl, and later one of Bobby’s trusted aides, was in charge of packing up his files after his assassination in L.A. She read too much, learned about the Kennedy Mafia involvement and other things. She said to friends: “This isn’t Camelot, this is murder.” She was an idealistic American Catholic. She didn’t like murdering hypocrites. She died trying to get off Chappaquiddick Island, where she had overheard (alonf with everyone else in the cottage) Teddy Kennedy’s end of the D.H. Lawrence cottage telephone calls from John Tunney and to Joe Alioto, and Democrat bigwigs Swig, Shorenstein, Schumann and Bechtel. Teddy’s good friend John Tunney called to complain that Alioto’s friend Cycil Magnin and others had tried to bribe Jess Unruh to switch from the Governor’s race to run for the Senate for the seat John Tunney wanted so that Alioto would have an easier run for Governor. Teddy called Alioto, who told him to go to hell; then Teddy called the rest to arrange for yet another Mafia murder. Mary Jo, up to there with Mafia ran screaming out of the cottage on her way to Nader. Drunken Teddy offered to drive her to the ferry. Trying to get away from curious Sheriff look, Teddy sped offf toward the Bridge, busted Mary Jo’s nose when she tried to grab his arm from the back seat, and bailed out of the car as it went off the bridge. Mary Jo with a busted nose, breathed in an air bubble in the car for more than two hours waiting for help, while Teddy, assuming she was dead, to set up an alibi. Mary Jo finally suffocated in the air bubble, diluted with carbon dioxide. It took her 2 hours and 37 minutes to suffocate while Teddy called Jackie and Onassis on the Christina. Teddy also clled Katherine Meyer Graham, lawyers, etc. Jackie called the Pope on Teddy’s behalf, who assigned Cardinal Cushing to help. The next morning, the first person Teddy tried to call after deciding he’d have to take the rap himself was a lawyer, Burke Marshall, Onassis’s friend in the U.S. Liberty shipps deal back in the forties and also the designated custodian for JFK’s brains after Dallas (the brains have since disappeared). Cover-up of the Chappaquiddick murder required the help of Massachusetts Highway Patrol, which “confiscated” the plates from Teddy’s car after it was fished out of the pond: the Massachusetts Legislature, which changed a 150 year old law requiring an autopsy (which would have revealed the suffocation and broken nose); Coroner Mills, who let Kennedy’s aide K. Dun Grifford, supply him with a death certificate, already prepared for Hill’s signature, listing cause of death as drowning: Police Chief Arenas: Cardinal Cushing’s priest who appeared before the Kopechne’s “direct from God” with personal instructions from Him that Mary Jo was not to be disturbed; a Pennsylvania mortuary where Mary Jo’s broken nose was patched up, East and West phone companies, whiched clamped maximum security on the records of calls to and from the cottage. S.F. Police Chief Cahill was reassigned to a new job; Security Chief for Pacific Telephone. The U.S. Senate, who never said a word about Teddy’s (required equipment) plug- in phone; the judge who presided over the mock hearing; James Feston, editor of Martha’s vineyard’s only newspaper, who never heard a word about Teddy’s phone at the cottage, though residents called in to tell the newspaper; the New York Times, Washington Post, etc. John Tunney’s sister, Joan, heard her brother’s end of the phone call, made from her house in Tiburon, to the Chappaquiddick cottage. The next day, after Mary Jo died, Joan ran away to Norway, where she was kidnapped by Mafia hoods Mari and Adamo. They locked her up in a Marseille heroin factory. Joan’s husband complained so she chopped his head off with an ax, and was subsequently locked up in a nuthouse belonging to the Marquess of Blandford, then Tina Livanos Onassis’ husband. Mari and Adamo got pressed into scrap metal in a New Jersey auto junkyard. In the panic of trying to cover up Teddy’s quilt at Chappaquiddick, many things came unglued. The JFK murder threatened to creep out of the woodwork again; Black Panthers Hampton and Clark were murdered (the Chicago cops fired over Attorney Charles Garry’s because of what they knew about the JFK murder squad’s presence at Chicago on November 1,1963. September 1969: “Gemstones”, with histories, had been released around the globe for several years. In 1969, Roberts gave a Gemstone with history to Mack, head of California CREEP, for Nixon, with the proposition: the Presidency in return for wiping out the Mafia. The “history” included Teddy’s phone calls to and from the Lawrence Cottage on Chappaquiddick billed to Teddy’s home phone in Havannisport. Nixon being Mafia himself, wasn’t interested; but kept the information to use on Teddy whenever it seemed advantageous. May 4, 1970: Charlotte Ford Niarchos called her ex-husband Stavros, worried about the Ford Foundation’s involvement in the Chappaquiddick cover-up. Eugenie Livanos Niarchos, in bed with her husband, overheard the conversation. Stavros was forced to beat her to death; he ruptured her spleen and broke the cartilage in her throat. Cause of death was listed as “overdose of barbituates,” though autopsy showed these injuries. NOTE: L. Wayne Rector was hired around 1955 by the Carl Byoir P.R. Agency (Hughes L.A. P.R. firm) to act as Hughes double. In 1957 when Onassis grabbed Hughes, Rector continued to act as his stand-in. Rector was the Hughes surrogate in Las Vegas; Robert Maheu actually ran the show; Maheu got his orders from Onassis; the six “nursemaids”, called the “Mormon Mafia”, kept Rector sealed off from prying eyes. June 17, 1969: Bobby Kennedy knew who killed his brother; he wrote about it in his unpublished book, The Enemy Within. When he foolishly tried to run for President, Onassis had offed, usinf=g a sophisticated new technique hypnotized Sirhan, Sirhan shooting from the front “security guard” (from Lockheed Aircraft). Thane Cesar shooting from two or three inches away from Bobby’s head from the rear. Sirhan’s shots all missed. Evelle Younger, then the L.A. District Attorney, coverer it all up including the squawks of the L.A. Coroner Thomas Noguchi. Younger was rewarded with the post of California Attorney General later. His son, Eric Younger, got a second generation Mafia reward; a judge-ship at age 30. (See Ted Charach, L.A. author and director, The Second Gun, a documentary film on the RFK murder, bought and suppressed by Warner Brothers for more details). After Bobby’s death, Teddy knew who did it. He ran to Onassis afraid for his life and swore eternal obedience. In return, Onassis granted him his life and said he could be President, too, just like his big brother, if he would behave himself and folow orders. September 16, 1968: Hit and run accident on Robert’s car parked in front of the Russian consulate on S.F. who routinely takes pictures of everything that goes on in front of the consulate. Their photos showed the license plate of the hit and run car UKT-264, on a blue Cadillac belonging to Angela Alioto, Joe’s daughter, being driven by Tom Alioto, Joe’s son whose driving license had been revoked. His license and the cars license were both fraudulent. To cover up the hit and run circumstances, B.F. MPJ’s from the Presido quickly staged a few more hit and runs on the same corner all duly filmed by the Russians. Katheryn Hollister, the Alioto family nurse was “persuaded” to take the rap for the hit and run. Roberts threatened to spill the whole story in court with photos. Next evening Brading and Frattiano showed up in the Balck Magic Bar, Brading wearing his x-marked hat from Dallas to see whether Roberts recognized it, how much he knew, etc. A S.F. MP from the Presidio piped up from the end of the bar, “Iheard they let everyone with an X-marked hatband through the police lines at Dallas”. Cover up support for Alioto in the hit and run was completed. End of 1970: Howard Hughes presence on earth no longer required. His handwritting could be duplicated by a computer. His biography all the known facts about his life had been compiled and a computerized biography issued to top Hughes executives. His double – Rector – had been doing “Hughes” for years. And Hughes was ill. Clifford Irving, author of Hoax, about an art forger, became interested in “Hughes”. Living on Ibazza, he heard the Mediterranean gossip that “Hughes” was a hoax, too. He went to “Hughes” so-called “Mormon Mafia”, the six nursemaids for information. One of them, Merryman perhaps, tired of the game, gave Irving the computerized Hughes biography and from it Irving wrote his “autobiography”. Hughes’ death was expected shortly. Preparations were being made so that it would not interfere with the orderly continuation of his empire. Irving wrote his book and the publishers anounced it. Onassis knew someone had given Irving the information. He thought it was Maheu and fired him in November, 1970. On Thanksgiving Eve, 1970, in the middle of the night “Hughes” (Rector made a well-publicized “secret departure” from Las Vegas to the Bahamas). December 1970: Onassis discovered his mistake and had Merryman killed. Robert Maheu accidentally deprived of his half-million dollars annual salary, sued “Hughes” for millions mentioning “Hughes” game plan for the purchase of Presidents, governors, Senators, judges, etc. Onassis paid off cheap at the price to maintain his custodianship of “American democracy” and the “free world” and keep from hanging for multiple murders. The “Hughes” Mormon Mafia party, plus Rector, fled around the world from the Bahamas where they murdered an uncooperative Governor and Police Chief, to Nicaragua, where they shot the U.S. Ambassador between the eyes for noticing that there wasn’t really any Hughes; and then to Canada, where Mormon Mafia nursemaid Sckersley looted a goodly sum in a swindle of the Canadian Stock Exchange; and on to London to Rothschild’s Inn of the Park. April 18, 1971: Howard Hughes, a human vegetable as the result of serious brain damage during his 1957 hustle, plus fourteen years of heroin, grew sicker and sicker. A final overdose of heroin did him in. His coffin was lowered into the sea from a rocky headland off the coast of Skorpios. Present at the funeral were: Jackie Kennedy Onassis, Teddy Kennedy, Francis L. Dale, Director of CREEP, and a South Vietnamese cardinal named Thue. Onassis allowed some pictures to be taken from a distance; he himself did not appear. The pictures were published in Midnight, a Canadian tabloid. Albanian frogmen, tipped off, were waiting under the water. They siezed the coffin and took the corpse off to Yugoslavia, then to China, Russia and then perhaps to Boston in a foot locker. The corpse’s dental work was compared to Hughes very own dental records and they matched. News of Hughes death, the U.S. take-over by Onassis and the facts surrounding the murders of JFK, RFK, Martin Luther King, Mary Jo Kopechne, and many more and the subsequent cover-ups (involving still more murders) had been circulating around the globe for several years. Any country with this information can blackmail the U.S> Mafia government, which has no choice but to pay up. The alternative is to be exposed as a bunch of treasonous murderers. This is why China-hating, red-hating Nixon was forced to recognize China (which he now claims as his greatest accomplishment). And this is also why the USSR walks off with such good deals in U.S. loans, grains and whatever elst it wants. All they have to do is mention those magic words – ‘Hughes, JFK, RFK, MLK, Mary Jo – and the U.S. Mafia government crawls into a hole. Information once leaked can’t be unleaked. The only way to end the delema is through a nuclear war and that wouldn’t be one-sided. The other way would be to throw the Mafia out of the United States. Starting at the top with Ford, Rockefeller and Kissinger. Super- patriots please note: No one, not all of the radicals and subversives hounded by the US domestic intelligence put together has done one fraction of the damage done to US economy, morality, power and prestige as by the theives at the top. On the day that Hughes was buried, Clifford Irving’s wife presented a publisher’s check mode out to “H. Hughes” to Onassis’ Swiss Bank for payment. Onassis paid off cheaply at the price. Gemstone papers rolling around the world here and abroad kept the situation hot. Everyone was nervous. Rockefeller gave Kissinger $50,000 for Carlson and Brisson to write their ‘expose’ The Alioto Mafia Web for LOOK magazine. Their mission: find out everything that was public record about Alioto’s connection with the JFK murder. There was a pay-off to Frattiano, listed in D&B. They were to explain it any way that didn’t lead back to Dallas. The idea was to get Alioto to quietly go away but still keep the lid on everything. May, 1971: Tina Livanos Onassis Blandford married Starvon Niarchos, her former brother-in-law until he killed her sister, Eugenie. May, 1971: “Folk Hero” Daniel Ellsberg, a well-known hawk from the Rand Corporation, who had designed the missile ring around the “Iron Curtain” countries (how many missiles to aim at which cities) was told to release the faked-up “Pentagon Papers” to help distract people from Hughes, JFK, RFK, MLK etc. The papers were carefully designed by Ellsberg and his boss, Rand Chief and new World Bank Chief Bob (Body Count) McNamara, to make the Vietnamese War look like “just one of those incredibly dumb mistakes”. This helped to cover up the real purpose of the war: continued control, for Onassis and his friends of the Golden Triangle dope trade: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; and for Onassis and the oil people of Eastern oil sources, to say nothing of control over huge Federal sums, which could be siphoned off in profitable arms contracts, or conveniently ‘disappear’ in the war effort. McNamara’s ‘World Bank’ handing-out of American money to ‘starving nations’ actually set up huge private bank accounts for various dictators in the Onassis-controlled Swiss bank. The money could be used as needed to support and extend Mafia operations. Example: $8 billion in World Bank funds for ‘starving Ethiopians’ wound up in Emperor Haile Selassie’s personal accounts in the Swiss bank. This would make him the richest individual in the world, but other dictators have Swiss bank accounts too. Perhaps they are even larger. The money drained from America and other captive Mafia nations feeds a greed that can never be satisfied. Rand Corp., one of our major ‘think tanks’ has another goody in store for the public: “Project Star” – Rand’s cover-up fallback version of the JFK murder held in reserve should public restlessness over the Warren Commission Report cover-up ever threaten to get out of hand. That ought to confuse the people for at least another twelve years, and by that time most of us will be dead anyway…. NOTE IN PASSING: The dope trade routes are: Golden Triangle to Taiwan to San Francisco. Heroin from the Golden Triangle was sometimes smuggled into San Francisco in the bodies of American GIs who died in battle in Vietnam. One body can hold up to 40 pounds of heroin, crammed in where the guts would be. Some dope gets pressed into dinner plates and painted with pretty patterns. One dope bust in S.F. alone yielded $6 billion in herion ‘china plates’ – the largest dope bust in history. It was quickly and completely hushed up by the S.F.-Mafia press. The dope sat in the S.F.P.D. for a while, then was removed by FBI men and probably sent on its way to American veins. All this dope processing and shipping is controlled and supervised by the Mafia for the Mafia. Dope arrests and murders are aimed at independant pushers and maverick peddlers and smugglers who are competing with or holding out on the Mafia. While Nixon was conducting his noisy campaign against dope smuggling accross the Mexican border, his dope officer in charge of protecting the Mafia dope trade was E. Howard Hunt! Lots of heroin gets processed in a Pepsi Cola factory in Laos. So far, it hasn’t produced a single bottle of Pepsi Cola. Some dope gets processed in heroin factories in Marseilles. (See the French Connection). Still more dope comes from South America — cocaine and new heroin. US aid went to build a highway accross Paraguay. Useless for the natives who have no cars. (They use it for sunbathing in the day), it becomes the longest landing strip in the world and serves airplanes loaded with cocaine. It is financed by US tax money for the benifit of the international Mafia dope pushers. And then there is opium from Turkish morphine. This was the starting point of Onassis’ fortune. In case one is still wondering whether the Mafia can actually get away with such things, consider the benifits derived from controlling the stock market, the courts, the police, etc. In one swindle alone; the 1070 acquisition by “Hughes” of “Air West”, which involved swindling Air West stockholders of $45 million. Recently indicted for this swindle by the SEC in a civil suit were “Howard Hughes” and Jimmy (the Greek) Snyder, not usually associated with the Hughes crowd, and others. June 1971: Ney York Times began publishing the Pentagon Papers, Rand Corp’s prepared cover-up of the real reasons for the Vietnamese war. Nixon had gotten a copy of the first Gemstone Papers circulated in the U.S. back in 1969. He was now wondering how much information Democratic Chairman Larry O’Brien had about Hughes, Onassis, JFK, RFK, etc. and more specifically how much of the dirt the Democrats planned to use. Nixon set up the “plumbers unit” to stop security leaks, investigate other security matters. Erlichman, Krogh, Liddy, Hunt, Young, etc. Hunt as “White House consultant” supposedly worked for the Mullen Corp. a CIA cover. Mullen’s head client was “Howard Hughes” Robert Bennett was the head of the Mullen Corp. June 28, 1971: Ellsberg indicted for leaking the Pentagon Papers. September 3, 1971: The Watergate team broke into Ellsberg’s docter’s (Fielding’s) office to get Ellsberg’s psychiatric records. Team members CIA Hunt and Liddy, Cuban “Freedom fighters” De Denio, Martinez, Bernard Barker. All except Liddy had worked together back at the Bay of Pigs. Question: Why the intense battle between Mafia forces? Answer: While Onassis was the recognized crowned head of the Mafia, intense, no holdsbarred scuffling for the lucrative second spot (control of U.S. Presidency, government and so on) was permissible and encouraged under the Mafia code of rules. The only stipulation: Outsiders mustn’t know about it. “Hughes” contributed liberally and equally to both Democratic and Republican parties for the 1972 election. The winner would get even more for “Hughes”. September 23, 1971: E. Howard Hunt spliced up the phoney cables implicating JFK’s administration in the Diem assassination. October, 1971: Look magazine apologized to Alioto for their Alioto Mafia Web article and folded. The sticking point: they couldn’t prove Alioto’s Mafia Nut Tree meeting back in 1963 re: the JKF murder. November, 1971: Alioto re-elected S.F. mayor. December, 1971: Robets applied for a “Gemstone” visi from the Russian Consulate on a tapped phone. Phone was tapped by Hal Lipset, S.F. private investigator, who worked for Katherine Meyer Graham and others, and routinely monitored Consulate phone calls. January, 1972: The Watergate team showed up at the San Francisco Drift Inn, a CIA-FBI safe-house hangout bar, where Roberts conducted a nightly Gemstone rap for the benefit of any CIA or FBI or anyone who wandered in for a beer. James McCord, Martinez, Bernard Barker, Garcia and Frank Sturgis showed up – along with a San Francisco dentist named Fuller. James McCord remarked: “Sand and Arab oil with hydrogen heat makes glass brick threat of war to Arab nations”. The event, like the other nightly raps, was taped by the Drift Inn bartender, Al Stern, who was paid to do so by his old friend, Katherine Graham, but told his other friend, Roberts, about it. The bar was also wired for sound by Arabs, Russians and Chinese. January 27, 1972: Liddy and Dean met in Mitchell’s office, with Liddy’s charts for his $1 million “plan” for spying, kidnapping, etc. The plans included breaking into Hank Greenspun’s Las Vegas office safe, in hopes of recovering Greenspun’s file: on the Hughes kidnapping and Onassis’s Vegas operations, which Greenspun had successfully used to blackmail Onassis out of $4 million or so. A “Hughes” get away plane would stand by to take the White House burglers to Mexico. February, 1972: Liddy and Hunt traveled around a lot, using “Hughes Tool Co.” calling cards, and aliases from Hunt’s spy novels. Liddy, Hunt and other Watergaters dropped by for a beer at the Drift Inn, where they were photographed on bar stools for Katherine Graham. These photos were later used in the Washington Post, when Liddy, Hunt and others were arrested at Watergate because CIA men like Liddy and Hunt aren’t usually photographed. Roberts quoted to Liddy “the Chinese stock market in cars” the price on Onassis’s head by the ear in retaliation for a few things Onassis had done; on Wayne Rector, the Hughes double; Eugene Wyman, California Democratic Party Chairman and Mafia JFK pay off bagman; and on Lyndon Johnson “four bodies twisting in the breeze”. Robert’s quoting prices to Liddy at the Drift Inn made their deaths a mortal cinch. Liddy’s like that and that’s why the murdering slob was picked by the Mafia. “Gemstones” rolling around the Drift Inn in February inspired Liddy’s Gemstone plan that became Watergate. February, 1972: Francis L. Dale, head of CREEP and ITT Board of Directors member, pushed Magruder to push Liddy into Watergate. In a Mafia-style effort to shut Roberts up, his father was murdered by “plumbers” team members Liz Dale (Francic L. Dale’s ex-wife), Martinez, Gonzalez, Barker; in Hahnemann’s hospital, S.F. where Mr. Roberts had been take after swallowing a sodium morphate “pill” slipped into his medicine bottle at home by Watergate locksmith (Miami’s “Missing Link” locksmith shop) Gonzales. The pill didn’t kill him. He had a weak digestion and vomitted enough of the sodium morphate up (it burned his lips and tongue on the way out) but he had emphyxema and went to the hospital. In the hospital, “nurse” Liz Dale and “doctor” Martinez assisted him to sniff a quadruple-strength can of aerosol medicine enough to kill him the next day. The day before, Tisseront, head of the College of Cardinals at the Vatican, was pushed out of a Vatican window. Tisseront had followed the career of the present Pope, Montini (whose mother was Jewish). Montini sodium-morphate murdered Pope Pius XI; was banished from Rome for it by Pius XII; became Pope in 1963. Tisseront wrote it all down; called the Pope “The Deputy of Christ at Auschwitz”, and the fulfillment of the Fatima 3 Phophecy: that “The anti-Christ shall rise to become the head of the Church”. Tisseront also wrote about all the suppressed secrets of the Roman Catholic Church: i.e. that Jesus Christ was an Arab, born April 16, 6 B.C. at the rare conjunction of Saturn and Jupiter. Arab (Persian) astronomers (the Magi) came to Bethlehem to look for their king, an Arab baby and found him in a stable, because the Jews wouldn’t let Arabs Joseph and Mary into their nice clean inns, even then. When Jesus overturned the tables of the money lenders at the Temple, the Jews had the Romans nail him to a cross. He died on the cross when the Roman soldiers stuck a spear in his side, pulled out his liver, and ate it. Tacitus, the Roman historian, described it all in a chunk of history deleted by the Church. Nero burned Rome but that didn’t stop the spreading of Moses’ teachings by the early Christians, (Arabs). So the Romans decided to adopt the religion, clean it up, make Christ a Jew and Mary a virgin, and work out a chruch state deal to fool the people in the name of God and country that had been operating ever since. Around 311 A.D. at the Council of Nicasa the Christian Orthodoxy was established; a dissenting bishop had his hands chopped off; another bishop was assigned to round up all the old copies of the Bible and destroy them in favor of the “revised” de-Arabized version. Cleaned up Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were declared “it”, the other Gospels were declared Apocryphal, and heretical. Roman Emperor Constantine became the first “Christian” emperor. Later during the holy crusades the Bible was again rewritten to include Jesus’ warning against the “yellow race”. “27 Gemstones, with histories, to 27 countries brought Red China into the U.N. and threw Taiwan out. April, 1972: Money pours into CREEP: “Gulf Resources and Chemicals Corp., Houston, Texas” contributes $100,000; illegal laundered through Mexico, comes back through Liedtke of Pennzoil Corp., Houston. Robert Vesco gives Maurice Stans $200,000 “campaign contributions”, etc. Liddy gives McCord $76,000. McCord buys $58,000 worth of bugging equipment, cameras, etc. May, 1972: J. Edgar Hoover had the Gemstone File: threatened to expose Dallas-JFK in an “anonymous” book, The Texas Mafia. Instead, someone put sodium morphate in his apple pie. The corpse was carted away from his home in the back seat of a V.W.–and his files were “burned” but some of them got away. May 28, 1972: First break-in at Watergate: McCord, Barker, Martinez, Garcia, Gonzales, Sturgis, DeDiego and Pico stood guard outside. Hunt and Liddy directed the operation from a (safe?) distance –across the street. The object was to check on Onassis’s two men to Democratic Party HQ: Larry O’Brien and Spencer Oliver. (O’Brien chief “PR: client had been “Hughes”; Oliver’s father worked for Onassis). McCord wire-tapped their phones. But!!!! little did McCord know that the plumbers were being observed by Hal Lipset, Katherine Graham’s S.F. detective who had followed two of the plumbers from Liz Dale’s side in S.F. to Watergate. Lipset “watched in amazement” as the Plumbers broke in and bugged the phones: then reported back to his boss Katherine Graham. Lipset and Graham set the trap for the Watergaters when they returned to remove their bugs and equipment. “The style of the old Holy Roman Empire: a slave nation paying tribute to the conqueror.” October, 1973: Another “Holy War”–Israelis VS Arabs.. January, 1974: Joe Alioto grants Sunol Golf Course lease to Mafioso Komano, Frattiano, Nuniz, Madiros, Abe Chapman and Neil Neilson. Alioto sets up the Dallas murder squad in S.F. for more murders. January 26, 1974: “Hughes” extradition trial cancelled in Reno by “Alioto Mafia Web” Mafia Judge Thomson after Moses Lasky from Mafia Alioto’s California Crime Commission waves the forged “Howard Hughes” signature under his nose. Maheu “wins” his damage suit against “Hughes” his blackmail pay-off after discussing Hughes’ “Game Plan” for buying control of the U.S> by buying politicians: governors, judges, senators and presidents. February, 1974: Mafia Hearst’s daughter Patty “kidnapped” by Lipset’s SLA in a fake terrorist action. Martin Luther King’s mother was murdered by a black student, a self declared “Israelite”–“acting alone” who was escorted to the church by somebody– and who had a list of other mothers as targets. Next day the target Shirley Chisholm got the message and rushed to sign off the DNC suit against CREEP naming Francis L. Dale; she had been the last to hold out. April 4, 1974: Mary McCarthy, a writer who had been given a copy of the Gemstone file, said in an article in the New York Review of Books, that the key to the formation of Liddy’s Gemstone plan lay in the where-abouts and activities of the Plumbers between December, 1971 and February, 1972. Answer: They were in the Drift Inn, watching Gemstones rolling around on the bar top. August 6, 1974: Nixon and Ford signed a paper at the White House. It was an agreement: Ford could be President. Nixon got to burn his tapes and files and murder anyone he needed to cover it all up. August 7, 1974: Roberts passed information to Pavlov at the S.F. Russian Consulate which led directly to Nixon’s resignation the “more” journalism review’s story about Denny Walsh’s “Reopening of the Alioto Mafia Web story for the New York Times, killed in a panic”, plug a long taped discussion of who and what the Mafia is. Hal Lipset listened to the conversation in the bugged Consulate room, had the phone lines open to Rockefeller and Kissinger who listened too. Rockefeller sent Kissinger to the White House with Nixon’s marching orders: “Resign right now”. Nixon and Julie cried. But there was still some hope, if Nixon resigned immediately, of drawing the line somewhere–before it got to the King of the Mountain himself– Onassis. Nixon, on trial, would blurt out those names to save himself: Onassis, Dale, “Hughes”, even JFK. August 8, 1974: Nixon stepped down, and Ford stepped up: to keep the cover-up going. August 23, 1974: Frattiano in San Francisco, staying at the Sunol Golf Course. More murders scheduled RE: Gemstone cover-up. August 30, 1974: Ford hires Mafia lawer Becker to work out a pardon deal for Nixon, who might otherwise name Onassis, Graham, and Pope Martini to save himself. San Francisco Zebra Murders: A series of “random” killings, dubbed “Zebra murders” by the police because supposedly blacks were killing whites. The real target was Silva, the witness to Alioto’s Mafia Nut Tree meeting. Silva was shot to death in an alley. Careful Mafia planning went into this series, to kill several birds with one stone. 1.) Get witness Silva out of the way, without being too “obvious” about it. 2.) Spread fear of “black terrorists” and convince people that the police department needed more money and more repressive power. 3.) Blame and frame Black Muslims, knock off leaders of the opposition. September 7, 1974: Roberts made made an agreement with a friend, Harp, of Kish Realty, over a bugged phone. Harp was to buy a Gemstone with history for $500, the price of a trip to Canada for Roberts to check into the “Hughes” Mormon Mafia Canadian stock market swindle and other matters. But Harp was sodium-morphate poisoned before the deal could go through on this date. Note: Sodium morphate: a favorite Mafia poison for centuries. Smells like apple pie, and is sometimes served up in one, as to J. Edgar Hoover. Sometimes in a pill or capsule. Symptoms: lethergy, sleep, sometimes vomiting. Once ingested, there is a heart attack and no trace is left in the body. Proof is in the vomit which is usually not analysed. Not mentioned in your standard medical book on poisons, etc. It is a common ingredient in rat poison. September 8, 1974: Ford pardons Nixon for “all crimes committed” from June 20, 1969, (opps, make that January) through August, 1974. Gemstone papers still floating around the world. Gandhi talks about the U.S.’ bloody deeds. October, 1974: Ford drops “extradition” of Hughes from the Bahamas. Explanation: “We dropped it because we knew he wouldn’t come”. THAT’S FOR SURE. “Four documents; four bodies twisting slowly in the breeze”. Lyndon Johnson: Sodium morphate “heart attack” at his ranch on the Pedernales River. Among his last words: “You know fellows, it really was a conspiracy….” Alexander Onassis’s plane crash at the “1000 foot Walter Reuther Level”, via a fixed altimeter, at Athens Airport. Eugene Wyman: California Democratic Party Chairman and JFK assassinatin pay-off bagman: Heart attack. L. Wayne Rector, Hughes’ double: Killed at Rothchild’s Inn of the Park, London. “Started the Shattering of the Mafia Economy”. March 18, 1973: Roberts called Hal Lipset, discussing all these matters publicly over a tapped phone. Lipset reported to Dean, who had hired him away from Graham, after they figured out who had taped the door at Watergate. (Mitchell: Katie Graham’s liable to get caught in a wringer”). March 21, 1973: Nixon said that on this date, he “received new evidence on Watergate”. Lipset bragged on T.V. that he had been the one to bring new evidence to Nixon. Meanwhile, back at the Washington Post, Katherine Graham had been feeding Woodward and Bernstein information for their articles. May 10, 1973: The first witness at the Watergate hearing running down the names on the CREEP organizational chart, mentioned the name at the top: Francis L. Dale, Chairman. Dale was never mentioned again during the rest of the trial. July 9, 1973: Roberts had used Al Strom’s Drift Inn bar as an open lecture forum for any and all and Al Strom taped it, for his boss, Katherine Graham. But Al was fair and told Roberts he was doing it, for which he was murdered on this date. August 1973: Murder of Chile, by Group of 40: (Rockefeller and his man Kissinger), working with the CIA and $8 million. Allende’s Chile. Admiral Noel Gaylor, Navel Intelligence, told Roberts 1 1/2 years earlier that Chile would get it: Roberts warned the Chilean consul in advance: Allegria, now “teaching” at Stanford. ITT had now extracted $125 million payment for its Chilean plants, a good return for their $8 million. Mafia controlled Chile’s annual inflation rate has set a world’s record. March 19, 1973: Dean to Nixon, nervously: “There is a cancer growing on the Presidency”. October 3, 1974: The Watergate trial, the cover-up of the cover-up got underway, starting Montini’s Bon Veniste, Onassis’s Neal, Graham’s Jill Volner. In the White House, Mafia Mayors Alioto, Daley and Beame met with the truth squad Ford, Scott and Griffin and Mike Mansfield, in secret. October 10, 1974: Tina Livanos Onassis Blandford Niarchos, sodium morphate poisoned by hubby Stravos, puked, slept and died of “heart attack”. Losing his son Alexander, took all the fun out of killing for Onassis. Who was there left to inherit the world empire he had dreamed of handing over to his son? December, 1974: Brezhnev had scheduled a meeting with Sadat. The outcome wouldn’t help the U.S. no matter how many trips Henry made to the mid-East with clean socks and blank checks. A new U.S. “secret weapon” was apparently used, a tiny speck of metal, introduced somehow into Brezhnev’s lymph system. It lodged in the cluster of lymph nodes over his heart, and there it was coated with layers of, much as an oyster created a pearl around an irritating grain of sand. Brexhnev’s lymph system clogged up: he got the flu and the meeting with Sadat was cancelled. Russian doctors X-rayed him and found a hugh lump in his chest. Then they put him before a Kirlian camera and checked his aura for cancer. No cancer. Note: Kirlian photography is the latest Russian diagnostic tool. It reveals the presence of disease physical or moral (it also detects lies). Brezhnev’s lump had to be treated with radiation therapy: hence the rumors he had cancer> It took six weeks to clear up. March, 1975: Onassis died. The Mafia Organization regrouped itself. Prince Fisal watched his uncle, King Fisal, silently watch the shift of Mafia Power and couldn’t stand it anymore. He shot his uncle, the spiritual leader of 60,000,000 Moslems, who had played ball with Onassis all along. South Vietnam’s Thieu, dubious about which way the Mafia cooky would crumble, now that Onassis was dead, decided the time was right for him to split. He abandoned the war effort, cursed the U.S., and split for Taiwan, his plane so overloaded with gold bullion that he had to dump some of it overboard. March 15, 1975: Roberts got the “Brezhnev Flu” and spent 2 weeks at U.C. Hospital. Doctors there without the Kirlian photography diagnostic technique, assumed the softball sized lump over his heart was cancer. It wasn’t. April, 1975: The Cambodian domino was no fun at all – it fell right over. Premier Lon Nol fled to exile in a Hawaiian suburb. CIA chief Colby, in a fit of spite, leaked the stolen story of CIA Hughes Glomar Explorer’s raising of the drowned Russian sailors from their sunken nuclear submarine. Purpose: To bag the Russians and also to halt criticism of the CIA by pointing out how noble, brave and self-sacrificing they are in their efforts to save us. The Russians are funny about their dead. They bitterly resented Colby’s game. They quietly went through a massive navel “war game”, the rehearsal of a nuclear attack on the U.S. Which brings us almost to the present time. Ford, Kissinger and Rockefeller squat like toads on the corpse of America. By the time of the Bi-centenial the stink may be unbearable. Ford now plans a propoganda mode version of his book, “Portrait of an Assassin”, which will reiterate the exploded cock and bull notion that Oswald was JFK’s lone assassin. With singular inept misunderstanding of the times, he seems to think Americans will take his word for it and be re- assured in the face of those crackpot conspiracy theories. He doesn’t seem to realize that he will be reminding or informing Americans of his role on the infamous Warren Commission. I hope this outline will make individual Gemstone papers easier to understand. IF YOU FOUND THIS OUTLINE INTERESTING: – You won’t be reading it in the papers for quite some time. At present the only way to spread this information here in America is hand to hand. Your help is needed. Please make 1, 5, 10, 100 copies or whatever you can, and give them to friends or politicians, groups, media. This game is nearly up. Either the Mafia goes or AMERICA goes. End of verbatim transcript – July, 1986. —–END OF GEMSTONE FILE ————————————————

فیض

اک ذرا سوچنے دو

اس خیاباں میں

جو اس لحظہ بیاباں بھی نہیں

کون سی شاخ میں پھول آئے تھے سب سے پہلے

کون بے رنگ ہوئی رنگ و تعب سے پہلے

اور اب سے پہلے

کس گھڑی کون سے موسم میں یہاں

خون کا قحط پرا

گُل کی شہ رگ پہ کڑا

وقت پڑا

سوچنے دو

اک ذرا سوچنے دو

یہ بھرا شہر جو اب وادئ ویراں بھی نہیں

اس میں کس وقت کہاں

آگ لگی تھی پہلے

اس کے صف بستہ دریچوں میں سے کس میں اول

زہ ہوئی سرخ شعاعوں کی کماں

کس جگہ جوت جگی تھی پہلے

سوچنے دو

ہم سے اس دیس کا تم نام ونشاں پوچھتے ہو

جس کی تاریخ نہ جغرافیہ اب یاد آئے

اور یاد آئے تو محبوبِ گزشتہ کی طرح

روبرو آنے سے جی گھبرائے

ہاں مگر جیسے کوئی

ایسے محبوب یا محبوبہ کا دل رکھنے کو

آ نکلتا ہے کبھی رات بِتانے کے لئے

ہم اب اس عمر کو آ پہنچے ہیں جب ہم بھی یونہی

دل سے مل آتے ہیں بس رسم نبھانے کے لیے

دل کی کیا پوچھتے ہو

سوچنے دو

فیض احمد فیض
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شب و روزِ آشنائی مہ و سال تک نہ پہنچے
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزلملال، حال، خیال، خال، سوال، سال
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 13
کیے آرزو سے پیماں جو مآل تک نہ پہنچے
شب و روزِ آشنائی مہ و سال تک نہ پہنچے
وہ نظر بہم نہ پہنچی کہ محیطِ حسن کرتے
تری دید کے وسیلے خد و خال تک نہ پہنچے
وہی چشمہء بقا تھا جسے سب سراب سمجھے
وہی خواب معتبر تھے جو خیال تک نہ پہنچے
ترا لطف وجہِ تسکیں، نہ قرار شرحِ غم سے
کہ ہیں دل میں وہ گلے بھی جو ملال تک نہ پہنچے
کوئی یار جاں سے گزرا، کوئی ہوش سے نہ گزرا
یہ ندیم یک دو ساغر مرے حال تک نہ پہنچے
چلو فیض دل جلائیں کریں پھر سے عرضِ جاناں
وہ سخن جو لب تک آئے پہ سوال تک نہ پہنچے
فیض احمد فیض
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پھر دل کے آئینے سے لہو پھوٹنے لگا
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزلٹوٹنے، پھوٹنے
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 12
دیوارِ شب اور عکسِ رُخِ یار سامنے
پھر دل کے آئینے سے لہو پھوٹنے لگا
پھر وضعِ احتیاط سے دھندلا گئی نظر
پھر ضبطِ آرزو سے بدن ٹوٹنے لگا
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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ایک شہرِ آشوب کا آغاز
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سیناایک شہرِ آشوب کا آغاز
اب بزمِ سخن صحبتِ لب سوختگاں ہے

اب حلقہء مے طائفہء بے طلباں ہے

گھر رہیے تو ویرانیِ دل کھانے کو آوے

رہ چلیے تو ہر گام پہ غوغائے سگاں ہے

پیوندِ رہِ کوچہء زر چشمِ غزالاں

پابوسِ ہوس افسرِ شمشاد قداں ہے

یاں اہلِ جنوں یک بہ دگر دست و گریباں

واں جیشِ ہوس تیغ بکف درپئے جاں ہے

اب صاحبِ انصاف ہے خود طالبِ انصاف

مُہر اُس کی ہے میزان بہ دستِ دگراں ہے

ہم سہل طلب کون سے فرہاد تھے لیکن

اب شہر میں تیرے کوئی ہم سا بھی کہاں ہے

فیض احمد فیض
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سپاہی کا مرثیہ
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سیناسپاہی کا مرثیہ
اٹھو اب ماٹی سے اٹھو

جاگو میرے لال،

اب جاگو میرے لال

تمری سیج سجاون کارن

دیکھو آئی رین اندھیارن

نیلے شال دو شالے لے کر

جن میں اِن دُکھیَن اکھیَن نے

ڈھیر کیے ہیں اتنے موتی

اتنے موتی جن کی جیوتی

دان سے تمرا

جگ جگ لاگا

نام چمکنے

اٹھو اب ماٹی سے اٹھو

جاگو میرے لال

اب جاگو میرے لال

گھر گھر بکھرا بھور کا کندن

گھور اندھیرا اپنا آنگن

جانے کب سے راہ تکے ہیں

بالی دلہنیا ، بانکے ویِرن

سونا تمرا راج پڑا ہے

دیکھو کتنا کاج پڑا ہے

بیری بیراجے راج سنگھاسن

تم ماٹی میں لال

اٹھو اب ماٹی سے اٹھو ، جاگو میرے لال

ہٹ نہ کرو ماٹی سے اٹھو ، جاگو میرے لال

اب جاگو میرے لال

فیض احمد فیض
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اعلانِ جنوں دل والوں نے اب کے بہ ہزار انداز کیا
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزلناز، آغاز، انداز، باز، طناز
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 9
کس حرف پہ تو نے گوشہء لب اے جانِ جہاں غماز کیا
اعلانِ جنوں دل والوں نے اب کے بہ ہزار انداز کیا
سو پیکاں تھے پیوستِ گلو، جب چھیڑی شوق کی لےَ ہم نے
سو تیر ترازو تھے دل میں جب ہم نے رقص آغاز کیا
بے حرص و ہوا، بے خوف و خطر، اِس ہاتھ پہ سر، اُس کف پہ جگر
یوں کوئے صنم میں وقتِ سفر نظارہء بامِ ناز کیا
جس خاک میں مل کر خاک ہوئے، وہ سرمہء چشمِ خلق بنی
جس خار پہ ہم نے خوں چھڑکا، ہمرنگِ گلِ طناز کیا
لو وصل کی ساعت آپہنچی، پھر حکمِ حضوری پر ہم نے
آنکھوں کے دریچے بند کیے، اور سینے کا در باز کیا
فیض احمد فیض
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بَلیک آؤٹ
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سینابَلیک آؤٹ
جب سے بے نور ہوئی ہیں شمعیں

خاک میں ڈھونڈتا پھرتا ہوں نہ جانے کس جا

کھو گئی ہیں میری دونوں آنکھیں

تم جو واقف ہو بتاؤ کوئی پہچان مری

اس طرح ہے کہ ہر اِک رگ میں اُتر آیا ہے

موج در موج کسی زہر کا قاتل دریا

تیرا ارمان، تری یاد لیے جان مری

جانے کس موج میں ٖغلطاں ہے کہاں دل میرا

ایک پل ٹھہرو کہ اُس پار کسی دنیا سے

برق آئے مری جانب، یدِ بیضا لے کر

اور مری آنکھوں کے گُم گشتہ گہر

جامِ ظلمت سے سیہ مست

نئی آنکھوں کے شب تاب گُہر

لوٹا دے

ایک پل ٹھہرو کہ دریا کا کہیں پاٹ لگے

اور نیا دل میرا

زہر میں دھُل کے، فنا ہو کے

کسی گھاٹ لگے

پھر پئے نذر نئے دیدہ و دل لے کے چلوں

حسن کی مدح کروں، شوق کا مضمون لکھوں

فیض احمد فیض
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غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سیناغم نہ کر، غم نہ کر
درد تھم جائے گا غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

یار لوٹ آئیں گے، دل ٹھہر جائے گا، غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

زخم بھر جائے گا،

غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

دن نکل آئے گا

غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

ابر کھُل جائے گا، رات ڈھل جائے گی

غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

رُت بدل جائے گی

غم نہ کر، غم نہ کر

فیض احمد فیض
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یوں فضا مہکی کہ بدلا مرے ہمراز کا رنگ
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزلہمراز، آواز، آغاز، اعجاز، ساز
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 6
یوں سجا چاند کہ جھلکا ترے انداز کا رنگ
یوں فضا مہکی کہ بدلا مرے ہمراز کا رنگ
سایہء چشم میں‌حیراں رُخِ روشن کا جمال
سُرخیء لب میں‌ پریشاں تری آواز کا رنگ
بے پئے ہوں کہ اگر لطف کرو آخرِ شب
شیشہء مے میں‌ ڈھلے صبح کے آغاز کا رنگ
چنگ و نَے رنگ پہ تھے اپنے لہو کے دم سے
دل نے لےَ بدلی تو مدھم ہوا ہر ساز کا رنگ
اک سخن اور کہ پھر رنگِ تکلم تیرا
حرفِ سادہ کو عنایت کرے اعجاز کا رنگ
فیض احمد فیض
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یہاں سے شہر کو دیکھو
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سینایہاں سے شہر کو دیکھو
یہاں سے شہر کو دیکھو تو حلقہ در حلقہ

کھنچی ہے جیل کی صورت ہر ایک سمت فصیل

ہر ایک راہ گزر گردشِ اسیراں ہے

نہ سنگِ میل، نہ منزل، نہ ؐمخلصی کی سبیل

جو کوئی تیز چلے رہ تو پوچھتا ہے خیال

کہ ٹوکنے کوئی للکار کیوں نہیں آئی

جو کوئی ہاتھ ہلائے تو وہم کو ہے سوال

کوئی چھنک، کوئی جھنکار کیوں نہیں آئی

یہاں سے شہر کو دیکھو تو ساری خلقت میں

نہ کوئی صاحبِ تمکیں، نہ کوئی والیِ ہوش

ہر ایک مردِ جواں مجرمِ رسن بہ گلو

ہر اِک حسینہء رعنا، کنیزِ حلقہ بگوش

جو سائے دُور چراغوں کے گرد لرزاں ہیں

نہ جانے محفلِ غم ہے کہ بزمِ جام و سبُو

جو رنگ ہر در و دیوار پر پریشاں ہے

یہاں سے کچھ نہیں کھُلتا یہ پھول ہیں کہ لہو

کراچی، مارچ 1965ء

فیض احمد فیض
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کاسہء چشم میں خوں نابِ جگر لے کے چلو
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزلجگر، سر
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 4
دیدہء تر پہ وہاں کون نظر کرتا ہے
کاسہء چشم میں خوں نابِ جگر لے کے چلو
اب اگر جاؤ پئے عرض و طلب اُن کے حضور
دست و کشکول نہیں کاسہء سر لے کے چلو
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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خونِ تمنا دریا دریا، دریا دریا عیش کی لہر
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، سرِ وادئِٔ سینا، غزللہر، شہر
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 3
زنداں زنداں شورِ انالحق، محفل محفل قلقلِ مے
خونِ تمنا دریا دریا، دریا دریا عیش کی لہر
دامن دامن رُت پھولوں کی، آنچل آنچل اشکوں کی
قریہ قریہ جشن بپا ہے، ماتم شہر بہ شہر
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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لہو کا سراغ
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سینالہو کا سراغ
کہیں نہیں ہے کہیں بھی نہیں لہو کا سراغ

نہ دست و ناخن قاتل نہ آستیں پہ نشاں

نہ سرخیِ لبِ خنجر نہ رنگِ نوکِ سناں

نہ خاک پر کوئی دھبا نہ بام پر کوئی داغ

کہیں نہیں ہے کہیں بھی نہیں لہو کا سراغ

نہ صرف خدمتِ شاہاں کہ خوں بہا دیتے

نہ دیں کی نذر کہ بیعانہء جزا دیتے

نہ رزم گاہ میں برسا کہ معتبر ہوتا

کسی عَلم پہ رقم ھو کے مشتہر ہوتا

پکارتا رہا بے آسرا یتیم لہو

کسی کو بہرِ سماعت نہ وقت تھا نہ دماغ

نہ مدعی، نہ شہادت، حساب پاک ہوا

یہ خون خاک نشیناں تھا رزقِ خاک ہوا

کراچی، جنوری 1965ء

فیض احمد فیض
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انتساب
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، سرِ وادئِٔ سیناانتساب
آج کے نام

اور

آج کے غم کے نام

آج کا غم کہ ہے زندگی کے بھرے گلستاں سے خفا

زرد پتوں کا بن

زرد پتوں کا بن جو مرا دیس ہے

درد کی انجمن جو مرا دیس ہے

کلرکوں کی افسردہ جانوں کے نام

کِرم خوردہ دلوں اور زبانوں کے نام

پوسٹ مینوں کے نام

تانگے والوں کے نام

ریل بانوں کے نام

کارخانوں کے بھوکے جیالوں کے نام

بادشاہِ جہاں، والیِ ما سوا، نائب اللہ فی الارض،

دہقاں کے نام

جس کے ڈھوروں کو ظالم ہنکا لے گئے

جس کی بیٹی کو ڈاکو اٹھالے گئے

ہاتھ بھر کھیت سے ایک انگشت پٹوار نے کاٹ لی ہے

دوسری مالیے کے بہانے سے سرکار نے کاٹ لی ہے

جس کی پگ زور والوں کے پاؤں تلے

دھجیاں ہو گئی ہے

ان دکھی ماؤں کے نام

رات میں جن کے بچے بلکتے ہیں اور

نیند کی مار کھائے ہوئے بازوؤ ں میں سنبھلتے نہیں

دکھ بتاتے نہیں

منتوں زاریوں سےبہلتے نہیں

ان حسیناؤں کے نام

جن کی آنکھوں کے گُل

چلمنوں اور دریچوں کی بیلوں پہ بیکار کھل کھل کے

مرجھاگئے ہیں

ان بیاہتاؤ ں کے نام

جن کے بدن

بے محبت ریا کار سیجوں پہ سج سج کے اکتا گئے ہیں

بیواؤں کے نام

کٹڑیوں؎۱ اور گلیوں، محلوں کے نام

جن کی ناپاک خاشا ک سے چاند راتوں

کو آ آ کے کرتا ہے اکثر وضو

جن کے سایوں میں کرتی ہے آہ و بکا

آنچلوں کی حنا

چوڑیوں کی کھنک

کاکلوں کی مہک

آرزو مند سینوں کی اپنے پسینےمیں جلنے کی بو

پڑھنے والوں کے نام

وہ جو اصحابِ طبل و علم

کے دروں پر کتاب اور قلم

کا تقاضا لیے ہاتھ پھیلائے

پہنچے، مگر لوٹ کر گھر نہ آئے

وہ معصوم جو بھولپن میں

وہاں اپنے ننھے چراغوں میں لو کی لگن

لے کے پہنچے جہاں

بٹ رہے تھے، گھٹا ٹوپ، بے انت راتوں کے سائے

ان اسیروں کے نام

جن کے سینوں میں فردا کے شب تاب گوہر

جیل خانوں کی شوریدہ راتوں کی صر صر میں

جل جل کے انجم نما ہو گئے ہیں

آنے والے دنوں کے سفیروں کے نام

وہ جو خوشبوئے گل کی طرح

اپنے پیغام پر خود فدا ہو گئے ہیں

(ناتمام)

؎۱ کٹڑی۔ کٹڑے کی تصغیر، پنجابی میں ملحقہ مکانوں کے احاطے کو کہتے ہیں

فیض احمد فیض
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فیض
اپریل 5, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دیباچہ، سرِ وادئِٔ سینافیض
میں فیض سے کوئی بیس سال قبل اس وقت متعارف ہواتھا جب وہ ایم ۔اے۔او کالج ، امرتسر میں لیکچرار تھے۔ایک اور پرانے دوست جو اس وقت فیض کے رفیق کار تھے، کل اچانک ایڈنبرا میں دکھائی دیے اور ان سے مل کر مجھے بیتے ہوئے دن یاد آگئے، معلوم یہ ہوا کہ فیض کو یہ ذمہ داری سونپی گئی تھی کہ وہ اس قدیم دوست کی ایڈنبرا میں آمد سے مجھے مطلع کریں گے۔لیکن وہ بھول گئے، اس زمانے میں بھی وہ اپنی بھول جانے کی عادت اور غائب دماغی کی وجہ سے خاصے مشہور تھے، لیکن ان کے طالب علم ان کی اس عادت کو آسانی سے درگزر کردیتے تھے۔کیونکہ کوئی پروفیسر یہ بھول جائے کہ اسے طلبا کولیکچر دینا تھا تو انہیں کبھی اس کا افسوس نہیں ہوتا۔اسی طرح تانگہ چلانے والوں کا بھی ان کے ساتھ یہی رویہ تھا، کیونکہ وہ کسی کے گھر جا کر باتوں میں مصروف ہوجاتے اور یہ بھول جاتے کہ باہر تانگہ کھڑا ہوا ہے اور اس طرح تانگے والوں کا کرایہ بڑھتا رہتا تھا۔اور ادبی لوگ انہیں یوں معاف کردیتے تھے کہ وہ اس وقت بھی ایک اہم شاعر تھے۔مجھے یہ معلوم کرکے بڑی مسرت ہوئی کہ اس ہفتے لندن میں ایک ادبی تقریب ان کے اعزاز میں منعقد کی جارہی ہے اور مجھے اس کا افسوس ہے کہ میں خود وہاں حاضر ہونے سے قاصر ہوں۔گزشتہ بار کوئی پانچ سال قبل جب وہ انگلستان آئے تھے تو ایک ایسی ہی تقریب میں شریک ہونے کا مجھے شرف حاصل ہوا تھا۔اس تقریب کے فوراًبعد فیض یورپ روانہ ہورہے تھے تاکہ وطن واپس جا سکیں۔جہاں انہیں جیل میں ڈال کر ان کا پرجوش خیر مقدم کیا گیا، کئی ادبی شخصیتوں کی زندگی میں اس قسم کی خفیف غلط فہمیاں پیدا ہوتی رہی ہیں۔اس بار وہ نسبتاً زیادہ طویل مدت کے لیے انگلستان میں قیام کررہے ہیں تاکہ خوش قسمتی سے ان کے دوستوں کو مستقبل قریب میں اسی قسم کسی اور غلط فہمی کا خوف باقی نہ رہے، نیز کسی محب وطن شاعر کو اپنے وطن سے خواہ کتنا ہی لگاؤ کیوں نہ ہو، یہ امر خاصا دل خوش کن ہوتا ہے کہ بعض اوقات وہ (کسی دوست کی طرح)بہت قریب سے جائزہ لینے کے بجائے چار یا پانچ ہزار میل کے فاصلے سے اپنے وطن کے بارے میں غور و خوض کرے۔یہ امر بلاشبہ افسوسناک ہے کہ فیض مع اہل و عیال ہمارے یہاں کے متعدد پر سکون اور رومان انگیز مقامات مثلاً میرے آبائی شہر مانچسٹر، بالیک ڈسٹرکٹ جہاں ایک زمانے میں اتنے سارے شاعروں نے عروج پایا، سب سے بڑھ کر ایڈنبرا میں رہنے کے بجائے لندن میں سکونت اختیار کررہے ہیں۔اسی شہر میں جو اینٹوں، کہر ، شور و غل اور اہالیان لندن کا ایک دیو ہیکل مجموعہ ہے۔ڈاکٹر جانسن کہا کرتے تھے کہ جب آدمی لندن سے اکتا جائے تو وہ زندگی سے اکتا جاتا ہے۔لیکن یہ اٹھارہویں صدی میں ہوتا تھا، آج تو یہ کہنا زیادہ صحیح ہو گا کہ جب آدمی زندگی سے اکتا جائے تو وہ لندن کا رخ کرتا ہے۔فیض بلا کے سگریٹ نوش واقع ہوئے ہیں، ہ بری عادت لندن کے کہر اور دھند کے ساتھ مل کر کہیں ان کی انتہائی تابناک صلاحیتوں کو ماند نہ کردے تاہم مجھے کامل یقین ہے کہ اپنی بیوی اور بچیوں کی مدد سے وہ اس مسئلے پر قابو پا لیں گے۔نیز یہ کہ ایک ادبی شخصیت کی حیثیت سے اس ملک میں ان کا قیام حقیقی معنوں میں تخلیقی ثابت ہو گا، وہ اب تک بہت کچھ کرچکے ہیں، لیکن انہیں ابھی اور بہت کچھ کرنا ہے۔اور اب جب کہ وہ دوسرے ہنگاموں سے آزاد ہیں، انہیں یقیناً خیال آئے گا کہ ان سے کس قدر زیادہ توقع کی جاتی ہے۔ان بیس برسوں میں مجھے یقین ہے کہ میں نے انہیں اس قسم کے موضوعات پر کم از کم بیس کتابیں لکھنے کا مشورہ دیا ہے۔جدید معاشرے میں فنکار کا مرتبہ، تاریخ ادب اردو یا مغربی تہذیب کے مقابلے میں اسلامی تہذیب کی نوعیت وغیرہ وغیرہ۔

ہر شخص کو جو ان سے واقف ہے، فطری طور پر یہ توقع بھی ہو گی کہ وہ اپنے فرصت کے اوقات میں مزید نظمیں لکھیں گے۔میری ہمیشہ سے یہ خواہش بھی رہی ہے کہ وہ دوسرے ممالک کی بعض نظمیں خصوصاً ہمارے عہد کی ترقی پسند شاعری کا ترجمہ اردو میں کریں۔جو اسی روایت یا عالمی تحریک سے تعلق رکھتی ہو، جس سے خود ان کی شاعری وابستہ ہے۔ویسے جارج بارد، جنہوں نے آئرستان ، ڈنمارک اور دوسرے علاقوں کی شاعری کو انگریزی میں منتقل کرنے کی کوشش کی ہے، اپنی ایک کتاب لیونگرومیں لکھتے ہیں کہ ’ترجمہ زیادہ سے زیادہ ایک بازگشت ہی ہوتا ہے۔‘تمام ترجمہ کرنے والے یقیناًیہی محسوس کرتے ہونگے لیکن کچھ نہ ہونے سے باز گشت بھی بہرحال بہتر ہے۔اور فیض کی پیدا کردہ بازگشت کم از کم مترنم ضرور ہو گی۔گزشتہ دنوں ان سے یہ سن کر میں بے حد متاثر ہو ا کہ خود ان کی بعض نظمیں سواحلی زبان میں ترجمہ ہونے کے بعد مشرقی افریقہ میں پڑھی جارہی ہیں۔جہاں ایک ملک گیر زبان کی حیثیت سے سواحلی کا مستقبل بہت تابناک نظر آتا ہے۔مجھے امید ہے کہ جلد ہی دوسری زبانوں میں بھی ان کے کلام کا ترجمہ ہوجائے گا۔

ایک اسکاٹ خاتون نے جو کئی سال تک افغانستان میں رہی ہیں، فیض کے والد کے بارے میں ایک کتاب لکھی ہے، جو اس زمانے میں وہاں وزیر اعلیٰ تھے(فیض کے والد سلطان احمد خاں افغانستان میں چیف سکریٹری کے عہدے پر فائز تھے۔)مصنفہ کے بیان کے مطابق وہ بڑے پختہ عز م و ارادے کے مالک تھے اور انتہائی انتشار کے ماحول میں نظم و نسق قائم کرنے کی کوشش کررہے تھے۔امرتسر کی آزادانہ زندگی کے زمانے سے فیض بھی دوسرے متعدد باحوصلہ انسانوں کے دوش بدوش اس جد و جہد میں مصروف ہیں کہ ہمارے جدید عہد کے انتشار میں ضبط و توازن قائم کیا جائے۔جو کبھی کبھی افغانستان کے دور قدیم سے زیادہ مایوس کن نظر آتا ہے۔میں ایک اور پشت کو سرگرم عمل دیکھنے کا خواہاں ہوں، اور چشم تصور سے فیض کی بیٹیوں کو اپنی اپنی رغبت کے عظیم کارناموں کی تکمیل میں منہمک دیکھ بھی رہا ہوں، ان میں ایک کو غالباً پاکستان کی پہلی عظیم مصورہ کی حیثیت سے اور دوسری کو شاید پہلی خاتون صدر کی حیثیت سے۔دریں اثنا فیض کے دوستوں کو ہر ہفتے کے خاتمے پر ان سے دریافت کرت رہنا چاہیے کہ کہ انہوں نے کتنے صفحات لکھ لیے ہیں اور ہر روز شام کو معلوم کرتے رہنا چاہیے کہ انہوں نے کتنے سگریٹ نہیں پیے ہیں۔

27، نیلس سٹریٹ ایڈنبر

فیض احمد فیض
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منظر
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگمنظر
رہ گزر ، سائے شجر ، منزل و در، حلقۂ بام

بام پر سینۂ مہتاب کھُلا، آہستہ

جس طرح کھولے کوئی بندِ قبا، آہستہ

حلقۂ بام تلے ،سایوں کا ٹھہرا ہُوا نیل

نِیل کی جِھیل

جِھیل میں چُپکے سے تَیرا، کسی پتّے کا حباب

ایک پل تیرا، چلا، پُھوٹ گیا، آہستہ

بہت آہستہ، بہت ہلکا، خنک رنگِ شراب

میرے شیشے میں ڈھلا، آہستہ

شیشہ و جام، صراحی، ترے ہاتھوں کے گلاب

جس طرح دور کسی خواب کا نقش

آپ ہی آپ بنا اور مِٹا آہستہ

دل نے دُہرایا کوئی حرفِ وفا، آہستہ

تم نے کہا ’’آہستہ‘‘

چاند نے جھک کے کہا

’’اور ذرا آہستہ‘‘

(ماسکو)

فیض احمد فیض
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غربت کدے میں کس سے تری گفتگو کریں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلوضو، گفتگو، آرزو، بُرو، رفو، سَبُو، عدو
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 37
شرحِ فراق ، مدحِ لبِ مشکبو کریں
غربت کدے میں کس سے تری گفتگو کریں
یار آشنا نہیں کوئی ، ٹکرائیں کس سے جام
کس دل رُبا کے نام پہ خالی سَبُو کریں
سینے پہ ہاتھ ہے ، نہ نظر کو تلاشِ بام
دل ساتھ دے تو آج غمِ آرزو کریں
کب تک سنے گی رات ، کہاں تک سنائیں ہم
شکوے گِلے سب آج ترے رُو بُرو کریں
ہمدم حدیثِ کوئے ملامت سُنائیو
دل کو لہو کریں کہ گریباں رفو کریں
آشفتہ سر ہیں ، محتسبو، منہ نہ آئیو
سر بیچ دیں تو فکرِ دل و جاں عدو کریں
تر دامنی پہ شیخ ہماری نہ جائیو
دامن نچوڑ دیں تو فرشتے وضو کریں
فیض احمد فیض
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دھوکے دئیے کیا کیا ہمیں بادِ سحری نے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلنظری، گری، بدری، سحری، سری
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 36
ہر سَمت پریشاں تری آمد کے قرینے
دھوکے دئیے کیا کیا ہمیں بادِ سحری نے
ہر منزلِ غربت پہ گماں ہوتا ہے گھر کا
بہلایا ہے ہر گام بہت در بدری نے
تھے بزم میں سب دودِ سرِ بزم سے شاداں
بیکار جلایا ہمیں روشن نظری نے
مَے خانے میں عاجز ہُوئے آزُردہ دِلی سے
مسجد کا نہ رکھا ہمیں آشفتہ سری نے
یہ جامۂ صد چاک بدل لینے میں کیا تھا
مہلت ہی نہ دی فیض، کبھی بخیہ گری نے
فیض احمد فیض
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نہ شب کو دن سے شکایت ، نہ دن کو شب سے ہے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزللب، کب، ادب، سبب، شب
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 35
تری اُمید ترا انتظار جب سے ہے
نہ شب کو دن سے شکایت ، نہ دن کو شب سے ہے
کسی کا درد ہو کرتے ہیں تیرے نام رقم
گِلہ ہے جو بھی کسی سے ترے سبب سے ہے
ہُوا ہے جب سے دلِ ناصبُور بے قابو
کلام تجھ سے نظر کو بڑے ادب سے ہے
اگر شررِ ہے تو بھڑکے ، جو پھول ہے تو کِھلے
طرح طرح کی طلب ، تیرے رنگِ لب سے ہے
کہاں گئے شبِ فرقت کے جاگنے والے
ستارۂ سحری ہم کلام کب سے ہے
بمبئی
فیض احمد فیض
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پاس رہو
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگپاس رہو
تم مرے پا س رہو

میرے قاتل ، مرے دِلدار،مرے پاس رہو

جس گھڑی رات چلے،

آسمانوں کا لہو پی کے سیہ رات چلے

مرہمِ مُشک لئے، نشترِالماس لئے

بَین کرتی ہوئی، ہنستی ہُوئی ، گاتی نکلے

درد کے کاسنی پازیب بجاتی نکلے

جس گھڑی سینوں میں ڈُوبے ہُوئے دل

آستینوں میں نہاں ہاتھوں کی رہ تکنے لگیں

آس لئے

اور بچوں کے بلکنے کی طرح قُلقُل مے

بہرِ ناسودگی مچلے تو منائے نہ مَنے

جب کوئی بات بنائے نہ بنے

جب نہ کوئی بات چلے

جس گھڑی رات چلے

جس گھڑی ماتمی ، سُنسان، سیہ رات چلے

پاس رہو

میرے قاتل، مرے دلِدار مرے پاس رہو!

(ماسکو)

فیض احمد فیض
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رنگ ہے دل کا مرے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگرنگ ہے دل کا مرے
تم نہ آئے تھے تو ہر چیز وہی تھی کہ جو ہے

آسماں حدِّ نظر ، راہگزر راہگزر، شیشہ مَے شیشہ مے

اور اب شیشہ مَے ،راہگزر، رنگِ فلک

رنگ ہے دل کا مرے ،’’خون جگر ہونے تک‘‘

چمپئی رنگ کبھی راحتِ دیدار کا رنگ

سرمئی رنگ کہ ہے ساعتِ بیزار کا رنگ

زرد پتّوں کا ،خس وخار کا رنگ

سُرخ پُھولوں کا دہکتے ہوئے گلزار کا رنگ

زہر کا رنگ ، لہو رنگ ، شبِ تار کا رنگ

آسماں ، راہگزر،شیشہ مَے،

کوئی بھیگا ہُوا دامن ،کوئی دُکھتی ہوئی رگ

کوئی ہر لخطہ بدلتا ہُوا آئینہ ہے

اب جو آئے ہو تو ٹھہرو کہ کوئی رنگ ،کوئی رُت ،کوئی شے

ایک جگہ پر ٹھہرے،

پھر سے اک بار ہر اک چیز وہی ہو کہ جو ہے

آسماں حدِّ نظر ، راہگزر راہگزر، شیشہ مَے شیشہ مے

(ماسکو)

فیض احمد فیض
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جب تیری سمندر آنکھوں میں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، گیت، دستِ تہِ سنگجب تیری سمندر آنکھوں میں
یہ دُھوپ کنارا، شام ڈھلے

مِلتے ہیں دونوں وقت جہاں

جو رات نہ دن ، جو آج نہ کل

پل بھر کو امر ،پل بھر میں دھواں

اِس دھوپ کنارے، پل دو پل

ہونٹوں کی لپک

باہوں کی چھنک

یہ میل ہمارا ، جھوٹ نہ سچ

کیوں زار کرو، کیوں دوش دھرو

کس کارن، جھوٹی بات کرو

جب تیری سمندر آنکھوں میں

اس شام کا سورج ڈوبے گا

سُکھ سوئیں گے گھر دَر والے

اور راہی اپنی رہ لے گا

(لندن سے)

فیض احمد فیض
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خوشا ضمانتِ غم
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگخوشا ضمانتِ غم
دیارِ یار تری جوششِ جنوں پہ سلام

مرے وطن ترے دامانِ تار تار کی خیر

رہِ یقین افشانِ خاک و خوں پہ سلام

مرے چمن ترے زخموں کے لالہ زار کی خیر

ہر ایک خانۂ ویراں کی تیرگی پہ سلام

ہر ایک خاک بسر، خانماں خراب کی خیر

ہر ایک کشتۂ ناحق کی خامشی پہ سلام

ہر ایک دیدۂ پُرنم کی آب و تاب کی خیر

رواں رہے یہ روایت ، خوشا ضمانتِ غم

نشاطِ ختمِ غمِ کائنات سے پہلے

ہر اک کے ساتھ رہے دولتِ امانتِ غم

کوئی نجات نہ پائے نَجات سے پہلے

سکوں ملے نہ کبھی تیرے پافگاروں کو

جمالِ خونِ سرِ خار کو نظر نہ لگے

اماں ملے نہ کہیں تیرے جاں نثاروں

جلالِ فرقِ سرِ دار کو نظر نہ لگے

(لندن)

فیض احمد فیض
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جو بچے ہیں سنگ سمیٹ لو، تنِ داغ داغ لُٹا دیا
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزللُٹا، مٹا، چُکا، بنا، بھلا
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 30
نہ گنواؤ ناوکِ نیم کش، دلِ ریزہ ریزہ گنوا دیا
جو بچے ہیں سنگ سمیٹ لو، تنِ داغ داغ لُٹا دیا
مرے چارہ گر کو نوید ہو، صفِ دُشمناں کو خبر کرو
جو وہ قرض رکھتے تھے جان پر، وہ حساب آج چُکا دیا
کرو کج جبیں پہ سرِ کفن، مرے قاتلوں کو گماں نہ ہو
کہ غرورِ عشق کا بانکپن، پسِ مرگ ہم نے بھلا دیا
اُدھر ایک حرف کہ کُشتنی، یہاں لاکھ عذر تھا گفتنی
جو کہا تو سُن کے اُڑا دیا، جو لکھا تو پڑھ کے مٹا دیا
جو رُکے تو کوہِ گراں تھے ہم ، جو چلے تو جاں سے گزر گئے
رہِ یار ہم نے قدم قدم تجھے یادگار بنا دیا
فیض احمد فیض
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شہرِ یاراں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگشہرِ یاراں
آسماں کی گود میں دم توڑتا ہے طفل ابر

جم رہا ہے ابر کے ہونٹوں پہ خوں آلود کف

بُجھتے بُجھتے بُجھ گئی ہے عرش کے حُجروں میں آگ

دھیرے دھیرے بِچھ رہی ہے ماتمی تاروں کی صف

اے صبا شاید ترے ہمراہ یہ خونناک شام

سر جھکائے جارہی ہے شہرِ یاراں کی طرف

شہر یاراں جس میں اِس دم ڈھونڈتی پھرتی ہے موت

شیر دل بانکوں میں اپنے تیر و نشتر کے ہدف

اِک طرف بجتی ہیں جوشِ زیست کی شہنائیاں

اِک طرف چنگھاڑتے ہیں اہرمن کے طبل و دف

جاکے کہنا اے صبا ، بعد از سلامِ دوستی

آج شب جس دم گُزر ہو شہرِ یاراں کی طرف

دشتِ شب میں اس گھڑی چپ چاپ ہے شاید رواں

ساقیِ صبحِ طرب ، نغمہ بلب ، ساغر بکف

وہ پہنچ جائے تو ہو گی پھر سے برپا انجمن

اور ترتیبِ مقام و منصب و جاہ و شرف

فیض احمد فیض
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فصلِ گُل آئی امتحاں کی طرح
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلناگہاں، کماں، امتحاں، ارغواں، دوستاں، زباں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 28
یک بیک شورشِ فغاں کی طرح
فصلِ گُل آئی امتحاں کی طرح
صحنِ گلشن میں بہرِ مشتاقاں
ہر روش کِھنچ گئی کماں کی طرح
پھر لہو سے ہر ایک کاسۂ داغ
پُر ہُوا جامِ ارغواں کی طرح
یاد آیا جنُونِ گُم گشتہ
بے طلب قرضِ دوستاں کی طرح
جانے کس پر ہو مہرباں قاتِل
بے سبب مرگِ ناگہاں کی طرح
ہر صدا پر لگے ہیں کان یہاں
دل سنبھالے رہو زباں کی طرح
فیض احمد فیض
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کہاں جاؤ گے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگکہاں جاؤ گے
اور کچھ دیر میں لُٹ جائے گا ہر بام پہ چاند

عکس کھو جائیں گے آئینے ترس جائیں گے

عرش کے دیدۂ نمناک سے باری باری

سب ستارے سرِ خاشاک برس جائیں گے

آس کے مارے تھکے ہارے شبستانوں میں

اپنی تنہائی سمیٹے گا ، بچھائے گا کوئی

بے وفائی کی گھڑی ، ترکِ مدارات کا وقت

اس گھڑی اپنے سوا یاد نہ آئے گا کوئی!

ترکِ دنیا کا سماں ، ختمِ ملاقات کا وقت

اِس گھڑی اے دلِ آوارہ کہاں جاؤ گے

اِس گھڑی کوئی کسی کا بھی نہیں ، رہنے دو

کوئی اس وقت ملے گا ہی نہیں رہنے دو

اور ملے گا بھی تو اس طور کہ پچھتاؤ گے

اس گھڑی اے دلِ آوارہ کہاں جاؤ گے

اور کچھ دیر ٹھہر جاؤ کہ پھر نشترِ صبح

زخم کی طرح ہر اک آنکھ کو بیدار کرے

اور ہر کشتۂ واماندگیِ آخرِ شب

بھول کر ساعتِ درماندگی آخرِ شب

جان پہچان ملاقات پہ اصرار کرے

فیض احمد فیض
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جیسے خوشبوئے زلفِ بہار آگئی، جیسے پیغامِ دیدارِ یار آگیا
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلنکھار، یار، پیار، اعتبار، بہار، دار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 26
آج یوں موج در موج غم تھم گیا، اس طرح غم زدوں کو قرار آگیا
جیسے خوشبوئے زلفِ بہار آگئی، جیسے پیغامِ دیدارِ یار آگیا
جس کی دید و طلب وہم سمجھے تھے ہم، رُو بُرو پھر سرِ رہگزار آگیا
صبحِ فردا کو پھر دل ترسنے لگا ، عمرِ رفتہ ترا اعتبار آگیا
رُت بدلنے لگی رنگِ دل دیکھنا ، رنگِ گلشن سے اب حال کھلتا نہیں
زخم چھلکا کوئی یا کوئی گُل کِھلا ، اشک اُمڈے کہ ابرِ بہار آگیا
خونِ عُشاق سے جام بھرنے لگے ، دل سُلگنے لگے ، داغ جلنے لگے
محفلِ درد پھر رنگ پر آگئی ، پھر شبِ آرزُو پر نکھار آگیا
سر فروشی کے انداز بدلے گئے ، دعوتِ قتل پر مقتل شہر میں
ڈال کر کوئی گردن میں طوق آگیا ، لاد کر کوئی کاندھے پہ دار آگیا
فیض کیا جانیے یار کس آس پر ، منتظر ہیں کہ لائے گا کوئی خبر
میکشوں پر ہُوا محتسب مہرباں ، دل فگاروں پہ قاتل کو پیار آگیا
فیض احمد فیض
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قاصدا ، قیمتِ گلگشتِ بہاراں کیا ہے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلیاراں، بہاراں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 25
ان دنوں رسم و رہِ شہرِ نگاراں کیا ہے
قاصدا ، قیمتِ گلگشتِ بہاراں کیا ہے
کُوئے جاناں ہے کہ مقتل ہے کہ میخانہ ہے
آج کل صورتِ بربادیِ یاراں کیا ہے
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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دو مرثیے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگدو مرثیے
۔ ۱ ۔

ملاقات مری

ساری دیوار سیہ ہو گئی تا حلقۂ دام

راستے بجھ گئے رُخصت ہُوئے رہ گیر تمام

اپنی تنہائی سے گویا ہوئی پھر رات مری

ہو نہ ہو آج پھر آئی ہے ملاقات مری

اک ہتھیلی پہ حِنا ، ایک ہتھیلی پہ لُہو

اک نظر زہر لئے ایک نظر میں دارو

دیر سے منزلِ دل میں کوئی آیا نہ گیا

فرقتِ درد میں بے آب ہُوا تختۂ داغ

کس سے کہیے کہ بھرے رنگ سے زخموں کے ایاغ

اور پھر خود ہی چلی آئی ملاقات مری

آشنا موت جو دشمن بھی ہے غم خوار بھی ہے

وہ جو ہم لوگوں کی قاتل بھی ہے دلدار بھی ہے

۔۲ ۔

ختم ہوئی بارشِ سنگ

ناگہاں آج مرے تارِ نظر سے کٹ کر

ٹکڑے ٹکڑے ہوئے آفاق پہ خورشید و قمر

اب کسی سَمت اندھیرا نہ اُجالا ہو گا

بُجھ گئی دل کی طرح راہِ وفا میرے بعد

دوستو! قافلۂ درد کا اب کیا ہو گا

اب کوئی اور کرے پرورشِ گلشنِ غم

دوستو ختم ہوئی دیدۂ تر کی شبنم

تھم گیا شورِ جنوں ختم ہوئی بارشِ سنگ

خاکِ رہ آج لئے ہے لبِ دلدار کا رنگ

کُوئے جاناں میں کُھلا میرے لہو کا پرچم

دیکھئے دیتے ہیں کِس کِس کو صدا میرے بعد

’’کون ہوتا ہے حریفِ مَے مرد افگنِ عشق

ہے مکرّر لبِ ساقی پہ صلا میرے بعد‘‘

فیض احمد فیض
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سنتے تھے وہ آئیں گے ، سنتے تھے سحر ہو گی
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلنظر، بسر، تر، خبر، سحر
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 23
کب ٹھہرے گا درد اے دل ، کب رات بسر ہو گی
سنتے تھے وہ آئیں گے ، سنتے تھے سحر ہو گی
کب جان لہو ہو گی ، کب اشک گہر ہو گا
کس دن تری شنوائی اے دیدۂ تر ہو گی
کب مہکے گی فصلِ گل ، کب بہکے گا میخانہ
کب صبحِ سخن ہو گی ، کب شامِ نظر ہو گی
واعظ ہے نہ زاہد ہے ، ناصح ہے نہ قاتل ہے
اب شہر میں یاروں کی کس طرح بسر ہو گی
کب تک ابھی رہ دیکھیں اے قامتِ جانانہ
کب حشر معیّن ہے تجھ کو تو خبر ہو گی
فیض احمد فیض
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کِھلتی ہے صبح گل کی طرح رنگ و بُو سے پُر
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزل
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 22
ڈھلتی ہے موجِ مَے کی طرح رات ان دِنوں
کِھلتی ہے صبح گل کی طرح رنگ و بُو سے پُر
ویراں ہیں جام پاس کرو کچھ بہار کا
دل آرزو سے پُر کرو، آنکھیں لُہو سے پُر
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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سِل گئے ہونٹ ، کوئی زخم سِلے یا نہ سلے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلکھلے، سلے
فیض احمد فیض ۔ قطعہ
آگئی فصلِ سکُوں چاک گریباں والو
سِل گئے ہونٹ ، کوئی زخم سِلے یا نہ سلے
دوستوں بزم سجاؤ کہ بہار آئی ہے
کِھل گئے زخم ، کوئی پھول کِھلے یا نہ کھلے
فیض احمد فیض
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تری رہ میں کرتے تھے سر طلب ، سرِ رہگزار چلے گئے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلیار، گار، گسار، اختیار، رہگزار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 20
ترے غم کو جاں کی تلاش تھی ترے جاں نثار چلے گئے
تری رہ میں کرتے تھے سر طلب ، سرِ رہگزار چلے گئے
تری کج ادائی سے ہار کے شبِ انتظار چلی گئی
مرے ضبطِ حال سے رُوٹھ کر مرے غم گسار چلے گئے
نہ سوالِ وصل ، نہ عرضِ غم ، نہ حکایتیں نہ شکایتیں
ترے عہد میں دلِ زار کے سبھی اختیار چلے گئے
یہ ہمیں تھے جن کے لباس پر سرِ رہ سیاہی لکھی گئی
یہی داغ تھے جو سجا کے ہم سرِ بزمِ یار چلے گئے
نہ رہا جنونِ رُخِ وفا، یہ رسن یہ دار کرو گے کیا
جنہیں جرمِ عشق پہ ناز تھا وہ گناہ گار چلے گئے
فیض احمد فیض
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زندگی
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگزندگی
ملکۂ شہرِ زندگی تیرا

شُکر کسِ طور سے ادا کیجے

دولتِ دل کا کچھ شمار نہیں

تنگ دستی کا کیا گلہ کیجے

جو ترے حُسن کے فقیر ہوئے

ان کو تشویشِ روزگار کہاں؟

درد بیچیں گے گیت گائیں گے

اِس سے خوش وقت کاروبارکہاں؟

جام چھلکا توجم گئی محفل

مِنّت لُطفِ غم گسار کسے؟

اشک ٹپکا تو کِھل گیا گلشن

رنجِ کم ظرفیِ بہار کسے؟

خوش نشیں ہیں کہ چشم و دل کی مراد

دَیر میں ہے نہ خانقاہ میں ہے

ہم کہاں قسمت آزمانے جائیں

ہر صنم اپنی بارگاہ میں ہے

کون ایسا غنی ہے جس سے کوئی

نقدِ شمس و قمر کی بات کرے

جس کو شوقِ نبرد ہو ہم سے

جائے تسخیرِ کائنات کرے

فیض احمد فیض
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جو عُمر سے ہم نے بھر پایا سب سامنے لائے دیتے ہیں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزللائے، اُلٹائے
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 18
ہم خستہ تنوں سے محتسبو کیا مال منال کا پوچھتے ہو
جو عُمر سے ہم نے بھر پایا سب سامنے لائے دیتے ہیں
دامن میں ہے مشتِ خاکِ جِگر ، ساغر میں ہے خونِ حسرتِ مَے
لو ہم نے دامن جھاڑ دیا ، لو جام اُلٹائے دیتے ہیں
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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قیدِ تنہائی
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگقیدِ تنہائی
دُور آفاق پہ لہرائی کوئی نُور کی لہر

خواب ہی خواب میں بیدار ہُوا درد کا شہر

خواب ہی خواب میں بیتاب نظر ہونے لگی

عدم آبادِ جُدائی میں سحر ہونے لگی

کاسۂ دل میں بھری اپنی صبُوحی میں نے

گھول کر تلخی دیروز میں اِمروز کا زہر

دُور آفاق پہ لہرائی کوئی نُور کی لہر

آنکھ سے دُور کسی صبح کی تمہید لیے

کوئی نغمہ ، کوئی خوشبو ، کوئی کافر صورت

بے خبر گزری ، پریشانیِ اُمیّد لیے

گھول کر تلخیِ دیروز میں اِمروز کا زہر

حسرتِ روزِ ملاقات رقم کی میں نے

دیس پردیس کے یارانِ قدح خوار کے نام

حُسنِ آفاق ، جمالِ لب و رخسار کے نام

(زندانِ قلعۂ لاہور)

فیض احمد فیض
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ترا حُسن دستِ عیسیٰ ، تری یاد رُوئے مریم
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلہم، ماتم، مریم، شبنم، عالم
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 16
یہ جفائے غم کا چارہ ، وہ نَجات دل کا عالم
ترا حُسن دستِ عیسیٰ ، تری یاد رُوئے مریم
دل و جاں فدائے راہے کبھی آکے دیکھ ہمدم
سرِ کوئے دل فگاراں شبِ آرزو کا عالم
تری دِید سے سوا ہے ترے شوق میں بہاراں
وہ چمن جہاں گِری ہے ترے گیسوؤں کی شبنم
یہ عجب قیامتیں ہیں تری رہگزر میں گزراں
نہ ہُوا کہ مَرمِٹیں ہم ، نہ ہُوا کہ جی اُٹھیں ہم
لو سُنی گئی ہماری ، یُوں پِھرے ہیں دن کہ پھر سے
وہی گوشۂ قفس ہے ، وہی فصلِ گُل کا ماتم
لاہورجیل
فیض احمد فیض
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آج بازار میں پابجولاں چلو
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگآج بازار میں پابجولاں چلو
چشمِ نم ، جانِ شوریدہ کافی نہیں

تہمتِ عشق پوشیدہ کافی نہیں

آج بازار میں پابجولاں چلو

دست افشاں چلو ، مست و رقصاں چلو

خاک بر سر چلو ، خوں بداماں چلو

راہ تکتا ہے سب شہرِ جاناں چلو

حاکم شہر بھی ، مجمعِ عام بھی

تیرِ الزام بھی ، سنگِ دشنام بھی

صبحِ ناشاد بھی ، روزِ ناکام بھی

ان کا دم ساز اپنے سوا کون ہے

شہرِ جاناں میں اب باصفا کون ہے

دستِ قاتل کے شایاں رہا کون ہے

رختِ دل باندھ لو دل فگارو چلو

پھر ہمیں قتل ہو آئیں یار چلو

(لاہورجیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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شورشِ زنجیر بسم اللہ
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگشورشِ زنجیر بسم اللہ
ہُوئی پھر امتحانِ عشق کی تدبیر بسم اللہ

ہر اک جانب مچا کہرامِ دار و گیر بسم اللہ

گلی کوچوں میں بکھری شورشِ زنجیر بسم اللہ

درِ زنداں پہ بُلوائے گئے پھر سے جُنوں والے

دریدہ دامنوں والے ،پریشاں گیسوؤں والے

جہاں میں دردِ دل کی پھر ہوئی توقیر بسم اللہ

ہوئی پھر امتحانِ عشق کی تدبیر بِسم اللہ

گنو سب داغ دل کے ، حسرتیں شوقیں نگاہوں کی

سرِ دربار پُرسش ہورہی ہے پھر گناہوں کی

کرو یارو شمارِ نالۂ شب گیر بسم اللہ

ستم کی داستاں ، کُشتہ دلوں کا ماجرا کہیے

جو زیر لب نہ کہتے تھے وہ سب کچھ برملا کہیے

مُصرِ ہے محتسب رازِ شہیدانِ وفا کہیے

لگی ہے حرفِ نا گُفتہ پر اب تعزیر بِسم اللہ

سرِ مقتل چلو بے زحمتِ تقصیر بِسم اللہ

ہُوئی پھر امتحانِ عشق کی تدبیر بِسم اللہ

(لاہورجیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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تم اچھے مسیحا ہو شِفا کیوں نہیں دیتے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلپتا، اُٹھا، بُھلا، شِفا، صِلا، صدا
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 13
بے دم ہوئے بیمار دوا کیوں نہیں دیتے
تم اچھے مسیحا ہو شِفا کیوں نہیں دیتے
دردِ شبِ ہجراں کی جزا کیوں نہیں دیتے
خونِ دلِ وحشی کا صِلا کیوں نہیں دیتے
مِٹ جائے گی مُخلوق تو انصاف کرو گے
منصف ہو تو اب حشر اُٹھا کیوں نہیں دیتے
ہاں نکتہ ورو لاؤ لب و دل کی گواہی
ہاں نغمہ گرو ساز صدا کیوں نہیں دیتے
پیمانِ جُنوں ہاتھوں کو شرمائے گا کب تک
دل والو! گریباں کا پتا کیوں نہیں دیتے
بربادیِ دل جبر نہیں فیض کسی کا
وہ دشمنِ جاں ہے تو بُھلا کیوں نہیں دیتے
لاہورجیل
فیض احمد فیض
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کوئی بھی حیلۂ تسکیں نہیں اور آس بہت ہے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلآس، اُداس
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 12
نہ دید ہے نہ سخن ، اب نہ حرف ہے نہ پیام
کوئی بھی حیلۂ تسکیں نہیں اور آس بہت ہے
اُمیدِ یار ، نظر کا مزاج ، درد کا رنگ
تم آج کچھ بھی نہ پُوچھو کہ دل اُداس بہت ہے
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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تم یہ کہتے ہو اب کوئی چارہ نہیں!
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگتم یہ کہتے ہو اب کوئی چارہ نہیں
تم یہ کہتے ہو وہ جنگ ہو بھی چکی!

جس میں رکھا نہیں ہے کسی نے قدم

کوئی اترا نہ میداں میں ، دشمن نہ ہم

کوئی صف بن نہ پائی ، نہ کوئی علم

منتشرِ دوستوں کو صدا دے سکا

اجنبی دُشمنوں کا پتا دے سکا

تم یہ کہتے ہو وہ جنگ ہو بھی چُکی!

جس میں رکھا نہیں ہم نے اب تک قدم

تم یہ کہتے ہو اب کوئی چارہ نہیں

جسم خستہ ہے ، ہاتھوں میں یارا نہیں

اپنے بس کا نہیں بارِ سنگ ستم

بارِ سنگِ ستم ، بار کہسار غم

جس کو چُھوکر سبھی اک طرف ہو گئے

بات کی بات میں ذی شرف ہو گئے

دوستو، کوئے جاناں کی نا مہرباں

خاک پر اپنے روشن لہو کی بہار

اب نہ آئے گی کیا؟ اب کِھلے گا نہ کیا

اس کفِ نازنیں پر کوئی لالہ زار؟

اس حزیں خامشی میں نہ لَوٹے گا کیا

شورِ آوازِ حق ، نعرئہ گیر و دار

شوق کا امتحاں جو ہُوا سو ہُوا

جسم و جاں کا زیاں جو ہُوا سو ہُوا

سُود سے پیشتر ہے زیاں اور بھی

دوستو ماتمِ جسم وجاں اور بھی

اور بھی تلخ تر امتحاں اور بھی

فیض احمد فیض
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سجے گی کیسے شبِ نگاراں کہ دل سر شام بجھ گئے ہیں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلنام، پیغام، بام، دام، شام
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 10
جمے گی کیسے بساطِ یاراں کہ شیشہ و جام بجھ گئے ہیں
سجے گی کیسے شبِ نگاراں کہ دل سر شام بجھ گئے ہیں
وہ تیرگی ہے رہِ بُتاں میں چراغِ رُخ ہے نہ شمعِ وعدہ
کرن کوئی آرزو کی لاؤ کہ سب در و بام بجھ گئے ہیں
بہت سنبھالا وفا کا پیماں مگر وہ برسی ہے اب کے برکھا
ہر ایک اقرار مٹ گیا ہے تمام پیغام بجھ گئے ہیں
قریب آ اے مہِ شبِ غم ، نظر پہ کُھلتا نہیں کچھ اس دم
کہ دل پہ کس کس کا نقش باقی ہے ، کون سے نام بجھ گئے ہیں
بہار اب آکے کیا کرے گی کہ جن سے تھا جشنِ رنگ و نغمہ
وہ گل سرِ شاخ جل گئے ہیں ، وہ دل تہِ دام بجھ گئے ہیں
فیض احمد فیض
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شام
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگشام
اس طرح ہے کہ ہر اِک پیڑ کوئی مندر ہے

کوئی اُجڑا ہوا ، بے نُور پُرانا مندر

ڈھونڈتا ہے جو خرابی کے بہانے کب سے

چاک ہر بام ، ہر اک در کا دمِ آخر ہے

آسماں کوئی پروہت ہے جو ہر بام تلے

جسم پر راکھ ملے ، ماتھے پہ سیندور ملے

سرنگوں بیٹھا ہے چپ چاپ نہ جانے کب سے

اس طرح ہے کہ پسِ پردہ کوئی ساحر ہے

جس نے آفاق پہ پھیلایا ہے یوں سحر کا دام

دامنِ وقت سے پیوست ہے یوں دامنِ شام

اب کبھی شام بُجھے گی نہ اندھیرا ہو گا

اب کبھی رات ڈھلے گی نہ سویرا ہو گا

آسماں آس لئے ہے کہ یہ جادو ٹُوٹے

چُپ کی زنجیر کٹے ، وقت کا دامن چُھوٹے

دے کوئی سنکھ دہائی ، کوئی پایل بولے

کوئی بُت جاگے ، کوئی سانولی گھونگھٹ کھولے

فیض احمد فیض
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کرنے آئی ہے مری ساقی گری شام ڈھلے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلڈھلے، تلے
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 8
آج تنہائی کسی ہمدمِ دیریں کی طرح
کرنے آئی ہے مری ساقی گری شام ڈھلے
منتظر بیٹھے ہیں ہم دونوں کہ مہتاب اُبھرے
اور ترا عکس جھلکنے لگے ہر سائے تلے
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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آگ سُلگاؤ آبگینوں میں
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلمہینوں، آبگینوں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 7
رات ڈھلنے لگی ہے سینوں میں
آگ سُلگاؤ آبگینوں میں
دلِ عُشاق کی خبر لینا
پھول کِھلتے ہیں ان مہینوں میں
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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جشن کا دن
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگجشن کا دن
جنُوں کی یاد مناؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

صلیب و دار سجاؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

طرب کی بزم ہے بدلو دِلوں کے پیراہن

جگر کے چاک سِلاؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

تنک مزاج ہے ساقی نہ رنگِ مَے دیکھو

بھرے جو شیشہ ، چڑھاؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

تمیزِ رہبر و رہزن کرو نہ آج کے دن

ہر اک سے ہاتھ ملاؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

ہے انتظارِ ملامت میں ناصحوں کا ہجوم

نظر سنبھال کے جاؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

وہ شورشِ غمِ دل جس کی لے نہیں کوئی

غزل کی دُھن میں سُناؤ کہ جشن کا دن ہے

فیض احمد فیض
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سفر نامہ
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگسفر نامہ
۱ ۔ پیکنگ

یوں گماں ہوتا ہے بازو ہیں مرے ساٹھ کروڑ

اور آفاق کی حد تک مرے تن کی حد ہے

دل مرا کوہ و دمن دشت و چمن کی حد ہے

میرے کیسے میں ہے راتوں کا سیہ فام جلال

میرے ہاتھوں میں ہے صبحوں کی عنانِ گلگوں

میری آغوش میں پلتی ہے خدائی ساری

میرے مقدور میں ہے معجزۂ کُن فَیَکُوں

۲ ۔ سِنکیانگ

اب کوئی طبل بجے گا ، نہ کوئی شاہسوار

صبحدم موت کی وادی کو روانہ ہو گا!

اب کوئی جنگ نہ ہو گی نہ کبھی رات گئے

خون کی آگ کو اشکوں سے بُجھانا ہو گا

کوئی دل دھڑکے گا شب بھر نہ کسی آنگن میں

وہم منحوس پرندے کی طرح آئے گا

سہم ، خونخوار درندے کی طرح آئے گا

اب کوئی جنگ نہ ہو گی مے و ساغر لاؤ

خوں لُٹانا نہ کبھی اشک بہانا ہو گا

ساقیا! رقص کوئی رقصِ صبا کی صورت

مطربہ! کوئی غزل رنگِ حِنا کی صورت

فیض احمد فیض
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اپنا لی ہوس والوں نے جو رسم چلی ہے
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلچلی، ولی
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 4
میخانوں کی رونق ہیں ، کبھی خانقہوں کی
اپنا لی ہوس والوں نے جو رسم چلی ہے
دلداریِ واعظ کو ہمیں باقی ہیں ورنہ
اب شہر میں ہر رندِ خرابات ولی ہے
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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دستِ تہِ سنگ آمدہ
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، دستِ تہِ سنگدستِ تہِ سنگ آمدہ
بیزار فضا ، درپئے آزارِ صبا ہے

یوں ہے کہ ہر اک ہمدمِ دیرینہ خفا ہے

ہاں بادہ کشو آیا ہے اب رنگ پہ موسم

اب سیر کے قابل روشِ آب و ہوا ہے

اُمڈی ہے ہر اک سمت سے الزام کی برسات

چھائی ہوئی ہر وانگ ملامت کی گھٹا ہے

وہ چیز بھری ہے کہ سلگتی ہے صراحی

ہر کاسۂ مے زہرِ ھلاہل سے سوا ہے

ہاں جام اٹھاؤ کہ بیادِ لبِ شیریں

یہ زہر تو یاروں نے کئی بار پیا ہے

اس جذبۂ دل کی نہ سزا ہے نہ جزا ہے

مقصودِ رہِ شوق وفا ہے نہ جفا ہے

احساسِ غمِ دل جو غمِ دل کا صلا ہے

اس حسن کا احساس ہے جو تیری عطا ہے

ہر صبح گلستاں ہے ترا روئے بہاریں

ہر پھول تری یاد کا نقشِ کفِ پا ہے

ہر بھیگی ہوئی رات تری زلف کی شبنم

ڈھلتا ہوا سورج ترے ہونٹوں کی فضا ہے

ہر راہ پہنچتی ہے تری چاہ کے در تک

ہر حرفِ تمنّا ترے قدموں کی صدا ہے

تعزیرِ سیاست ہے ، نہ غیروں کی خطا ہے

وہ ظلم جو ہم نے دلِ وحشی پہ کیا ہے

زندانِ رہِ یار میں پابند ہوئے ہم

زنجیر بکف ہے ، نہ کوئی بند بپا ہے

“مجبوری و دعوائے گرفتاریِ الفت

دستِ تہِ سنگ آمدہ پیمانِ وفا ہے”

فیض احمد فیض
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کس راہ کی جانب سے صبا آتی ہے دیکھو
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ تہِ سنگ، غزلصبا، صدا
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 2
یہ خوں کی مہک ہے کہ لبِ یار کی خوشبو
کس راہ کی جانب سے صبا آتی ہے دیکھو
گلشن میں بہار آئی کہ زنداں ہُوا آباد
کِس سمت سے نغموں کی صدا آتی ہے دیکھو
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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فیض از فیض
اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دیباچہ، دستِ تہِ سنگفیض از فیض
اپنے بارے میں باتیں کرنے سے مجھے سخت وحشت ہوتی ہے ۔اس لئے کہ سب لوگوں کا مرغوب مشغلہ یہی ہے۔اس انگریزی لفظ کے معذرت چاہتاہوں لیکن اب تو ہمارے ہاں اس کے مشتقات بوریت وغیرہ بھی استعمال میں آنے لگے ہیں۔اس لئے اب اسے اردو میں روزمرہ میں شامل سمجھنا چاہیے۔تومیں یہ کہہ رہا تھاکہ مجھے اپنے بارے میں قیل وقال بری لگتی ہے۔بلکہ میں تو شعر میں بھی حتیٰ الامکان واحد متکلم کا صیغہ استعمال نہیں کرتا،اور ’’میں ‘‘کے بجائے ہمیشہ’’ہم‘‘لکھتاآیا ہوں۔چنانچہ جب ادبی ساغران حضرات مجھ سے یہ پوچھنے بیٹھتے ہیں کہ تم شعرکیوں کہتے ہو تو بات کو ٹالنے کے لئے جو دل میں آئے کہہ دیتاہوں۔مثلاً یہ کہ بھئی میں جیسے بھی کہتاہوں جس لئے بھی کہتا ہوں تم شعر میں خود ڈھونڈواورمیرا سر کھانے کی کیاضرورت ہے۔لیکن ان میں ڈھیٹ قسم کے لوگ جب بھی نہیں مانتے۔چنانچہ آج کی گفتگوکی سب ذمہ داری ان حضرات کے سر ہے مجھ پر نہیں ہے۔

شعر گوئی کا واحدعذرِ گناہ تومجھے نہیں معلوم۔اس میں بچپن کی فضائے گردوپیش میں شعر کا چرچا دوست احباب کی ترغیب اور دل کی لگی سبھی کچھ شامل ہے۔یہ نقشِ فریادی کے پہلے حصے کی بات ہے جس میں ۹۲۔۸۲ء سے۵۳ء تک کی تحریریں شامل ہیں،جو ہماری طالب العلمی کے دن تھے۔یوں توان سب اشعارکاقریب قریب ایک ہی ذہنی اورجذباتی واردات سے تعلق ہے اور اس واردات کا ظاہری محرک تو وہی ایک حادثہ ہے جواس عمر میں نوجوان دلوں پر گزرجایاکرتا ہے۔لیکن اب جو دیکھتا ہوں تویہ دور بھی ایک دور نہیں تھا بلکہ اس کے بھی دو الگ الگ حصے تھے۔جن کی داخلی اورخارجی کیفیت کافی مختلف تھی۔وہ یوں ہے کہ۰۲ء سے۰۳ء تک زمانہ ہمارے ہاں معاشی اورسماجی طورسے کچھ عجب طرح کی بے فکری،آسودگی اورولولہ انگیزی کا زمانہ تھا،جس میں اہم قومی اورسیاسی تحریکوں کے ساتھ ساتھ نثر ونظم میں بیشتر سنجیدہ فکرومشاہدہ کے بجائے کچھ رنگ رلیاں منانے کا سا اندازتھا۔شعر میں اولاً حسرت موہانی اوران کے بعد جوش،حفیظ جالندھری اوراختر شیرانی کی ریاست قائم تھی،افسانے میں یلدرم اورتنقید میں حسن برائے حسن اور ادب برائے ادب کا چرچاتھا۔نقشِ فریادی کی ابتدائی نظمیں ، ’’خدا وہ وقت نہ لائے کہ سوگوارہوتو‘‘مری جاں اب بھی اپنا حسن واپس پھیر دے مجھ کو‘‘ تہ نجوم کہیں چاندنی کے دامن میں‘‘وغیرہ وغیرہ اسی ماحول کے زیراثر مرتب ہوئیں اور اس فضا میں ابتدائے عشق کا تحیر بھی شامل تھا۔لیکن ہم لوگ اس دور کی ایک جھلک بھی ٹھیک سے نہ دیکھ پائے تھے کہ صحبتِ یار آخرشد۔پھر دیس پرعالمی کساد بازاری کے سائے ڈھلنے شروع ہوئے۔کالج کے بڑے بڑے بانکے تیس مارخاں تلاشِ معاش میں گلیوں کی خاک پھانکنے لگے۔یہ وہ دن تھے جب یکایک بچوں کی ہنسی بجھ گئی‘اجڑے ہوئے کسان کھیت کھلیان چھوڑکر شہروں میں مزدوری کرنے لگے اوراچھی خاصی شریف بہو بیٹیاں بازار میں آبیٹھیں۔گھر کے باہر یہ حال تھااورگھر کے اندر مرگِ سوزِ محبت کا کہرام مچاتھا۔یکایک یوں محسوس ہونے لگا کہ دل و دماغ پر سبھی راستے بندہو گئے ہیں اور اب یہاں کوئی نہیں آئے گا۔اس کیفیت کا اختتام جو نقشِ فریادی کے پہلے حصے کی آخری نظموں کی کیفیت ہے ایک نسبتا غیر معروف نظم پر ہوتا ہے، جسے میں نے یاس کا نام دیا تھا۔وہ یوں ہے:

یاس

بربطِ دل کے تار ٹوٹ گئے

ہیں زمیں بوس راحتوں کے محل

مٹ گئے قصہ ہائے فکر وعمل

برم ہستی کے جام پھوٹ گئے

چِھن گیا کیف کوثر و تسنیم

زحمتِ گریہ و بکا بے سود

شکوہ بختِ نارسا بے سود

ہوچکا ختم رحمتوں کا نزول

بند ہے مدتوں سے بابِ قبول

بے نیازِ دُعا ہے رب کریم

بُجھ گئی شمعِ آرزوئے جمیل

یاد باقی ہے بے کسی کی دلیل

انتظارِ فضول رہنے دے

راز الفت نباہنے والے

بارِ غم سے کراہنے والے

کاوش بے حصول رہنے دے

34ء میں ہم لوگ کالج سے فارغ ہوئے اور 35ء میں میں نے ایم اے او کالج امرتسر میں ملازمت کرلی۔یہاں سے میری اور میرے بہت سے ہمعصرلکھنے والوں کی ذہنی اورجذباتی زندگی کا نیا دور شروع ہوتا ہے۔اس دوران کالج میں اپنے رفقاء صاحب زادہ محمود الظفر مرحوم اوران کی بیگم رشیدہ جہاں سے ملاقات ہوئی۔پھر ترقی پسند تحریک کی داغ بیل پڑی ، مزدور تحریک کا سلسلہ شروع ہوا اور یوں لگا کہ جیسے گلشن میں ایک نہیں کئی دبستان کھل گئے ہیں۔اس دبستان میں سب سے پہلا سبق جو ہم نے سیکھا تھاکہ اپنی ذات باقی دنیا سے الگ کرکے سوچنااول تو ممکن ہی نہیں،اس لئے کہ اس میں بہر حال گردوپیش کے سبھی تجربات شامل ہوتے ہیں اوراگر ایسا ممکن ہوبھی تو انتہائی غیر سودمند فعل ہے کہ ایک انسانی فرد کی ذات اپنی سب محبتوں اورکدورتوں مسرتوں اور رنجشوں کے باوجود بہت ہی چھوٹی سی بہت محدود اورحقیر شے ہے۔اس کی وسعت اور پہنائی کا پیمانہ تو باقی عالم موجودات سے اس کے ذہنی اورجذباتی رشتے ہیں،خاص طور پر انسانی برادری کے مشترکہ دکھ درد کے رشتے۔چنانچہ غمِ جاناں اورغمِ دوراں تو ایک ہی تجربے کے دو پہلو ہیں۔اسی نئے احساس کی ابتداء نقشِ فریادی کے دوسرے حصے کی پہلی نظم سے ہوتی ہے۔اس نظم کا عنوان ہے ’’مجھ سے پہلی سی محبت مری محبوب نہ مانگ‘‘

اور اگر آپ خاتون ہیں تو’’مرے محبوب نہ مانگ‘‘

’’مجھ سے پہلی سی محبت مری محبوب نہ مانگ

میں نے سمجھاتھا کہ توہے درخشاں ہے حیات

تیرا غم ہے تو غمِ دہر کا جھگڑا کیا ہے

تیری صورت سے ہے عالم میں بہاروں کو ثبات

تیری آنکھوں کے سوا دنیا میں رکھا کیا ہے؟

تومل جائے تو تقدیر نِگُوں ہوجائے

یوں نہ تھا،میں نے فقط چاہاتھا یُوں ہوجائے

اور بھی دُکھ ہیں زمانے میں محبت سے سوا

راحتیں اور بھی وصل کی راحت کے سوا

ان گنت صدیوں کے تاریک بہیمانہ طلسم

ریشم و اطلس و کمخاب میں بُنوائے ہوئے

جا بجا بکتے ہوئے کوچہ و بازار میں جسم

خاک میں لتھڑے ہوئے خون میں نہائے ہوئے

جسم نکلے ہوئے امراض کے تنوروں سے

پیپ بہتی ہوئی گلتے ہوئے ناسوروں سے

لوٹ جاتی ہے ادھر کوبھی نظرکیا کیجئے

اب بھی دلکش ہے ترا حسن ،مگرکیا کیجئے

اور بھی دکھ ہیں زمانے میں محبت کے سوا

راحتیں اور بھی ہیں وصل کی راحت کے سوا

مجھ سے پہلی سی محبت مری محبوب نہ مانگ

اس کے بعد تیر ہ چودہ برس’’کیوں نہ جہاں کا غم اپنالیں‘‘میں گزرے اورپھر فوج،صحافت ٹریڈیونین وغیرہ میں گزارنے کے بعد ہم چار برس کے لئے جیل خانے چلے گئے۔نقشِ فریادی کے بعد کی دوکتابیں’’دست صبا‘‘اور’’زنداں نامہ‘‘اسی جیل خانے کی یادگار ہیں۔بنیادی طورپر تویہ تحریریں انہیں ذہنی محسوسات اور معمولات سے منسلک ہیں جن کا سلسلہ مجھ سے پہلی سی محبت ،سے شروع ہو اتھالیکن جیل خانہ عاشقی کی طرح خود ایک بنیادی تجربہ ہے،جس میں فکرونظر کا ایک آدھ نیا دریچہ خودبخود کھل جاتا ہے۔چنانچہ اول تویہ ہے کہ ابتدائے شباب کی طرح تمام حسیات یعنی(Sensations)پھر تیز ہوجاتی ہیں اور صبح کی پَو،شام کے دُھندلکے،آسمان کی نیلاہٹ،ہوا کے گذار کے بارے میں وہی پہلا سا تحیر لوٹ آتا ہے۔دوسرے یوں ہوتا ہے کہ باہر کی دنیا کا وقت اورفاصلے دونوں باطل ہوجاتے ہیں۔نزدیک کی چیزیں بھی بہت دور ہوجاتی ہیں اوردور کی نزدیک اورفرداودی کا تفرقہ کچھ اس طور سے مت جاتا ہے کہ کبھی ایک لمحہ قیامت معلوم ہوتا ہے اورکبھی ایک صدی کل کی بات۔تیسری بات یہ ہے کہ فراغتِ ہجراں میں فکرومطالعہ کے ساتھ عروسِ سخن کے ظاہری بناؤ سنگھاؤ پر توجہ دینے کی زیادہ مہلت ملتی ہے۔جیل خانے کے بھی دو دور تھے۔ایک حیدرآباد جیل کا جواس تجربے کے انکشاف کے تحیر کا زمانہ تھا،ایک منٹگمری جیل کا جو اس تجربے سے اکتاہٹ اورتھکن کا زمانہ تھا۔ان دو کیفیتوں کی نمائندہ یہ دو نظمیں ہیں ،پہلی’’دستِ صبا‘‘ میں ہے دوسری’’زندان نامہ‘‘میں ہے۔

زندان نامہ کی ایک شام

شام کے پیچ و خم ستاروں سے

زینہ زینہ اُتر رہی ہے رات

یوں صبا پاس سے گزرتی ہے

جیسے کہہ دی کسی نے پیار کی بات

صحنِ زنداں کے بے وطن اشجار

سرنگوں ، محو ہیں بنانے میں

دامنِ آسماں پہ نقش و نگار

شانہ بام پر دمکتا ہے

مہرباں چاندنی کا دست جمیل

خاک میں گُھل گئی ہے آب نجوم

نُور میں گُھل گئی ہے عرش کا نیل

سبز گوشوں میں نیلگوں سائے

لہلہاتے ہیں جس طرح دل میں

موجِ دردِ فراقِ یار آئے

دل سے پیہم خیال کہتا ہے

اتنی شیریں ہے زندگی اس پل

ظلم کا زہر گھولنے والے

کامراں ہوسکیں گے آج نہ کل

جلوہ گاہِ وصال کی شمعیں

وہ بجھا بھی چکے اگر تو کیا

چاند کو گُل کریں تو ہم جانیں

’’اے روشنیوں کے شہر‘‘

سبزہ سبزہ سوکھ رہی ہے پھیکی زرد دوپہر

دیواروں کو چاٹ رہا ہے تنہائی کا زہر

دور افق تک گھٹتی،بڑھتی ،اٹھتی،گرتی رہتی ہے

کہر کی صورت بے رونق دردوں کی گدلی لہر

بستا ہے اِس کُہر کے پیچھے روشنیوں کا شہر

اے روشنیوں کے شہر

اے روشنیوں کے شہر

کون کہے کس سمت ہے تیری روشنیوں کی راہ

ہر جانب بے نورکھڑی ہے ہجر کی شہر پناہ

تھک کر ہر سُو بیٹھ رہی ہے شوق کی ماند سپاہ

آج مرا دل فکر میں ہے

اے روشنیوں کے شہر

شبخوں سے منہ پھیر نہ جائے ارمانوں کی رو

خیر ہو تیری لیلاؤں کی ،ان سب سے کہہ دو

آج کی شب جب دیئے جلائیں اونچی رکھیں لو

زنداں نامے کے بعد کچھ ذہنی افراتفری کا زمانہ ہے جس میں اپنا اخباری پیشہ چُھٹا ،ایک بار جیل گئے۔مارشل لاء کا دور آیا،اورذہنی گردوپیش کی فضا میں پھر سے کچھ انسداد راہ اورکچھ نئی راہوں کی طلب کا احساس پیداہوا۔اس سکوت اورانتظار کی آئینہ دار ایک نظم ہے’’شام‘‘اور ایک نامکمل غزل کے چند اشعار:

کب ٹھہرے گا درد اے دل کب رات بسر ہو گی!

فیض

فیض احمد فیض
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اپریل 4, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دیباچہ، دستِ تہِ سنگتقریر
محترم اراکینِ مجلسِ صدارت ، خواتین اور حضرات!

الفاظ کی تخلیق وترتیب شاعر اور ادیب کا پیشہ ہے۔لیکن زندگی میں بعض مواقع ایسے بھی آتے ہیں جب قدرت کلام جواب دے جاتی ہے ۔ آج عجزِ بیان کا ایسا ہی مرحلہ مجھے درپیش ہے۔ایسے کوئی الفاظ میرے ذہن میں نہیں آرہے ، جن میں اپنی عزت افزائی کے لئے لینن پرائز کمیٹی،سوویٹ یونین کے مختلف اداروں ،دوستوں اور سب خواتین اورحضرات کا شکریہ خاطر خواہ طور سے ادا کرسکوں۔لینن امن انعام کی عظمت تو اسی ایک بات سے واضح ہے کہ اس سے لینن کا محترم نام اور مقدس لفظ وابستہ ہے۔لینن جو دور حاضر میں انسانی حریت کا سب سے بزرگ علم بردار ہے اور امن جو انسانی زندگی اور اس زندگی کے حسن وخوبی کی شرطِ اول ہے۔مجھے اپنی تحریر وعمل میں ایسا کوئی کام نظر نہیں آتا جس اس عظیم اعزاز کے شایان شان ہو۔لیکن اس عزت بخشی کی ایک وجہ ضرور ذہن میں آتی ہے اور وہ یہ ہے کہ جس تمنا اور آدرش کے ساتھ مجھے اور میرے ساتھیوں کو وابستگی رہی ہے یعنی امن اور آزادی کی تمنا وہ بجائے خود اتنی عظیم ہے کہ اس واسطے سے ان کے حقیر اور ادنیٰ کارکن بھی عزت اوراکرام کے مستحق ٹھہرتے ہیں۔

یوں تو ذہنی طور سے مجنون اور جرائم پیشہ لوگوں کے علاوہ سبھی مانتے ہیں کہ امن اور آزادی بہت حسین اور تابناک چیز ہے اور سبھی تصور کرسکتے ہیں کہ امن گندم کے کھیت ہیں اور سفیدے کے درخت،دلہن کا آنچل ہے اور بچوں کے ہنستے ہوئے ہاتھ،شاعر کا قلم ہے اور مصور کاموئے قلم اورآزادی ان سب صفات کی ضامن اورغلامی ان سب خوبیوں کی قاتل ہے جو انسان اورحیوان میں تمیز کرتی ہے۔یعنی شعور اورذہانت ،انصاف اور صداقت،وقار اورشجاعت،نیکی اور رواداری____اس لئے بظاہر امن اورآزادی اورکے حصول اور تکمیل کے متعلق ہوشمند انسانوں میں اختلاف کی گنجائش نہ ہونا چاہیے۔لیکن بدقسمتی سے یوں نہیں ہے کہ انسانیت کی ابتدارء سے اب تک ہر عہداور ہر دور میں متضاد عوامل اور قوتیں برسرِعمل اور برسرپیکار رہی ہیں۔یہ قوتیں ہیں ،تخریب وتعمیر،ترقی اور زوال،روشنی اور تیرگی،انصا ف دوستی کی قوتیں۔یہی صورت آج بھی ہے اور اسی نوعیت کی کشمکش آج بھی جاری ہے۔لیکن ساتھ ہی ساتھ آج کل انسانی مسائل اور گزشتہ دور کی انسانی الجھنوں میں کئی نوعیتوں سے بھی فرق ہے۔دورِ حاضر میں جنگ سے دوقبیلوں کا باہمی خون خرابہ مراد نہیں ہے۔نہ آج کل امن سے خون خرابے کا خاتمہ مراد ہے۔آج کل جنگ اور امن کے معنی ہیں امنِ آدم کی بقااور فنا۔بقااورفنا ان دو الفاظ پر انسانی تاریخ کے خاتمے یا تسلسل کا دارومدار ہے۔انہیں پرانسانوں کی سرزمین کی آبادی اوربربادی کا انحصار ہے۔یہ پہلا فرق ہے۔دوسرا فرق یہ ہے کہ اب سے پہلے انسانوں کو فطرت کے ذخائر پر اتنی دسترس اور پیداوار کے ذرائع پر اتنی قدرت نہ تھی کہ ہر گروہ اوربرادری کی ضرورتیں پوری طرح تسکین پاسکتیں۔اس لئے آپس میں چھین جھپٹ اور لوٹ مار کا کچھ نہ کچھ جواز بھی موجود ہے۔لیکن اب یہ صورت حال نہیں ہے۔انسانی عقل ، سائنس اورصنعت کی بدولت اس منزل پر پہنچ چکی ہے کہ جس میں سب تن بخوبی پل سکتے ہیں اور سبھی جھولیاں بھرسکتی ہیں۔بشرطیکہ قدرت کے یہ بے بہا ذخائر پیداوار کے یہ بے اندازہ خرمن،بعض اجارہ داروں اورمخصوص طبقوں کی تسکینِ ہوس کے لئے نہیں،بلکہ جملہ انسانوں کی بہبود کے لئے کام میں لائے جائیں۔اورعقل اورسائنس اورصنعت کی کل ایجادیں اورصلاحتیں تخریب کے بجائے تعمیری منصوبوں میں صرف ہوں۔لیکن یہ جبھی ممکن ہے کہ انسانی معاشرے میں ان مقاصد سے مطابقت پیدا ہو اورانسانی معاشرے کے ڈھانچے کی بنائیں ہوسِ ،استحصال اوراجارہ داری کے بجائے انصاف برابری،آزادی اوراجتماعی خوش حالی میں اٹھائیں جائیں۔اب یہ ذہنی اورخیالی بات نہیں،عملی کام ہے۔اس عمل میں امن کی جدوجہد اورآزادی کی حدیں آپس میں مل جاتی ہیں۔اس لئے کہ امن کے دوست اوردشمن اورآزادی کے دوست اور دشمن ایک ہی قبیلے کے لوگ،ایک ہی نوع کی قوتیں ہیں۔ایک طرف وہ سامراجی قوتیں ہیں جن کے مفاد،جن کے اجارے جبر اورحسد کے بغیر قائم نہیں رہ سکتے اورجنہیں ان اجاروں کے تحفظ کے لئے پوری انسانیت کی بھینٹ بھی قبول ہے۔دوسری طرف وہ طاقتیں ہیں جنہیں بنکوں اور کمپنیوں کی نسبت انسانوں کی جان زیادہ عزیز ہے۔جنہیں دوسروں پر حکم چلانے کے بجائے آپس میں ہاتھ بٹانے اورساتھ مل کر کام کرنے میں زیادہ لطف آتا ہے۔سیاست واخلاق،ادب اورفن،روزمرہ زندگی،غرض کئی محاذوں پر کئی صورتوں میں تعمیر اورتخریب انسان دوستی اور انسان دشمنی کی یہ چپقلش جاری ہے۔

آزادی پسند اور امن پسند لوگوں کے لئے ان میں سے ہر محاز اورہرصورت پر توجہ دینا ضروری ہے۔مثال کے طور پر سامراجی اورغیر سامراجی قوتوں کی لازمی کشمکش کے علاوہ بدقسمتی سے بعض ایسے ممالک میں بھی شدید اختلاف موجود ہیں،جنہیں حال ہی میں آزادی ملی۔ایسے اختلافات ہمارے ملک پاکستان اور ہمارے سب سے قریبی ہمسایہ ہندوستان میں موجود ہیں۔بعض عرب ہمساہہ ممالک میں اور بعض افریقی حکومتوں میں موجود ہیں۔ظاہر ہے کہ ان کے اختلافات سے وہی طاقتیں فائدہ اٹھاسکتی ہیں جو امن عالم اورانسانی برادری کی دوستی اور یگانگت کو پسند نہیں کرتیں۔اسلئے صلح پسنداورامن دوست صفوں میں ان اختلافات کے منصفانہ حل پر غوروفکر اوراس حل میں امداددینا بھی لازم ہے۔

اب سے کچھ دن پہلے جب سوویت فضاؤں کا تازہ کارنامہ ہر طرف دنیا میں گونج رہا تھاتومجھے باربارخیال آتا رہا کہ آج کل جب ہم ستاروں کی دنیا میں بیٹھ کر اپنی ہی دنیا کا نظارہ کرسکتے ہیں توچھوٹی چھوٹی کمینگیاں،خود غرضیاں ،یہ زمین کے چند ٹکڑوں کو بانٹنے کو کوششیں اورانسانوں کی چند ٹولیوں پر اپنا سکہ چلانے کی خواہش کیسی بعیدازعقل باتیں ہیں۔اب جبکہ ساری کائنات کے راستے ہم پرکشادہ ہو گئے ہیں۔ساری دنیاکے خزینے انسانی بس میں آسکتے ہیں،توکیاانسانوں میں ذی شعور،منصف مزاج اوردیانت دارلوگوں کی اتنی تعداد موجود نہیں ہے جو سب کو منواسکے کہ یہ جنگی اڈے سمیٹ لو۔یہ بم اورراکٹ ،توپیں بندوقیں سمندر میں غرق کردو اور ایک دوسرے پر قبضہ جمانے کی بجائے سب مل کر تسخیر کائنات کو چلو۔جہاں جگہ کی کوئی تنگی نہیں ہے،جہاں کس کو کسی سے الجھنے کی ضرورت نہیں ہے،جہاں لا محدود فضائیں ہیں اوران گنت دنائیں۔مجھے یقین ہے کہ سب رکاوٹوں اورمشکلوں کے باوجود ہم لوگ اپنی انسانی برادری سے یہ بات منواکررہیں گے۔

مجھے یقین ہے کہ انسانیت جس نے اپنے دشمنوں سے آج تک کبھی ہار نہیں کھائی اب بھی فتح یاب ہوکررہے گی۔اورآخرِکار جنگ ونفرت اورظلم کدورت کے بجائے ہمارے باہمی زندگی کی بناوہی ٹھہرے گی جس کی تلقین اب سے بہت پہلے فارسی شاعر حافظ نے کی تھی

خلل پذیر بود ہر بناکہ می بینی

مگر بنائے محبت کہ خالی از خلل است

فیض احمد فیض
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آگ سلگاو آبگینوں میں
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمہینوں، آبگینوں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 34
رات ڈھلنے لگی ہے سینوں میں
آگ سلگاو آبگینوں میں
دلِ عشا ق کی خبر لینا
پھول کھلتے ہیں ان مہینوں میں
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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نہ شب کو دن سے شکایت نہ دن کو شب سے ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزللب، کب، ادب، سبب، شب
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 33
تری امید، ترا انتظار جب سے ہے
نہ شب کو دن سے شکایت نہ دن کو شب سے ہے
کسی کا درد ہو کرتے ہیں تیرے نام رقم
گلہ ہے جو بھی کسی سے ترے سبب سے ہے
ہوا ہے جب سے دلِ ناصبور بے قابو
کلام تجھ سے نظر کو بڑے ادب سے ہے
اگر شرر ہے تو بھڑکے، جو پھول ہے تو کھِلے
طرح طرح کی طلب، تیرے رنگِ لب سے ہے
کہاں گئے شبِ فرقت کے جاگنے والے
ستارہء سحری ہمکلام کب سے ہے
لاہور
فیض احمد فیض
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کیا خبر آج خراماں سرِ‌گلزار ہے کون
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلرخسار، سرِ‌گلزار، طلبگار، طرحدار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 32
صبح کی آج جو رنگت ہے وہ پہلے تو نہ تھی
کیا خبر آج خراماں سرِ‌گلزار ہے کون
شام گلنار ہوئی جاتی ہے دیکھو تو سہی
یہ جو نکلا ہے لیے مشعلِ رخسار، ہے کون
رات مہکی ہوئی آتی ہے کہیں سے پوچھو
آج بکھرائے ہوئے زلفِ طرحدار ہے کون
پھر درِ دل پہ کوئی دینے لگا ہے دستک
جانیے پھر دلِ وحشی کا طلبگار ہے کون
فیض احمد فیض
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تو صبح جھوم کے گلزار ہو گئی یکسر
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلگلزار، طرحدار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 31
کِھلے جو ایک دریچے میں آج حسن کے پھول
تو صبح جھوم کے گلزار ہو گئی یکسر
جہاں کہیں‌ بھی گرا نور اُن نگاہوں سے
ہر ایک چیز طرحدار ہو گئی یکسر
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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تمہاری یاد سے دل ہمکلام رہتا ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلہمکلام، مقام
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 30
تمہارے حسن سے رہتی ہے ہمکنار نظر
تمہاری یاد سے دل ہمکلام رہتا ہے
رہی فراغتِ ہجراں تو ہو رہے گا طے
تمہاری چاہ کا جو جو مقام رہتا ہے
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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ہر اک صدا میں ترے حرفِ‌ لطف کا آہنگ
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلآہنگ، رنگ
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 29
تمام شب دلِ وحشی تلاش کرتا ہے
ہر اک صدا میں ترے حرفِ‌ لطف کا آہنگ
ہر ایک صبح ملاتی ہے بار بار نظر
ترے دہن سے ہر اک لالہ و گلاب کا رنگ
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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کوچہء یار سے بے نیلِ‌ مرام آتا ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمرام، نام، تمام، خرام، شام
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 28
یوں بہار آئی ہے اس بار کہ جیسے قاصد
کوچہء یار سے بے نیلِ‌ مرام آتا ہے
ہر کوئی شہر میں پھرتا ہے سلامت دامن
رند میخانے سے شائستہ خرام آتا ہے
ہوسِ‌ مطرب و ساقی میں‌پریشاں اکثر
ابر آتا ہے کبھی ماہِ تمام آتا ہے
شوق والوں‌ کی حزیں‌ محفلِ شب میں اب بھی
آمدِ صبح کی صورت ترا نام آتا ہے
اب بھی اعلانِ سحر کرتا ہوا مست کوئی
داغِ دل کرکے فروزاں سرِ شام آتا ہے
ناتمام ۔ لاہور
فیض احمد فیض
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کوئی کرتا ہی نہیں ضبط کی تاکید اب کے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلنہیں‌تمہید، تاکید، خورشید، دید، عید
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 27
شہر میں‌ چاک گریباں ہوئے ناپید اب کے
کوئی کرتا ہی نہیں ضبط کی تاکید اب کے
لطف کر، اے نگہِ یار ، کہ غم والوں‌ نے
حسرتِ دل کی اُٹھائی نہیں‌تمہید اب کے
چاند دیکھا تری آنکھوں میں ، نہ ہونٹوں پہ شفق
ملتی جلتی ہے شبِ غم سے تری دید اب کے
دل دکھا ہے نہ وہ پہلا سا، نہ جاں تڑپی ہے
ہم ہی غافل تھے کہ آئی ہی نہیں عید اب کے
پھر سے بجھ جائیں گی شمعیں‌ جو ہوا تیز چلی
لا کے رکھو سرِ محفل کوئی خورشید اب کے
کراچی
فیض احمد فیض
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کوئی عاشق کسی محبوبہ سے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہکوئی عاشق کسی محبوبہ سے!
یاد کی راہگزر جس پہ اسی صورت سے

مدتیں بیت گئی ہیں تمہیں چلتے چلتے

ختم ہو جائے جو دو چار قدم اور چلو

موڑ پڑتا ہے جہاں دشتِ فراموشی کا

جس سے آگے نہ کوئی میں ہوں نہ کوئی تم ہو

سانس تھامے ہیں نگاہیں کہ نہ جانے کس دم

تم پلٹ آؤ، گزر جاؤ، یا مڑ کردیکھو

گرچہ واقف ہیں نگاہیں کہ یہ سب دھوکا ہے

گر کہیں‌ تم سے ہم آغوش ہوئی پھر سے نظر

پھوٹ نکلے گی وہاں اور کوئی راہگزر

پھر اسی طرح جہاں ہو گا مقابل پیہم

سایہء زلف کا اور جنببشِ بازو کا سفر

دوسری بات بھی جھوٹی ہے کہ دل جانتا ہے

یاں کوئی موڑ کوئی دشت کوئی گھات نہیں

جس کے پردے میں‌ مرا ماہِ رواں ڈوب سکے

تم سے چلتی رہے یہ راہ، یونہی اچھا ہے

تم نے مڑ کر بھی نہ دیکھا تو کوئی بات نہیں

فیض احمد فیض
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بنیاد کچھ تو ہو
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہبنیاد کچھ تو ہو
کوئے ستم کی خامشی آباد کچھ تو ہو

کچھ تو کہو ستم کشو، فریاد کچھ تو ہو

بیداد گر سے شکوۂ بیداد کچھ تو ہو

بولو، کہ شورِ حشر کی ایجاد کچھ تو ہو

مرنے چلے تو سطوتِ قاتل کا خوف کیا

اتنا تو ہو کہ باندھنے پائے نہ دست و پا

مقتل میں‌ کچھ تو رنگ جمے جشنِ رقص کا

رنگیں لہو سے پنجۂ صیاد کچھ تو ہو

خوں پر گواہ دامنِ جلّاد کچھ تو ہو

جب خوں بہا طلب کریں ،بنیاد کچھ تو ہو

گرتن نہیں ، زباں سہی، آزاد کچھ تو ہو

دشنام، نالہ، ہاؤ ہو، فریاد کچھ تو ہو

چیخے ہے درد، اے دلِ برباد کچھ تو ہو

بولو کہ شورِ حشر کی ایجاد کچھ تو ہو

بولو کہ روزِ عدل کی بنیاد کچھ تو ہو

(منٹگمری جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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یہ فصل امیدوں کی ہمدم
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہیہ فصل امیدوں کی ہمدم
سب کاٹ دو بسمل پودوں کو

بے آب سسکتے مت چھوڑو

سب نوچ لو

بیکل پھولوں کو

شاخوں پہ بلکتے مت چھوڑو

یہ فصل امیدوں کی ہمدم

اس بار بھی غارت جائے گی

سب محنت، صبحوں شاموں کی

اب کے بھی اکارت جائے گی

کھیتی کے کونوں، کھدروں میں

پھر اپنے لہو کی کھاد بھرو

پھر مٹی سینچو اشکوں سے

پھر اگلی رت کی فکر کرو

پھر اگلی رت کی فکر کرو

جب پھر اک بار اُجڑنا ہے

اک فصل پکی تو بھر پایا

جب تک تو یہی کچھ کرنا ہے

(منٹگمری جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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گل کھلے جاتے ہیں وہ سایہء در تو دیکھو
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلہنر، نظر، تر، جگر، در، راہگزر
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 23
گرمیء شوقِ نظارہ کا اثر تو دیکھو
گل کھلے جاتے ہیں وہ سایہء در تو دیکھو
ایسے ناداں بھی نہ تھے جاں سے گزرنے والے
ناصحو ، پندگرو، راہگزر تو دیکھو
وہ تو وہ ہے، تمہیں ہوجائے گی الفت مجھ سے
اک نظر تم مرا محبوبِ نظر تو دیکھو
وہ جو اب چاک گریباں بھی نہیں کرتے ہیں
دیکھنے والو کبھی اُن کا جگر تو دیکھو
دامنِ درد کو گلزار بنا رکھا ہے
آؤ اِک دن دلِ پُر خوں کا ہنر تو دیکھو
صبح کی طرح جھمکتا ہے شبِ غم کا افق
فیض، تابندگیء دیدہء تر تو دیکھو
فیض احمد فیض
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Africa Come Back
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہAFRICA COME BACK
آجاؤ، میں نے سن لی ترے ڈھول کی ترنگ

آجاؤ، مست ہو گئی میرے لہو کی تال

“آجاؤ ایفریقا“

آجاؤ، میں نے دھول سے ماتھا اٹھا لیا

آجاؤ، میں نے چھیل دی آنکھوں سے غم کی چھال

آجاؤ، میں نے درد سے بازو چھڑا لیا

آجاؤ، میں نے نوچ دیا بے کسی کا جال

’’جاؤ ایفریقا“

پنجے میں ہتھکڑی کی کڑی بن گئی ہے گرز

گردن کا طوق توڑ کے ڈھالی ہے میں نے ڈھال

“آجاؤ ایفریقا“

جلتے ہیں ہر کچھار میں بھالوں کے مرگ نین

دشمن لہو سے رات کی کالک ہوئی ہے لال

“آجاؤ ایفریقا“

دھرتی دھڑک رہی ہے مرے ساتھ ایفریقا

دریا تھرک رہا ہے توبن دے رہا ہے تال

میں ایفریقا ہوں، دھار لیا میں نے تیرا روپ

میں تو ہوں ،میری چال ہے تیری ببر چال

“آجاؤ ایفریقا“

آؤ ببر کی چال

“آجاؤ ایفریقا“

(منٹگمری جیل ۔ ؎۱افریقی حریت پسندوں کا نعرہ)

فیض احمد فیض
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رنگِ رخسار کی پھوہار گری
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلپھوہار، آبشار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 21
صبح پھوٹی تو آسماں پہ ترے
رنگِ رخسار کی پھوہار گری
رات چھائی تو روئے عالم پر
تیری زلفوں کی آبشار گری
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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درد آئے گا دبے پاؤں
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہدرد آئے گا دبے پاؤں
اور کچھ دیر میں ، جب پھر مرے تنہا دل کو

فکر آ لے گی کہ تنہائی کا کیا چارہ کرے

درد آئے گا دبے پاؤں لیے سرخ چراغ

وہ جو اک درد دھڑکتا ہے کہیں دل سے پرے

شعلہء درد جو پہلو میں لپک اٹھے گا

دل کی دیوار پہ ہر نقش دمک اٹھے گا

حلقہء زلف کہیں، گوشہء رخسار کہیں

ہجر کا دشت کہیں، گلشنِ دیدار کہیں

لطف کی بات کہیں، پیار کا اقرار کہیں

۔۔

دل سے پھر ہو گی مری بات کہ اے دل اے دل

یہ جو محبوب بنا ہے تری تنہائی کا

یہ تو مہماں ہے گھڑی بھر کا، چلا جائے گا

اس سے کب تیری مصیبت کا مداوا ہو گا

مشتعل ہو کے ابھی اٹھیں گے وحشی سائے

یہ چلا جائے گا، رہ جائیں گے باقی سائے

رات بھر جن سے ترا خون خرابا ہو گا

جنگ ٹھہری ہے کوئی کھیل نہیں ہے اے دل

دشمنِ جاں ہیں سبھی، سارے کے سارے قاتل

یہ کڑی رات بھی ، یہ سائے بھی ، تنہائی بھی

درد اور جنگ میں کچھ میل نہیں ہے اے دل

لاؤ سلگاؤ کوئی جوشِ غضب کا انگار

طیش کی آتشِ جرار کہاں ہے لاؤ

وہ دہکتا ہوا گلزار کہاں ہے لاؤ

جس میں گرمی بھی ہے ، حرکت بھی توانائی بھی

۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔

ہو نہ ہو اپنے قبیلے کا بھی کوئی لشکر

منتظر ہو گا اندھیرے کی فصیلوں کے اُدھر

ان کو شعلوں‌کے رجز اپنا پتا تو دیں‌گے

خیر، ہم تک وہ نہ پہنچیں بھی، صدا تو دیں گے

دور کتنی ہے ابھی صبح، بتا تو دیں گے

(منٹگمری جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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دریچہ
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہدریچہ
گڑی ہیں کتنی صلیبیں مرے دریچے میں

ہر ایک اپنے مسیحا کے خوں کا رنگ لیے

ہر ایک وصلِ خداوند کی امنگ لیے

کسی پہ کرتے ہیں ابرِ بہار کو قرباں

کسی پہ قتل مہِ تابناک کرتے ہیں

کسی پہ ہوتی ہے سرمست شاخسار دو نیم

کسی پہ بادِ صبا کو ہلاک کرتے ہیں

ہر آئے دن یہ خداوندگانِ مہر و جمال

لہو میں‌ غرق مرے غمکدے میں‌ آتے ہیں

اور آئے دن مری نظروں کے سامنے ان کے

شہید جسم سلامت اٹھائے جاتے ہیں

(منٹگمری جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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ہم بادہ کشوں کے حصے کی، اب جام میں کمتر جاتی ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمنور، کمتر، کر، برابر، در، ستمگر
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 18
کچھ محتسبوں کی خلوت میں، کچھ واعظ کے گھر جاتی ہے
ہم بادہ کشوں کے حصے کی، اب جام میں کمتر جاتی ہے
یوں عرض و طلب سے کب اے دل، پتھر دل پانی ہوتے ہیں
تم لاکھ رضا کی خُو ڈالو، کب خوئے ستمگر جاتی ہے
بیداد گروں کی بستی ہے یاں داد کہاں خیرات کہاں
سر پھوڑتی پھرتی ہے ناداں فریاد جو در در جاتی ہے
ہاں، جاں کے زیاں کی ہم کو بھی تشویش ہے لیکن کیا کیجے
ہر رہ جو اُدھر کو جاتی ہے، مقتل سے گزر کر جاتی ہے
اب کوچہء دلبر کا رہرو، رہزن بھی بنے تو بات بنے
پہرے سے عدو ٹلتے ہی نہیں اور رات برابر جاتی ہے
ہم اہلِ قفس تنہا بھی نہیں، ہر روز نسیمِ صبحِ وطن
یادوں سے معطر آتی ہے اشکوں سے منور جاتی ہے
منٹگمری جیل
فیض احمد فیض
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منتِ‌این و آں تو چھوٹے گی
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلآں، جاں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 17
فکرِ سود و زیاں تو چھوٹے گی
منتِ‌این و آں تو چھوٹے گی
خیر، دوزخ میں مے ملے نہ ملے
شیخ صاحب سے جاں تو چھوٹے گی
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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ہم جو تاریک راہوں میں مارے گئے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہہم جو تاریک راہوں میں مارے گئے
تیرے ہونٹوں کے پھولوں کی چاہت میں ہم

دار کی خشک ٹہنی پہ وارے گئے

تیرے ہاتوں‌کی شمعوں کی حسرت میں ہم

نیم تاریک راہوں میں مارے گئے

سولیوں پر ہمارے لبوں سے پرے

تیرے ہونٹوں‌کی لالی لپکتی رہی

تیری زلفوں کی مستی برستی رہی

تیرے ہاتھوں کی چاندی دمکتی رہی

جب گھلی تیری راہوں میں شامِ ستم

ہم چلے آئے ،لائے جہاں تک قدم

لب پہ حرفِ غزل ، دل میں قندیلِغم

اپنا غم تھا گواہی ترے حسن کی

دیکھ قائم رہے اس گواہی پہ ہم

ہم جو تاریک راہوں‌میں مارے گئے

نارسائی اگر اپنی تقدیر تھی

تیری الفت تو اپنی ہی تدبیر تھی

کس کو شکوہ ہے گر شوق کے سلسلے

ہجر کی قتل گاہوں سے سب جا ملے

قتل گاہوں سے چُن کر ہمارے علم

اور نکلیں گے عُشاق کے قافلے

جن کی راہِ طلب سے ہمارے قدم

مختصر کر چلے درد کے فاصلے

کرچلے جن کی خاطر جہاں گیر ہم

جاں گنوا کر تری دلبری کا بھرم

ہم جو تاریک راہوں میں‌ مارے گئے

فیض احمد فیض
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چلے بھی آؤ کہ گلشن کا کاروبار چلے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمشکبار، یار، کاروبار، تار، دار، سنوار، غمگسار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 15
گلوں میں رنگ بھرے بادِ نو بہار چلے
چلے بھی آؤ کہ گلشن کا کاروبار چلے
قفس اداس ہے یارو صبا سے کچھ تو کہو
کہیں تو بہرِ خدا آج ذکرِ یار چلے
کبھی تو صبح ترے کنجِ لب سے ہو آغاز
کبھی تو شب سرِ کاکل سے مشکبار چلے
بڑا ھے درد کا رشتہ، یہ دل غریب سہی
تمہارے نام پہ آئیں گے غمگسار چلے
جو ہم پہ گزری سو گزری مگر شبِ ہجراں
ہمارے اشک تری عاقبت سنوار چلے
حضورِ‌ یار ہوئی دفترِ جنوں کی طلب
گرہ میں لے کے گریباں کا تار تار چلے
مقام، فیض، کوئی راہ میں جچا ہی نہیں
جو کوئے یار سے نکلے تو سوئے دار چلے
منٹگمری جیل
فیض احمد فیض
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اے روشنیوں‌کے شہر
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہاے روشنیوں‌کے شہر
سبزہ سبزہ، سوکھ رہی ہے پھیکی، زرد دوپہر

دیواروں‌کو چاٹ رہا ہے تنہائی کا زہر

دور افق تک گھٹتی، بڑھتی ، اُٹھتی، گرتی رہتی ہے

کہر کی صورت بے رونق دردوں کی گدلی لہر

بستا ہے اس کہر کے پیچھے روشنیوں کا شہر

اے روشنیوں کے شہر

کون کہے کس سمت ہے تیری روشنیوں کی راہ

ہر جانب بے نور کھڑی ہے ہجر کی شہر پناہ

تھک کر ہرسو بیٹھ رہی ہے شوق کی ماند سپاہ

آج مرا دل فکر میں ہے

اے روشنیوں کے شہر

شب خوں سے منھ پھیر نہ جائے ارمانوں کی رو

خیر ہو تیری لیلاؤں کی، ان سب سے کہہ دو

آج کی شب جب دیے جلائیں، اونچی رکھیں لو

(لاہور جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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دشنام تو نہیں ہے، یہ اکرام ہی تو ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلہنگام، نام، ناکام، ایام، اکرام، بام، شام
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 13
ہم پر تمہاری چاہ کا الزام ہی تو ہے
دشنام تو نہیں ہے، یہ اکرام ہی تو ہے
کرتے ہیں جس پہ طعن کوئی جرم تو نہیں
شوقِ فضول و الفتِ ناکام ہی تو ہے
دل مدعی کے حرفِ ملامت سے شاد ہے
اے جانِ جاں یہ حرف ترا نام ہی تو ہے
دل ناامید تو نہیں، ناکام ہی تو ہے
لبمی ہے غم کی شام مگر شام ہی تو ہے
دستِ فلک میں گردشِ تقدیر تو نہیں
دستِ فلک میں گردشِ ایام ہی تو ہے
آخر تو ایک روز کرے گی نظر وفا
وہ یارِ خوش خصال سرِ بام ہی تو ہے
بھیگی ہے رات فیض غزل ابتدا کرو
وقتِ سرود، درد کا ہنگام ہی تو ہے
منٹگمری جیل
فیض احمد فیض
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صد شکر کہ اپنی راتوں میں اب ہجر کی کوئی رات نہیں
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمات، بات، حالات، ذات، رات
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 12
کب یاد میں تیرا ساتھ نہیں، کب ہات میں تیرا ہات نہیں
صد شکر کہ اپنی راتوں میں اب ہجر کی کوئی رات نہیں
مشکل ہے اگر حالات وہاں، دل بیچ آئیں جاں دے آئیں
دل والو کوچہء جاناں میں‌کیا ایسے بھی حالات نہیں
جس دھج سے کوئی مقتل میں گیا، وہ شان سلامت رہتی ہے
یہ جان توآنی جانی ہے ، اس جاں کی تو کوئی بات نہیں
میدانِ وفا دربار نہیں یاں‌ نام و نسب کی پوچھ کہاں
عاشق تو کسی کا نام نہیں، کچھ عشق کسی کی ذات نہیں
گر بازی عشق کی بازی ہے جو چاہو لگا دو ڈر کیسا
گرجیت گئے تو کیا کہنا، ہارے بھی تو بازی مات نہیں
فیض احمد فیض
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شوخیِ رنگِ گلستاں ہے وہی
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمہرباں، گلستاں، آسماں، آشیاں، جاں‌، داستاں
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 11
شاخ پر خونِ گل رواں ہے وہی
شوخیِ رنگِ گلستاں ہے وہی
سروہی ہے تو آستاں ہے وہی
جاں وہی ہے تو جانِ جاں‌ہے وہی
اب جہاں مہرباں نہیں کوئی
کوچہء یارِ مہرباں ہے وہی
برق سو بار گر کے خاک ہوئی
رونقِ خاکِ آشیاں ہے وہی
آج کی شب وصال کی شب ہے
دل سے ہر روز داستاں ہے وہی
چاند تارے ادھر نہیں آتے
ورنہ زنداں میں‌ آسماں ہے وہی
منٹگمری جیل
فیض احمد فیض
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واسوخت
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہواسوخت
سچ ہے ہمیں کو آپ کے شکوے بجا نہ تھے

بے شک ستم جناب کے سب دوستانہ تھے

ہاں، جو جفا بھی آپ نے کی قاعدے سے کی!

ہاں، ہم ہی کاربندِ اصولِ وفا نہ تھے

آئے تو یوں کہ جیسے ہمیشہ تھے مہرباں

بھولے تو یوں کہ گویا کبھی آشنا نہ تھے

کیوں دادِ غم، ہمیں نے طلب کی، برا کیا

ہم سے جہاں میں کشتہء غم اور کیا نہ تھے

گر فکرِ زخم کی تو خطاوار ہیں کہ ہم

کیوں محوِ مدح خوبیء تیغِ ادا نہ تھے

ہر چارہ گر کو چارہ گری سے گریز تھا

ورنہ ہمیں جو دکھ تھے ، بہت لادوا نہ تھے

لب پر ہے تلخیء مئے ایام ، ورنہ فیض

ہم تلخیء کلام پہ مائل ذرا نہ تھے

فیض احمد فیض
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دل کی حالت سنبھل چلی ہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلڈھل، ٹل، پل، بہل، بدل، سنبھل
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 9
بات بس سے نکل چلی ہے
دل کی حالت سنبھل چلی ہے
اب جنوں حد سے بڑھ چلا ہے
اب طبیعت بہل چلی ہے
اشک خونناب ہو چلے ہیں
غم کی رنگت بدل چلی ہے
یا یونہی، بجھ رہی ہیں شمعیں
یا شبِ ہجر ٹل چلی ہے
لاکھ پیغام ہو گئے ہیں
جب صبا ایک پل چلی ہے
جاو اب سو رہو ستارو
درد کی رات ڈھل چلی ہے
فیض احمد فیض
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وہ رات جو کہ ترے گیسوؤں کی رات نہیں
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلبات، رات
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 8
نہ آج لطف کر اتنا کہ کل گزر نہ سکے
وہ رات جو کہ ترے گیسوؤں کی رات نہیں
یہ آرزو بھی بڑی چیز ہے مگر ہمدم
وصالِ یار فقط آرزو کی بات نہیں
قطعہ
فیض احمد فیض
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ملاقات
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہملاقات
یہ رات اُس درد کا شجر ہے

جو مجھ سے ، تجھ سے عظیم تر ہے

عظیم تر ہے کہ اس کی شاخوں

میں لاکھ مشعل بکف ستاروں

کے کارواں، گھِر کے کھو گئے ہیں

ہزار مہتاب، اس کے سائے

میں اپنا سب نور، رو گئے ہیں

یہ رات اُس درد کا شجر ہے

جو مجھ سے تجھ سے عظیم تر ہے

مگر اسی رات کے شجر سے

یہ چند لمحوں کے زرد پتے

گرے ہیں، اور تیرے گیسوؤں میں

الجھ کے گلنار ہو گئے ہیں

اسی کی شبنم سے خامشی کے

یہ چند قطرے، تری جبیں پر

برس کے ، ہیرے پرو گئے ہیں

۔ ۲ ۔

بہت سیہ ہے یہ رات لیکن

اسی سیاہی میں رونما ہے

وہ نہرِ خوں جو مری صدا ہے

اسی کے سائے میں نور گر ہے

وہ موجِ زر جو تری نظر ہے

وہ غم جو اس وقت تیری باہوں

کے گلستاں میں‌ سلگ رہا ہے

(وہ غم، جو اس رات کا ثمر ہے)

کچھ اور تپ جائے اپنی آہوں

کی آنچ میں تو یہی شرر ہے

ہر اک سیہ شاخ کی کماں سے

جگر میں‌ٹوٹے ہیں تیر جتنے

جگر سے نوچے ہیں، اور ہر اک

کا ہم نے تیشہ بنا لیا ہے

الم نصیبوں، جگر فگاروں

کی صبح، افلاک پر نہیں ہے

جہاں پہ ہم تم کھڑے ہیں دونوں

سحر کا روشن افق یہیں ہے

یہیں‌پہ غم کے شرار کھل کر

شفق کا گلزار بن گئے ہیں

یہیں پہ قاتل دکھوں کے تیشے

قطار اندر قطار کرنوں

کے آتشیں ہار بن گئے ہیں

یہ غم جو اس رات نے دیا ہے

یہ غم سحر کا یقیں بنا ہے

یقیں جو غم سے کریم تر ہے

سحر جو شب سے عظیم تر ہے

(منٹگمری جیل)

فیض احمد فیض
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شبِ سیہ سے طلب حسنِ یار کرتے رہے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلیار، انتظار، اختیار، استوار، بار، روزگار، رازدار
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 6
رہِ خزاں میں تلاشِ بہار کرتے رہے
شبِ سیہ سے طلب حسنِ یار کرتے رہے
خیالِ یار، کبھی ذکرِ یار کرتے رہے
اسی متاع پہ ہم روزگار کرتے رہے
نہیں شکایتِ ہجراں کہ اس وسیلے سے
ہم اُن سے رشتہء دل استوار کرتے رہے
وہ دن کہ کوئی بھی جب وجہِ انتظار نہ تھی
ہم اُن میں تیرا سوا انتظار کرتے رہے
ہم اپنے راز پہ نازاں تھے ، شرمسار نہ تھے
ہر ایک سے سخنِ‌ رازدار کرتے رہے
ضیائے بزمِ جہاں بار بار ماند ہوئی
حدیثِ شعلہ رخاں بار بار کرتے رہے
انہیں کے فیض سے بازارِ عقل روشن ہے
جو گاہ گاہ جنوں اختیار کرتے رہے
جناح ہسپتال، کراچی
فیض احمد فیض
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دل تھا کہ پھر بہل گیا، جاں تھی کہ پھر سنبھل گئی
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلمچل، نکل، ڈھل، بدل، سنبھل
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 5
شامِ فراق، اب نہ پوچھ، آئی اور آکے ٹل گئی
دل تھا کہ پھر بہل گیا، جاں تھی کہ پھر سنبھل گئی
بزمِ خیال میں ترے حسن کی شمع جل گئی
درد کا چاند بجھ گیا، ہجر کی رات ڈھل گئی
جب تجھے یاد کرلیا، صبح مہک مہک اٹھی
جب ترا غم جگا لیا، رات مچل مچل گئی
دل سے تو ہر معاملہ کرکے چلے تھے صاف ہم
کہنے میں ان کے سامنے بات بدل بدل گئی
آخرِ شب کے ہمسفر فیض نجانے کیا ہوئے
رہ گئی کس جگہ صبا، صبح کدھر نکل گئی
جناح ہسپتال کراچی
فیض احمد فیض
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سزا، خطائے نظر سے پہلے، عتاب جرمِ سخن سے پہلے
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلوطن، پن، تن، رسن، سمن، سخن
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 4
ستم کی رسمیں بہت تھیں لیکن، نہ تھی تری انجمن سے پہلے
سزا، خطائے نظر سے پہلے، عتاب جرمِ سخن سے پہلے
جو چل سکو تو چلو کہ راہِ وفا بہت مختصر ہوئی ہے
مقام ہے اب کوئی نہ منزل، فرازِ دار و رسن سے پہلے
نہیں رہی اب جنوں کی زنجیر پر وہ پہلی اجارہ داری
گرفت کرتے ہیں کرنے والے خرد پہ دیوانہ پن سے پہلے
کرے کوئی تیغ کا نظارہ، اب اُن کو یہ بھی نہیں گوارا
بضد ہے قاتل کہ جانِ بسمل فگار ہو جسم و تن سے پہلے
غرورِ سرو و سمن سے کہہ دو کہ پھر وہی تاجدار ہوں گے
جو خار و خس والیء چمن تھے عروجِ سرو و سمن سے پہلے
ادھر تقاضے ہیں مصلحت کے، ادھر تقاضائے دردِ دل ہے
زباں سنبھالیں کہ دل سنبھالیں ، اسیر ذکر وطن سے پہلے
حیدرآباد جیل ١٧، ٢٢ مئی ٥٤ء
فیض احمد فیض
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اے حبیبِ عنبر دست!
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، نظم، زنداں نامہاے حبیبِ عنبر دست!
کسی کے دستِ عنایت نے کنجِ زنداں میں

کیا ہے آج عجب دل نواز بندوبست

مہک رہی ہے فضا زلفِ یار کی صورت

ہوا ہے گرمیء خوشبو سے اس طرح سرمست

ابھی ابھی کوئی گزرا ہے گل بدن گویا

کہیں قریب سے ، گیسو بدوش ، غنچہ بدست

لیے ہے بوئے رفاقت اگر ہوائے چمن

تو لاکھ پہرے بٹھائیں قفس پہ ظلم پرست

ہمیشہ سبز رہے گی وہ شاخِ مہرووفا

کہ جس کے ساتھ بندھی ہے دلوں کی فتح و شکست

یہ شعرِ حافظِ شیراز ، اے صبا! کہنا

ملے جو تجھ سے کہیں وہ حبیبِ عنبر دست

“خلل پذیر بود ہر بنا کہ مے بینی

بجز بنائے محبت کہ خالی از خلل است”

(سنٹرل جیل حیدر آباد ٨٢)

فیض احمد فیض
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تبصرہ چھوڑیں
ہم لوگ سرخرو ہیں کہ منزل سے آئے ہیں
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلقاتل، منزل، محفل، دل، شمائل
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 2
سب قتل ہوکے تیرے مقابل سے آئے ہیں
ہم لوگ سرخرو ہیں کہ منزل سے آئے ہیں
شمعِ نظر، خیال کے انجم ، جگر کے داغ
جتنے چراغ ہیں، تری محفل سے آئے ہیں
اٹھ کر تو آگئے ہیں تری بزم سے مگر
کچھ دل ہی جانتا ہے کہ کس دل سے آئے ہیں
ہر اک قدم اجل تھا، ہر اک گام زندگی
ہم گھوم پھر کے کوچہء قاتل سے آئے ہیں
بادِ خزاں کا شکر کرو، فیض جس کے ہاتھ
نامے کسی بہار شمائل سے آئے ہیں
فیض احمد فیض
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شکر ہے زندگی تباہ نہ کی
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، زنداں نامہ، غزلناف، وراہ، آہ، تباہ
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 1
شیخ صاحب سے رسم و راہ نہ کی
شکر ہے زندگی تباہ نہ کی
تجھ کو دیکھا تو سیر چشم ہُوے
تجھ کو چاہا تو اور چاہ نہ کی
تیرے دستِ ستم کا عجز نہیں
دل ہی کافر تھا جس نے آہ نہ کی
تھے شبِ ہجر، کام اور بہت
ہم نے فکرِ دلِ تباہ نہ کی
کون قاتل بچا ہے شہر میں فیض
جس سے یاروں نے رسم وراہ نہ کی
فیض احمد فیض
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دیباچہ
اپریل 3, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دیباچہ، زنداں نامہدیباچہ
ایک زمانہ ہوا جب غالب نے لکھا تھا کہ جو آنکھ قطرے میں دجلہ نہیں دیکھ سکتی دیدہ بینا نہیں بچوں کا کھیل ہے۔اگر غالب ہمارے ہم عصر ہوتے تو غالبا کوئی نہ کوئی ناقد ضرور پکار اٹھتا کہ غالب نے بچوں کے کھیل کی تو ہین کی ہے یا یہ کہ غالب ادب میں پروپگینڈا کے حامی معلوم ہوتے ہیں۔ شاعر کی آنکھ قطرے میں دجلہ دیکھنے کی تلقین کرنا صریح پروپگینڈا ہے۔اس کی آنکھ کو تو محض حسن سے غرض ہے اور حسن اگر قطرے میں دکھائی دے جائے تو وہ قطرہ دجلہ کا ہو یا گلی کی بدرو کا، شاعر کو اس سے کیا سروکار یہ دجلہ دیکھنا دکھانا حکیم فلسفی یا سیاستداں کا کام ہو گا شاعر کا کام نہیں ہے۔اگر ان حضرات کا کہنا صحیح ہوتا تو آبروئے شیوہ اہل ہنر، رہتی یا جاتی، اہل ہنر کا کام یقینا بہت سہل ہو جاتا، لیکن خوش قسمتی یا بد قسمتی سے فن سخن (یا کوئی اور فن)بچوں کا کھیل نہیں ہے۔اس کے لیے تو غالب کا دیدہ بینا بھی کافی نہیں۔اس لیے کافی نہیں کہ شاعر یا ادیب کو قطرے میں دجلہ دیکھنا ہی نہیں دکھانا ہی ہوتا ہے۔مزید برآں اگر غالب کے دجلہ سے زندگی اور موجودات کا نظام مراد لیا جائے تو ادیب خود بھی اسی دجلہ کا ایک قطرہ ہے۔اس کے معنی یہ ہیں کہ دوسرے ان گنت قطروں سے مل کر اس دریا کے رخ، اس کے بہاؤ، اس کی ہیت اور اس کی منزل کے تعین کی ذمہ داری بھی ادیب کے سر آن پڑتی ہے۔

یوں کہیے کہ شاعر کا کام محض مشاہدہ ہی نہیں، مجاہدہ بھی اس پر فرض ہے۔گردو پیش کے مضطرب قطروں میں دجلہ کا مشاہدہ اس کی بینائی پر ہے، اسے دوسروں کو دکھانا اس کی فنی دسترس پر، اس کے بہاؤ میں دخل انداز ہونا اس کے شوق کی صلابت اور لہو کی حرارت پر۔اور یہ تینوں کام مسلسل کاوش اور جد و جہد چاہتے ہیں۔

نظام زندگی کسی حوض کا ٹھہرا ہوا سنگ بستہ مقید پانی نہیں ہے، جسے تماشائی کی ایک غلط انداز نگاہ احاطہ کرسکے۔ دور دراز، اوجھل دشوار گزار پہاڑیوں میں برفیں پگھلتی ہیں، چشمے ابلتے ہیں، ندی نالے پتھروں کو چیر کر، چٹانوں کو کاٹ کر آپس میں ہمکنار ہوتے ہیں اور پھر یہ پانی کتنا بڑھتا، گھاٹیوں، وادیوں، جنگلوں اور میدانوں میں سمٹتا اور پھیلتا چلا جاتا ہے۔جس دیدہ بینا نے انسانی تاریخ میں زندگی کے یہ نقوش و مراحل نہیں دیکھے اس نے دجلہ کا کیا دیکھا ہے۔پھر شاعر کی نگاہ ان گزشتہ اور حالیہ مقامات تک پہنچ بھی گئی لیکن ان کی منظر کشی میں نطق و لب نے یاوری نہ کی یا اگلی منزل تک پہنچنے کے لیے جسم و جاں جہد وطلب پہ راضی نہ ہوئے تو بھی شاعر اپنے فن سے پوری طرح سرخرو نہیں ہے۔

غالبا اس طویل و عریض استعارے کو روز مرہ الفاظ میں بیان کرنا غیر ضروری ہے۔مجھے کہنا صرف یہ تھا کہ حیات انسانی کی اجتماعی جد و جہد کا ادراک، اور اس جدو جہد میں حسب توفیق شرکت، زندگی کا تقاضا ہی نہیں فن کا بھی تقاضا ہے۔

فن اسی زندگی کا ایک جزو اور فنی جدو جہد اسی جد و جہد کا ایک پہلو ہے۔یہ تقاضا ہمیشہ قائم رہتا ہے اس لیے طالب فن کے مجاہدے کا کوئی نروان نہیں، اس کا فن ایک دائمی کوشش ہے اور مستقل کاوش۔اس کوشش میں کامرانی یا ناکامی تو اپنی اپنی توفیق اور استطاعت پر ہے لیکن کوشش میں مصروف رہنا بہر طور ممکن بھی ہے اور لازم بھی۔یہ چند صفحات بھی اسی نوع کی ایک کوشش ہیں۔ممکن ہے کہ فن کی عظیم ذمہ داریوں سے عہد بر آہونے کی کوشش کے مظاہرے میں بھی نمائش یا تعلی اور خود پسندی کا ایک پہلو نکلتا ہو لیکن کوشش کیسی بھی حقیر کیوں نہ ہو زندگی سے یا فن سے فرار اور شرمساری پر فائق ہے۔

اس مجموعے کی ابتدائی تین نظمیں نقش فریادی کی آخری اشاعت میں شامل ہیں۔یہ تکرار اس لیے کی گئی ہے کہ اسلوب اور خیال کے اعتبار سے یہ نظمیں نقش فریادی کی نسبت اس مجموعہ سے زیادہ ہم آہنگ ہیں۔

فیض احمد فیض

سنٹرل جیل، حیدرآباد(سندھ)

فیض احمد فیض
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اپنالی ہوس والوں نے جو رسم چلی ہے
اپریل 2, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ صبا، غزلچلی، ولی
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 42
میخانے کی رونق ہیں کبھی خانقہوں کی
اپنالی ہوس والوں نے جو رسم چلی ہے
دلداریء واعظ کو ہمیں باقی ہیں ورنہ
اب شہر میں ہر رندِ خرابات ولی ہے
فیض احمد فیض
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سب کچھ نثارِ راہِ وفا کر چکے ہیں ہم
اپریل 2, 2012فیض احمد فیض، دستِ صبا، غزلقبا، وفا، گِلا، پتا، جدا، خفا، سوا
فیض احمد فیض ۔ غزل نمبر 41
قرضِ نگاہِ یار ادا کر چکے ہیں ہم
سب کچھ نثارِ راہِ وفا کر چکے ہیں ہم
کچھ امتحانِ دستِ جفا کر چکے ہیں ہم
کچھ اُن کی دسترس کا پتا کر چکے ہیں ہم
اب احتیاط کی کوئی صورت نہیں رہی
قاتل سے رسم و راہ سوا کر چکے ہیں ہم
دیکھیں ہے کون کون، ضرورت نہیں رہی
کوئے ستم میں سب کو خفا کر چکے ہیں ہم
اب اپنا اختیار ہے چاہیں جہاں چلیں
رہبر سے اپنی راہ جدا کر چکے ہیں ہم
ان کی نظر میں، کیا کریں پھیکا ہے اب بھی رنگ
جتنا لہو تھا صرفِ قبا کر چکے ہیں ہم
کچھ اپنے دل کی خو کا بھی شکرانہ چاہیے
سو بار اُن کی خُو کا گِلا کر چکے ہیں ہم
فیض احمد فیض
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پرانی پوسٹیں
یاور ماجد

 

تصاویر
سخن سرا پر ۔۔۔

شکیل سروش کا ادبی رسالہ ادب و ثقافت
آفتاب اقبال شمیم
احمد فراز
امیر مینائی
امیر خسرو
پروین شاکر
توقیر عباس
جون ایلیا
داغ دہلوی
رفاقت حیات
سعادت حسن منٹو
شکیب جلالی
عرفان ستار
عرفان صدیقی
قمر جلالوی
گلناز کوثر
ماجد صدیقی
مرزا اسد اللہ خان غالب
مجید امجد
مصطفٰی خان شیفتہ
منصور آفاق
مولانا الطاف حسین حالی
میر تقی میر
ن م راشد
نینا عادل
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سخن سرا

آفتاب اقبال شمیم عرفان صدیقی فیض احمد فیض ماجد صدیقی مجید امجد مرزا اسد اللہ خان غالب منصور آفاق میر تقی میر نظم پروین شاکر
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Junaid Ahmad East Pakistan

 

The right of Junaid Ahmad to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the above Copyright Ordinance.

1

St

AJA Publishers
Floor, PIDC House,

M.T. Khan Road, Karachi, Pakistan Email: ajapub&hers.rmx@gmaicom http://www.marHggmentconsultants.pk

The author and publishers have made all reasonable efforts to contact copyright- holder’s for permission, and apologize for any omissions or errors in the form
of credits given

Corrections maybe made to fiiture printings.

ISBN: 978-969-23169-0-3

Typeset in Garamond 11.5

Printed and bound by Fazlee’s Book Supermarket in Karachi. Pakistan DEDICATION

I

 

would like to dedicate this book to the memory of my fellow countrymen who laid down their lives for the creation of Pakistan and its unity. Quran says, ‘ But
do not think of those that ha\>e been slain in God’s cause as dead. Nay, they are alive! With their Sustainer ha\>e they their sustenance, (Allmran,
3:169)’.

 

“There is no doubt that RAW played a vital role during our liberation war, but their motive was to divide Pakistan at any cost to weaken their arch rival
[Pakistan]. Their hidden objective is to establish undivided India, which they call ‘ Akhand Bharat Mata.”

Major General (retd) Z A. Khan, former Director, DGFI of Bangladesh

“Regular Indian soldiers disguised as the Mukti Bahini have been fighting tire Pakistani Army in East Pakistan from April till December 1 97 1 when after losing
5,000 men in covert operations, Indira ordered open war.”

Former Indian Prime Minister Moraiji Desai confessing to Oriana Fallac, 1984 “I would give 100% credit to India for the liberation ofBangladesh”
Deputy Speaker of Bangladesh Parliament, Shawket Ali, 2011

“Indian soil wa s made available for training camps, hospitals and supply depots for tire Mukti Bahini of tire Bengali resistance movement. . . India was in feet
waging a proxy war agffinst Pakistan.”

Archer Blood, American Consul-General to Dhaka, The Cruel Birth of Bangladesh – Memoirs of an American Diplomat

“In 1 97 1 Inditnji decided to help Sheikh Mujibur Rahman carve out an independent Bangladesh for tire Bengalis of East Pakistan. . . was she also
simultaneously thinking of an operation in West Pakistan aimed to achieve two major objectives, namely to Balkanize West Pakistan, and to liberate Pakistan
occupied Kashmir’.”

L.K. Advani, BJP leader, on his blog in 2010
ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A

bove all I would like to thank Allah (SWT) who gave me the strength, courage, inspiration, and means to undertake and complete this book.

I am most grateful to my parents who brought me up as a Muslim and a proud Pakistani, having complete feitlr in Tauheed, love for our beloved Prophet
(PBUH), and tire Two-Nation theory which led to the creation ofPakistan

Ure guidance, sipport, and advice given by ny respected colleague Mr Mabboobul Hasan, enabled me to complete this daunting task expeditiously and
efficiently.

Fellow researchers including Hammal IkranrKashaney, Khurrunr Ahmad, and Mir Belrroze Noor played an important role in collecting data, its analysis and
preparation of theworking drafts. Admirable staff and secretarial support was provided by Muhammad Aflab, Waseem Ahmad, and Syed Zalrir. A special

 

thanks is due to Ms Tara Kashif for doing a great job of editing the text. Her work has made the book readable.

 

JUNAID AHMAD August, 20 1 6

iii

 

Bhutto arrived in Dhaka in July 1974. 1 drove to the airport through dense crowds lining both sides ofthe streets… resounding with slogans like “Bangladesh-
Pakistani maitre (friendship) Zindabad” and Zulfiqai’ Ali Bhutto Zindabad. .. All tire heads of tire diplomatic missions were lined up at the tarmac. Bhutto
descended from a special Air Force aircrafi. . . I was introduced when he reached me in tire reception line. Shaking me by tire band, he turned to Mujibur
Rehmanand said: “So, he represents the country which re- arranged the map ofthe subcontinent hr 1971.” Then, addressing me, Ire said: “Maybe Ire (would)
help us a second tone inre-an’anghrgtlre map by resolving the Kashmir problem which has been pending for such a longtime”. .. It was the journey back from
the airport which was a politically and emotionally disturbing experience for me. As tire motorcade moved out, the frenzied enthusiasm ofthe masses of the
people lining tire route reached a high pitch with slogqns and shouting in favour of Bhutto and Pakistan. . . I was told later that people threw garlands of shoes
on Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s car on his journey back to tire President’s house. My flag car was vandalized and tire Indian flag tampered with by tire
crowds . . . Abusive slogans were shouted against the Indian High Commission and tire Government of India. 1 have to confess that I had tears of anger in ny
eyes when 1 returned to my office and sat down to draft my telegram reporting on tire arrival ceremonies.

A passage from the book by former Indian Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, on the first ever visit to Bangladesh by a Pakistani Prime Minister,
Zufliqar Ali Bhutto, in July 1974) PROLOGUE

T

he birth of Bangladesh remains as one ofthe most paiirful incident in the seventy-year history of Pakistan On the fateful day of 16 th December 1971 34,000
Pakistani troops surrendered in Bangladesh giving up the dream of a united Pakistan It was not only a military failure, but a failure on all fronts by all Tire
politicians failed to maintain unity among the diversified Pakistani communities, tire media failed to counter tire propaganda campaign of India and her cronies,
the diplomats failed to defend and present Pakistan’s position to tire world on tire political crisis of 1971, and tire defenders failed to secure our’ ideological
and territorial frontiers against internal and external enemies.

Even though, forty- five years have passed, Pakistan, as a nation, is still haunted by this tragic episode of its dismemberment. Every year tire date of 1 6th
December revives emotions of sorrow, griefj and guilt; and marry of us only manage to mourn on our blunders. Great nations learn from their past, but except
bereavement we, as a nation, have not learned from our historical blunders. Our flawed political and diplomatic strategies continue to compromise our’ national
interests. Despite tire humiliating experience, we continue to stick to ineffective and outdated polices and behaviours. This inadequacy Iras reincanrated old and
given birth to new national, regional, and global foes to plot agqinst Pakistan’s unity, sovereignty, and existence.

Since 1971, sizeable yet casual analysis has emerged and numerous narratives have been written by intellectuals, academicians, military personnel, journalists,
diplomats, and politicians from across tire world. However, a holistic view and account ofthe tragedy of 1 97 1 seems to be missing This attempt would
endeavour to present a comprehensive and balanced picture of Pakistan’s dismemberment and creation of Bangladesh Pakistan was not bifurcated
instantaneously on 1 6th December 1971, rather a series of events lead to its catastrophic division. This book is a humble attempt to trace the historical, social,
strategic, political, economic, and ideological roots which led to tire day of this dissolution of the miracle, called Pakistan.

 

V

 

Additionally, several myths have been created, propagqted, and disseminated by India and, at her behest, the Bangladeshi government, to defame Pakistan
and her institutions. This book Iras been divided into eight chapters which provide a comprehensive view of tire tragedy of 1 97 1 . The chapters are summarized
as under:

In Chapter One : Introduction , we discuss the various myths, that have been propagated, and facts related to the creation of Bangladesh. Firstly, we
summarize various myths like how tire Agartala Case is seen as a conspiracy, how tire Mukti Balrini is seen as a reactionary force (while in actuality they were
basically terrorists), and how Pakistan is blamed for initiating tire war with India. Other myths such as the myth of 3 million Bengqlis killed by Pakistani forces,
or tire capture of 93, 000 Pakistani army personnel as POWs in Bangladesh, etc. are dispelled. Eachofthese and others have been discussed in detail in the
subsequent chapter’s.

Chapter Two is on the ‘Creation ofPakistan’, detailing how Pakistan was perceived and set-up by tire Hindus and British. This was a consequence of tire
Hindu belief that Pakistan is innate, integral part of their ‘Aklrand Bharat’, destined to return to make India whole again Pakistan Iras had countless enemies
from within and outside, who, from its inception, have tried to destroy it. These include, not only Hindu nationalist parties, but almost all the Islamic / Muslim
parties oflndia, tire British, Sikhs, and other’s. The dismemberment ofPakistan is one ofthe success stories of these foes.

In Chapter Three : Dismemberment Starts , we cover all major events that led to tire East Pakistanis’ demands of a separate homeland. A complete picture
of the language issue, tire economic depravity, biasness in government and other issues, with supporting facts, is given

In Chapter Four : India Machinations , we expose how India was the puppet master in this whole dismemberment drama. We start by presenting how India
managed to take over all the princely states including Sikkim, Junagqdh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir and her strong desire to treat all her neighbours Nepal,
Bhutan, Sri Lanka as her vassal states, hr tire case ofPakistan and her role in tire creation of Bangladesh we discuss in detail, India’s foreign policy, her
relationships with Mujib and the Mukti Balrini, and how India and RAW were at the forefront of tire Bengali call for separation Additionally, this chapter
exposes the creation of 1 80 training camps for tire training of the Mukti Bahirri terrorists, India conducting espionage and terrorist activities, and mere than
50,000 Indian soldier’s actively helping the Mukti Bahiiri terrorists, etc.

Chapter Five : Tire 1971 Insurgency, deals with the events that finally led to the dismemberment ofPakistan Here we look attire elections of 1970 of
Pakistan and their’ effects and at how the triumvirate of Yalrya, Bhutto, and Mujib played their parts in tire unfolding of events culminating in tire creation of
Bangladesh. This chapter further delves into ‘Operation Searchlight’, its implications, and tire war of 1971, the inteijection oflndia into tire Pakistani political
scene, and the catastrophic blunders of Pakistani politicians bringing shame as a result ofPakistan’ s dismemberment. This chapter concludes by shedding light
on the role of Bhutto at home and in the UN, with the mistakes of tire Pakistani establishment, and the Indian diplomatic and media campaign playing the
background score to consummate tire orchestration of tire division ofPakistan

 

In Chapter Six : Atrocities Committed by Mukti Bahini , we give a detailed account of die ten’orist activities of the Mukti Bahini, revealing tire atrocities it
committed with India’s support. This chapter dispels the notion of tire inaccurately, exaggerated deaths of tire innocent Bengalis at tire hands of tire Pakistan
Amy and brings to light the reckless carnage of West Pakistanis by Mukti Bahini. All these revelations are buttressed with evidences from credible Bengali,
Indian, and Western sources.

In Chapter Seven: Post Dismemberment , we cover the events alter tire dismemberment of 1 97 1 . The chapter further analyses various countries’ reaction
to the creation of Bangladesh, the treatment of POW’s, and tire continued Indian manipulation of Bengalis, etc. In conclusion, the chapter elaborates on tire
politically self-serving, unpatriotic action ofBbutto’s recognition of Bangladesh legitimizing its existence for the sought-after membership of the UN.

Chapter Eight: Way Forward , deals with the steps recommended for Pakistan for clearing its blood- stained reputation and providing closure to Bengalis
and Pakistanis affected by the calamitous vicissitudes of 1 97 1 . The Indian and Bangladeshi governments have been on numerous occasions issued made
maligning statements about Pakistan and its role iir 1971. This chapter attempts to unearth the barbaric treatment of tire ‘ friends of Pakistan’ by the
Bangladeshi government and its kangaroo courts with the much- needed response

 

vii

to the planned Detrial of Liberation War Act at the local and international level

A comprehensive methodology has been adopted to provide a balanced and complete document on the calamity ofl971.Both primary and secondary
sources have been used in our investigation A detailed study of Bangladeshi Indian, and Pakistani narratives has been earned out to provide a better
understanding. Books by Indian and Bengali army officers, militants, politicians, intellectuals have been studied tbr understanding their perspective on the event
of 1971. Interviews of Pakistani soldier’s, army officers, member’s of the Pakistan Air Force and the Navy, civilians, and intellectuals have been conducted to
get first-hand infonnation about their’ experiences in East Pakistan The original texts of agreements, official reports, white papers and treaties between
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India have been accessed lbr authentic information The UN resolutions and UNSC meetings have also been studied to provide
international context and perspective. To attain conplete credibility, FIRs lodged against the militants of the Awami League and the Mukti Bahini tbr their
heinous crimes have been accessed. Further, a detailed study of national newspapers – Pakistan Observer, Dawn, Daily Jang – Indian newspapers – Times of
India, Hindustan Times – western press – New York Times , Washington Post, London Times, Wall Street Journal Newsweek, Times, Economist, etc. has
been carried out to understand the 1 97 1 -conundrum in a more comprehensive manner’. By embracing an in-depth methodology we have attempted to provide
a fresh and extensive narrative on the disastrous break-up of Pakistan

 

viii

CONTENT

Acknowledgements

v List of Abbreviations

1 CREATION OF BANGLADESH AMID MYTHS AND FABLES

 

2 CREATION OF PAKISTAN 17

3 THE DISMEMBERMENT STARTS 57

4 INDIA’S MACHINATIONS 95

5 THE 1971 INSURGENCY 139

6 MUKTI BA HIN I – ITS TRUE FACE 183

7 POST DISMEMBERMENT 223

8 WAY FORWARD 267

Glossary 291

Index 295

Bibliography 301

 

Annexure 1:

Instrument ofAccessionofJanmr and Kashmir 26 October 1947 Annexure 2:
UNSC 1948, Kashmir’ Resolution

Annexure 3:

Treaty ofFriendship between Indian and Bhutan, 1949

Annexure 4:

India- Bhutan Friendship Treaty
Annexure 5:

Indo-I_anka Accord, 1987
Annexure 6:

Indo- Soviet Treaty, 1971
Annexure 7:

Judicial Enquiry Commission Report on Hijacking of Indian Plane to Lahore

Annexure 8:

Instrument of Surrender, 1971

Annexure 9:

Legal Framework Order, 1970

Annexure 10:

Affidavit of General Yahya Khan, 1978

Annexure 11:

Awami League (Mukti Bahinis) Directly Involved in Killing and Rape in East Pakistan

Annexure 12:

Awami League (Mukti Bahinis) Directly Involved in Fighting Against the State

 

Hi Prologue
xi

 

1

 

Annexure 13:

Awarni League (Mukti Bahinis) Directly Involved in Looting Annexure 14:
Treaty ofFriendship Between India and Bangladesh, 1972 Annexure 15:
Delhi Agreement Between Pakistan and India, 1973

Annexure 16:

Tripartite Agreement Between Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, 1974

 

X

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIML AM- India MusMm League
AIR AM- India Radio
AL Awami League

BAKSAL Bangladesh Kiishak SramDc Awami League BJP Bharatiya Janta Party
BNP Bangladesh NationaMst Party

BRAC Bangladesh RehabMitation Assistance Committee BSF Indian Border Security Force

CIA Central InteMigence Agency

CM Chief Minister

CML C ouncM MusMm League

CMLA Chief Martial Law Administrator

CSO CivM Society Organizations

CSP Central Civilian Services of Pakistan

DAC Democratic Action Committee

EBR East Bengal Regiment

EPR East Pakistan Rifles

FTA Foreign Trade Agreement

GHQ General Headquarters

HRW Human Rights Watch

IB Intelligence Bureau

ICAO International CivM Aviation Organization ICCPR International Covenant on CivM and PoMtical Rights ICFM Islamic Countries Foreign Ministers’

Conference ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICT International Climes Tribunal of Bangladesh ICTJ International Centre of Transitional

Justice IDBP Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force

ISI Inter Services InteMigence

JIP Jamaat-i-Islani Pakistan

JP Jatiya Party

JSD Jatiya Samajtanrik Dal

JUI Jamiat Ulema-i Islam

JUP Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan

LFO Legal Framework Order

LLTE Liberation Tigers of TamM Eelam

MP Meirber of Parliament

MPA Menber of Provincial Assenbly

N AP N ational Awami Party

NGOs Non-gpvemmental organization

OIC Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

PDP People’s Democratic Party

PM Prime Minister

PML Pakistan MusMm league

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party

RAAI Rabita Al- Alain- Al-Islam

RAW Research & Analysis Wing

RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

RTB Rabita Trust Board

SFF Special Frontier Force

SUF Sindh United Front

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Orgpnization

UNGA United Nations General Assenbly

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refiigees UN SC United Nations Security CouncM
UP Uttar Pradesh

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepubMcs
VHP Vishva Hindua Paiishad
WHO World Health Organization

xii

1

CREATION OF BANGLADESH AMID MYTHS AND FABLES

 

J

ames Feibleman, the famous American philosopher, once said, A myth is a religion in which no one any longer believes but, when it comes to Bangladesh
and its creation, it seems that the religion of mythology still exists and has a number of followers. Since the

surrender of Pakistani forces on 1 6 th December 1971, several accounts lave been written, multiple narratives have been generated, various questions have
been raised and a large number of personal memoirs of military men, politicians, intellectuals, and diplomats have been published. Many of the discourses on
Bangladesh lave an accusatory approach and only half of the picture is painted. Many have emerged with new sets of complaints and blame for a new reason
to malign Pakistan, their favourite punching bag Within a few breaths of tire 1971 tragedy, Pakistan was blamed for causing starvation, deprivation, and by tire
end, killing and slaughter in East Pakistan All these biased narratives are the product of g’eater myths.

A deliberate effort is always carried out to bypass facts like: tire Indian security dilemma, Awami League and its fascist political policies, tire terrorist group of
Mukti Bahirri, tire propaganda campaign of the Indians and some global media outlets, the Indian diplomatic campaign at tire global level, the political
confrontation between West and East Pakistan, and the colonial legacy in terms of economic disparity. Albeit, tire weakness of the Pakistani federal
government in political, social and economic terms, aforementioned facts cannot be overlooked and therefore tire assessment, particularly regarding the
violence prior to the creation of Bangladesh, remains too exaggerated. These exaggerated narratives accuse the Pakistani Armed Forces of gruesome
massacre of innocent Bengalis giving a clean chit to Mukti Balrirri and the Indian armed forces. Selfprompted narratives are generated to defame Pakistan and
its military to protect the Indian- supported Mukti Balrini from their heinous crimes. It is now high time tot a holistic view of Bangladesh’s creation and its
afiennath is presented. By utilizing primary sources, the present naraative hies to respond to some of the most commonly created myths by endeavouring to
expose them based on facts and figures surrounding Bangladesh and its creation

Hie most prevailing myths about the creation of Bangladesh are: West Pakistan exploited Sonar Bengal (East Pakistan). No development was earned out in
East Pakistan West Pakistanis imposed their culture on the Bengalis. The Agartala Conspiracy case was a fabrication of the West Pakistan
Operation Searchlight was launched by die West Pakistani establishment against the innocent civilians of East Pakistan
Pakistani Aimed Forces killed more dian 3 million innocent Bengalis.

Pakistani Aimed Forces exclusively targeted and killed the Hindus in East Pakistan
Pakistan Army is solely responsible for all die violence in East Pakistan
Hie Indian military intervention was a humanitarian intervention hying for a political solution
The Indian military intervention was spontaneous and not planned.

Pakistani forces numbering 93,000 men sunendered to become Indian POWs.

Bengali women were raped by Pakistan Army personnel India was not supported by international powers. The Pakistani backed Kashmiri Mujaliideens
hijacked die Indian Fokker Friendship aircraft on 30 January 1971 .

There may be even more mydis but the most common myths are cited above. The paragaplis below will investigate each myth separately.

West Pakistan Exploited The Sonar Bengal (East Pakistan)

The economic disparity had always remained die most effective propaganda tool for die so-called nationalists of the Awami League. The Bengalis were
convinced to believe that Bengal was a ‘ Golden Bird ’ where streams of honey and milk had flowed. Through weaving such fictitious tales, the Awami
League leadership lambasted West Pakistan for marginalizing East Pakistan Hie believers and die brainwashed Bengalis remained unaware of the fact diat the
economic disparity between East Pakistan and West Pakistan was a historical legacy. In addition to diis, die economic structure of rest of West Pakistan
(other than Punjab): Balocbistan, Sind and N WFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkbwa) were not much different tiian East Pakistan Further, it should also be noted
that Punjab was much developed prior to die creation of Pakistan As Rome was not built in a day the historical economic marginalization of East Pakistan
could have not been eliminated in a short span of time. Moreover, nature in fonn of annual cyclones, foods, and particularly the cyclone of 1 970, also bad not
been friendly in die case of East Pakistan which is anodier rationale of die economic disparity between West and East Pakistan Also, the food supply in East
Pakistan was never allowed to recover from the famine of 1 943 by the fury of nature pushing East Pakistan into further economic despair. A detailed analysis
of the economic disparity and die fabricated mydi of die economic stagnation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan is discussed in Chapter 3 . 0 in detail

No Development Was Carried Out In East Pakistan

Critics and historians blame diat the development of East Pakistan was not planned by die western wing and, diere was no attempt to address the plight of the
unemployed Bengalis confronted will higher food prices, lesser income, and no development projects. The blames were put solely on die western wing’s
shoulder. On die contrary, i was the west wing that initiated die famous Bangladeshi Parliament Building during President Ayub ’ s era in 1 96 1 . Also, the
unemployed Bengalis were employed in large, capital-intensive jute mills set-up by West Pakistani industrialists lice the Crescent, the Isphani , and the
Adamjee jute mills, which between diem had employed twenty- six diousand (26,000) workers. It should be noted that at Partition in 1947, West Bengal was
a more developed region which had gone to India while East Bengal which became East Pakistan, did not have even a single jute mill Raw jute was ejqported
to India for value addition The jute trade had dourished in East Pakistan solely owing to the West Pakistani investment in the jute indusby. It was after
Partition diat investments were encouraged by die government through Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC ), Pakistan Industrial Credit and
Investment Corporation (PICIC), and the Industrial Development Bank ofPakistan (IDBP) in East Pakistan During President Ayub’s ‘industrialization
period’ half of the cabinet members including many secretaries were from East Pakistan ensuing equal representation for die decision of the allocation of
development funds. The development of die Chittagpng Port, the Chandragona Paper Mils, die Fenugange Fertiliser complex and die first Steel Mill of
Pakistan; the construction of railway, road, airline, and river networks all took place by the help of the central government. The details of these are given in
Chapter 4.

The price situation in East Pakistan had become adverse when die Hindu Marwaris greedily hoarded goods for g’eater profit (common in any economy) and
the politically- motivated attempts of the ‘ Akhand Bharat’ supporters. By 1 97 1 , East Pakistanis were involved and absorbed both in die civil administration
and in the military. They enjoyed prestigious positions like serving as ambassadors and counsellors in bodi die governments, which diey exploited on many
occasions for personal gains betraying Pakistan Sadly, it was East Pakistanis who prioritised diemselves over Pakistan and not die odier way around.

 

West Pakistanis Imposed Their Culture On The Bengalis

The cultural inposition of the implementation of Urdu as a national language of West Pakistan over East Pakistan had been one of the gievances of the

 

Bengalis. It must, however, be understood that Urdu was not the language of any of the four regions of West Pakistan too. Punjab, Sindh, Balocbistan, and
N WFP (now Khyber Pakhtunklrwa), like East Pakistan, all had their own languages. Urdu had been the lingua franca of the Muslims of India, and Pakistan
had been created as a homeland for them, therefore, it was quite befitting that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan The weak political
governments and political parties did not handle tire situation well and die language controversy was allowed to grow out of proportion The cultural imposition
actually did not arise totally from the language issue; instead it may be looked in other areas also such as dress, music, and food. With delicate distinction
between various issues, we may find that in reality it was an equal diffusion and exchange of cultures from both wings. There was a ‘natural’ cultural
reciprocity between East and West Pakistan with no inposition from either side. The people of both East and West Pakistan were living happily until the seed
of hatred under the umbrella of cultural imposition was planted by conspirators. In reality Bengali culture and artists, like F irdousi Begum, Shehnaz Begum,
Alarrgir, Shabnam and Runa Laila to name a few, were loved and embraced by West Pakistan before and also after the dismemberment of 1 97 1 . The
families on both sides were intertwined with frequent intennaixiages making hatred an impossible emotion to brew. Chapter 3 delves into this in detail

The Agartala Conspiracy Case Was A fabrication Of The West Pakistanis

Another blame was that tire Agartala Conspiracy case was a construct of the West Pakistani establishment. It Iras been blamed that West Pakistan wanted to
frame Mujfo as a traitor, by alleging in the conspiracy case that in February 1962 he along with other Awami League leaders met with Indian Intelligence
officers to conspire for the dismemberment of Pakistan The Agartala conspiracy had remained mysteriously a Pakistani construct until books like ‘ 77?e
Agartala Doctrine: A Proactive North-East in Indian Foreign Policy ’, and Indian intellectuals, military officers, and retired intelligence officers made
revelations about its Indian roots and connections, which bad to be delayed because tire Indo-Cbina war broke out.

The plot was first delayed due to the Indo-Clrina war hr 1962 and later due to tire Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. By 1967, Pakistani government became
cognizant of this conspiracy resulting in tire filing ofthe Agartala Conspiracy Case against thirty- five persons including Sheikh Mujfo, on 12th July 1967, during
President Ayub’s government. It was, however, withdrawn in 1969 amidst immense political pressures. Since 1962, tire Awami League leadership remained
in close contact with the Indian Intelligence of which the leadership’s (except for Mujfo and Kamal Hussain) escape to India on 25th March 197 1 is
testament. Another fact available as evidence to support the conspiracy theory is tire establishment of the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) in 1 97 1 to
further Indian hegemony and to wage proxy wars between states like Tibet and China. Tire Special Frontier Force and Mukti Balrini experienced simultaneous
births providing more fodder to the conspiracy theory. The Agartala Conspiracy had been hatched and implemented by the Awami Leaguers and Indian
Intelligence with Pakistan bearing tire burden of its blame proving that history sides with tire victor. For further details see Chapter 4.

Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman Was A National Liberator

It was propagandised all over the world that Mujfo was the liberator of Bangladesh, whose people had been oppressed by tire tyrannical government of
Pakistan Historically, Mujfo was consistently using the election hustle in his favour and farming agitation all over East Pakistan, generating volatile emotions
benefitting no one. Mujfo wanted to assume power and West Pakistan was not willing to lose it.

Mujfo got his way by exploiting the finds given to him through Indian channels overshooting the other candidates who were using legitimate funds for
campaigning. West Pakistan was reluctant to transfer power to Mujfo because of his illicit, treason- like relationship with India and his involvement in the
Agartala Conspiracy Case. Mujfo was released from the Agartala Conspiracy Case because of political pressure from prominent politicians, most notably
Bhutto. Mujfo had been conspiring with India for the dismemberment ofPakistanand eventually in 1971 both parties succeeded.

After the dismemberment, Mujfo became a ‘National Liberator’ who had never been in a battlefield in his whole life. In 1 972, Mujfo, India’s puppet, signed a
treaty of peace and friendship with India for twenty- five years. The Indian interests were well protected with Bangladesh playing puppet in its hands. India
maintained its hegemony in the region with the treaty protecting its militaristic and hegemonic interests from any Bangladeshi opposition and protest.

Mujfo assumed power in Bangladesh as tire President, then Prime Minister, and then again President until Iris assassination on 15th August 1975. Mujfo was
murdered along with his family by the Indian-trained Mukti Bahinis, tire National Liberator ’s soldier’s. The Mujib-era saw rise in prices, snuggling, hoarding,
corruption, and political killings.

The prices rose to 300 times higher than they were in East Pakistan Snuggling was rampant due to corrupt politicians of Awami League who granted licenses
to their’ friends and relatives, and hoarding had also become persistent, which caused tire price hike of gpods hr Bangladesh only. Corruption levels remained
greater than they were hr West Pakistan The Red Cross Chairman, who had been politically appointed, became famously known as the ‘ Kambal Chor ’.
Once it was quoted about Mujfo, at the time he was tire President ofBangladesh, he said, ‘where is my Kambal ?’ Two hundred thousand (200,000) people
were displaced from Dacca, more than fifty thousand were sent to camps. Tire camps were more like concentration camps where people preferred to die than
live. Two thousand people lost their lives in political killings because Mujfo could not tolerate opposition He amended the constitution for his own benefit,
introducing tire presidential foren of government and Single Party Rule (BAKSAL). Mujfo became the president ofBangladesh and also the head ofBAKSAL
– it was tire old Awami League in a new garb. Mujfo built the paramilitary forces to counter and suppress opposition and, in most cases, kill tire opposition
leaders. In tire end, to add about tire National Liberator , when he was a minister in East Pakistan, hr 1 950s, he had been accused of nepotism, banding out
licenses to Awami Leaguers and misuse of funds while other Awami League minister’s were also accused of corruption For further details see Chapter 7.

Operation Searchlight Was Launched By T he West Pakistan’s Establishment Against The Innocent Civilians Of East Pakistan

It was blamed that the Operation Searchlight had caused deaths of innocent civilians. It was alleged that tire Operation Searchlight was tire real cause behind
the dismemberment ofPakistan, thus tire culprits were the armed Pakistani soldier’s who terrorized, killed, and raped innocent Bengalis. Unfortunately, such
allegations are contrary to reality. The reality of tire Operation Searchlight and its relevance unravelled when Yalrya Khan postponed the National Assembly
session in early March 1 97 1 . With this announcement Awami Leaguers took to the roads armed with ‘daos’ (meat-cleavers), sickles arid sticks. Tire Awami
Leaguers were armed, waiting for tire announcement and started vandalism, arson, loot, and killings as an immediate aftermath ofthe antrouncement. F rom tire
National Assembly session postponement on 1 st March till tire start of tire Operation Searchlight thousands of innocent people lost their lives, national flag was
desecrated every day, and jailbreaks occurred regularly all over the province. Contrary to popular’ belief tire perpetrator’s of violence were tire Bengali mobs,
not tire non- Bengalis (Bihari Muslims, West Pakistanis), with their ferociousness targeting the non- Bengalis. The Bengali mob mentality was exhibiting such
savagery that the army was ordered to remain in their bamacks resulting in attacks even on tire American and British institutions. Throughout most of March,

1 st to the 25 th , the situation was under Awami League’s control and Mujfo was issuing directives ffomlris 32, Dhanmandi House. During these 25 days, the
Bangladeshi flag was raised, firing practices ensued within Dacca University, barricades were erected throughout Dacca city, checkpoints of Awami Leaguers
were erected near tire airport to search people, and looting on Mujib’s directive that Wo money should leave East-Pakistan ‘ became a tragic reality. Mujfo

 

and his Awami League were in no way willing to act in a civilized way by peacefully protesting for transfer of power. Due to this lawlessness. Operation
Searchlight, a military, surgical operation was launched against the Awami League leadership and its terrorist supporters. Hie Operation had another vital
objective, which was to disarm the Bengali armed forces, as it had become evident that Mujib’s political agitation had reached deep within the Bengali Armed
Force personnel.

With the stall of the Operation, the Bengal regiments and the East Pakistan Regiments revolted. As a bloody display of their extreme abhorrence, the
defecting Bengali soldiers before leaving their barracks killed their counterpart West Pakistani soldiers and their families like cowards in the dead of the night.
Hie situation of Dacca University was the dismal desecration of its noble grounds, no longer the site of the subliminal cause of education, but serving as the
training ground for temoiists defying human civilization’s progress from medieval barbarity. The university environment no longer celebrated the sounds of
students but cowered amidst the sounds of gunshots. Civility and order bad ‘indeed’ been lost under the ‘ National Liberator guns had replaced the pens.
The army personnel were fired from the university halls, under the illusion that trained terrorists resided there, proved from tire relentless barrage of fire, amry
retaliated with frill force and blood replaced ink on the university grounds. For atrocities and crimes of tire Awami League, see Chapter 6.

Pakistani Armed Forces Killed More Than 3 Million Innocent Bengalis and Raped 200,000 Bengali Women

Since the creation of Bangladesh it is propagated that tire Pakistani Army: exclusively constituting of West Pakistani soldiers had killed 3 million Bengalis and
raped 200,000 (two hundred thousand) Bengali women. Accordingly, tire only reason for their genocide was their ethno- linguistic identity. Around tire world
people, including both Pakistanis and Indians, believe in this distorted version as propagated and intended by tire Bangladeshi and Indian governments. The
need is to investigate tire bighfyexagggrated figure of 3 million The origin of tire 3 million myth can be traced back to December 1971 when ‘ Pravda ’ the
Soviet newspaper in its editorial of23rd December 1971 entitled ‘ Enemy Occupation ’ reported that deaths in tire war of 1971 is about 3 million Soon this
figure emerged in tire Bangladeshi media and was widely disseminated in Bangladesh. This figure gained legitimacy after it was endorsed by Mujib in his
interview with David Frost (a well-known British journalist) on 1 8th January 1 972. Answering a query he asserted, “ Three million people have been killed,
including children, women, intellectuals, peasants, workers, students ”. Responding on tire question regarding sources of such an assertion, he further
remarked, “ Before my coming, my people had started collecting the information. I hcn’e messages coming from all areas where I have a base. We
ha\>e not finally concluded, it might be more, but definitely it will not be less than three million ” . Since then the figure given by Mujib remains
unquestioned.

Several investigative accounts have rejected these evidentially unsupported claims of tire Awami League government. Even the immediate government of tire
Awami League afler the creation Bangladesh failed to prove its own generated myth of 3 million. Mujib formed air inquiry committee in January 1 972 to meet
the figure of 3 million but failed as tire committee came with a figure not more than fifty thousand. Likewise the global media also denied tire figure of three
million. Further, tire Bengali intellectuals like Samila Bose, Chowdlrury Abdul Munrin and many others have also deified the accuracy of the 3 million figure. A
detailed study of this myth is accessible in Chapter 7.

The Pakistani Armed Forces Exclusively Targeted And Killed Hindus In East Pakistan

It was blamed that the Pakistani Armed Forces specifically targeted and killed Hindus of East Pakistan as it was ordered to flush out the large
Hindu population from the eastern province. In reality the Pakistan Amy was only concerned about the temorist Bahinis. The Pakistan Amry made no
discrimination between criminals on communal basis; its aim was to only obliterate the Mukti Bahinis irrespective of their religious beliefs. The renowned
author Sannila Bose writes in her book about tire Pakistan Army saving tire Hindu population from massacre, by tire terrorist Awami Leaguers, not committing
it. According to her accounts, in 1 97 1 Hindus remained unhurt by tire Pakistani Amy migrating to India not because of the Pakistan Amy’ s actions, but to
secure themselves from tire Mukti Bahini contrived persecution to satisfy their material greed and not communal strife. Hindu persecution alone is evidence of
Mukti Bahiifi’s not-so-noble intentions and actions.

The Pakistan Army Is Solely Responsible For All The Violence In East Pakistan

It was blamed that Pakistan Army is solely responsible for all violence . All violence – rapes, arson, loots, and tire massacres – were blamed on the
Pakistan Army. They were accused of raping 200,000 women and killing three million people during the nine- month struggle for restoration of law and order.
These facts and figures given by Mujib’s government were exorbitantly embellished and have been contested by renowned Bengali authors like Sarmila Bose.
A close examination of tire facts reveals that tire main perpetrators of these heinous crimes (committed from 1 st March to 25th March and from 26th March to
1 6th December 1971) were the Awami Leaguers and the Mukti Bahinis. Thouands of horrifying cases of loot, arsons, rapes, truders and massacres were
reported before 25th March There are petrifying accounts ofwhole colonies burnt to ashes with inmates locked inside and burnt alive. The entire violence
was targeted at the non- Bengalis – Biharis, foreigners, West Pakistanis, creating a merciless hell on earth forcing the Pakistan Amy to initiate Operation
Searchlight. It became clear after 25 th March, that the trained Mukti Bahini terrorists are merciless and unremorseful killer’s, whose inhuman methods find little
parallel in civilized human history. After 25 th March, people – non- Bengalis, rarely Bengalis – were taken to buildings to be burnt alive in thousands and
guillotined hr jute mills, turning the river waters red, choked with rotting human corpses. Young women were subjected to gang rapes; the unlucky ones who
survived were damned to endure numbed existences as sex slaves. The mantra of the rapists was simple, succumb to rape or be vandalised with throats slit
and innards pulled out (eyes gouged and body flesh sliced) for an excruciatingly painful death. The pregnant women or their unborn babies were not spared
either; their wombs were cut with unborn babies hoisted on bayonets as trophies of savagery. Humanity left tire earth to cry on its own demise. These crimes,
so nefarious that adjectives fail their purpose or rather tire brain refuses to comprehend this display of human opprobrium, were not committed by tire Pakistan
Army but tire Awami League workers and tire Mukti Bahinis. For further details see Chapter 6.

The Indian military intervention was a humanitarian intervention trying for a political solution

It was propagated that Indian intervention was a humanitarian intervention and had tried for political solution. This humanitarian intervention of India
had been appreciated by thousands of people in different countries especially in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Throughout the nine-month crisis India tried
to persuade the world power’s and Pakistan for a political solution These efforts failed because Yahya was unwilling to talk with Mujtb, the true leader of
Bengalis, who had been imprisoned.

In the world of facts and truth, we would be surprised to find a less-heard narrative backed by strong facts that Indian intervention, in reality, was not
humanitarian rather it was a vicious, planned attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty. These plans were made with the consent of tire Awami League leadership in an
infamous meeting known as tire Agprtala Conspiracy. The Awarri League leadership was in constant contact with tire India’s Research & Analysis Wing
(R&AW) officers retreating, like mice hr their burrows, during Operation Searchlight to their’ Indian base camp at Agartala. Yahya, very astutely, was reluctant

 

to conciliate with the Awani League because it simply meant handing over power and East Pakistan to die Indian p uppets. No sane man would contemplate
a political solution with the opposition negotiating from the enemy’s lap. Even ifYahya bad naively parleyed with the Awani League it would have been a fixtile
effort of expecting Indian interests to allow the existence of a united Pakistan. A fool’s effort for a foolish dream The Indian intervention was egotistical, and
by no means humanitarian, to accomplish the creation of the vassal state of Bangladesh to grant India unchallengeable hegemony in the region. The Awani
League leadership and the Mukti Bahinis were mere pawns in the ‘grandmaster’s golden plan’. For Huffier details see Chapter 4.

The Indian Military Intervention Was Spontaneous And Not Planned

It was propagated that the Indian military intervention was spontaneous and that it was the pre-emptive strikes that forced India into war against
Pakistan . India claimed that it only interfered when Pakistan’s civil war reached its soil by the crossing of its borders by a hundred thousand refugees from
East Pakistan and attacks on its airfields, leaving India no choice but to protect itself This is the general narrative which has no relationship with the facts.

In reality, Pakistan attacked Indian airfields on 3 rd December 1 97 1 afier the war had begun while the refugees had gone to India as a consequence of the
horrific atrocities perpetrated by Mukti Babini and not because of the Pakistan Army. For Hither details see

Operation Searchlight stalled failing as the Mukti Bahinis swelled in number. A full-fledged civil war broke out in East Pakistan, with the Indian- trained Mukti
Bahinis and Awani League workers destroying all hopes of restoration of law and order with their destruction of Pakistani forces’ morale and infrastructure.
The refugee crisis also made borders porous that were already inadequately protected by the thinly- dispersed forces of Pakistan

The Pakistani forces were continuously ambushed by the Indian forces, Mukti Bahinis, and the special Frontier Force internally while the Tibetan guerrilla
force raised by R&AW was constantly attacking border outposts. The Pakistani forces were confronted by this predicament from March till November 1971.
November 1971 is most significant in history as the Indian hypocrisy doming the humanitarian garb was unveiled with its 100,000 Mukti Bahini forces
launching attacks on army posts on the 21 st and 22 nd day of the month Hie Pakistani forces were outgunned and outmamed; a single Corps of Pakistani
troops were pitted against three Corps oflndian troops who were additionately supported by the 100,000 Mukti Bahinis, thus making Pakistani forces virtual
sitting ducks.

The accumulation of three Corps, as opposed to a single Corps as in the past, around East Pakistan borders strengthened by Mukti Bahinis who adopted a
more aggressive posture afier the rebellion of tire Bengali forces, screams of a planned intervention. India proved its shrewd military planning by the presence
of three Corps and a Communication Zone before November 1971, with the Northern Borders Forces also directed towards East Pakistan in
September/October, indicating that Indians were actually calculating a spontaneous Chinese intervention

It should be noted that on 3 rd December 1971 Pakistan had only opened the western front with the Indian forces intruding considerably inside East Pakistan
with tanks and artilleries since November 2 1 st /22 nd . India had already occupied temitories, destroyed Pakistani tanks, and fighter planes in November 1 97 1
which all is testament that India’s claim of spontaneity is a fallacy. The truth remains that India by the 3 rd of December had entrenched itself firmly in some
territories of East Pakistan guaranteeing it an upper hand over the Pakistani forces. If India had not achieved this, in tire words oflndian Amy Chief; Sam
Manekshaw, it would have guaranteed 100 per cent defeat for tire Indian forces.

Pakistani forces and civilians lost their air route due to tire plane hijacker plot while the Indian forces laboured continuously raising their military capabilities, in
a notably calculating manner. The Indian Army Chief SamManekshaw, said in an interview that, ‘I got the money, went to Soviet Union and bought the
tanks’, which in itself is a not- so- spontaneous act. For further details see Chapter 6.

Ninety-Three Thousand (93,000) Pakistani Soldiers Surrendered And Became Indian POWs

The surrender did happen and there were soldiers who surrendered but their exaggerated, unreal, and untrue numbers were reported, published and
propagated by the international newspapers. To this day the disproportionate number of 93,000 soldiers persists, sustained by the Indian, Bangladeshi and
Soviet propaganda. The actual number according to General Niazi was 34, 000 troops; Police, Rangers, Scouts and militia were 11, 000 personnel , which
made the total number of combatants or fighting troops to 45,000 only. Accordingly, tire number of 93,000 as conjured by tire Indians included the children,
women, civil administration officials and staff; non-combatant anry personnel – nurses, doctors, barbers, shoemakers – and others with the soldiers. For
further details see Chapter 5.

India Was Not supported By The International Powers

It is another myth that Soviet Union had only provided diplomatic support to India, and there was no militaristic involvement of Soviet Union On tire contrary,
Soviet Union had sold modem tanks and aircrafts to India and a treaty was signed between them in August 1971. This treaty was made to threaten Pakistan,
an ally of America, and succeeded in thwarting all Pakistani efforts at the United N ations after 3 rd December 1971. America and China, two out of tire five
permanent members of the Security Council, were overruled by tire Soviet vetoes in their attempts to help Pakistan through their ceasefire resolutions. One of
the Soviet Union Representative, Molotov, at United Nations was so fond of vetoes that he was nicknamed, Mr. Veto; Mr. No. For further details see

Chinese and Americans were not willing to plunge into any war and were also advising Pakistan against it, but constant Indian attacks and aggression forced
Pakistan to enter into the war without any military support of its powerful friends. When Indian forces with Soviet tanks and aircrafts were bombing and
occupying territories in East Pakistan, Pakistan’s international diplomatic support was vetoed by the Soviets.

The Pakistan Backed Kashmiri Mujahideen Hijacked the Indian Fokker Friendship Aircraft On 30th January 1971

It was said that this cannot be untrue that Pakistan had been helping Kashmir in its struggle against the Indian occupation. After independence when
India sent its army in Kashmir, Jinnah as advised did not send regular anry for help but the irregular Mujahideen (fighter) groups were sent as liberators in
occupied Kashmir. In such a logical sequence we are obliged to accept that Pakistani backed Kashmiri Miijahedeen hijacked Indian Fokker Friendship
aircraft on 30 rh January’ 1971. Enthusiastic crowds cheered the Mujahideen for their brave act at Lahore airport. Pakistan under international convention
was obliged to arrest hijackers and found itself in a complicated situation to own or disown the Kashmir struggle. The hijackers were granted political asylum
to ensure the safety of the passengers. The situation was almost under control, the aircraft crew and the passengers were safely evacuated and hijackers had
to leave the Indian aircraft. At that point, hijackers did not comply with Pakistani authorities’ orders, blowing up the aircraft. India blaming this on Pakistan
suspended all air route communication between East and West Pakistan over its airspace. This isolated incident developed into the persistent myth that

 

Pakistan always supports Kashmiris in their struggle against India. In reality this was an Indian and Awani League concocted conspiracy against united
Pakistan. This was an extremely successful manoeuvre as it completely isolated East Pakistan from West Pakistan, increasing air travel time from three hours
to seven hours. This isolation helped Mujib’s Awami League to terrorize civilians and declare independence at the next opportunity available since the
Agartala Conspiracy. It was a pre- planned strategy of India to leave East Pakistan in complete control of Awami League, to declare independence. The
Awami League leadership overconfident with India’s support were caught by surprise by Operation Searchlight against its terrorists and fled to India.

Air route communication blockade was not enough for the dismemberment until Pakistan Army remained intact. Throughout the period of 1 97 1 , Pakistan
Armed Forces lacked proper reinforcements, due to a single mishandled conspiracy of ‘hijackers’. An investigation report presented on 15th April 1971
proved that the hijacking was an Indian devised plan and hijackers themselves were neither revolutionary nor interested in Kashmir issue. At that point it was
too late to undo the mistake, but historically it is never too late to unveil the reality, burdened by biased Indian, Bangladeshi, and Soviet myth. For further
details see Chapter 4.

2 CREATION OF PAKISTAN Introduction

P

akistan was a nation about which most Congress and Hindu leaders had thought that it would crumble under the weight of expectations and hardships. The
timing and the terms of independence ensured that Pakistan had no infrastructure and no assets. To add to the misery of the newly- formed state, many
important Muslim territories had been handed over to India or like the princely states were taken over by India through force. Yet, defying all odds Pakistan
survives to this day.

Before independence, the Muslims constituted a large minority in a Hindu majority British India. The Hindus conditioned and consumed by religious
propaganda and Hindu revivalist sentiments plotted incessantly to eliminate the Muslims, either by killing them or by converting them One can gamer evidence
ofthis from the activities ofthe current religious right-wing parties of contemporary India like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangb(RSS), Shiv Sena, Bajrang
Dal Vishva Hindua Parishad (VHP), etc.

The RSS is the ideology guider of tire Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) and has been deemed responsible for bloody events like the Gujarat massacres in the so-
called modem democratic India. Regretfully, the Hindu radical BJP is now the largest party in India in terms of membership and electoral votes.

During their rule the British were largely indifferent if not hostile in their attitude towards Muslims, the previous rulers of India for a thousand years. Remaining
true to colonial traditions the British had their own interests at heart, rendered no importance to the protection ofthe Muslims. Rather they favoured the
Hindus and the Indian National Congress as they had greater control over the larger proportion of the populace of British India. Their policies reflected this
attitude, of which history is testament.

The activities of the Muslim Ulema in British India worsened the already precarious Muslim predicament. They were a class of Muslinelite scholars, who had
been gaining momentum over the last number of decades in pre-Partiion India. Succinctly, they had been against the Pakistan movement and tire idea of
Pakistan from inception Their version of Islam deemed the Pakistan movement ‘heretical’ and its propagators ‘kafirs’ (non-believers).

As history tells us that tire creation of Pakistan always seemed like a far-fetched dream There were so many powers and elements against it, that is creation
is no less than a miracle ir itself The purpose of this chapter is not to highlight the freedom movements, but it is to highlight that from the moment tire idea of
Pakistan was conceived, i faced irpossible odds which led to its dismemberment in 1971 and continue to threaten is existence even today.

Hindu Revivalist Movements and the Far Right Agenda

Hindu activism took an ugfy turn soon after tire apogee of the Hindu- Muslin unity in the Khilafat Movement days of the early 1 920s, and continued to grow
until 1 947, resuiing in Partition. It is generally considered that tire British Raj had a hand in developing the Hirdu- Muslim divide, which we discuss hr the next
section, but this necessarily has not been tire case. Both Congress and the MuslhrrLeague were actually British- sponsored parties since their inception But the
Hindu extremists who had crept into tire mainstream politics of British India, with the help of the Congress, did all what they could to suppress the Muslins.

It was Dayananda Sarswati, a Hindu religious leader, who established tire revivalist Arya Samaj hr 1875. His ideas were based on re- establishing and reviving
the ancient Hindu civilization ofthe Vedic period. 1 Dayananda Sarswati was also responsible for devising the ‘ Shuddlri’ , the practice of converting all non-
Hindus to the Hindu faith and the ‘Guaraksba Sabha’, a society for the protection of the cow. 2 The Arya Samaj movement rubbed salt into Muslims, wounds
by demanding Muslims to either embrace Hinduism or quit India. The agitation of some Muslims for independence was a reaction to and a consequence of the
Hindu suppression and not a sudden and mere desire for a separate homeland. It was simply a plea for freedom from tire Hindu hatred and extremism to
exercise their human riglrt of practicing their religion without fear.

‘ Cambridge History of India, pp 540 “ Duni Chand, The Ulster of India, 1936, p 18

In 1882, the ‘Vande Matram’, an anthem adopted from Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay’s 1882 novel Anandamath, inspiring Hindunationalistic sentiments
with Muslim- Hindu hostility at its core, was popularised. It was later adopted as the national anthem of the Hindus of India by tire Congress, as a clear
corroboration of Hirdu antagonism towards the Muslims.3

Even hr 1905, people recognized that Hindu nationalism was driving the Muslins away. Rabindranath Tagore thought that the communal strife in India was
due to the religion dominated Hindu nationalism He commented on the anti- partition agitation in 1 905,

” When our speakers failed in My’mensingh and other areas to win the heart of the Mussulman peasantry’, they felt very indignant. They never
thought for a moment that we have never given proof of our real interest in the welfare of the Missulmans or of the common people of our
country. We cannot, therefore, blame them if they are rather suspicious of our professions of goodwill. ” 4

The feeling? of some Arya Samaj leaders towards the Muslins were so hostile that Bhai Pannanand, an Arya Samaj leader ofPunjab wrote in 1912 only
seven years after Tagpre’s sympathetic statement about tire Muslim peasantry of Bengal, that the Muslins oflndia could have their homeland on the other side
of the River Indus. He thought that the solution lay in either the Hirdus assimilating the entire Muslin population ofthe subcontinent or beirg eventually

 

assimilated by the alien intruders. He said:

 

“It stuck me a long time ago that the only satisfactory avenue to unity is to effect complete ses’erance between the two peoples. India could be
partitioned in such a manner as to secure the supremacy of Islam in one zone and that of Hindustan in the other. ” 5

Another prominent figure in establishing Hindu revivalist movements was the fire-eating Bal Gang^dhar Tilak. Tilak became tire leader of the people and
popularised movements such as the Shivaji cult which had an anti- Muslim agenda. 6 He categorized the Muslims as malechas (impure) and foreigners. He
framed a close alliance with many Indian National Congress leaders including Bipin Chandra Pal, Lala Lajpat Rai, Aurobindo Ghose, and V. O.
Chidambaram Pillai.

^ F.K. Khan Durrani, The Meaning of Pakistan, 1944, p. 56-61
^ Hiran Kumar Sanyal, Young Tagore, Bombay, 1945, p. 25

5 K.K. Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan Vol I, Vanguard, 1987. Lahore, p. 46

6 Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest, London, 1910, p.44

In 1906 when the Muslim League was established in Dacca to secure separate representation, a parallel body was established by Hindus under the name of
the Hindu Mahasabba with the objective of ‘watching and safeguarding the interests of the entire Hindu community in all respects’. Soon after the end of the
Klrilafat Movement in 1922, the cooperation between the Hindus and the Muslims came to an end and tire anti- Muslim agenda re-emerged with a renewed
intensity.

In 1922 the Hindu Mahasabha was reorganized and the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS), the militant wing ofthe Mahasabha was launched in 1925. 7 The RSS
worked inconspicuously and in great secrecy to help the Mahasabha establish an ‘unadulterated’ Hindu Raj in British India. This ‘pure’ Hindu Raj was
idealized to be unencumbered by Muslims, Christians, or the Parsi’s.

Shuddhi and Sangtan had a disquieting effect on the Muslims of the British India in the 1920s. Also creating ripple effects on the quiet surface of the political
scenario were the Arya Samaj and tire other Hindu movements in Bengql and Bombay provinces espousing the division of India into Hindu and Muslim zones.
The Muslim religious parties such as the Ahrars, ADairra Maslrriqi’s Khaksar movement, and Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi’s lieutenants arraigned themselves
agqinst Arya Samaj ’s threat of extemrination ofthe weaker sections ofthe Muslim community. In fact, the Arya Samaj and other fictions ofthe Hindu
revivalism compelled even the hitherto politically languid segments of Muslims to demand tire preservation of their religious and cultural identity in this hostile
environment.

Hindutva has been the most potent feature of the Hindu mindset right from its origin. The Hindus being an economically stronger community and more
receptive to modem ideas were backed by the British Raj allowing them to openly oppose every Muslim effort to flourish. In fact, ary British reprieve fbr
Muslims was thwarted by the Hindu leaders’ remonstrations amidst the Muslim- favouring British attitude claims.

7 T.Walter Wallbank, A Short History of India and Pakistan, p. 183 Hindu Nationalism & the Congress Rule

Hie period between 1 920 and 1930 witnessed a series of weEplaimed riots by the Hindus, all in tire hope of building support for its militant wings. According
to estimates, some 450 people were killed and another 5,000 injured between 1923 and 1927 in HinduMuslimriots.8 More than hundred riots took place
over the course ofthe next three years causing 300 persons to lose their lives, hr Bengal only about 35,000 women were kidnapped between 1922 and 1927.
In Cawnpore more than 300 were massacred in 1931. Bombay experienced the annihilation of around 560 between 1929 and 1938. hr almost all riots tire
bloodshed was predominantly of Muslims.9

During this period the Muslim League made repeated but failed efforts for uniting Hindus and Muslims to work towards common grals. In 1 9 1 6, the Muslim
League and Congress met each other at Lucknow, and unanimously agreed to a refonns scheme that could lead to self governance hr the future. Thb was the
first time that the Congress had recognized the Muslim League as the representative party ofMuslims. Congress’ acknowledgment ofthe MuslimLeague
granted its leaders tire provision of separate electorates for Muslims and an agreement that tire Congress would support no law that supressed tire religious
identity of the Muslims. Thb agreement between the Muslim League and Congress came to be known as tire Lucknow Pact of 1 9 1 6. Subsequently, the
Muslims secured more seats than their ratio of population hr the Centre and minority provinces, but relatively less in Punjab and Bengql consequently affecting
their majority status. Thb paved the way for the HinduMuslim cooperation dining the Klrilafat Movement days as well 10

The rise of the Hindu nationalbm ran parallel to tire ascension of Congress with its elements thoroughly penetrating the Congress ranks and files by tire late
1920s. The presence of the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS leaders in the Congress b an attestation of thb as well as Congress’ renegqtion on all concessions it
had pronrbed the Muslims in the Lucknow Pact of 1 9 1 6 .

Thb rise of Hindu nationalbm was abo instrumental hr the failure of tire Round Table Conferences of 1931, 1932, and 1933. In one ofthe conferences the
Hindu Mahasabha had replaced the Congress completely, owing to the latter’s boycott. In others, tire callous Mahasabha leaders in the Congress did not give
any consideration to the Muslim Leaguers and their concerns about the comrmnal problems in India.

® Report ofthe Indian Statutory Commission, London 1930, p. 40
6 B.R. Ambedkar, Pakistan or Partition of India, Bombay 1945, p. 162-176

Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. “Lucknow Pact”, accessed July 14, 2016, https://www.britannica.com/event/Lucknow-Pact.

After the comprehensive win of provincial eletions ofwinter of 1936-37, the Congress refused to recognize tire exbtence of any communal problems in India.
There was no question of them cooperating with the Muslim League as it would go agqinst their stand of complete Hindu domination A stand that boasted of
the Hindu raj having been successfully establbhed in India. Thb led to the newly- fonned Congress Minbtries to adopt measures detrimental to Muslims. For
example, tire lrobtiirg ofthe Congress flag on all public offices, the recitation ofthe Vande Matram with its supplication to the Goddess Kali becoming
mandatory for all official workers and students at schoob, the banning of the slaughtering of cows and selling of beef and tire forcing of Muslim students to
worship the idol of Saraswati and Gandhi’s image on hb birthday. The C.P. Government passed the Cow Protection Bill that imposed heavy restrictions on
the slaughtering of cows, even on religious occasions like the Eid al- Adlra.

Urdu, tire language ofthe Muslim culture, was dbcouraged and removed as Hindi became the medium of instruction. A scheme that Gandhi had drawn up of

 

primary education, popularly known as the ‘ Wardha Scheme’, was introduced and implemented by the Congress Ministries in their respective provinces. This
scheme was another instance of the fundamental clash of national ideals between Hindus and Muslims. Its idea was to convert Muslims into Hindus through
the primary educational literature. The intention was to propagate Hindu ideas conflicting with the Muslim identity under the cover of the new education
policies. The projection of Hindu heroes like Gandhi and distortion of the Muslim history became their moral creed which distorted Muslim history and identity
casting a shadow of Hindu nationalism all over British India.

Apart from the cultural attack on the Muslims, systematic persecution of the Muslims was also taking place. During 1 937-39, as many as 72 riots took place
in Bihar, another 33 in U.P. and a large nurrber in C.P. 1 1 Incidents like Muslim butchers being assaulted, pigs being thrown into mosques, and Muslim prayers
being intenupted with songs of Hindu nationalism became commonplace. Muslims were persecuted for practising their religion freely at every turn In certain
localities in the Central Provinces, Muslim households were set on fire and their’ women molested or abducted. In one instance, the entire Muslim male
population (about one hundred and fifty men) of a village was collectively accused of murder, summoned to tine police station, kept without food and water,
tortured during inquiry, subsequently found innocent and acquitted by the court.

In different towns in the U.P., tire Muslims ‘voluntarily’ consented to music being played before mosques at the prayer hour and abandoned cow slaughter in
deference to tire Hindu religious feelings. These agreements appeared to be docile Hindu- Muslim settlement of long-standing disputes, but infect they were
achieved by threats. 12

The policy of the Congress government was inspired by its ambition of the Hindu domination of the Muslim minority, thereby forcing them to recognize their’
superiority. When the Muslims resented against injustices and discriminatory treatment at the hands of the Hindus they were bullied and in many instances
rioting and disorderly atmosphere was created.

As remarked by Coupland:

“the worst and most dangerous cause of disorder was, as it had always been,
communal strife. The barometer of rioting and fighting, which had stood so steady
for some years past, began to fall again. When the Congress ministries resigned in
the autumn of 1939, there had been 57 communal outbreaks in their provinces
and more than 1700 casualties of which over 130 had been fatal… By the end of
1939, it was widely believed that, if the Congress Government had lasted much

longer, communal fighting would ha\>e broken out on an unprecedented scale. ” 13 Another incident of the Congress high-handedness against tire
Muslims that serves to evince this nanative follows. In a small village,
caled Cbandur Biswas with a tiny Muslim population in the old
Central Province of India, there lived a man Jagdees, who was

notorious for his anti- Muslim activities and writings. Once he took out a procession playing music and shouting anti- Muslim slogans before a mosque at the
time of prayer. The Muslim worshippers protested and in the melee that followed many Muslims and Hindus were injured. Jagdees succurrbed to his injuries a
few hours later. The Premier of C.P. , Mr. Sukla, visited tire village and made an irresponsible speech charging tire Muslims with conspiracy. Under his orders
the entire adult, male Muslim population totalling 157 persons were arrested for tire alleged murder of one Hindu. In the hot weather they were locked qp in a
small room The Sessions

Judge, Mr. Clarke referring to this lock-up remarked:

“This is more suggestive of the conditions in Nazi Germany at the present
time than in any enlightened portion of the British Empire. ” 14
A Muslim villager in Tikori, Bihar’ had purchased some beef to
entertain Iris friends on tire occasion of tire wedding of Iris daughter.

Suddenly tire Hindus accused him of having killed a calf belonging to
a Hindu villager. In spite of tire Muslim villager’s protest and
although tire butcher testified that they had purchased tire beef from
him, tire Hindus attacked him and his guests tying their’ linbs to their
necks. Then the Hindus brought a pig from the house of a Hanjatr
and rubbed tire beast’s mouth against the mouth of tire Muslims,
saying: ‘this is the rex’enge of your eating beef.

The Hindus entered tire zenana, ripped tire clothes of tire Muslim
women, assaulted and dishonoured them 15
These cases show that under tire Congress rule tire ‘law of
civilization’ ceased to mle and tire ‘law of tire jungle’ prevailed as far’
as tire Muslims were concerned.

Commenting on the Congress treatment of tire Muslims of Bihar,

Lt Gen Sir Francis Tuker in Iris book While Memory Sen’es remarked: ‘ ‘During October and November, in Bihar. . .gi’eat mobs of Hindus turned

suddenly, but with every preparation for the deed, upon the few Muslims who had

lived and whose forefathers had lived, in amity and trust all their lives, among

these very Hindu neighbours . . . The number of Muslim dead men, women, and

children, in this short, srnage killing was about seven thousand to eight thousand.

In the United Provinces e\ >en pregnant women were ripped up, their unborn babies

tom out and the infants ’ brains dashed out on walls and on the ground. There was rape, and women and children were seized by the legs by burly
friends and
tom apart. ” !6

The Muslims were provoked and oppressed; if they resisted, they
were subjected to lathi charge, firing, and arrest; if they protested
against injustice and high-handedness, they were accused of farming

communalismarrd dubbed as ‘communalists’ and reactionaries. AH of this served to increase the feelings of discontent amongst

the Muslims and their distrust of the Congress. Jirmah contended, “On the threshold of what little power is given, the majority community have

clearly shown its hand that Hindustan is for Hindus. ”

 

He even accused the Congressmen o£ ‘behaving and acting towards
the Mussulmans in a much worse manner than the British did towards the
Indians 1 7

The behaviour ofthe Congress during 1937-39 foretold ofwhat
was to happen in an undivided All- India Federation When the rule
finally ended on 22 nd December 1939, it was celebrated by all
Muslims as the ‘ Day of Deliverance Any illusion that the Muslims were
under for creating a United India had been truly shattered by the
Congress rule. Finally in 1 940, the first concrete step was taken for
the establishment of a separate Muslim majority state, Le. Pakistan
which was by nature a response to tire growing Hindu nationalism
agenda and militancy.

‘ ‘ Sir Reginald Coupland, India: A Restatement , London, 1945, p. 187
‘ – Abdul Hamid, Muslim Separatism in India , Lahore, 1967, p. 222.

12 Sir Reginald Coupland, India: A Restatement , London, 1945

ld Ahmad, Jamiluddin, The Indian Constitutional Tangle , Lahore 1941, p261

15 Ibid, p 194

Elections of 1946 and the Aftermath

 

The British government dutifully tried to keep India united. The Cripps Plan of 1942 and the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 were both British efforts to bring
about a compromise between the Congress and the Muslim League. But the Congress was adamant in not giving the Muslims any share in governance. It was
not even prepared to concede Muslims the benefit of the grouping and limited-centre provisions which, under the Cabinet Mission Plan, would have given
them autonomy in their majority areas.

On 2 1 st August 1 945, Lord Wavell announced the holding of elections the next year. The Muslim League captured all the 30 Muslim seats in the Central
Legislature and 428 out of a total of 492 Muslim seats in the Provincial Legislatures. Amazingly, even after the election results the Hindu leadership was
reluctant to accept the League’s superior standing which had then been clearly established. Hie Congress leaders still castigated the League as a reactionary
and medieval entity, regretting the reverses of nationalist Muslims.

ld AzizAhrred, Discovery of Pakistan .Lahore, 1964, p. 341 1 7 Speeches and Writings of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, p.28

The Congress leader, Nehru, did not accept the elections as decisive, complaining that the Muslims swayed by a religious hysteria, did not realize tire full
consequences of their voting preferences. This was contrary to reality as the Muslim community was cognizant of the momentousness of these election results.
In this electoral victory lay their religious, economic, cultural and political salvation, which the Muslims yearned for with utmost fervour and zeaL

The Congress, had full support of the rightist elements, and other anti- Muslim League parties could not prove her worth at large and neither the gold nor the
money of the Birlas and the Dalmias could sway the Muslims from their demand for Pakistan

The echo of the elections had not yet dwindled when another gruesome episode of a Hindu- Muslim conflict resulted in violent communal riots in Bihar. A large
number of Muslims became victims to the inhuman atrocities and barbaric treatment ofthe Hindus. As reported by Mahbub Waris, then Joint Secretary of the
Bihar Muslim League,

“Not a single Mtslim was left alive in an area of 300 square miles Ponpoon to Teregna in Bihar. Dead bodies were lying everywhere, railway
platforms were littered with them. ”18

The Development Minster of Bihar reflected the attitude of the Congress Party when he refused to furnish any help to Muslims by saying,

“I cannot do anything to protect the lives of Mtslims. I can give you no help. ” 19

Much of tire butchery of the hopelessly outnumbered Muslims bore every sign of careful prior planning, the first to several such abominations to occur during
thel2-month period. The casualties were colossal A rough preliminary military estimate at the time put the injured as well as the dead at 5,000. According to
a subsequent statement in the British Parliament, the death toll only amounted to 5,000. While the Statesman’s estimate was between 7,500 and 10,000, the
Congress party admitted to 2,000 and Mr Jinnah claimed about 30,000 20

It was riveting that great mobs of Hindus had turned up suddenly, but with every preparation to kill upon the few Muslims who had lived in trust all their lives
among these very Hindu neighbours. It has never been ascertained who was tire organizing brain of this well- laid, widely- planned plot of extirpation of
Muslims, but the blame can be laid on the doorstep of the Congress and the Hindu Revivalist Parties.

It was clear that everything transpired as per a fixed plan and schedule. Had it not been so, such large mobs fully-armed with weapons, would never have
collected in time and moved with such obvious, fiendish intent from victim to victim 21

The Bihar calamity was decisive in its effects on the Partition controversy. After such a carnage bearing obvious signs of merciless, meticulous planning,
possibilities of getting India’s Hindu and Muslim populations to live together bamxrniously under a single, independent, post- British government shrank to zero.
The atrocities of tire Hindus did not end here. Tire atrocities continued and only after a few days of the Bihar calamity, there occurred the hoixible rural
slaughter at Garmukteswar in U.P. where Hindu pilgrims, at the annual religious fair set upon and exterminated Muslims, not only on tire festival grounds but in
the adjacent town. The dead were estimated to be 1 ,000 to 2,000. The U.P. Ministry succeeded in wrapping a heavy blanket of silence on the bloody
episode. And then there were the cities, particularly Calcutta, infer twelve months scarcely a day passed without ‘incidents’, from obscure stabbings and
burnings in lanes and alleys to bombings and gunning’s in the main streets. 22
Woodruff who was a District Officer in tire UP, describes his experience in the following words,

“…In ordinary communal trouble there was usually some point of focus, a mosque or temple, or a pipal tree. In a city, main thoroughfares could be
patrolled. But this was unaccountable; no one could foretell where it would come next. In a village where Hindus and Muslims had lived for
centuries, sudden fear would blaze up, and the weaker would be slaughtered with every kind of barbarity, babies being killed before their mothers ’
eyes, women and children burnt in their huts. ” 22

 

After the elections, the Provincial ministries were formed. The MuslimLeague ministries took office inBenggland Sind, but the North- West Frontier Province
had a Congress Ministry. In Punjab the Congress entered into a coalition with a handfijl of Unionists and Akali Sikhs to strengthen the anti- League front,
although the MuslimLeague Party constituted the largest single group in the legislature and included over 85 per cent of Muslim legislators.

^ The Eastern Times , Lahore, November 7, 1946
19 Ibid

Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Old Country/New Nation, 1964, p. 135.

21 Ibid, p. 136

The Great Calcutta Killings

 

In response to the League’s declaration of ‘Direct Action Day’ titles and honours conferred by the British government were renounced by tire Muslims to
express their resentment and a fijUfledged countrywide strike was observed on 16 th August 1946. These took place peacefully except in Calcutta where
ferocious HinduMuslim riots occurred.

To fathom the Great Calcutta killings, it is important to review it in its context. In the 1946 elections, the MuslimLeague celebrated a 100 per cent victory. A
few days later, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, an influential Congress leader threatened tire Muslims in a public speech,

“If Pakistan is to be achieved, Hindu and Muslims will have to fight. There will be civil war… “24
In mid- 1946, Gandhi wrote,

“We are not yet in the midst of civil war. But we are nearing it. At present we are playing at it. ” 2S

What happened in Calcutta was utterly appalling This was something unique, as a local commentator aptly temred a ‘new order in disorder’. It was not air
anti-westem riot but a communal one, of an intensity, size, and savaggness that no one had imagined possible.

According to Ian Stephens’ account,

“At the end of three dreadful days, corpses bestrewed the town. Borne
everywhere on the warn moisture monsoon breeze came the stink of human

putrefaction. In Shampuker and similar squalid outlying parts, on plots of waste ground, you could see mounds of decomposing, liquefying bodies,
heaped as high as the second floors of the nearby houses because of lack of space elsewhere. A visit to the police morgue necessitated use of
respirator; unremoved rotting cadavers were stacked to the ceiling. If you wished to watch how a vulture opened up a dead man ’s abdomen, you
could see it on the pavements of wealthy park street …We had seen more horrors than most modern soldiers ever do on the battlefield. . .About
100, 000 people were rendered homeless, mainly by arson. So great was the confusion that all possibility of a detailed numbering of the dead and
injured was ruled out.

…Even perhaps during the first days fighting, and certainly during the
second and third, Mtslim losses were the worst. Apparently local Hindu
organizations, hearing rumours that some sort of Mtslim attack was
contemplated, had made up formidable counter-preparations. But what may
decisively ha\’e tipped the scales was not the massive retaliatory Hindu onslaughts
but the intervention during the second afternoon of the Sikhs, who had in the
main held aloof on 16th August. ” 26

23 Ibid, p 138

33 Deccan Times (Madras), 20 1 ‘ 1 January 1946
23 EW.RLumby, The Transfer of Power in India 1945^47, p. 1 18

Partition and the Ensuing Massacres

 

Meanwhile tire partition of the subcontinent was looming largg over the Indian horizon. In February 1 947, the Prime Minister of Britain, Lord Attlee had made
a historic statement in the House of C oiirnrons with regard to the intention of the British government to transfer of power to India by June 1948.

Lord Mountbatten, the new Viceroy of India, arrived in Delhi on 22nd March 1 947 and soon after his arrival started to consult the leaders of different political
parties. After long negotiations and discussions a plan was prepared which was approved towards the end of May by the British Cabinet. The Plan was
published on 3rd June and this came to be known as the ‘3rd June Plan’.

It laid down the procedure of transfer of power in detail and the Viceroy, in a Press Conference on the following day, announced that the transfer of power
would take place by 15 th August 1947.

It was after this announcement that conmxmal tension increased enormously. Violence, plunder, abduction, and stabbing were rampant in the eastern districts
of Punjab. Muslims lacked security of life and property. Muslims started migrating to Pakistan on a large scale but were massacred on the way. Those who
survived related horror stories of children being cut, women being dishonoured, and men being butchered into countless pieces. The atrocities against Muslims
were such that grass changed its colour to red.

Human history is shamed to have witnessed young Muslim girls’ rapes ending in a butchering finale to grant them mercy from the burden of life. Streets, roads,
and highways were home to rotting corpses with suffocating stench pervading the air.

The rivers, canals, and sewers ebbed forward with their share of dead bodies and when the nature choked of their burden, or tire bodies were sent to
Pakistan piled high in trains. Several trains transported the dead bodies of Muslim refugees to Lahore. According to a contemporary British account:

“The scale of killings and movements of refugees became eve n more extensive than those caused by the more fonnal conflicts of opposing
amiies. ” 27

Another eyewitness Captain Glue of Royal Sappers and Miners recorded:

 

“I have sewed in France during the World War II and I did not see the destruction to the extent, which I ha\<e seen in Amritsar. ” 28
Around the beginning of August 1 947, the Sikhs and Hindus began attacking the Muslim inhabitants of central Punjab. Systematic attacks were being made on
Muslim villages by roving bands of Sikhs, usually on horseback and operating under military- like discipline. Gangs of Sikhs led by ex-soldiers and armed with
automatic guns, rifles, and bombs were roaming the countryside, attacking and burning villages, and massacring their inhabitants. It was estimated that, in tire
Amritsar district alone, nearly 1 ,000 people were killed during the first fortnight of August and most of them were Muslims. 29

Tire truth is that, despite all the warnings, leading public figures in Delhi Med to grasp the significance of tire news gruesomely pouring in from central Punjab.
The Sikh war of revenge, so long foretold, had begun, and in which the 1 69 helpless (sic) Punjab Boundary Force, belatedly formed, proved incapable of
dealing with, despite all its discipline and g 3 llantry — a lact necessitating its disbandment within a month Like tire great Calcutta killing of nearly a year before,
what was happening proved once ag^in to be a ‘new order in disorder’.

The new wave ofriots involved the whole Punjab including its princely states; tracts also ofWestemUP, of Southern Kashmir’, and ofNorth- Western
Frontier Province. When it reached Delhi, it came within a hair of plunging the whole subcontinent irretrievably in contusion It brought death to hundreds of
thousands, and set in motion millions of refugees. It was into conditions such as these about nine weeks afier the decision on 3rd June 1 947 that Pakistan was
bom on 14th August 1947.30

lair Morrison, a correspondent of The Times , informing about the barbaric incidents that occurred in East Punjab in only three weeks cabled the following
report:

“More horrible than anything we saw during that war, is the universal comment of experienced officers, British and Indian, on the present
slaughter in East Punjab. The Sikhs are clearing East Punjab of Muslims, burning Muslim villages and homesteads, e\’en in their frenzy burning
their own. This violence has been organized from the highest levels of Sikh leadership, and it is being done systematically, sector by sector.

Some large towns, like Amritsar and Jullundhur, are now quiet, because, there are no Muslims left. In a two hours air reconnaissance of the
Jullundhur district at the weekend I must have seen 50 villages aflame.

The Sikh jathas, armed mobs from 50 to 100 strong, assemble usually in the gurdwaras, their places of worship, before making a series of raids.
Many jathas cross over from the Sikh (princely) states. The Muslims are usually armed only with staves. When threatened, they’ assemble on their
roofs and beat gongs and drums to summon help from neighbouring Muslim communities, and prepare to throw stones at the attackers. The Sikh
attack scientifically. A first wave armed with firearms to bring the Muslims off their roofs. A second wa\>e lobs grenades over the walls. In the
ensuing confusion a third wave goes in with kirpans — the Sikh sabers, which are also religious emblems — and spears, and the serious killing begins.
A last wave consist of older men, often army pensioners with long white beards, who cany torches and specialize in arson. Mounted out riders with
kiipans cut down those trying to flee.

British officers have seen jathas that have included women and e\ >en children with spears. Appalling atrocities have been committed; bodies have
been mutilated; none had been spared, men, women, or children. In one village, out of fifty corpses, thirty were those of women. One officer found
four bodies roasted to death over a fire. ” 31

The panic- stricken process of migration from other parts of India to what was now Pakistan beg 3 n at a tremendous rate in tire third week of August of 1 947.
An innumerable number of Muslims accompanying the Muslim convoys on foot were brutally slain by the or^nized Hindu-Sikh jathas. Planned attacks were
made on refugee trains which ‘became a horrible specialty of the whole affair, and continued fer into the autumn’.

One such incident of train outrage as outlined by Colonel Sher Khan, later Major General of the Pakistan Army gpes as follows.

“On 22nd September I left Lahore, after a meeting, for Amritsar, and arrived in the area of theKhalsa (Sikh) College at 16.20 hours. There were
very big crowds with spears and swords, and more to the south of the road. There was firing going on. I stopped near a Garhwal Regiment post in
the Khalsa College; here I was told a train was being attacked. . . The following morning I went to the station, where the train had been pulled in
during the night… I talked to some survivors. They said they were refugees from Alwar State, and were put on the train at Delhi. Most of their
belongings were taken away at Delhi Station. They’ were asked to suirender sharp weapons at Ambala. Some who had knives did so. They were
fired at near Beas. An attack by about 100 Sikhs two or three stations on other side of Amritsar, the train slowed down, then stopped. Soon after,
heeny firing started from both sides. Then hundreds of Sikhs rushed towards the train. They first started collecting valuables of the women, and
throwing out boxes. Anyone resisting was killed by sword, kirpan, spear. Then started pulling out women, saying come with us, those resisting
being killed. Having done all the looting, they started killing. There was some firing from the train, presumably from the escort, but it died down.
Several bombs were thrown into the carriages. . . .It is impossible to estimate the number of dead, as they were piled on top of each other in the
compartments.. .Altogether, forty lorries were sent to Lahore loaded with wounded, including about 200 persons who had escaped serious injuries.
The train pulled out of Amritsar towards Jullundhur. ” 32

In the midst of these agonizing atrocities, Pakistan came into being. The Congress on its part was unwilling to provide protection to the Muslims in India, fire
following is the utterance of one of the Chief Ministers of the Congress, about the Muslims left in India,

27 Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Mission with Mountbatten , London, 1972, p. 143
2,7 Khalid Ghaznawi, The Story of Indian Aggression Against Pakistan

29 Ian Stephens, op. cit., p. 220.

30 Ibid, p.220

31 Ibid, p 222-223

32 Ibid, p 222-223

“ could not expect to be treated otherwise than as aliens. They would have no citizenship rights. ” 33
Hindu Revivalism & Its Continuation

Lala Lajpal Rai, an arch Marxist who propounded the theory that India was the original home of the Aryans and that it was wrong to think that their place of
origin was the territory alongside Ural in Central Asia, was for Indianizing the Aryans. Inhis article published in the Tribune of 14th December 1924, he wrote
that the demand for, or a continuation of separate representation for Muslims based on separate electorates was completely inconsistent with Indian
nationalism and a united India. He suggested that the Punjab should be partitioned into two provinces, the western Punjab with a large Muslim majority to be
the Muslim- governed province, and eastern Punjab with a large Hindu-Sikh majority to be the non-Muslimgpvemed province. OnBengslhe held his
judgment. To him it was ‘unimaginable’ that the rich and highly progressive and alive Hindus of Bengal could ever agree to work with the Bengali Muslims
under the Das Pact. He ftirther said:

“Under my scheme the Muslims will ha\’e four Mislim states (1 ) the Pathan Province & NWFP (2) Western Province (3) Sindhi and (4) Eastern
Bengal. It means a clear cut partition of India with a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India”. 3 4

 

This is the exact same partition plan that was implemented in 1 947. AI the blame on the partition of India has been laid on the feet of the Muslims. But the
Hindutva leaders of the time were very much responsible for the creation of Pakistan, maybe even more so than anybody else.

The Indo-Pakistan relations after the Partition are another proof of the Hindus’ disdain for Muslims. The Muslims who remained behind in India owing to one
reason or the other are still regarded as bitter enemies of the Hindus. There is a long-drawn list of nultitudinous communal riots in India which have occurred
since the birth of Pakistan, in which the Muslins have been and are still being treated as Malecbeh and bitter rivals. The consequences of which were what the
world witnessed during the bloodbath of Ahmedabad and in many other parts of India led by Hindu right wing parties like the RSS and BJP.

33 Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, The Last Phase , Vol. II, 1958, p. 318.

34 K.K. Aziz, A History of the Idea of Pakistan Vol I, Vanguard, 1987. Lahore, p. 48

Role Of The Islamic Parties & The Ulema

The idea behind the creation of Pakistan was to give tire Muslims of the subcontinent a nation where they could exercise their beliefs openly without any fear
of suppression or oppression Surprisingly, the majority of the Muslim religious organisations or jamats of the time totally opposed the concept and went to
great lengths to try and sabotage the Pakistan Movement. Almost all of the significant jamats like the Jamiat Ulema- i- Hind, Majlis- i- Ahrar-i-Islarn and
Jamaat-elslami were against the idea of the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims. Only a small group led by Maulana Sbabbir Ahmed Usmani
supported the creation of Pakistan and that too much laterl 945 onwards. 35 The fact that fire Ulema did not support the Pakistan Movement sets history
against them but today the most powerful claim on the destiny of Pakistan as an Islamic state has been by these very Ulemas whose organisations were at the
forefront of the anti-Pakistan reaction before 1947.

The history of the Ulema in the subcontinent has been one of perpetual conflict with the educated class; case in point. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan in 1 857. Nearly
a hundred of these Ulemas, including Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi who was a prominent Aalim from the Deoband, ruled that it was unlawful to join the
Patriotic Association founded by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan However, the Muslim community proved wiser than the religious elite and decided to follow the
political lead given by Sir Syed. 36

The conflict between the two classes had started in the early years of the British rule and reached its culmination with the creation of Pakistan Since the
movement for Pakistan was guided by the enlightened classes under the leadership of a western- educated man, the prestigg of the Ulema had been badly
damaged. 37 The conflict between the conservative Ulema and the political Muslim leadership continued throughout the struggle for Pakistan

35 Dr. Ali Arshad, MaulanaShabbir Ahmed UthmanikaTahrik-i-Pakistan Mein Kirdar,

2005, p.78

36 Afzallqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, p.28
33 Afzal Iqbal, Islamization in Pakistan, p.26

Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and Majlis- i-Ahrar propagated the idea that the concept of Pakistan was actually a territorial concept and had nothing to do with Islam
They believed that since Islam preached unity and brotherhood, the creation of a separate homeland was against its teachings. They rejected the idea of
Muslim N ationalism in the shape of the creation of a separate homeland claiming it to be unlslamic and supported the Congress Party’ s line of nationalism It is
worth remembering that this ‘nationalism’ that the Congress supported was rightly viewed by the Muslim League as Hindu Nationalism, a concept whereby
the Muslims would always be subjugated. But the Muslim religious parties disagreed and supported the Congress wholeheartedly.

Jamaat-e-Islami, on the other hand, rejected both the Muslims League’s stance on the creation of Pakistan and the Muslim nationalism stance of tire other
Ulemas. Maulana Abdul Aala Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, states his belief in his book, Nationalism and India :

“Among Indian Muslims today we find two kinds of nationalists: the Nationalists Muslims, namely those who in spite of their being Muslims belie\’e
in Indian Nationalism and worship it: and the Muslims Nationalist: namely those who are little concerned with Islam and its principles and aims,
but are concerned with the individuality and the political and economic interests of that nation which has come to exist by the name of Muslim, and
they are so concerned only because of their accident of birth in that nation. From the Islamic viewpoint both these types of nationalists were
equally misled, for Islam enjoins faith in truth only; it does not permit any kind of nation-worshipping at all. ”38

While the Ulema and the Muslim religious parties were staunchly against Jinnah’s ideals and the idea of Pakistan, most of the support for Pakistan came from
the educated class of Muslims. It was not until much later, around 1943, when the Muslim League began its mass movement based on the promise ofa
homeland based on Islamic principles. This promise wooed the hearts of some ofthe Muslim Ulema who rendered their support to the freedom struggle. 39

The Muslim intelligentsia preceding this had stayed clear ofthe religious parties since they did not believe that the religious clerics or Ulemas possessed the
knowledge or thinking capability to understand politics. It would be pertinent to point out at this stags that most ofthe problems lacing the Muslims of India
since the fall of the Mughals can be largely attributed to the close-minded and backward leadership of the Ulema. These Ulema were brought up on traditional
education and as such were in no position to lead the Muslims against the superiorly educated Hindus.

3,3 MaulanaMaududi, Nationalism and India, Pathankot, 1947, p-25 33 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State in Pakistan, p-66

The Ulemas were plagued with similar problems that they lace today. Their understanding of the Quran was primarily in a literal sense and they had no mental
capacity or perhaps the will to adapt to the changing times. Their version of Islam inhibited them from creative thinking and properly understanding the
problems, social or philosophical, confronting the Muslim society in the post- feudal era. They were intellectually Si-equipped to comprehend the crisis Islam
had to lace in the twentieth century. 40

The Pakistan movement before 1 943 had largely been a secular movement steered by the educated class of Muslims. It was led by established thinkers and
politicians like Jirmah, Iqbal, and Liaquat Ali Khan Jinnah was continuously harassed by the Ulema, particularly by those who sympathised with the Congress.
Many times these Ulemas resorted to questioning Jinnah’s temporal laith and lifestyle. Maulana Maududi of the Jamaat-e-Islami was the most critical among
them Some of his statements about the leadership ofthe Muslim League are reproduced below:

“Pity! From League ’s Quaid -e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose
perspective on matters is Islamic. ”41

 

‘ ‘To pronounc e these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western
organizational ails, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an un-lslamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam

“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a
trace of Islamic character. ” 42

The Ulema were not willing to listen to new ideas, stuck with then – limited and archaic view of Islam. For them, any mention of a separate homeland or a
territorial specification of Islam was heretical It was under such opposition from the Ulema that the Muslim League was forced to Junction Jirmah while
addressing students of the Muslim University Union at Aligarh in 1938 said:

Ziya-ul-HasanFaruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan, p.79-80 4* Muslims and the Present Political Tumioil (Vol.HI), A rmy Press, Delhi, p.37

“What the Leagyie has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish
game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable element ofMolvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Molvis as a whole class.
There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other, but there is a section of them which is undesirable. Ha\’ingfreed ourselves
from the clutches of the British Government, the Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Molvis, may I appeal to the youth to emancipate our
women. This is essential. I do not mean that we are to ape the evils of the West. What I mean is that they must share our life not only social but also
political. ” 4}

Hie above speech shows that the Muslim intelligentsia and Jirmah, in particular, were aware of the negative effect of the Maulvis on the Muslim populace.

They knew that they had to set the ordinary Muslim free from the claws of these religious leaders if they ever hoped to progress in the modem world.
Unsurprisingly the Maulvis vehemently opposed the ideals of the educated class of Muslims.

 

Majlis-i-Ahrar

 

Another Muslim religious party, the Majlis-i-Ahrar flung foul abuse on all the leading personalities of the MuslimLeague and accused them of leading un-
Islanic lives. These Ulemas utilized Islam as a mere tool to defeme and disgrace their political adversaries. The Ahrar openly supported the Congress, never
objecting or maligning its leadership’s religious practices while ceaselessly slinging slander on the MuslimLeague leader’s. The Muslim Leaguers remained
dignified maintaining that Islam was a private affeir and it did not have any bearings on their call for a separate homeland.

The role of Majlis-e- Ahrar can best be understood as a prePartition body of Nationalist Muslims who remained loyal to the Congress throughout the
independence movement. Majlis-e- Ahrar had formed as an Indian Nationalist Muslim body with its first major act being tire anti-Ahmaddiya movement in
1933. It clashed with All India Kashmir Committee, a rival organization fighting against the Dogra Rule in Kashmir.

43 Speech delivered at the Meeting of the Muslim University Union, Aligarh, 5 February 1938. (Yusufi 1996, Vol. II p. 727)

The Ulemas of Majlis-i-Ahrar like Ataullah Shah Bukhari, Habibur Rahman Ludhianawi, and Mazhar Ali Afiiar resorted to vilifying Jirmah by attacking his
personal life. Mafiiar Ali Azbar used the insulting moniker ‘Kafir-iAzarn ’ (the great unbeliever) for Quaidi- Azam 44 One of the resolutions passed by the
Working Committee of the Majlis- i- Ahrar which met in Delhi on 3rd March 1940, disapproved of the Pakistan plan, and in some subsequent speeches of the
Ahrar leaders Pakistan was dubbed as ‘palidistan ’ . The authorship of the following couplet is attributed to Maulana Mazhar Ali Afiiar, a leading personality
of the Ahrar:

“He abandoned Islam for the sake of a non-believer woman, is he a great leader or a great nonbeliever? ” 45

The Majlis was involved in the elections of 1 946 and was soundly beaten by the Muslim League. This is when Maulana Azhar said, ‘ ‘Madhe Sahaba can be
a weapon against the League ” , an obvious reference to Jirmah’ s background as a Khoja Shia Mohammedan.

The independence of Pakistan came as a huge shock to the Ahrar leadership. They disbanded with many of the Ahrar leaders migrating to Pakistan Although
before migration under the leaders’ directive, the All India Majlis-i-Ahrar passed a resolution dissolving their organization and advising the Muslims to accept
Maulana Azad as their leader and join the Congress Party. 46

In Pakistan, the leadership resurfaced in May 1948 as Majlis-e Ahrar- e- Islam This time they propagated the view that they would take MuslimLeague’s lead
in politics. In 1 949, they raised their voices for two significant demands. Firstly, they wanted Ahmadis to be declared kafir and secondly, they wanted the state
to disallow nonMuslims from holding government positions. Sabibzada FaizulHassan, another prominent leader ofMajlis-e-Abrar declared that all women
without purdah, including Raana Liaquat Ali Khan were ‘prostitutes’ . He went as fer as to say that the blame of the rapes of Muslim women in Indian Punjab
fell on Jirmah, due to his personal wish of being the Governor General of Pakistan 47

In the 1950s, the Majlis-e- Ahrar-e- Islam started agitating to establish itself politically again. They formed the Majlis-e- Amal with other religious parties. In
1953, they gave tire then Prime Minister of Pakistan, KhawajaNazimuddin, the option of either accepting their demands or fece civil disobedience. It is
pertinent to note that the Majlis-eAhrar had shunned the MuslimLeague’s Direct Action movement in 1946, yet they were more than happy to start one for
themselves in a Muslim Pakistan The Ahrar leaders were arrested on order of Khawaja Nazimuddin, leading to rioting all across the country.48
Majlis-eAhrar’s roots as a religious extremist party existed before the birth of Pakistan, although they had no role in Pakistan’s creation; in feet, they were
very much against its creation Yet, they carried over their narrow-minded policies to the newly-established country. Many attribute the birth of extremist
Islam in Pakistan to the Majlis-e- Ahrar leadership.

44 I. H. Qureshi (1972), Ulama in Politics, p.354
4- Afzallqbal, Islamization of Pakistan, p.54
46 The Munir Report 1954, p256

Jamiat-i-Ulema Hind

 

The Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, the largest and most prestigious organization of the Ulemas, saw nothing Islamic in the idea ofPakistan Its president, Maulana
Husain Ahmad Madani, who was also Mohtamimor the Principal of Darul Ulum Deoband, opposed the idea of the Two-Nation theory, pleading that all
Indians, Muslims or Hindus, were one nation He argued that feith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries but that nationality was
a matter of geography, and Muslims were obliged to be loyal to tire nation of their birth along with their non- Muslim fellow citizens.

 

In 1938, Maukna Madani said:

“all should endeavour jointly for such a democratic government in which
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, and P arsis are included. Such a freedom is
in accordance with Islam. ” 49

Maukna Madani accepted the doctrine of Indian nationalism
propagated by Congress and started preaching it in mosques. He
passed a fatwa prohibiting Muslims from joining the Muslim League,

to which Allama Iqbal retaliated with the following poem in 1938: “Hasan (rose) from Basrah, Bilal from Abyssinia, Suhaib from Rome,

Deoband produced Husain Ahmad, what monstrosity is this? He chanted from the pulpit that nations are created by countries, What an ignoramus
regarding the position of Muhammad! Take thyself to Muhammad, because he is the totality of

Faith, And if thou does not reach him, all (thy knowledge) is Bit Lahabism. ” Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind under Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and

Maulana Madani opposed Jinnah because they believed that tire

solution in Indk was a Medina- style treaty between Hindus and

Muslims. Maulana Azad, though also a Congressite, however had

favoured the Cabinet Mission Plan that Jinnah had also accepted.

According to Azad the Cabinet Mission Pkn preserved the positives
of the Pakistan scheme while avoiding the negatives.

Maulana Azad had long been an advocate of a united India
and he used Jamkt-e- Ulema Hind to further his cause. He was
offered the Presidency of Congress in 1946 which he refused and
kter regretted. He had persuaded the pro- Congress Ulema that their
interests would be better safeguarded under a united India, and that
they should repose full confidence in Indhn nationalism. He had told
them that they could secure for themselves the control of Muslim
personal kw, by getting a guarantee from the Indian National
Congress, that the Muslim personal kw would be administered by
qadis (judges) who were appointed from amongst the Ulema. 50

48 Ibid, p 133-136

49 Pakistan Struggle and Pervez, Tulu-e-Is lam Trust, Lahore, p.614
Jamaat-e-Islami

 

Maukna Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Iskmi and a fbnner Congressite had opposed die idea of a united nationhood because he was convinced that the
Muslims would be drawn away from Islam if they agreed to merge themselves in the Indian milieu He was interested more in Islam than in Muslims and could
not find comfort in ary of the two nationalism ideas of the C ongress or the Muslim League. The first priority for him was that Muslim loyalty to Islam should be
strengthened. This could be done only by a body of Muslims who sincerely believed in Islam and did not pay only lip service to it. Hence he founded the
Jamaat-e-Iskni in 1 94 1 .

The Jamaat-e-Iskmi opposed the idea of Pakistan by calling it NaPakistan (not pure). Maukna Maududi was of the view that the leadership of tire Muslim
League was actually aiming for a Muslim state with a secular fonn of government. In a speech shortly before Partition he said:

50 Dr.Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, p.328

“Why should we foolishly waste our time in expediting the so-called Muslimnation state and fritter away our energies in setting it up, when we
know that it will not only be useless for our purposes, but will rather prove an obstacle in our path. “51

Ironically, Maukna Maududi also advocated a separate homeknd with a stance complex even contradictory on certain occasions. But it would be remiss to
not to point out that many of his writing? pkyed an important role in convincing the Muslims that the concept of a united Indk was suicidal for the Muslims. He
was against Muslim nationalism but he was also against Indian N ationalism When asked to cooperate with the Muslim League he replied:

“Please do not think that I do not want to participate in this work because of any differences, my difficulty is that I do not see how I can participate
because partial remedies do not appeal to my mind and I ha\<e never been interested in patch work.

 

Congress and the Ulemas

 

In a bid to weaken the Muslim League’s ckimto represent all Muslims of the subcontinent, the Congress had strengthened its links with tire Jamkt-e- Ulema-
e-Hind, the Ahrars and some other minor non- I-eague Muslim groups like tire Momins and the Shk Conference. While a great majority of Shks had joined
the Muslim league and Jinnah liimself was known to be a Shk, the Momins and Shk Conference backed the Congress raising the apprehension that despite
Jinnah, the Sunni majority in Pakistan would ultimately restrict Shks in Pakistan

The Congress continued to refuse to share power with the Muslim I-eague and pursued an anti- Muslim League policy with the help of Jamkt-i- Ulema Hind.
They were not satisfied with just keeping the Muslim League out of the government; they wanted it to lose support of the Muslim popukce. Hence, it kunched
a clever movement with the Ulema in tow to establish rektionships with the Muslims even though tire policy of Muslim subjugation was clear from its actions.
This strategy, called the ‘Muslimmass contact movement’, was organized in 1937 with great finesse by Nehru.53

S 1 The Process of Islamic Revolution, 2nd edition, Lahore 1955, p.37

Syed Abut Ala Maududi, Tehrik-i-Azadi-e-Hind aur Mussalman, 1942, p.22-23
55 Dr. Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics p.334

Congress leaders used the Ulema to misguide tire Muslimmasses into following Congress’ agpndas. The Ulema bad no apparent motivation to support the
Congress, as it was unable to fulfil any of tire issues facing the Muslims, yet they continued to do so. The Ulema tried to create a division among the Muslim
masses by carrying on a most unworthy propaganda against the leaders of the Muslim League. However, this Muslimmass contact movement failed.

 

The loyalty of the Ulemas to the Congress can be judged by the following Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari, one ofthe founding members of Majlis- i-Ahrar once
said about Gandhi:

“I belie\’e that Gandhi in him has the makings of a Prophet. ” 54 Another prominent Ulema, Maulvi Habib-ur-Rehman of

Ludhiana once speaking about the MuslimLeague and Nehru said, “ Ten Thousand Jinnahs, Shaukats andZafars could safely be sacrificed for
the point ofthe shoe of Jawaharlal Nehru. ” 55

 

Ulema after the Creation of Pakistan

 

Contrary to the plea of the nationalist Ulema, the Muslim intelligentsia was worried that if the British left, the Muslims would be subjected to Hindu domination
The attitude of the Hindus, especially the rightest agenda would have never allowed the Muslims to coexist with them on equal terms. They had no intention of
just changing masters and yearned for a separate homeland.

The Ulema had argued that by asking for a separate homeland, the Muslim League was aguinst the concept of universal Muslim brotherhood. But in reality a
separate homeland was to give an identity to the Muslims of the subcontinent. The Muslims could not have served the cause of universal brotherhood by losing
their identity, which is what would have inevitably happened if they had been compelled to accept the political domination of the Hindus.

The Ulemas Med to realize this simple truth and eventually found themselves completely isolated from the Muslim struggle for emancipation Their opposition
to Pakistan on grounds of ‘territorial nationalism’ was the result of their failure to grasp reality. They Med to realize that Hindu domination would be
devastating for the Muslims.

Sayyad Muhammad Tufail Shah, Rehnuma-i-Tableegh, p. 139-140 Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, Chamanistan, p. 165

The Ulema, as a class, concentrated on jurisprudence and traditional sciences with a habit of nit-picking and name-calling As a consequence they
experienced progressive alienation from their own people, who while paying them respect due to their religiosity rejected their lead in national affairs. While
their influence on the religiously inclined masses remained considerable, their impact on public affairs dwindled. This was simply because the Ulema
concentrated on tire traditional Islamic studies ignoring the realities ofthe Muslim life in the contemporary world.

After independence, the conflict between the intellectuals with liberal orientation and the Ulema manifested itself in a judicial enquiry conducted by Justice
Muhammad Munir in Lahore for the anti- Qadiani riots in 1953. The Judge said something which the intellectuals and politicians had refrained from saying
openly. The enquiry’s findings, known as the Munir Report, publicized the feet that the Ulema were not only incompetent to lead a modem state but were
deplorably inept under cross-questioning even to give realistic guidance on the elementary matters of Islam. The court of enquiry was presented with the pitiful
spectacle of Muslim divines differing sharply on the definition of a Muslim yet each was adamant that all who disagreed should be put to death.56

At one point the report emphasized:

“But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret
to us that the Ulema whose first duty should be to hewe settled views on this
subject, were hopelessly disagreed amongst themselves. ”

The creation of Pakistan was the greatest defeat ofthe
‘nationalist’ Ulema. But soon after the establishment of Pakistan,
power-hungry Ulema raised their voice in the political arena with new
modulations. They argued that Pakistan was created to establish an
Islamic state based on the traditional Sharia law. However, the irony
of the argument that Pakistan was founded on religious ideology lies
in the feet that practically every Muslim group and organization in
the Indian subcontinent that was popularly religious was hostile to
Jinnah and the MuslimLeague, and strongly opposed to the Pakistan
movement.

The Hindus knew the importance ofthe freedom struggle for
Pakistan On 1st November 1941, K.M. Munshihad exclaimed to a
large gathering,

“Do you know what Pakistan is? If you don’t, listen! Pakistan means that
Muslims can make in one or more pails of India, their homeland, where the
system of government would be based on the Qur ’an with Urdu as their national
language. In simple temis, Pakistan will be a Muslim land where the government
will be Islamic. “57

56 Munir Report 1954, p.205

Unfortunately, the Ulema failed to realize this.

The claim ofthe Muslim League to be the sole representative of the entire Muslim community in India was gravely weakened by the opposition of the most
important group of Indian Ulema. A great deal of effort was devoted by MuslimLeague leaders to wiring over the Ulema. They did eventually succeed, but
only partially, and only when the creation of Pakistan was all but assured.

The Role of the British in the Creation of Pakistan

It was after the War of Independence in 1 857, when the Muslins were first seen as a threat by the British officials. The threat ofthe Muslin or the term
“Mussuhnanophobia” was first coined then by one of the British officials. The threat of Muslims convinced the British rulers to keep Muslims away from higher
administrative jobs and the army. It was the fear of another Muslinrevolt that led the British officials to recruit Hindus in the army and ii higher administrative
positions.

The education policy of Britain caused serious harm to the Muslin masses ii particular. The replacement ofthe English language in place ofPersian, as the

 

official vernacular, made the Muslims redundant. Unlike the Hindus, the Muslims referred to western education, as the ‘Godless’ education. This attitude
rendered Muslims illiterate allowing the Hindus, who had embraced the English language and western education, to ggin tire favour of tire British officials.

The hostile feelings of British vis-a-vis Muslims endured fcr a bug time, shaping the social and political development ofMuslimmovements. The post- 1857
British policies, directly or indirectly, affected the Muslims negatively. The Muslims lost their political dominance causing the loss of economic dominance as
well This economically and politically deteriorating situation of Muslims helped the strengthening of the Hindus communally as well as politically. The Hindus
would not lose any opportunity to undermine Muslims’ position in any sphere, political or economic.

^ Daily ‘Tribune’, November 2, 1941

The political scenario of the subcontinent was in part influenced by the British policies and largely by the Hindus’ indifference and hostility towards Muslims.
The new century saw tire scenario of new British policies vis-a-vis changes in tire policies of the regional powers. The British interest in encouraging tire
Muslim politicians was nothing but self preservation. The vast Empire so vast could not ignore rivals in the region or friends of rivals within tire Empire.

The British always tried to honour the importance, sacrifices, and services of the local communities. In 1942, when the British desperately needed Indian men
fcr recruitment to the British army they adopted tire policy of appeasement of Indians dedicated to their freedom struggle. They had to be sensitive to the
minorities ’ demands and the Hindu importance whilst the framing of any policy. Viceroy Linlithgow wrote to the Secretary of State fcr India in 1 942 :

“I may be right in thinking that your present formula is an attempt to meet my requirement of not upsetting the Punjab or the Amy. From my
point of view this formula would be fatal to declaration in Flindu eyes. They would intetpret it as a virtual promise not merely of Pakistan but of
Sikhistan also, and as containing greater possibilities of disintegrating India than e\’en Jinnah claims. They’ would observe that not even a majority
in a provincial assembly would be needed to detach some particular region from the Union. They would regard it as still further empowering
minorities to force separation on exorbitant terms by the mere refusal to agree. Ido not object to giving the minorities a strong position in the
future deliberations, but if we promise too much strength now the declaration will be reviled by Hindus. ” 5S

Even the British electoral process from the start had been generally fair of which the 1 946 election is testament.

The British and Their Relationships with the Ulemas

 

There are not many instances fcund that show Britain to have any links with tire Muslim Ulemas that opposed the creation of Pakistan But the British had a
history of using propaganda to hire potential agitators. These agitators included a number of Muslim leaders and were against Germany, Italy, and of course,
Russia. It is not a giant leap to realize that the British may have had a role behind the Ulemas’ later refusal to join the Muslim League in its efforts for the
creation of Pakistan

Letter fromthe Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on March 9, 1942

The British had to find means to employ a propaganda technique in a region which was increasingly becoming anti- British During this time, British had
appointed Sir Georgg Cunningham, famous as a man worth the equivalent of a division of troops, to carry out this task. Sir Cunningham’s trusted Pathan
advisor, Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan was assigned to get in touch with the religious personalities. 59

Before September 1939, Kuli Khan convinced people, mostly Ulema, to attend covert meetings with Sir Cunniiigham for his British agenda. Mullah Marwat,
a proponent of ‘free India from foreign rule’, was convinced to join the British agginst the Godless-Bolsheviks’ Russia and its allies (Gemnany and Italy). The
Press was largely used to forward this propaganda by the mentioned. 60

Religious organizations encouraged people to join the army and security services, for their faith, not the British They argued that British and Muslims were
enemies but in this World War II, they should be sipported because it had become a war ofbelievers and non-believers. The religious orgpnization, Jamiat ul-
Ulema-(Sarhad) arranged tours to propagate anti- Russian, anti-German, and antiltalian propaganda. This campaign of propaganda greatly helped Britain in its
war.6l

The dairies of Sir George Cunningham carry the proof of how tactfully British government had used preachers to act opposite of what they preached. They
had committed these heinous crimes against the masses and justified them as propaganda. Tlie Ulema became British pippets, enslaved and motivated by
their greed, selling their dignity and soul defaming Islam The Ulema displayed their duplicitous motives by narrating personally gratifying interpretations of
Islam to justify their actions.

^ Khan, W. (2004). “Facts are Facts: The Untold story ofIndia' Partition”. (trans.2.ed)., p.77

f)(l Christain Tripodi, Edge of Empire: The British Political Officer and Tribal Administration on the North-West Frontier 1877-1947, Routledge, 2016, p. 205
6 * Khan, W. (2004). “Facts are Facts: The Untold story ofIndia' Partition”. (trans.2.ed)., p.78

Kuli Khan, as stated above, had recruited Mullah Marwat already. The circle grew with a number of mullahs corning in contact with tire British agents. This
task was accomplished through convincing conversations accompanying monetary favours. Generous payments were made to people to disseminate the
British propaggnda. Sir George Cunningham’s diaries provide important evidence and historically accurate context of these activities. Payments passed
through a chain of people, with Kuli Khan playing the role of tire opening batsman, from Kuli Khan to Mullah Marawat and from Mullah Marwat to other
mullahs in the wider circle.62

The circle comprised of three groups. The less powerful nullahs were under tire local khans, with next higher ranked group reporting to deputy
commissioners, while Sir George Cunningham himself would meet the few important ones.

Tire political agents would meet mullahs individually then bribe tlrem witlr forty to fifty rupees extracting a promise of preaching jihad against forces for the
goodofAM-e-Kitaab (British and Muslims). They were also promised government pensions over satisfactory performance. According to Sir George
Cunningham, he had paid 600 rupees to Ghulam Haider Sherpao to visit villages and propagate j ihad. Hazrat Ali of Swat controlled tire nullahs from Swat,
Buner, Mardan, and Rani Zai on Cunningbanr’s command at tire payment of fifteen rupees per month. Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan had been
paid 600 rupees to band this amount to three spiritual leaders: Ama Khel Faqir, Pir Musa, and Pir Zakoori in exchange for their aflegiance.63

When the Russian threat ended the Japanese and Genrran threat retrained coaxing a call from Sir George Cunningham to Kuli Khan to adjust the propaggnda

 

accordingly from anti- Russian to antiGennan and anti- Italian. Islam was being traded by the so-called Ulema, menoffeith, and the British to fool the illiterate
masses for their own benefits. Sir George Cunningham states,

“ Insist ence on the Zulm of Nazism, its danger to Islam and its result on the conquered countries should be 90cper cent of our material. A small but
vivid incident – tme if possible – illustrating what Nazism means to a villager in a subject countiy, an incident which will strike an ordinary
Pathan ’s imagination and of a kind which will cause him to repeat it to others, is worth more than pages of general tirade against the creed of
Nazis” 64

^ Khan, W. (2004). “Facts are Facts: The Untold story of India' Partition”. (trans.2.ed)., p.78-79
^ W.Khan, “Facts are Facts: The Untold stoiy of India”, 2004, p.80

The British and their Congress Buddies

 

The British, for its part, adopted the policy to maintain harmony and peace between Muslims and Hindus in the latter part of their rule. They valued unity and
tranquillity in the British India providing several opportunities to the Indian leaders to achieve communal bannony but the leaders foiled to acquiesce. The
blame for this foils squarely on the shoulders of the Hindu nationalistic Congress.

Almost all the primary sources related to the colonial era have been declassified and no document has yet been found which reveals evidence of a deliberate
and sustained ‘divide and rule’ strategy in India. Moreover, to adopt this understanding, one lias to ignore evidence of the Hindu- Muslim conflict, which was
bom out of the Hindus’ need to stamp out the Muslims from ‘their’ Hindustan . Furthermore, the postcolonial gpvemments of India had been confronting
communal conflict in Kashmir, Gujarat, Assam, etc. for decades. The situation testifies that the British did not need much to brew hatred between the Hindus
and the Muslims, the Hindus accomplished this alone.

It is an undeniable reality that tire Congress leadership concluded ‘friendly’ dialogue with die imperialists who were projected before the masses as the
exploiters and enemies oflndia. There is no doubt that these negotiations were necessary but the Congress leadership, or the Muslim Leaguers, never treated
the British as enemies in the discussions. They never refused to address the British widi ‘His Majesty’s Government’ or ‘His or Your Excellency’. Hardly, any
letter from the top Congress leaders to the British Viceroy can be presented as evidence oftheir defiant attitude.

Although tiiese were the recognised and expected forms of address in imperial traditions, which the ‘freedom lighters’ should not have honoured as it
legitimised the very Imperial rule they were opposing. To support their desire of independence they should have acquired a polite, decent manner using
different honourable words during their correspondence. Gandhi and Nehru, the two most prominent Indian leaders, very astutely never refused negotiations
with the rulers. In feet, Nehru and Mountbatten enjoyed very welldocumenled friendly relations comprising of light talks, dinners, cocktails, functions and
more.

64 Christopher Tuck, Professor Greg Kennedy, British Propaganda and Wars of Empire: Influencing Friend and Foe 1900-2010, 2014, p.67

Many Indian historians maintain that the MuslimLeague played a pro-British role but not to the degree that the Indian National Congress did. The founding
leadership of the Indian National Congress in 1885 and in India after 1947 was British The initial period after independence the Hindus utilized the
competence of Allan Octavian Hume for establishing effective management of Congress and later of Lord Mountbatten as the first Governor General oflndia.

Allan Octavian Hume not only founded the Congress but also single-handedly managed its affeirs, like finances, reports, arranging Congress’ annual sessions,
successfully. There were no Hindus but only Hume who undertook all the political work until Gopal Krishna Gokbale followed his example in 1 90 1 . Five
Britons had been invited to preside over the annual meetings from 1885 to 1918 including Georgg Yule in 1888, William Wedderbumin 1889 and 1910,
Alfred Webb in 1 894, Henry Cotton in 1 904, and Annie Besant in 1 9 1 7. The Congress deliberately chose Britons as presidents in order to prove its British-
loyal, moderate, non-racist, and liberal character. The Congress’s president was a four-day (the duration of the annual gathering) king of the Indians. During
the annual gathering, the representatives from different areas oflndia were supposed to stay at different places according to their religions and status. 65

The British intention behind the foundation of the Indian National Congress was to provide a training forum to the Indians. Perhaps, under the same feelings,
the Nehru family allegedly adopted this political gimmick in the post- independence politics.

Gunnit Singh writes that the Nehru family being more experienced than the other Congressites, utilised the British policy of divide and rule in India after
Partition executing it with more barbaric finesse than their ‘masters’ in the East Punjab during the early 1 980s. According to Gunnit Singh, ‘The Central
Government ’s strategy was to divide Sikhs ” to maintain their political hold in the region 66

66 SRMehrotra, “The Early Indian National Congress, 1885-1918: Ideals, Objectives and Organization,” Essays in Modem Indian Elistoiy, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980,
p.45-48.

Additionally, Gandhi and majority of the Congress leaders never accepted the status ofBbagpt Singh Sbaheed, Babbar Akalis, Gbadar party, Kuka
movement, and a number of anti- British movements which is an attestation of their loyalty to the British

During the Round Table Conference, the Indian leaders including Gandhi showed their inability to reconcile with the demands of different communities in India,
virtually admitting theft failure and rendering a blind trust in the British

All political developments on the part of the MuslimLeague were considered to be dictated by the British but the major demand, the Pakistan scheme, was
not declared as a British move. In the opinion of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, ‘the Pakistan scheme accepted by the Muslim League at Lahore in March
does not represent the decision of Indian Mislims, and he has refused to admit the possibility of Muslims elected to a constituent assembly
demanding the vivisection of India. ’ 61

 

Wavell and Mountbatten

 

By 1 944, Britain and its ales had come out of the Work! War II successfully and United States of America, an ally, wanted a selfgoveming India. This was
the time when Wavell’s Plan came to the forefront. It had been dismissed a year earlier in 1943, but Wavel emphasized that the plan could help end the
political and constitutional deadlock in India.

 

Lord Wavell was not willing to accept Pakistan, as he could envision the losses (human and territorial) this event could accrue. The new Labour government
had fonned in Britain in July 1945, its mindset obvious fromits continued rejection of the proposals presented by the British Government. They wanted that
the final judges of any policy regarding India, should remain in Britain itself Wavell Jailed because lie could not regain the trust of ‘dominant parties, and have
the prestige of established parties’; tire mistrust Med him because the British Government was not willing to transfer power to the ‘Brown Oligarchy’. 68

()() Dr. Gurmit Singh, History of Sikh Struggles , vol. IVNew Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1992, 34-58
d7 Report on the situation in the Punjab for the first-half of June, 1940, LPJ/5/243.

Before the Labour Party’s victory in election, it eagerly supported Congress and wanted self rule in India. One of the statement states that, ‘if Labour is
returned we would close the India office and transfer Indian business to the Dominions office…. This act would give them confidence that they’ are
no longer governed from Whitehall’ .69

Cripps, a close friend ofNehminthe Labour government, was one of the three cabinet members in the Cabinet Mission fonned in 1946. Wavell remarks on
Cripps were that, ‘He is sold to Congress point of view ’ . Wavell felt that it would be biased and partial to accept Cripps’ decisions, ignoring one of tire
other dominant parties, Muslim League, which had the prestige of an established party. Wavell complained to Prime Minister Attlee regarding Cripps’
unoflicial advisers and indirect contacts. In reality, the failure of the Cijpps Mission can be attributed to the unoflicial and close contacts of tire cabinet
members with the Congress. 70 These close contacts were confidential, like an illicit romance, but instrumental in maintaining the Congress’ and Muslim
League’s differences.

The Secretary of State for India, Pethick- Lawrence maintained secret correspondence with Nehru on tire Cabinet mission proposals, with Nehru demanding
increased concessions each time. Cripps wanted tire Congress to fomnthe government in India, as the British Government, regarding them as ‘socialist
brothers’, had a lenient opinion towards them The appeasement of the Congress was the priority of the Labour Government, while the MuslimLeague was
cast aside.7l The alteration of the Cabinet mission plan, to gain Congress’ pleasure, eventually reformed it to the one proposed by the Congress rather than
the one proposed by the mediator. According to Leonard Mosley:

“Jinnah and Muslim League mistrusted the Congress and Congress mistrusted the Viceroy ; Wavell mistrusted the Labour Government ; Attlee did
not necessarily mistrust Wavell but he had certainly lost faith in him. ” 7 –

^ M.I Chawla., “Wavell’s Relations with his Majesty’s Government: (October 1943- March 1947)”. Journal of South Asian Studies: Vol. 24. No.l., 2009, p.75

69 Ibid. p. 76

70 Wavell, “Wavell: The Viceroy’s Journal”, Oxford University Press., 1973, p.494

71 Ibid, p. 287

77 M.I.Chawla, “Wavell’s Relations with his Majesty’s Government: (October 1943- March 1947)”. Journal of South Asian Studies: Vol. 24. No.l., 2009, p.83
On 21 st March 1947, the Daily Telegraph wrote,

“wide spread sympathy with Viscount Wavell, who is regarded as having
been given an impossible individual task, and is now made to appear a scapegoat

for the failure of the Government to bring the Indian parties together ” .73 There have been historians who have regarded Lord Wavell as an

honest, unbiased viceroy who, although had been against the demand

of Pakistan, but was not anti- Muslim His efforts were of an impartial

official of the British government, ensuring safety and unprejudiced

rights, constitutional or political, to all communities. This is much

more than that could be said ofNehru’s platonic lover and Wavel’s

successor, Lord Mountbattem On 22 nd March 1947, Mountbatten

was appointed as the last Viceroy of British India.

Nehru and Mountbatten became friends in March 1 946 with
their friendship growing stronger with each passing year and political
crisis they faced together. Congress, glad with Mountbatten’ s
appointment replacing Wavell’s impartiality, thought that pounding

the idea of Pakistan into oblivion had now become a possibility. Mountbatten met Jinnah in a series of meetings to discuss a

united plan. Mountbatten insisted on a ‘weaker central gpvemment

consisting of Pakistan and Hindustan, being a part of British

Commonwealth’, but was unable to convince Jinnah. He stated, It

had become clear that the Mislim League would resort to arms if Pakistan in

some form was not conceded’. 74

The British Government and Congress also agreed on partition
because Congress leaders believed that ‘partition would be
temporary’. This naive belief guided Congress to accept the
partition 75 The date for the transfer ofpower was 1st June 1948, but
later it was changed to 15 th August 1947.

The plan of transfer of power and division of British India was
chalked out by Lord Ismay, a chief aide of Mountbattem And the
chalked out plan required approval from the Governor’s Conference

in April which would progress to Britain in May of 1 947 for the final approval Within this period, the ‘plan’ would not involve any of the

parties, the Muslim League and the Congress, to retain its neutrality. 76 To Mountbatten, confidential matters had the least importance

especially with regards to Nehru. Mountbatten showed the ‘plan’ to

Nehru to which he responded that this plan means the ‘Balkanization

of India’. Mountbatten asked V.P. Menonto formulate a new plan in

which Nehru performed his duties as the ‘editor-inchief. The ‘plan’

flew to London and Attlee’s Cabinet approved it in a meeting of five

 

minutes.77

The Muslin League leadership was of the view that Bengal
should remain united and there was a prospect it would be
independent of Pakistan and Hindustan; a Muslin majority region
would assure a Muslim- led government. The Congress completely
changed its previous 1905’s stance, when ii 1905 Bengal was
partitioned; i protested against i as a policy to divide Bengal on
communal basis. Ironically in 1 947 the same C ongress wanted a
divided Bengal and Punjab on ‘communal’ basis. 78

77 Ibid, p. 94

74 M. Shahid Amin. A Concise History of Pakistan. Karachi: The Institute of Business Management, 2015, p 132

75 Ibid, p. 133

Britain and the Drawing of Boundaries

 

The first time Britain hinted towards the recognition of Pakistan was through the Cripps Mission At the same time, the British wanted to avoid the
‘Balkanisation of India’. Hie strategic necessity for this policy increased with tire onset of tire Cold War. As early as August 1942, Mr. Leo Amery, His
Majesty’s Secretary of State for India wrote to the Viceroy that the British mist not only, “ ‘avoid raising false expectations among the Sikhs themselves
but also to pre\>ent encouragement to separatist tendencies in other Provinces like Madras and Bombay 79 The evidence from the final years of
British rule is clear that United India, not ‘Balkanisatiori of this region was the creed and policy of the British Pakistan was eventually to be conceded, but
with great reluctance.

The British educational and democratic reforms influenced the Indian society and resulted in numerous g^ps. Due to the lack of creative political traditions, the
Indian leadership could not fill these ggps. By adopting the theories and practices of the British masters, they achieved independence but could not secure
integrity of the region despite their desire and efforts. The depressed saw their; posterity in chains therefore they preferred separation to eternal slavery. On
the eve of Partition, Jirmah warned the Sikhs not to commit suicide by joining the Hindu majority but they did. They are repenting now and will be doing so
forever for siding with India.

76 Ibid, p. 133

77 Ibid, p. 134

78 Ibid, p. 136

70 Letter from Amery to Lord Linlithgow on 20 August 1942

Hie Congress claimed to be the representative of all the peoples living in the subcontinent and wanted the support of all minorities to establish its writ in Indian
allairs but the British too needed the support of all the minorities, therefore, they could never overlook their interests. The status of the ruling class and the
moral pressure of the Muslim world also played a favourable role in British’s receptiveness of the Muslim League’s demands. 80

The tragedy of Pakistan and Ind ia’s conflict over borders has its roots in the British policies as well At the time of independence, British interests did not
allow complete disassociation from the region; it still was strategically important. Thus, Britain persuaded Pakistan and India to remain in the Commonwealth.
Afghanistan wanted the Durand Line to be reversed as soon as the British left, but when Pakistan became a part of the Commonwealth it did not reverse the
Durand Line. Great Britain had argued that if it was reversed, it would undermine the defence and stability of tire Commonwealth.81

The first trick played in the Boundary C ommission was the demarcation of borders. The C ommission was chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, consisting of two
subcommissions: the Muslim League’s commission and the Congress’ commission. Radcliffe did the demarcation of Bengql and Punjab within thirty-six days
and left for Britain The results of the Commission astonished both the subcommissions of Congress and Muslim League. The Indian side which was worried
over Kashmir, but were happy at the inclusion of Gurdaspur, dragged the Indian border to touch Kashmir. Muslim League already had lost the Muslim
majority regions to India and losing a Muslim- populated region sharing borders with Pakistan was a drastic wound to die leadership. 82

80 Letter from Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India on 3 March 1946

81 W. Khan, “Facts are Facts: The Untold story oflndia”, 2004, p. 197

82 Swami, P. (2006). “India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir,

006). “India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir,

2004”. Routledge., p.20

 

Hie MuslimLeague was not willing to let go of Kashmir. But, Liaquat Ali Khan and Ch Muhammad AH of die MuslimLeague selected Sir Zafarullali as the
senior counsel of the Commission to attempt conciliation with India on the Kashmir issue. Sir Zafarullali had not consulted anyone in deciding ‘tehsils’ as the
unit of division. Muslim League leaders, on the contrary, had been of the view to select population as die unit of division. Sir Zafarullali and Muslim League
differed over this. However, the Radcliff Award which favoured India and as a consequence, Gurdaspur was given to India which also led to losing Kashmir
to India. 83

There are similarities between the Radcliffe award and die Breakdown Plan. In both the demarcation plans, the Indians had Gurdaspur in then – territory. The
Breakdown Plan was made in the Wavell’s Vieeroyalty, while the Radcliffe award was made in the Mountbatten Viceroyalty.

When Wave! had named the demarcation plan as the Breakdown Plan, the purpose was to let Jirmah’ s demand for Pakistan look less attractive. The
similarities between the two plans were because one was drawn by Hindu advisers 84 and the other by Hindu leaders, ie. Nehru and Menon 85 .

The Breakdown Plan was worked out, as die Radcliffe award. Radcliffe himself had no knowledge of die Indian territories and had rarely attended any
meeting of the boundary commission. Radcliffe ’s private secretary, Beaumont revealed that Radcliffe under Mountbatten’ s pressure, who was pressurized by
Nehru, changed the already conceived map with a partition of territory favouring India dining lunch This is alluded to in an infamous BBC article as
Partitioning India over Lunch

 

Beaumont in his piece claimed,

 

“the Viceroy Mountbatten, must take the blame – though not the sole blame

—for the massacres in the Punjab in which between 500, 000 to a million men, women and children perished . . . The handover of power was done
too quickly” , 86

88 All mad. B. ( 1994). Khalistan and Qadiani State. In B. Ahmad, “Ahmadiyya Movement: BritishJewish Connections”. Islamic Study Forum, p.250-252.

89 Chawla, M. I. (2009). “Wavell’s Relations with his Majesty’s Government: (October
M. I. (2009). “Wavell’s Relations with his Majesty’s Government: (October

March 1947)”. Journal of South Asian Studies: Vol. 24. No.l., p.89

88 Amin, Shahid. M. (2015). “A Concise History of Pakistan”. The Institute of Business Management., p.134
8 ® BBC News . (2007, August 10). “Partitioning India over Lunch”.

Retrieved April 29, 2016: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6926464.stm

Wavell had said a year earlier that if Partition was inevitable it should be done in gradual, progressive phases. But he was prevented to do so because the
Labour Government feared the Congress’ negative reaction It ignored Wavell’s advice which would have helped the British gpvemment to retreat from India
respectfully. Ultimately, they had appointed Mountbatten, a man of lesser political aptitude and honour than Wavell

Jinnah’s refiisalto accept Mountbatten as the joint Governor General, humiliated Mountbatten who wrote in his personal report on 4th July 1947 that:

“I asked … [ Jinnah ], ‘ ‘do you realize what this will cost you ”? He said sadly ‘ ‘it may cost me several crores of rupees in assets ’ to which I replied
somewhat acidly “it may well cost you the whole of your assets and the future of Pakistan. ” 87

The Nawab ofBhopal informed Jinnah on 6 th June 1947 that Viceroy Mountbatten had been pressurizing the princely states to join the existing constituent
assembly. Except for Hyderabad, Junagpdh, Bhopal, and Jammi and Kashmir, every state acceded to India. This does not look kindly on the Viceroy’s
intention of being impartial 88

The Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai reminded Nixon on 23 rd February 1 972 that the Kashmir issue was lefi unresolved strategically by the British.89 There is a
possibility of this being true. Nehru and his ales may have been tire pawns of greater powers unwilling to loosen their grip on the region.

 

87 Lubna Saif, “Kashmir and 3 June Plan”, Pakistan Vision Vol. 14, No. 1., 2013, p.104

88 Ibid, p. 104

89 Ibid, p. 98

 

 

 

THE DISMEMBERMENT STARTS
Introduction

 

3

 

 

The two wings of Pakistan – East and West Pakistan – had Me in common. Be it common freedom struggle, demography, topography, geography, and even
culture. The ethnic, climatic, and economic distinctions between both parts of Pakistan were substantial Both the Pakistani territories did not include any
significant industrial assets at the time of its creation; consequently immediately laced significant economic crises and military vulnerabilities. After
independence, die Indian National Congress had expected the Muslim leadership to be willing to negotiate after realizing that Pakistan was destined to fail
However, their expectations remained unfulfilled. Undeterred, the Indian National Congress concocted devious machinations, resulting in the catastrophic
finale at the cost of human lives, that redrew borders again in 1 97 1 .

From a Muslim perspective, the borders of the new Pakistan made little sense since its establishment. Both major Muslim- majority provinces were carved-up
and East Bengal, in particular, lost its industrial base to West Bengal which acceded India. A third of the Muslims of pre-Partition India remained in the post-
Paitition India, and so the Muslims of the subcontinent were now divided into three territories; East and West Pakistan and India. The political and economic
crises that immediately laced the new state of Pakistan were, therefore, not unexpected and played a major role in the events that were to unfold in the ensuing
decades.

The areas ofBritish India creating Pakistan were composed primarily of the fifty- three raw material producing agrarian hinterlands of India. East Bengal, which
became East Pakistan, had previously supplied raw jute to tire jute mills located around Calcutta. West Punjab, the most important component of West
Pakistan, provided raw cotton to the Bombay textile industry. Both Bombay and Calcutta were now part of India. The two wings of Pakistan constituted 23
per cent of the land mass of India, possessed 18 per cent of its population, but inherited less than 10 per cent of its industry. 90

A political and constitutional crisis in the infant state was unavoidable. East Pakistan was poorer and less developed than West Pakistan, had virtually no
indigenous capitalists and no senior bureaucrats or army officers. West Pakistan too was underdeveloped, compared to the more advanced areas of India, but
many of the immigrant Muslim businessmen and senior bureaucrats from British India settled here due to then’ cultural compatibility with the region. The army,
too, was largely drawn from the Punjab region of West Pakistan The irony was that tire indigenous elites in neither wing of Pakistan had been supportive of
the idea ofPakistan Both the two most important Muslim- majority areas of India – Punjab and Bengal

– had suffered partitions. The demographic dominance of Muslims in these provinces before Partition had translated into Muslims enjoying substantial power in
the representative politics introduced by tire British in 1 936, making these areas unsympathetic towards the Muslim League and not prepared for Partition
Not surprisingly, the Muslim League faced serious problems in trying to stitch together a consolidated Pakistani state after 1 947.

West Pakistan’s largely Punjabi elites soon discovered that they were the dominant economic and military group in tire new state, softening them to the idea of
Pakistan In contrast, the East Pakistani elites remained embroiled in conflicts with the central leadership due to a variety of reasons. As a result of these
tensions, the new state ofPakistan laced serious conflicts, between the elites of its two wings from the outset, which remained unresolved even after a decade
of constitutional discussions.

At the forefront of the dismembennent ofPakistan was East Pakistan’s demand for provincial autonomy. In this chapter we discuss the various factors that led
to the dismemberment ofPakistan in 1 971 .

99 “Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origin of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence, Cambridge, 1990”

The Language Issue-Bengali versus Urdu

The Issue Rears its Head

 

Language is the reflection of a society’s status and serves as the sign of authenticity. Bengali, historically, was not a suppressed language and the Bengali
people were not suppressed people. The progressive sublimity of Bengali literature, developed under the patronage of Muslim rulers during the Mughal reign,
is a testament to this. The language issue shook the very foundation ofPakistan and many believe that the movement for Bangladesh began with the movement
for Bengali language. 91

The lact of the matter is that the language of Muslims in Pakistan was not Urdu It was Punjabi in Punjab, Sindhi in Sindh, Pashto in NWFP, Balocbi in
Balocbistan, and Bengali in East Pakistan Urdu was the lingua franca and the unifying language of the Muslims of India but did not represent either East
Pakistan or West Pakistan, a fact lost on most East Pakistanis.

The initial language controversy was triggered during the second session of the Constituent Assembly in 1 948. Mr Dhirendra Nath Datta, a Hindu member
from East Pakistan addressed the assembly,

“ Bengali is a provincial language but so far as our state is concerned ; it is the language of the majority of the state.. . Out of sixty- nine million
people in Pakistan, fortyfour million people speak the Bengali language.. . The state language of the state should be the language which is used by
the majority of the people of the state, and for that, 1 consider the Bengali language is a lingua franca of our state . . . Bengali should not be treated
as a provincial language. It should be treated as the language of the state. ” 92

Liaquat Ali Khan, who was at the time the Prime Minister, knowing very well that he was responding to a Bengali Hindu said the following,

” Pakistan has been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this subcontinent and the language of a hundred million
Mislims is Urdu . . . Pakistan is a Muslim state and it must have its lingua franca, the language of the Muslim nation … 1 had thought that the object
of the amendment was an innocent one, in that it was intended to include Bengali among the media of expression of assembly but now the object
seems to be to create a rift between the peoples of Pakistan and to take away from the Mislims that unifying link which can be achiex’ed by a
common language. ” 93

91 Rafiqul Islam, The Bengali Language Movement and Emergence of Bangladesh, Asian Studies, Vol. XI, 1978

92 Constituent Assembly ofPakistan, proceedings 1948, p. 15-16

This led to an increase in the demand of giving a national status to Bengali in East Pakistan. The student community contributed actively to this demand,
causing their clash with the police outside a government building, which resulted in some 50 injuries.94 Khawaja Nazimuddin, the Chief Minister of East
Pakistan, recognised tire need to contain the situation and entered into negotiations with the Committee of Action for a resolution Consequently, an agreement
was signed with two important clauses:

 

“i) In the 1948 session of the East Bengal Legislative Assembly, a special resolution would be moved to propose to the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan to make Bengali one of the national languages of Pakistan, giving it equal status to Urdu.

ii) Another resolution would be moved in the East Bengal Legislative Assembly, to make Bengali the official language of the province of East
Bengal in place of English. ” 95

For some reason, the provincial legislature of East Pakistan completely ignored the above-mentioned agreement. Thus the language issue, instead of fillin g
out and dying, renewed and begpn to gpin significant backing in East Pakistan The fault for this lies with Khawaja Nazimuddin whose futile efforts in handling
the issue condemned Pakistan to a division that didn’t wither away. Khawaja Nazimuddin restated what Liaquat Ali Khan had said in the Constituent
Assembly in 1948 about the language controversy being a conspiracy to undennine tire state.96 From this, it seems clear that Khawaja Nazimuddin was
influenced by his party colleagues from East Pakistan in believing that the whole language issue was a force and was only raised to undemrine them There are
also reports that he was convinced that the people behind the language movement were actually supporters of his political adversary Hussain Shaheed
Suhrawardy. All of this is open to conjecture, but the decline of Khawaja Nazimuddin from signing tire agreement with the Action Committee to the
representation in the Provincial Legislature did raise a few serious questions. The politics in Pakistan was so politically precarious that it is not bard to imagine
a leader making decisions based on his own well-being

92 Constituent Assembly ofPakistan, proceedings 1948, p. 17

99 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan era: Politics of Pakistan, 1958-1969, Syracuse University Press, 1971

95 R. Islam, op. cit., p. 144

96 Ibid.

The bureaucrats of the central government had no sympathy for the Bengali language and its movement. They believed that the Bengali- language movement
was being financed from across the border; so they advised Khawaja Nazimuddin not to bow down to the miscreants. Whether the language issue was
backed from across the border or not, what Khawaja Nazimuddin foiled to realize was that tire issue was real and the Bengalis were keen to see their
language, Bengali, given equal status to Urdu.

It is important to remember that at tire time of Partition most of the Bengali Muslims belonged to the lower middle class, having little or no education As a
consequence, they were under-represented in all of tire major sectors of state institutions including the armed forces and bureaucracy. Thus, afier Partition,
when the Hindus vacated many posts in the administration in East Pakistan, all these were filled by non- Bengali Muslims. The competitive tests held to fill these
positions were administered in Urdu or English but not in Bengali. East Pakistanis not knowing sufficient Urdu lost out to West Pakistanis and a feeling of
resentment persisted. 97 The Central Government of Pakistan started the unilateral use of Urdu money order forms, postal stamps, currency, coins, railway
tickets and official letterheads, even without formally adopting Urdu as the state language of Pakistan. Obviously, this created further hostility amongst Bengalis
for Urdu and its supporters.

This move particularly is not understandable. The Federal Government of Pakistan had not adopted Bengali as tire official language despite orders by the
Supreme Court. The bureaucrats wanted to be more loyal to their leaders, demonstrated this loyalty by using Urdu as the official language.

 

Quaid-eAzam ’s Role

 

Tire leadership ofPakistan foiled to handle the issue and it was referred to Quaid-iAzam’s able leadership. The Muslim League, as will be discussed later, was
in an administrative turmoil, completely reliant on its charismatic leadership especially that of Mr Jirmah

97 Ibid Jirmah himself was in foiling health hi his speech at Dacca University on 24 th March 1948 he said,

“There can, how e\’er, be only one lingua franca of the State, and that language should be Urdu and cannot be any other. The State language,
therefore, must obviously be Urdu, a language understood throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan, and above all a language which, more
than any other provincial language embodies the best that is in Islamic culture and Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other
Islamic countries. ” 98

Mr Jirmah also met with tire Committee of Action that had been working on the language issue. The Committee of Action was of the view that if one state
language was to be adopted, then English should be selected, or else two should be adopted like that in USSR and Switzerland. Since, they were ofthe view
that Urdu did not merit as the state language and if a Pakistani language must be the state language, it should be Bengali; as spoken by the majority of the
population Jinnali rejected this argument stating the Urdu was the language ofMuslims ofthe subcontinent and must remain the state language of Pakistan 99

In addition to the language issue, the Bengalis were getting sick of the haughty and supercilious attitude of Punjabi officers towards them 100 Jirmah was aware
of this and knew that the problem was complex. Addressing the Bengalis he said,

“Please do not think that I do not apprecia te the position, very often it becomes a vicious circle. When you speak to a Bengali he say’s: Yes you are
right, but Punjabi is so arrogant ; when you speak to a Punjabi or non-Bengali, he says, ‘Yes, but these people do not want us here, they want to get
us out. ’ Now this is vicious circle and I do not think anybody’ can solve this Chinese puzzle. The question is, who is going to be more sensible, more
practical, more statesman like and will be rendering the greatest service to Pakistan? So make up your mind and from today put an end to this
sectionalism. ” 101

This was because the core of the issue had always been based on religion Afier the death of Jinnali, the Muslim Ulema championed the cause of Urdu as the
only language ofPakistan as it, “embodied the best of Islamic culture, Muslim tradition and is nearest to the language used in other Islamic
countries. ” 102 The Bengalis wanted the independence to develop their own language, to separate it from the influence of the Hindus who they had shared it
for centuries. This was lost on the promoters of Urdu. It should be remembered that many of these Muslim Ulema had opposed Mr Jirmah, the Muslim
League, and the creation ofPakistan, as discussed earlier in Chapter 2.

9 * Lawrence Ziring, “The A Lawrence Ziring, “The A1969”, Syracuse University Press, 1971
99 Ahmed Kamruddin, “A Socio Political history of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh”, 1975
Khalid B. Sayeed, “Pakistan The Fonnative Phase”, 1986

 

Quaid-e-Azam Spech, p. 129

 

101

 

Dacca University Campus Action

 

Kbawaja N azimiddin bad replaced Mr J innah as the Governor General after his death in 1 948 . The language issue motored along with no territory being
gained or lost by either side. Pakistan and its Prime Minister were too busy looking after international affairs to look towards East Pakistan, and try to pacify
the growing discontent felt there. After the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, Kbawaja Nazimuddin became the Prime Minister of Pakistan

In the beginning of 1 952, the language controversy took a serious turn Both Mr Jirmah and Liaquat Ali Khan were no more in this world to resolve the issue
and Kbawaja Nazimuddin, given his track record, was not in a position to handle the issue properly.

The people ofEast Pakistan were critical of the anti- Bengali policy of the Punjabi and Muhajir dominated ruling class. With the political crisis, the economic
condition in East Pakistan had also deteriorated. The East Pakistanis, losing faith in Muslim League formed a new political party, the Awarrd Muslim League,
with Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bbashani, as its leader in 1 949. The party later dropped the word Muslim to accommodate the other minorities and became
the Awarrd League. 103 This party exploited the growing sense of deprivation and exploitation in East Pakistan, and attributed all this as a new form of
colonialism that had replaced British imperialism. Under these circumstances, the language controversy propelled forward with new momentum in 1952.

In January 1952, the Basic Principles Committee of the Constituent Assembly ofPakistan submitted its recommendation for making Urdu as tire only state
language. This sparked off a wave of anger in East Pakistan with protests erupting everywhere. The representatives of various political and cultural
organizations held a meeting on 3 1 st January 1952, which was chaired by Maulana Bbashani. An All-Party Central Language Action Committee was fonned
with Kazi GhulamMahboob as its convener and Maulana Bbashani as its cbainnan The Language Action Committee decided to call a strike and hold
demonstrations and processions on 2 1st February 1952 throughout East Pakistan 104

10“ P. Oldenburgg, op. cit.

103 Salik Siddiq, “Witness to surrender”, Oxford University Press, 1997

As the preparations for demonstrations were underway, the Provincial Government imposed Section 144 in the city of E)acca, banning all assenblies,
processions, and demonstrations. The Central Language Action Committee held a meeting on 20th February under the chairmanship ofAbulHashimto
decide a strategy about tire strike, but opinion was divided about the violation of Section 1 44. However, the students were detennined to violate Section 1 44,
and held a meeting as an act of its defiance on 2 1 st February at the University campus. During the meeting, the Vice Chancellor and a few university teachers
came and requested the students to avoid violating Section 144. These pleas were ignored and thousands of students from different schools and colleges of
Dacca assembled at the Dacca University campus and raised slogans. The armed police that was alert and waiting outside the gate, baton- charged; not even
sparing the female students. The students’ retaliation of throwing brick bats was responded with tear gas shells by the police. The situation spiralled out of
control with students proceeding towards tire Assembly Hall inciting police firing.

The situation escalated towards the worst when tire police arrested several students for violating Section 144. Enraged by the arrests, the students assembled
around the legislative Assembly and blocked tire legislators’ way, insisting them to present their demand to the Assembly. Meanwhile, a group of students
sought to storm into the building, and catastrophe happened. The police opened fire killing three students and two other persons, opening the door of bloody
unrest in East Pakistan. 105

As tire news of the killings spread, disorder erupted across the city. Shops, offices, and public transport were shut down and a general strike began. Inside the
Provincial Assembly, some legislators requested the Chief Minister, Nurul Amin to visit wounded students in the hospital and to adjourn the session as a sign
of mourning. On Nurul Amiris refusal, several other members wemt out and joined the students. Nurul Amin continued his stance for opposing the demand for
Bengali in the Assembly. Next day, 22nd February dawned with gloom, a mourning procession turned out to pray for the victims, and demonstrated. The
police and the army responded, resulting in several deaths, including that of a young man named Shafiur Rahman, while many others were injured and
arrested. On 23rd February, a memorial was erected, at the spot where students had been killed. 106

3*34 Lawrence Ziring, “The Ayub Khan era: Politics ofPakistan, 1958-1969”, Syracuse University Press, 1971
105 Ibid

Since 1 952, 2 1 st February has been observed every year to commemorate the martyrs of the language movement. The recent declaration by UNESCO for
declaring 2 1 st F ebruary as the International Mother Language Day is a clear recognition of the inspiring universal message of the Bengali language movement.
UNESCO adopted a resolution on 1 7th Novemberl 999 to declare 2 1 st February as the International Mother I_anguage Day. It is an honour bestowed by
the international community on the language movement of former East Pakistan, and present-day Bangladesh. 107

 

Solving the Language Issue

 

Political tensions came ahead of the elections of the provincial assembly ofEast Pakistan in 1954. The government wanted to ease the tension and Prime
Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra by resolving the issue gave official recognition to Bengali in a Muslim I-eague meeting. This decision was followed by a major
wave of unrest as other ethnic groups also sought recognition of their regional languages. Supporters of Urdu, such as Maulvi Abdul Haq, Baba-eUrdu,
condemned any proposal to grant official status to Bengali. He led a large rally of people to protest against Muslim I-eague’s decision. 108

After the elections, the United Front came to power in East Pakistan and the anniversary of language martyrs was observed on 2 1 st February 1 954. This was
achieved for the first time in an honourable manner and in a peaceful atmosphere. The government supported a major project to construct a new ‘Shaheed
Minar’. The session of the Constituent Assembly was stopped for five minutes to ejqpress condolences for the slain students. Major rales were organised by
Bengali leaders, while all pubftc offices and businesses remained closed. Bengali was recognised as the second official language ofPakistan on 29 February
1956, and Article 214(1) ofthe Constitution ofPakistan was amended as:

3®® K M. Arif, Khaki Shadows : Pakistan 1947-1997, Oxford University Press, 1999
107 Ibid

3*38 Maulvi Abdal-Haq, Pakistan mein Urdu ka alamiyya, 1956.

 

“ The state language of Pakistan shall be Urdu and Bengali ”. 109

Although the question of official languages was settled in 1 956, the aura of discontent amongst the Bengalis continued to grow, hr the dismemberment of
Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, the language issue had a huge role to play. But it was not an issue that could not have been solved earlier. Urdu was
actually the first language of just 5 per cent of Pakistanis, and Mr Jinnah’s decision to make it the official language of Pakistan was for the purpose ofbringing
all Pakistanis together under one language. This is perhaps the most telling of the reasons behind Urdu being given preference as the national language of
Pakistan. The Bengplis were never made to realize this and the language issue was allowed to grow into an ‘us versus them’ issue. Similarly, even if this was
not enough, the establishment had plenty of chances to solve the issue before it took a violent turn That violence remained etched into the memories of the
Bengplis; even though the language issue was solved in 1 956 it continued as fodder to the fire of Bengali feelings of injustice and discontent with the West
Pakistanis and the Central Government.

The Role of Political Parties in Dismemberment

No National Party

 

The dismemberment of Pakistan cannot be blamed on linguistic and cultural issues alone. The separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan was, for a large
part, the result of downright incompetence and inability of tire Pakistani political system to handle tire situations that confronted it. This was in turn the
culmination of the failure of Pakistan’s prominent leaders, who were more concerned with their personal stakes. Their total disregard and ineptitude in
understanding the importance of establishing strong political institutions and unity amongst the various groups of people that inhabit Pakistan, proved to be the
perfect recipe for political chaos and upheaval

K. M. Arif, Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997, Oxford University Press.

Pakistan’s geographical composition was in itself quite complex, with a thousand miles of hostile India lying between the two parts, thus, maintaining strong
political link was essential and paramount. This proved to be a ggrgpntuan task as the two wings had little in common in tenus of demography, culture, and
geography.

Political parties must exist to inculcate into and foster hannonious relations among the diverse units of a country. Political parties are required to bring the
distinctive political elements of different regions together on the basis of a common national ideology. Consequently, these regions establish close ties with the
federation, creating crucial national unity. It is these national political parties that guarantee national integration and become an aggnt of unity among the regions
and provinces. History remains witness to the dismal and complete failure of tire political parties ofPakistanto achieve this. There was no national political
party including the Muslim League that came to the fore, after the death of Mr Jirmah and Liaquat Ali Khan, leaving a political vacuum which required to be
filled in order to kill the seeds of separatism growing in East Pakistan.

Two limitations of the Pakistani leadership of the political parties affected the unity of Pakistan to a large extent. Firstly, in a political culture where the growth
of political parties was baned for long periods of time, the development of a national political party was a neglected area that remained ineptly ignored by the
Pakistani leadership. The position of the Pakistan Muslim League, the only national political party at the time of the establishment of Pakistan, had weakened
in the course of time with no party emerging to fill the void. Secondly, the parties were always secondary to their leaders, proof that the political leaders of the
time were very much responsible for the debacle of East Pakistan.

In Pakistan, regional political parties had become more powerful than the national parties. This proved to be injurious to the state, since the regional parties
had no national stakes or following in other regions. These regional political parties, having no following and organisation in other regions, won the elections in
their respective areas and there was no national party that could unite the people of the country together.

The obvious division between the political parties of the two wings of Pakistan was never more evident than in elections held on 7th December 1970, for 300
seats of National Assembly of Pakistan, the East Pakistan based Awami League secured 160 out of 162 East Wing’s seats. No West Pakistan based party
including Pakistan Peoples Party, the largest party of West Pakistan and second largest seat- winner in the National Assembly, could win a single seat in East
Pakistan This division in the political parties proved as a crisis point that concluded in the dismembennent of Pakistan

 

Failures of the Pakistan Muslim League

 

Pakistan Muslim League (PML), being the founder- party of Pakistan, had a national identity at tire time of independence. Its achieved independence of
Pakistan was no small feat. PML had the unique status ofbeing the only party in Pakistan in what was virtually a one-party state. Almost every figure of
importance on both the central and provincial governments was its member. Fifty-seven of the seventy- four members of the first Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan were affiliated with the PML and it was inconceivable that a government could be formed without its support. 1 10

PML was organized on a national scale with a full paraphernalia of secretariats, working committees and publicity with corresponding organisations at the
provincial level sending delegates to the AllPakistan Muslim League Counci But its organisation was loose, unwieldy, and subject to continual internal stress.
And it lacked a strong structure to control and enforce discipline over its regional supporters. For erqpansion of the party’s influence, its central leadership was
completely dependent on the provincial leaders for support.

PML enjoyed the mass support of the people after Partition which could have provided any leader a strong backing,, if he had worked on the organisation of
the Party. However, this never happened.

PML renamed tire ruling party in the Centre for more than seven years after tire establishment of Pakistan With the creation of Pakistan, the All- India
Muslim League assumed power in the new state, as Mr I iinralr became tire first Governor General and Liaquat Ali Khan became tire general secretary and
leader of the League parliamentary party. After tire assassination ofLiaquat Ali Khan in 1951, KhawajaNazimuddinwas government elected as the Prime
Minister as well as the party leader. When his ministry was dismissed in April 1 95 3 by Ghulam Muhammad, tire new Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra
was elected the Party’s president on 18th October, 1953. MuslimLeague thus remained in power till October, 1954 when the first Constituent Assembly was
dissolved. PML also remained tire ruling party in the provinces in one way or the other till 1954.

* 1(1 Political Affairs Department UK ‘Political Parties in Pakistan’

But the leadership of PML, in the lust for power, did not leam tire principles of party organisation. There can be Me honest disagreement with Suhrawardy’ s

 

indictment of the PML as ‘a ruthless oligarchy in which the interests of the country, the views of the people and canons of justice and fair play were
being brushed aside in the struggle for power. ’ 1 1 1 The party often remained leadercentred. The party’s council remained in the state of lethargy, meeting
only four times during the six important years from 1949 to 1955, and that too with Me effect. 1 12

In the early months of Pakistan’s life , both Mr Jirmah and Liaquat Ali Khan exercised a close control over the policy of the party to ensure that it was in line
with the government policy. This was perhaps necessary at that time when Pakistan was an infant state requiring a strong hand to guide its years of infancy.

But, still, in February 1 948, an organizing committee was appointed to supervise the work of restructuring the PML with Cbaudhry Khaliq uz Zaman as the
Chief Organizer.

Cbaudhry Khaliq uz Zaman had little influence or respect as a leader, with only a reputation for intrigue in his political repertoire. He failed to transform and
regroup the party from being a group of freedom fighters to a fully functional and organized political party which could bind the masses together. His efforts
were seen as mere political manoeuvring, between him and different leaders across the provinces and the centre. 1 1 3

The PML leadership quickly managed to lose mass support in East Pakistan, the most populous province of Pakistan. This misfortune gemmated with tire
action of limiting of the PML membership there. The PML leaders disbanded the party in East Bengal excusing the division of Bengal. They formed an ad hoc
committee with their own band of people and kept the membership books for the new PML under their own control Maulana Akram Khan, tire provincial
organizer of the Muslim League, managed to restrict the membership of PML in East Pakistan This has been coirfinned by Mahmud Ali, who was at the time
the President of the East Pakistan Youth League. 1 14 Although the purpose of this is not quite clear, but it is assumed that East Pakistani membership was
curtailed so as to establish the superiority of West Pakistanis, especially the Punjabis within the PML ranks.

Mazhar Ali, Pakistan First Twelve Years, Pakistan Times, 10 November 1953
* 1 – Kokab, RizwanUllah, and MassarratAbid. “A Factor in East Pakistan’s Separation: Political Parties or Leadership.” Pakistan Vision 14.1 (2013): 1.

113 Ibid

PML in East Pakistan was divided into three major factions from before independence, re. tire Nazinuddiir faction, the Fazhi Haq faction, and the
Subrawardy faction. These factions remained even after 1947. The Nazimuddin faction ultimately took hold over the party organisation, successfully securing
positions in the Central League. While the Subrawardy faction, with its organizational capability enjoyed authority over the mobilized urban intellects,
especially the students of East Pakistan C ontrarily, though, the F azhi Haq faction in spite of its organizational weakness possessed the mass support of
Bengalis. These two factions experienced a falling out with the central PML hierarchy, over the issue of Bengal’s political autonomy. Another group led by
Maulana Bbasbani, which had its main strength in Assam and Sylhet, broke away from the PML in February 1948, due to the appointment ofMaulana Akram
Khan as the provincial organizer. 1 15 Maulana Bbashani later formed the historically notorious Awami Muslim League in 1 949 as stated earlier.

The parting ofthe major factions of the PML severely weakened it in Pakistan On the other hand, Khawaja Nazimuddin secured an amendment to the
PML’s constitution that allowed him to become the President of PML again, otherwise lie would have been disqualified for this appointment. Dining his tenure
as the president of the party, he was neither able to establish a properly functioning Working C ommittee nor to impose his will in the factional clashes of the
provincial branches ofthe League.

The institutional foundation of the PML was further undermined when in a meeting at Dacca in October 1952, presided over by Khawaja Nazimuddin, tire
provision for the annual election of the office bearers was removed, and they were given tenures of 3 years. Thus, office bearers could continue enjoying the
privileges of the party offices for a longer period without any mandate from the party members.

* 13 Badruddin Umar, The Emergence of Bangladesh, Oxford University Press, 2004 1 13 Rafique A l/al. Political Parties

Hie PML’s influence in East Pakistan also decreased due to a fundamental amendment adopted in PML’s constitution in the meeting of 1952. This
amendment was adopted after heated discussions amongst the party members. This amendment propagated the representation of various provinces in the
central council of the party on the principle of parity on the basis of population between East and West Pakistan. Through this formula, the quota for East
Pakistan was fixed at 327 menbers, Punjab 1 84, NWFP 58, Sindh and Khairpur 45, the Bahawalpur state 1 8, and for Balochistan, and Karachi 1 1 . 1 16

In East Pakistan, the Muslim League suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the new United Front in the provincial elections of 1 954, despite keeping its
promise to the peasants to abolish 231101×1311, which it did in 1950. The United Front was a coalition, consisting of the Awami Muslim League, the Krishak
Praja Party, the Ganatantri Dal (Democratic Party) and Nizam-e- Islam The coalition was led by three major Bengali populist leaders AK. Fazlul Haq,
Huseyn Sbaheed Subrawardy and Maulana Bbasbani. The United Front parties won 223 seats out of 309, with the Awami League winning 143. The East
Pakistani political elite had discovered that the Muslim League was not receptive to its demands for more autonomy for East Pakistan, and be^n to stand for
itself This political assertion was however, quickly suppressed by the central bureaucracy, which dismissed the Legislative Assenbly and imposed Governor’s
Rule. 117

N ot only did the party’ s heads of the state damage the reputation and image ofthe League, other ruling personalities also played a role in denting the national
party. Considerable damage to the party took place at the fonnation of the Republican Party by Chief Minister of West Pakistan, Dr Khan Sahib, under the
influence of the President of Pakistan, General Iskandar Mirza. The power-seeking leaders, preferred to leave the PML when the Central Working
Committee of the party ordered the ministers in the West Pakistan cabinet of Dr. Khan Sahib to resign or be expelled from the party. PML was hit hard
because it no longer had popular support and the leaders who were leaving the party did not fear from any backlash from the workers within the party and
their following in general. And those who remained in the party did not have the capability to make it a national force agqin.

* Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mike Enskat, and Clemens Spiess, “Political Parties in South Asia”, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004
1 1 7 Salahuddin Ahmad, Bangladesh: Past and Present

Although, West Pakistan comprised of four provinces, the population of East Pakistan alone at that time was greater. If the provinces had equal weight in the
legislature it would be unfair for the East, and if they had representation according to their population, the economically dominant West, with its centres of
bureaucratic and military power, would feel threatened. The cbsest Pakistan came to a constitutional settlement was under the Bogra Formula put forward by
Mohammed Ali Bogra, the third Prime Minister of Pakistan and a Bengali from East Pakistan, on 7 th October, 1953.

Under this formula, there would be a bicameral legislature with an Upper House with 50 seats, 10 from each province. There would also be a Lower House

 

with 3 00 seats in proportion to population, so that East Pakistan would have 1 65 . This formula then g^ve East and West Pakistan exactly the same number of
seats in the two houses added together. The president and prime minister would also have to be from different wings. The plan was popular but was put to
rest by the military and the bureaucracy, who conspired to dissolve the Constituent Assembly in 1953, eventually led to the military takeover of 1958. 1 18

In October 1 958, Martial Law was enforced in Pakistan and the political parties were banned. Hie inposition of the martial law curtailed the org 3 nizational
freedom to operate political organizations, establishing an authoritarian ruling coalition One effect of this intervention was that for a decade the political
settlement in Pakistan ensured a relatively favourable growth- stability trade-off with state- led industrialization This allowed the development of a home-grown
capitalist class in a county that was virtually non- industrial in 1947. But the new capitalists and tire bureaucratic beneficiaries of the state- led development
strategy were mostly from West Pakistan This, together with a number of other factors gradually undennined the authoritarian ruling coalition

* 1 ^ Mushtaq H. Khan, Bangladesh: Partitions, Nationalisms and Legacies for State Building, Department of Economics, University of London, 2010

Alter the revival of political parties in 1962, the Convention Muslim League was fomred under the patronage of the President of Pakistan General Muhammad
Ayub Khan General Ayub had agreed, to revive the party politics as a political compulsion Therefore, when he was elected party president in May 1963, he
did not desire personally to realty do anything for the party, justifying his autonomous, independent political campaign in the 1965 presidential election in spite
of running for elections on the party ticket. He issued an independent election manifesto, which the party later adopted. He waged the campaign mainly on his
personal record and performance, and not on the party’s record. 1 19

In the arrangement of tire affairs of the C onvention Muslim League, Ayub Khan as tire president of the party, was the main driving force and tire party was
secondary to his personality. The members of almost all important Committees of Convention Muslim League were nominated by the President himself In
East Pakistan, the party was divided into two factions; one led by the Governor, Monem Khan, while the other led by his opponents. Intra- party feuds often
made the party ineffective in local elections. Moreover, their support was based not on ideological principles but on the personal g^in they could derive from
the regime. Additionally, tire Convention Muslim League had been thoroughly discredited in East Pakistan. Thus the party’s unity and claim to national
character depended on Ayub. Following Ayub’s downfall, his party was split into three factions.

Convention Muslim League did not get the image of a national party even though its programme was based on the unity of the country. The party was always
used by its leaders to further their own cause. Thus, even though it was tire only national party, it could never be utilised for the purpose of uniting the country.

In 1962, when the Council Muslim League (CML), a laction of the Muslim League formed by a majority of old PML leaders who had left the Convention
League, was revived there was a certain amount of disagreement between the principal leaders of the party and the minor figures who had never been
conspicuous for loyalty. In the elections of the party in 1 967, Mumtaz Daulatana won the presidency of CML and all of his nominees were elected for other
offices, amidst the allegations of rigging. All of the other three candidates for the presidency of the party, re. Qayyum Khan, Sbaukat Hayat and Khawaja
Safdai’ gradually left the CML. Qayyum Khan and Khawaja Safdar established their own Leagues. In this way, the one and only national party was
completely dismantled and divided. 120

* 19 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration,

The Organizational Problems of the Parties

 

After the virtual demise of the PML, no party could emerge with a national mandate. The political leaders made very few efforts to develop the political parties
on a national level The possibilities to fonn a national opposition party, Jinnali Awani Muslim League, during early fifties was dissolved because Nawab
Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot and his Punjabi supporters objected to the nomination of the East Pakistani Awami League members to the Working Committee of
the party, as they did not accept the former as part of the parent body of the party. 121

The East Pakistan Awani League during 1960s realized that it mist either become a ‘national party’ on paper, like the Convention Muslin League and the
Council MuslinLeague, or re-establish its mass contact and risk forfeiting all clains to beftig a national party. It chose the latter. The Awani League’s national
president N asrullah chose the latter. The Awami League’ s national president N asrullah point programme, which resulted in a final lift and his leaving the party
and fonring the Pakistan Democratic Movement. 122

The National Awani Party could have functioned as a national party. Its leadership included nationally- known figures from both wings, who had mass support
belind them In East Pakistan, it had Maulana Bhasbani and in West Pakistan, it had Abdul Gaffar Khan, Pir of Manki Sharifj Mian Iftikbaruddin, G.M. Syed
and Mahmood ul Haq Usmani representing all die provinces of Pakistan But there was no unity of purpose in the party after its revival in 1964. The split
portions of the Party could not be useful for national purposes, because of the lack of will for unity. Another East Pakistani party, Nizam- i-Islam, remained
regional from its foundation

120 Ibid.

121 Mushtaq Ahmad, “Politics without Social Change”, Space Publishers, 1971

122 Ibid.

Dining General Ayub’s government, no political party developed as a national institution The Jamaat-e-Islami, the Council MuslimLeague, and the Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP) were largely West Pakistan-based. The Awami League was East Pakistan-based. The two factions of the National Awami Party, though
had interregional orgpnizations, remained fragmented and weak. The regime did not pay enough attention to building a national party of its own, and the policy
of repression prevented other parties from developing into broad-based national organizations.

The 1970 elections showed that there was no national party which could claim to represent both the wings of united Pakistan. Awami League tiiat won die
elections in die Centre as well as in East Pakistan concentrated only in East Pakistan. It placed its candidates on all seats contested in East Pakistan, but chose
to field very few candidates in West Pakistan. PPP, a party that emerged as the second largest party in die Centre and the majority party in West Pakistan,
showed its conplete indifference for East Pakistan during die process of nomination of its candidates. It did not file a single nomination paper from die Eastern
wing. 123

 

HS Suhrawardy & Khawaja Nazimuddin

At this point it is pertinent to realize that the state of die political parties in Pakistan could have been mxh befter, if free political activities had been allowed. If

 

this had happened, the East Pakistani leaders like HS Suhrawardy, Khawaja Nazimiddin and Nunil Amin could have easily established a national political
party. US Suhrawardy had rendered substantial services ibr tire organisation of political parties ibr the cause of Muslims and the Pakistan Movement. He was
the moving spirit behind the United Muslim Party, which was converted into tire Muslim League in Bengal before independence.

In 1 94 1 , Suhrawardy had kept the masses consolidated in support of the League during the critical situation when A, K. Fazl-ul-Huq was dismissed from the
League. Suhrawardy with the help of Abul Hasbimtook the League in Bengal to a level of membership that was more than the party’s membership in all other
provinces in combined India. In April 1946, he ted the largest and the most enthusiastically welcomed contingent in Muslim League Legislators’ Convention
held in Delhi on 8th April 1946, where he moved a resolution Ibr Pakistan through which ambiguities, of whatever kind existed in the Lahore Resolution
(1940) were removed.

123 Syed ShabbirHussain, Ayub, Bhutto and Zia (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2000)

In 1949, whenH.S. Suhrawardy’ s supporters had joined the Awami Muslim League, he tried to bring it within tire framework of a national party.

Suhrawardy, negating the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan, tiled to establish links with the political workers of West Pakistan. In making
substantial development to this direction, in March 1 950, he formed the All- Pakistan Awami Muslim League.

In December 1 952, in order to fitlfil his desire to establish an allPakistan political party for the sake of the integration of Pakistan, Suhrawardy called a
convention of the three parties – All- Pakistan Awami Muslim League, Mamdot’s Jinnah Muslim League in Punjab and Pir of Manki Sharif s Awami League in
theNWFP at Lahore and a new party, the AllPakistan Jinnali Awami Muslim League. The Mamdot group departed from the All-Pakistan Awami Muslim
League in 1 953 and substantially weakened the party in West Pakistan.

Suhrawardy’ s efforts to establish a national Awami League and to make it fonn a coalition with the regional autonomists in both East and West Pakistan
between 1953 and 1955 also tailed due to lack of interest from other political and ruling leaders of Pakistan. 124 Then after the Martial Law of 1958, having
tiled to establish the National Democratic Front, Suhrawardy rejected the plea of Sheikh Mujib for the revival of the regional Awami League saying that he
had given his word to the other leaders of the National Democratic Front and that he would not revive the party without consulting them. His attempts were
nullified by his death on 5 th Deceirber 1963.

H.S. Suhrawardy, despite being the chief executive of tire biggpst Muslimmajority province and having rendered significant services to the AH- India Muslim
League, was not included in the Working Committee of the AIML during the critical period of 1945-7. Bengal was represented in this highest policymaking
bodyofthe League by Maulana AkramKhan, Khawaja Nazhniddin, or I.H Isphahani 125 After the creation of Pakistan he was ban’ed from entering into
East Pakistan and his merrbership ofthe Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was cancelled in March 1949. In May 1949, he was expelled from the Pakistan
Muslim League.

1 22 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration

Suhrawardy’s case is an example ofbow the Bengali nationalists were not co-opted, as the Pakistani leadership did in the case of Pakhtun separatist
challenge. This failure in co-optation can also be marked in the study of other high-ranked leaders like Fazhil Haq, Sheikh Mujib and Maulana Bbasbani. The
Awami League as a party could have been co-opted at least on two occasions, when Suhrawardy was working as the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1957,
and when in 1 970, it won the majority seats in tire elections. The leadership of Pakistan missed both of these chances and failed to appease the growing
Bengali Separatist Movement. It, in fact, suited the West Pakistan establishment that parties were increasingly regionalised and thus, there were no serious
attempts made to co-opt the Bengali nationalists.

Khawaja N azimiddin too could not help in transfonning the Muslim League into a national party. He could not play any significant role in the development of
PML during the time when he was the Prime Minister of Pakistan as wei as the president of the party. However, duiing the Ayub-era, old-style Muslim
Leaguers, who objected to the gpvemment hijacking ofthe League nomenclature, framed a separate Council MuslimLeague, which was led by Khawaja
Nazmiddin.

Khawaja Nazimiddin emerged from retirement to rally support for tire Council MuslimLeague in West Pakistan in January 1963. The receptions accorded to
him at Lahore and along the route from Rawalpindi to Peshawar were reminiscent of the days immediately preceding independence, when the Muslim
League’s popularity was at its height. Khawaja Nazimuddin died in 1964, leaving Nurul Amin in control of the party along with the mammoth task of forming a
national political party without him or Suhrawardy. 126

^ 25 Khalid bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1948, Pakistan Publishing Flouse, 1960

Maleeha Lodhi, “Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party and Political Development in Maleeha Lodhi, “Bhutto, The Pakistan People’s Party and Political Development in 1977”,
University of London, 1980

Political Suppression Killed the Political Parties

 

Dining the democratic period of 1947-58 various suppressive steps were taken against different political parties. The leaders ofthe ruling Pakistan Muslim
League did not like other parties taking a stand against them The incident of the MuslimLeague workers disrupting the initiation of a meeting of tire Awami
MuslimLeague in East Pakistan is the best example of tire prevalent suppressive political culture. The quelling measures utilized to curb tire Communist Party
of Pakistan in 1947 is another example. After amred clashes with the communists in 1949-50, the government tried to curb their influence by keeping its
activities under tight supervision. The League did not try to take on tire party on political grounds, rather as a final resort the government banned the party on
4 th July 1954. 127

Another example of the suppression by the government against political parties during 1950s can be seen from the treatment of the Ganatantri Dal, a party
established in January 1 953 in East Pakistan The party called for the abolition of the zamindari system without compensation, release of political prisoners,
adoption of Bengali as a national language, and an independent foreign policy, hr order to obscure the activities of the party, its offices were often searched
and ransacked by the police. Many members of the party were arrested and were left to languish in jail until the parliamentary government in East Pakistan
was restored in June 1955.128

 

These actions against the political parties handicapped the development of a free political culture, in which the political parties could have nurtured and in turn

 

strengthened the political system While suppressing the ideologically different political parties, the ruling leaders of the country forgot that in the democratic
federal political system the existence of federal political parties is not only a solution for integration among different federal units but also guarantees the
security of a democratic set-up.

This intolerant culture of the political parties intensified under the martial law of 1 95 8 . Political parties were banned. Thousands of political workers and many
prominent leaders of political parties were arrested and fcr four years ( 1 95 8 to 1 962), political activities in Pakistan were virtually silenced. President General
Ayub had declared on 16 th April 1959 that the political parties would be liberated after launching of the constitution, but till 2 1st June 1962, he rendered
political parties useless. 129

1 Badruddin Urrar, Emergence of Bangladesh 1 Zarina Salamat, Pakistan 1947-58

The encumbered political culture of the Ayub era did not alow the political parties to establish themselves nationally. The leaders also were less interested in
org 3 nizing any national party, which is a strong indicator of die dismemberment process and national disintegration during Ayub’s regime. The regional parties
flourished and leaders were unable to stop this trend to such an extent drat one of the two largest political parties appealing in the elections of 1970, the PPP,
had to terminate die East Pakistan branch in March 1 969. Although, it had been reported tiiat the PPP branch in East Pakistan had itself severed connections
with the party in West Pakistan. 130

President Ayub held this view against the political parties, notwithstanding pressure from prominent cabinet ministers, Muhammad Ali Bogra and a few others,
who argued that poltical parties when regulated by law would provide an organizational framework for mass mobilization on behalf of die government. As a
consequence of President Ayub’s misconception, that suppression of regional political parties could save the unity of the country, his regime mainly targetted
the National Awami Party and the East Pakistan Awarrd League. A largp number of leftist workers and intellectuals suffered imprisonment and lost their
livelihoods during this era. 131

The political parties were allowed to operate only when strict restrictions were imposed under the Political Organization Ordinance in May 1 962. The
politicians were disqualified from becoming members or office holders of any political party till a decision was taken in the National Assembly. Following this,
the Political Parties Bill 1962 was passed, according to which no political party could be formed which would work and propagate against Islamic principles
and Pakistan’s integrity.

The restrictions on EBDO (Elected Bodies Disqualification Order of 1959) leaders also did not support the free functioning of the political parties. ELS.
Suhrawardy had demanded that political parties should not be revived in the absence of EBDOed or arrested leaders but to no aval A proper climate for the
functioning of political parties was so insistent on the part of political- minded East Pakistanis that Nurul Amin, former ChiefMinister ofEast Pakistan, felt that
lie had no alternative but to demand the lifting of restrictions from political leaders along with the revival of political parties to ensure his political future. He was
offered the gpvemorship ofEast Pakistan which he refused on the grounds of political parties having no real rights. 132

*29 Pakistan Crises, David Loshak, Heinemann, London, 1971

130 Ibid

131 Zaheer, Separation ofEast Pakistan
The Leadership of Political Parties

 

From 1 947 to 1971 in all the political parties of Pakistan, the authority was concentrated in a single leader. The significance of a party was in proportion to the
significance of the leader. Often it was the leader who was important and not the principles for which the party stood. Power and personality were in fact
personalised. There were too many ‘important’ figures and too few sensible ideas. Politics was intensely personal, and not doctrinaire. A group of about
twenty individuals beginning from Mr Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan to Khawaja N azhruddin, Ayub Khan, Bhutto, Sheikh Mujib, Qayyum Khan, Bhasbani,
etc. made all important political and governmental decisions at every leveL 133

In 1958, after two years of Republican Party ’s establishment, its constitution was very much on paper and the organizing committee whose life was to expire,
still exercised all power and authority on the party’s behalf The party enjoyed undisputed patronage of and revolved around President General Iskandar
Mirza, the Governor General and the President of Pakistan Formally the party was founded by Dr Khan Sahib but Iskandar Mirza was pulling the strings. He
wanted Dr Khan to continue as ChiefMinister and moreover, the integration of his favourites. 134

The Muslim League (Qayyum) and the National Awami Party (Bhashani) were all factions of the parties, pippeteering for their leaders. Likewise, fire
Convention Muslim League was the puppet of Ayub Khan

1 33 Mohammad H. R. Talukdar, ed., Memoirs of Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, The University Press, 1987
1 33 Keith Callard, Pakistan, A Political Study, George Allen & Unwind, 1957
‘ 34 K. K Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-58

There was a concentration of powers in the Jamaat-e-Islami too, and its Ameer exercised all the powers. The party organisation was highly centralised, will
Maulana Maududi the founderamee7′ (leader), had no time limit on his period of office. This unlimited tenure was said to be based on the teachings of the
Quran and Sunnah . It was, however, up to the ameer to renounce his office if he felt that a person who was more capable than him had emerged in the
Jamaat. He had a Majlis-e-Shura whose selection, mitially, was left to his judgement. In organisational matters, the powers of the ameer were absolute, and
lie could remove even duly-elected local ameer s for the maslihat-e-kulli (collective good). Members of the Jamaat were enjoiied to view disobedience to
the ameer as a sin tantamount to that of disobeying God and the Prophet (PBUH).

In 1942, the Jamaat faced an internal crisis which led to the creation of a department of ‘party organisation’ ( tanzim-e-Jamaat ) to verify each member’s
qualifications. After this, final approval for the registration of a member was vested in the ameer -e- Jamaat. The Jamaat had various departments generally
under the direct control of the ameer . Moreover, the founder of the party, Maulana Maududi remained the ameer from the foundation of the party until the
breakup ofPakistam Maulana Maududi enjoyed wide ‘extra’ constitutional powers, with an extremely authoritative disposition. The politics of the party
revolved around one personality and other members who dared to oppose the status quo had to leave the party. 135

ImZ.A Bhutto’s PPP, which was established in November 1967, all of the four committees ofthe PPP constituted in the first convention were headed by

 

Bhutto while no other personality was even a member of all four committees. The PPP executive committee was nominated by Bhutto for the first time just a
few days before tire meeting for negotiations during the 1971 crisis. In essence, Bhutto was PPP and PPP was Bhutto.

The political culture in Pakistan was so weak that very few of the oflice-bearers in the parties were elected members and most were nominated. The trend of
importing leadership from out of the party made the democratic process of parties even more sinister. Leaders were brought from outside and the
parliamentary parties were forced to accept them In 1953, Governor General Ghulam Muhammad brought Muhammad Ali Bogra and made him the leader
of the Muslim League parliamentary party. The same year, Feroz Khan Noon was appointed as the leader of the Muslim League Punjab, replacing Mumtaz
Daultana. Sardar Abdur Rashid replaced Qayyum Khan in N WFP. Dr Khan Sahib’s place, on his death, was filled by his son Saadullalr Khan. Even the PML
leaders like Noon and Nurul Amin confronted the existing president of the party, Nazimuddin, to replace him with tire imported Prime Minister, Bogra. 136

333 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration

Like language and provincial autonomy, the absence of a nationwide party orgunisation was one of tire factors that became instrumental in the successes of the
Bengali separatist movement. The language demand was accepted to a large extent when Bengali language was endorsed as the second national language of
Pakistan in the Constitution of 1956. The autonomy was a broader demand that changed into the separatist movement in the end. The leadership could have
found some ease in addressing these demands if a nationwide political party had been working in Pakistan during the time.

The leaders of Pakistan used and damaged every political party through their domination over them individually. Regional parties were developed and national
parties were discouraged. The Pakistan MuslimLeague’s national status declined and the leaders could do nothing to save it. Very limited efforts were made
to develop national parties in a well-orgunized manner, contrary to the orgunized regional political parties which could be seen developing in the growth of the
Bengali Movement in East Pakistan.

The restrictions over the free development of the parties and domination of the leaders decreased the positive impact of tire parties and increased the negative
effects of the rise of incapable leaders. The leaders who could or tried to establish national political parties were blocked in many ways. In this way, the
political parties vis-a-vis the leadership weakened and they could not help in restraining the strengthening separatist movement.

^ Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan The Political Deprivation of East Pakistan

Feelings of political deprivation prevailed among the people of East Pakistan who felt that they were ruled by West Pakistan in general, and Punjab in
particular, as the political power remained finrrly in the hands of the Punjabis and the Mubajir elite of the West Pakistan. Despite the numerical superiority,

East Pakistan was not given its share in the gpvemment due to the domination of old landlords and religious leaders, mainly from Punjab and Sindh in the
Muslim League. 137

East Pakistanis increased hatred for tire central government inspired the fomrationofa coalition of main political parties under the banner of ‘United Front’, in
which tire Awami League and the Krisbak Siramic Party were the principal players. Leaders of these parties collaborated, finding solace in their common
grievances against the central government and matters concerning the nation as a whole. Notwithstanding their domination, the Muslim League lost support in
East Pakistan during the election of 1 954. It was a time when the politics of Pakistan was dominated by two groups of parties, each of which enjoyed
hegemony in one or the other wing.

The plan for the fonnationofOne Unit in West Pakistan was first spelt out on 2 nd March 1949 by Malik Feroz Khan Noon on the floor ofthe first
Constituent Assembly. The following day Begum Jeban Ara Shahnaz supported it, invoking a myriad of statements, for and against. Chaudhry Mohammed
Ali, Mushtaq Ahmad Gunnani, Mumtaz Mohammad Khan and some other leaders were at the forefront to see the scheme implemented. The fonnation of
One Unit finally happened during Muhammad Ali Bogra’s reign under the eye of then Commander- in- Chief General Ayub Khan, converting the whole of
West Pakistan into one province, strengthening the feeling of distrust in East Pakistan. This was seen as a dubious formula for changing the straightforward
system of population-based representation that maintained the numerical superiority allowing the concentration of political power in East Pakistan, in West
Pakistan’s favour. The decision to merge four provinces in One Unit was made hastily without much consideration and implemented without adequate
preparations. One Unit was seen as a counterbalance to the votes of East Pakistan.

1 33 Salik Siddiq, Witness to surrender, Oxford University Press, 1997

Yahya Khan inherited this formula by which East and West had an equal number of seats in the N ational Assembly regardless of the numerical superiority of
the Eastern Wing. Ironically, after the breakup of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh, the province of Punjab insisted that party position should now be
decided on the basis of a straightforward vote. Punjab was sure of its superiority as Punjabis outnumbered the other ethnic groups, such as Sindbis, Pashtuns
andBaloch. The overthrow ofthe civilian rule in 1958 and subsequently, the adoption of tire new constitution formulated by Ayub Khan in 1962 intensified the
unremitting marginalization of East Pakistan The 1 962 constitution made provisions for a highly centralized fomi of gpvemment, vesting all powers in the
president by creating room in the legislation It also placed the civil service and the military under the direct control of the president, curtailing tire powers and
functions of the provincial legislative assemblies. 138

By that time, the Awami League had secured strength and popular support by absorbing tire smaller parties of East Pakistan hr itself After Subrawardy’s
death in 1 963 , tire leadership of Awami League passed into the bands of Sheikh Muj lb, who played a different but decisive role hr the propulsion ofthe
separatist movement.

Another factor that contributed to tire intensification of resentment hr East Pakistan was the rejection of those Bengali leaders for political appointment who
had mass support. It had been pointed out that all East Pakistanis who were given cabinet appointments hr the centre and governorship of the province, during
Ayub regime, were civil servants, pro-gpvemment journalists or tire defeated candidates of Muslim League in the provincial elections of 1954. During the
military regimes of Ayub Khan, the Bengali Muslims were excluded from important decision-making levels of the gpvemment, as we will discuss in the
following sections. 139

The Gvil and Military Bureaucracy

It may be said that Pakistan was a nation built for bureaucrats. Democracy, although enshrined on paper, never existed hr reality. A successful federation is
one that paves way with mutual satisfaction of its various regions bringing cohesion to build the nation through unity. But instead of democracy, the gpvemment

 

of Pakistan largely relied on a system with a central focus of power. General Ayub Khan argued that this was essential for national integration Instead of
creating power, he concentrated power, which meant that in spite of Iris efforts for a centralization process, the real capabilities of the gpvemment did not
increase much during his decade ofmle from 1958-69.

138 Ibid

1 3 ^ Peiris, G H., Political conflict in Bangladesh, Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. 16, No.l,

1998.

The bureaucratic elites mostly belonged to Punjab and Sindh. Most of the Muhajirs from India were also settled in West Pakistan and had sizeable assets to
invest. It is not surprising that they made concentrated efforts to fiirther the interests of their regions and their extended families (biradari). 140 The bureaucrats
collaborated with each other for protection and patronage. Unfortunately, Bengalis did not fit into this nexus. The dismemberment of Pakistan had already
been laid down through the policies of the West Pakistani bureaucrats, that largely ignored the people of the largest province of Pakistan.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1 95 1 , the head of the state, Khawaja N azinuddin, concentrated power in his office with the support of civil and
military bureaucracy. This happened due to the absence of a cohesive national leadership and a consensus on constitutional nonns. The above-mentioned
were the repercussions of a weak political system, allowing the increased role of administrative and military power in decision-making The majority of senior
bureaucrats were from West Pakistan who opposed the decentralization of authority for self – preserration. This led to sectionalism and provincialism that
became permanent features of politics, and led to the eventual dismembennent of the state.

Remaining true to its undemocratic nature, General Ayub’s and General Yahya Khan’s regimes were intolerant of any criticism The bureaucracy and ‘basic
democracies’ were a tool for tire political exploitation of the masses to put selected people in power. It can be surmised that the political system of Pakistan,
especially during the Ayub period, was in many ways not political but bureaucratic. The state elite which came to rule Pakistan primarily came from the top
echelons of the military and the bureaucracy, with a collaborative relationship with the new industrial and commercial class. The state elites were mainly
composed of the Punjabis, the Muhajirs and the Pashtuns. The Sindhis, the Balochand the Bengalis were greatly under-represented. According to Herbert
Feldman, “60 per cent of the amy consisted of the Punjabis, 35 per cent were Pashtuns and other constituted the remaining 5 per cent. ”141

130 Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Group Interests in Pakistan Politics, Pacific Alfaris, Vol 39, 1966-67

Table 1

Ethnic Origins of the Top Military Hite in 1964

Number Percent Punjabi 17 35.5
Pashtun 19 39.5
Muhajirs 1 1 23

Sindhis 0 0 Baloch 0 0 Bengalis 1 2 Total 48 100 Source: Tahir Amin (1 988), Ethno National Movements of Pakistan, Institute of Policy Studies,
Islamabad

From the above table it may be seen that East Bengal which constituted over 50 per cent of the population of Pakistan, was represented by just 1 person in
the Top Military Elite of the country during General Ayub ’ s reign Additionally, only 5 per cent, 1 6 per cent and 1 0 per cent of tire officers in the anny, air
force and navy, respectively, were from East Pakistan, while tire total Bengali representation in Pakistan military was less than 2 per cent. 142

By 1958, the Bengali demands for participation in the military had become both numerous and vociferous. They ranged from the shifting of the naval
headquarters to East Pakistan to the raising of an autonomous Bengali paramilitary for East Pakistan’s defence. No quota system was instituted to rectify the
regional recruitment disparity. The Army, Navy and Air Force commands were firmly convinced that the Bengalis could not meet tire physical standards
required of all entrants of the armed forces, which in itself spoke volumes of how Bengalis were looked down upon by the West Pakistanis. According to a
remark by a Punjabi general. General Yahya Khan, they were not meant to be soldiers. Moreover, it was asserted that their very nature made them unfit for
war like activities. 143

141 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis,:Pakistanl962-1969,Oxford University Press,

1972

142 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Lahore ,1974

In any case, regardless of the huge defence spending East Pakistan received none of the benefits, such as contracts, purchasing and military supported jobs.
The central bureaucracy was composed of 80 per cent of the West Pakistanis, mostly from Punjab and Sindh. This under representation of Bengalis in the
mflitary services led Muj ib to suggest during the 1970 election campaign that East Pakistan would contribute 6 per cent of its taxes to the maintenance of the
Pakistan Military. 144

The Bengalis were similarly under-represented in the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). The CSP officers did not reflect the majority that Bengalis had in terms
of population.

Table 2

Representation in Central Superior Services of Pakistan during 1959-67

Total West Pakistan East Pakistan

 

1959

24

12

12

1960

31

19

12

1961

27

17

10

1962

27

15

12

1963

31

18

13

1964

33

19

14

1965

30

15

15

1966

30

16

14

1967

30

17

13

 

Source: Raimaq Jehan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, USA

The Bengali participation in the central policymaking institutions, commissions of inquiry, the central secretariat and the public cooperation was marginal. Out
of 280 members ofthe various commissions of inquiry, only 75 (27 per cent) were fromEast Pakistan. 145

144 Craig Baxter and others, Government and Politics in South Asia, Vanguard Books,

1988

144 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis:Pakistanl962-1969,Oxford University Press,

1972

144 Raunaq Jehan, Pakistan Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press,

1972

Table 3

East and West Pakistan’s Representation in Class 1 officers in 1969 Division ofCSP

Economic Affairs

Commerce

Finance

Agriculture

Industries

Cabinet division

Establishment Division

Planning Information & Broad casting

Labour and social welfare

Defence

Total

West East Pakistan Pakistan

 

49

29

20

61

41

20

42

30

12

34

28

6

31

21

10

26

22

4

36

25

11

23

17

6

15

10

5

36

31

5

 

Source: Dr. Khawaj a Alqama, Bengali Elites Perception of Pakistan, The Road to Disillusionment, Uneven De\’elopment or Ethnicity? 1995, P.

190

At the secretary level, all the officers until 1 969 were from West Pakistan The civil services had continued to play a decisive role in determining economic
policies, while the military monopolized the formulation of defence policies. The location ofthe administrative authorities in West Pakistan meant a relief to the
investors, as they would need less time to approach the government and could also manipulate more pressures as compared to their counterparts in East
Pakistan

Hie decision-making was an exclusive function of the President and his chosen advisors. Provincial autonomy, for all intents and purposes, was non-existent.
No efforts were made to curtail the infernal but extremely influential roles of the military and the civilian bureaucracy. The coup led by Ayub Khan further
expanded the role of military.

The people of East Pakistan demanded parity in the civil service. They were convinced that the economic disparity could not be corrected unless a greater
nurrfoer of East Pakistanis were placed in senior positions in the Central Secretariat. There was a conspicuous Bengali absence in the civil services even in
1 964, which is evident from the feet that there were only two Bengali officers who held the rank of acting secretaries. 146 West Pakistan not only hosted the
central government but also held nearly 90 per cent of its positions.

East Pakistanis openly expressed then’ bitterness by claiming that they were being ruled by West Pakistanis. The gesture of the central government for
restricting the elevation of Bengali Muslims to the higher ranks of civil and military services infuriated the Bengalis, as it was accepted as a denial of
opportunities for their upward social mobility. The poison of discontent and frustration among the Bengalis became more potent with the removal of the
leaders belonging to East Pakistan. They noticed that whenever one of them, such as Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra or Hussain Shaheed
Suhrawardy became the Prime Minister of Pakistan, he was swiftly deposed by the establishment, which was mainly from West Pakistan.

144 Talukdar Manniruzzama, Group Interests and Political Changes: Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh, South Asian Publishers, 1982, p. 14

The Ayub regime did make some efforts to increase East Pakistani participation in the civil bureaucracy, by revising administrative autonomy and quota system
in the selection of civil servants to benefit East Pakistan. Accordingly, 20 per cent of the vacancies were filled on the basis of merit, while the remaining 80 per
cent were divided equally between East and West Pakistan 147 The government practised redemption by correcting tire disparities in the administrative
services by posting East Pakistan’s civil servants in their province and increasing their number in the civil service of Pakistan. In 1 969, for the first time most of
the key positions in the province were given to the East Pakistanis, with the hope that the Bengalis will attain and experience a sense of self- government which
will help alleviate their grievances.

The Bengali demand was not merely for more representation at the Centre but also for a greater decentralization of power, empowering the Eastern wing to

 

be administratively autonomous. By 1 966, the provincial secretariat, district and subdivisional offices were monopolized by the Bengalis. The top positions
including those of the F inance Ministry, which were important for the allocation of resources, were occupied exclusively by the West Pakistani civil
servants. 148 Bengalis were marginally represented in the entrepreneurial class, policymaking, and political support groups dining Ayub’s reign It was a
genuine Bengpli belief that their province was deprived of the advantages it could have gained under the parliamentary fcnnby virtue of its numerical majority.
This bitterness helped in intensifying the Awami League’s struggle fcr attaining maxirmm autonomy.

Sohail Mahmood, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, 1990
148 Raunaq Jehan, Ten Years of Ayub Khan and the Problemof National Integration, Journal of Comparative Administration, 1983

The bureaucracy held a place of higher consideration, dealing with the public in an arrogant and whimsical manner. This generated animosity in the Bengali
masses fcr the Punjabi ‘high-banded’ bureaucrats. These bureaucrats had awarded undeserved advantages to the President’s family and other businessmen,
making them obscenely rich at the cost of tire greater public interests. This undennined the electoral process but satisfied Ayub’s political advisors.

It is also important to note that regional parties became dominant in the Eastern wing even though the Awami League, National Awami Party and Nizam- e-
Islam Party had tried to fonn a national alliance. The inability of the establishment to form a national party or a national coalition was an indicator of the
problems in the federation of Pakistan, re. bureaucracy. Thus, in the absence of an effective political system, the bureaucracy seized de fecto political power.
The civil bureaucracy had played a decisive role in the policy fcnnulation and execution. It readily filled the vacuum created by the lack of strong non-
parocbial leadership and in the process politicised itself and discarded the politicians as superfluous and as hindrances to modernization. 149

With all of this being said, it is important to understand the importance of the civil- military bureaucracy. The bureaucracy was the primary executive branch
and the legislative branch of the government. The Ayub regime also utilized civil servants fcr winning elections of the Provincial and National Assemblies. In
this way, the CSPs had developed into a ruling institution which the opposition wanted it to be disbanded. The bureaucracy too, had little patience with the
opponents of the system. The military-bureaucratic elite frequently used extreme authoritarian measures to quell any opposition, such as the action agpinst the
United Front in the 1950s. 150

They ruled through a highly-centralized administration in which they were powerful actors. The federal government bad a natural tendency to attract business,
commerce, banking, and industry, hi Pakistan there had been a much larger influx of refugee entrepreneurship and capital from India to West Pakistan, than to
East Pakistan. The advantage of hosting the federal government was great in West Pakistan in view of the hold it had over the economic life of the country.

144 Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan: The fiiigma of Political Development, WM Dawson and Sons, Bigland, 1980
1 7(1 Charless H. Kennedy, Bureaceacy in Pakistan Oxford University Press, 1987

The Role of Private Investors In Creating A Divide

It is also very important to note that private investment was concentrated mainly in West Pakistan. East Pakistan was often ignored even by its own
businessman for various reasons, fcr example, better infrastructure and access to all the prominent officials and ministries, which was much easier in the West.
Keeping in consideration that private investment has a higher rate of return than public investment (discussed in the next section), the economic disparity
between the two wings rose sharply in the late 50s and 60s.

During the 60s, the public sector spending and development in East Pakistan increased sharply, but the private sector investment remained low and worked
agqinst the Eastern Wing. A revolution had occurred in the agricultural sector of West Pakistan, to which its growth rate of 4.8 per cent during the 60s is a
testament, hi contrast, the agricultural growth rate of East Pakistan was just 3 . 1 per cent. 1 5 1

During 1969-70, things did not improve. The private sector development in East Pakistan was just 30 percent of its total development spending, as
compared to the 60 per cent in West Pakistan. Public sector investment always plays a periphery role in the actual development of a state, with private sector
investment being the actual engine of growth. This lack of private sector investment was the reason of the deflated growth rate of East Pakistan.

Pakistan had little resources of its own and leaned heavily on external sources for funds in the fcnn of aid. The table below explains just how vast the
difference in Net Resource Inflows was between East and West Pakistan.

151 Report on the Panel of Economists prepared under order from President Yahya Khan, 1970

Table 4

Net Resource Inflow into East and West Pakistan

(Rs. in million) Period East Pakistan West Pakistan 1961-62 347 1671 1962-63 488 1607 1963-64 797 1864 1964-65 950 2531

Second Plan (4 years) 2582 7673

1965- 66 736 1853

1966- 67 814 2088

1967- 68 862 2103

1968- 69 1016 1208

Source: Report on the Panel of Economists prepared under the order from President Yahya Khan, 1970

The main part of the foreign resources remained in West Pakistan with East Pakistan not receiving an adequate share in the net inflow of external assistance
into Pakistan

Economic Deprivation and Exploitation

There was a growing sense of deprivation and exploitation in East Pakistan, with resentments peaking with East Pakistanis feeling of being colonized by the
West Pakistani imperialism East Pakistanis felt victimized by their new ‘masters’. The language issue had made the people of the Eastern wing more sensitive
to social, economic, and political deprivation at tire hands of the central gpvemment. They complained about unequal growth and development between both
the wings, and the criticism was mostly directed towards Punjab and Sindh. East Pakistan, which accounted for 55 per cent of the population and generated

 

the bilk of foreign exchange earnings, received a raxh smaller share of the government revenues. 152 It maybe observed from the table below that the
disparity of per capita income between the West and East continued to grow till 1969-70.

TaHe5

Per Capita GDP of East and West Pakistan at Constant Prices Per Capita GDP Per Capita East Pak (Rs.) GDP West Pak

(Rs.)

1959 – 60 269 355

1960 – 61 277 363

1961 – 62 286 376

West-East Disparity Disparity Index Ratio

1.32 100 1.31 97 1.31 97 1962-63 277 393 1.42 131

1963 – 64 299 408 1.36 113

1964 – 65 293 426 1.45 141

1965 – 66 295 427 1.45 141

1966 – 67 290 448 1.54 169

1967 – 68 307 468 1.52 163

1968 – 69 312 490 1.57 178

1969 – 70 314 504 1.61 191 Growth over 17% 42%
decade

Source: Economic Disparities Between East and West Pakistan, Government of Pakistan for Planning Department
152 M. Rafique Alzal, Pakistan; history and politics 1947-1971, Oxford University Press, 2001

Ayub Khan celebrated his ten- year tenure as a ‘Decade of Development’ in 1 968. This celebration was perceived as a slap on the lace of East Pakistan
Ayub’s successor, Yahya Khan, increased the share of development expenditures lfom37 percent in the third five-year Plan to 52.5 per cent in the fourth
five-year Plan But there were still great disparities in terms of resource allocation and sector wise expenditure. This may be observed in the table below:

Table 6

Revenue and Development Expenditure in East and West Pakistan (in crores ofRs.)

Period Revenue Expenditure

 

WEST PAKISTAN Development Expenditure

1950-55 720
1955-60 898
1960-65 1284
1960-70 2223

Period Revenue Expenditure

400

757

2071

2970

EAST PAKISTAN Development Expenditure

1950-55 171
1955-60 254
1960-65 434
1960-70 648
100
270
970
1656

Development Expenditure as percentage of total Pakistan Exp.

80%

74%

68 %

64%

Development Expenditure as percentage of total Pakistan Exp.

20 %

26%

32%

36%

 

Source: Pakistan Ministry of Economic Affairs, CSO, Karachi, 1974

The economic prospects were of higher considerations in East Pakistan, with its substantially higher population density, greater vulnerability to natural
disasters, lower levels of productivity, income and consumption, the almost total absence of an industrial base and extreme backwardness of economic

 

infrastructure.

 

East Pakistan was generating about 60 per cent of the country’s export earnings and in turn receiving only about 30 per cent of the national imports. In
addition, it was estimated that East Pakistan had been suffering from a constant deficit in trade between the two wings since independence, which increased
from an annual average ofRs. 162 million, in the early 1950s to about Rs. 425 million in the 1960s. Total amount of foreign aid received from 1948-49 to
1968-69 valved about the Rs. 61.6 billion, and East Pakistan gpt 3 1 .4 per cent only.153

Table 7

Actual Imports (in million Rupees) Period

West Pakistan East Pakistan Value Percentage Value Percentage 1957-58 1,314 64 736 36 1958-59 1,025 65 554 35 1959-60 1,806 73 655 27
1960-61 2,173 68 1,015 32 1961-62 2,236 72 873 28 1962-63 2,800 73 1,019 27 1963-64 2,982 67 1,449 33 1964-65 3,672 68 1,702 32

 

Source: Bhanwar Singh, Industrial Growth in Pakistan, A fiction or a reality, Rajastan University Press, 1971, p 76-77

 

During Ayub Khan’s regime (1958 -69), wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small group of West Pakistani entrepreneurs who came to constitute a
politically and economically powerful elite class. Throughout the 1950s and the 1 960s, the discriminatory policies and practices damaged the pace of
economic progress in East Pakistan, which not only increased disparities but also widened the gap between the two wings.

The Bengalis advocated for an economic program in which each wing was to control all income from regional and foreign sources, and to contribute its share
to the Centre for catering to the foreign affairs, general administration and defence. The central government paid no attention to this demand of articulating a
separate framework for East Pakistan’s development planning 154

By early 1960s, the agitation for the economic autonomy of East Pakistan had taken the form of the earlier demand of language and autonomy. Generally, it
became apparent with the passage of time that macro- economic policies of the central government were not only discriminatory but also exploitative,
producing a negative impact on the economy of East Pakistan.

 

1 ^ Sobhan Rehman, Bangladesh: Problems of Governance, Konark Publishers, 1993 ‘ Ibid.

 

 

 

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INDIA’S MACHINATIONS Hegemonic India: A Historical Outlook of the Indian Imperialistic Desires

T

lie Indian vicious desire, to dismerrfoer Pakistan emerged soon after the creation of Pakistan. The dogmatic leadership of Congress never concealed their
desire for reversing the Partition of 1947. The philosophy of “Akhand Bharath ’- [the united India], was propagpted by most of the Indian leadership. The
Indian leadership considered the Partition a temporary event, and eiqplored eveiy opportunity for achieving Pakistan’s dismemberment. Such desires

were openly expressed by the Congress leadership on various occasions. Gandhi, the founder of the Indian nation, in his address of July 1 947 to Congress
Party of Bengpl said,

‘ The Congress Committee there ( East Bengal) mast never look upon Bengal as divided ’ 155 .

Similarly, Gandhi was also reported to state that,

‘ Congress was opposed to Pakistan and that he was one of those who have steadfastly opposed the division of India ‘156 .

Nehru, another architect of Indian independence, also had similar views, as he said, ‘owe day (Pakistan) would be ine\’itably integrated with India ’ 157 .
Conespondingly on the eve of Partition, Nehru remarked that, ‘ India accepted the partition with the conviction that the new state was not viable and
would collapse in a short time ’ 158 . Nehru also perceived the establishment of Pakistan as a short-lived measure, which would eventually lead to united
India sooner than later. Inhisbook ‘Danger in Kashmir’, Josef Korbel narrates that; Nehru had told him that, ‘ Pakistan is a mediaex’al state with an
impossible theocratic concept ’ 159 .

Similar intentions were also erqpressed by the All- Indian Congress Committee in their resolution of 14th June 1947. It states that, ‘ Geography and the
mountains and the seas fashioned India as she is, and no human agency can change that shape or come in the way of her final destiny . . . The
picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and our hearts. The All-India Congress Committee earnestly trusts that when the
present passions hcwe subsided, India ‘s problem will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be
discredited by all ’ 16 ° .

Commenting on the resolution, Congressite Maulana Azad on 16 th June 1947 argued: “The division is only of the map of the country’ and not in the
hearts of the people and I am sure it is going to be a short-lived partition ’ 161 . Another president of AH- India Congress Committee, Acharya Kirpalani
demonstrated his prejudiced approach by saying ‘ Neither the Congress nor the nation had given up a claim of united India. Accordingly the freedom
that India had achieved would not be complete without the unity of India ’. 162

The rigid and dogmatic mentality of Congress and the Hindu leadership continued even after tire establishment of Pakistan Premier Nehru along with his
colleagues had tire view that, “Creation of Pakistan as a “temporary” outcome of Britain’s divide and rule policy ’163 . Radha Krishna, the fonner
Indian President, considered Partition a grave blunder and is reported to state that, “re-union of the two successor states of British India was necessary
and inevitable ’164 . Another prominent Indian politician and fonner interior minister, Sardar Valebbhai Patel argued that, “Sooner or later we shall again
be united in common allegiance to a country’ ’. 165

Apart from the Congress leadership the other Hindu rightist parties also shared the Congress’ mentality. The Hindu Mahasabha, a prominent, influential Hindu
right-wing nationalist organization, became more vociferous when it declared:

“India is one and indivisible and there will never be peace unless and until the separated parts are brought back into the Indian Union and made
integral parts thereof ’ 166 .

Likewise another Hindu right-wing militant organization, Rashtriya Smayamsevak Sang generally known as ‘RSS’, used to chant slogans for Pakistan’s break
up. One of their principal slogans was, “Pakistan torh do Nehru Hakumat Chhod do ’ (Pakistan should be broken up, Nehru should leave office) which
they chanted mostly in Nehru’s era 167 .

The Indian desires for Pakistan’s dismembemnent were brazenly confessed by Subramanyam Swamy, a Former member of Indian Parliament when he stated
that, “the main stream of India wants to undo Pakistan. . . Nationalists in India are for the dismemberment of whatever remains of Pakistan. That is
the road to Akhand Bharat ’ 7 6S .

Similarly, the Indian populace was made to believe that, India could not emerge as a super power unless Pakistan was dismembered ’ 169 . All ofthese
citations clearly illustrate the Congress and Hindu mindset.

Apart from the initial denial of Pakistan’ s right of existence, the Indians were also quick to develop and utilize tire unfavourable situation of 1 97 1 . The Indian
vicious aims can be gauged by looking into the statements of India’s top leadership, Indira Gandhi, in a public gptheringon31st November 1971,

“”India has never reconciled with the existence of Pakistan. . . Indian leaders ha\’e always believed that Pakistan should not ha\’e been created and
that Pakistani nation has no right to exist ”170 .

 

Moreover, well- known Indian Scholar and ,then, Director of the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, K. Subramanyanstatedon31 st March, 1971 that,

‘ What Indians must realize is the fact that the breakup of Pakistan is in our interest an opportunity [East Pakistan Crisis] the like of which will
never come again ’ m .

^ Gosh, Sucheta, Role of India in the Emergence of Bangladesh, Minneora Associated Ltd, Calcutta, 1983, p.9
156 y p Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Orient Longsman Calcutta, 1957, p.386.

1 s7 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p.273.

Azad, M.A.K, India Wins Freedom, Stosius Inc/Advent Books Division, 1978,p.242.

Korbel, Joseph, Danger in India, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1954, p. 137

160 y p Menon, The Transfer of Power in India, Orient Longsman Calcutta, 1957, p.384

161 Ibid., p.385

Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis Jrahore 1994, p.274

1 ® Rose,Sission Richard and I no E„ War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, Berkely,IA,1990,p.43
164 Ibid, 43.

Mehmood.Safdar, Pakistan Divided, Ferozsons Ltd. Lahore,1984, p. 138
1 (>l) Pande, Apama, Explaning Pakistan Foreign Policy, Routledege, Newyork, 201 1 ,p. 14.

167 Ibid.p. 16.

1 ® Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1994p.274.

Mehmood,Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984, p.139.

170 Ibid, 138

Further, former Indian Parliamentarian Subramanyam Swamy while expressing his views about tire Indian policy towards Pakistan had stated,

‘ A dispassionate analysis would show, India did not dismember Pakistan to solve refugee problem . . . that is utter rubbish. India went to war to
satisfy the nationalists and consequently, popular view that the dismemberment of Pakistan was in the long-term interest of India ’172 . Commenting
on the situation of 1971, veteran Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyar, in his book “Distant Neighbour ’ writes that with the inception of the East Pakistan crisis,
“The Indians felt happy, that Pakistan, their enemy was in trouble ”173 .

The above-mentioned citations are a reflection of tire Indian offensive policy toward Pakistan. Soon after Partition, owing to the Indian offensive and
hegemonic attitude, Pakistani establishment urggd for the fonnulation of a defensive policy to deal with India. Accordingly, the Indian aims of destructing
Pakistan were fittingly anticipated by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Father ofthe Nation. During his nine-day visit to East Pakistan in March 1948, he mentioned
the Indian machinations in his various speeches. In his address of 19 th March 1948 he stated that,

‘ Having failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan thwarted and frustrated by their failure, the enemies of Pakistan have now turned their
attention to disrupt the state. . . These attempts have taken the shape principally of encouraging provincialism. As long as you do not throw off this
poison in our body politics you will never be able to weld yourself An .

Additionally, in another address broadcasted by Radio Dacca on 28th March 1 948, he remarked,

“I would ask you plainly, when political agencies and organs of the Indian press, which fought tooth and nail to pre\’ent the creation of Pakistan,
ha\’e suddenly found with a tender conscience for what they call the ‘just claims ’ of the Muslims of East Bengal, do you not consider this … a most
sinister phenomenon? Is it not perfectly obvious that, havingfailed to prevent the Mtslims from achieving Pakistan, these agencies are now trying
to disrupt Pakistan from within by insidious propaganda aimed at setting Brother Muslim against Brother Muslim? ” 175
Similarly, Indian offensive policies were also recognized by Liaquat Ali Khan- the first Premier of Pakistan, as lie declared,

7 charge the Government of India: first, it has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, but her leaders paid lip service to it merely to
get British troops out of the country. Secondly, India is out to destroy the states of Pakistan which Indian Leaders persistently continue to regard as
a part of India itself ’ .176

The first impression of India in Pakistan has always been that of an imperialistic and hegemonic state. To illustrate, an editorial of tire daily Dawn, after the
Indian forceful annexation of Goa in 1961 demonstrates such an impression of India.

‘ Pakistan faces exactly the same danger as Goa did and as soon as India feels strong enough to do so she will try to wipe out Pakistan because
Indians in their heart of hearts still regard the areas now forming Pakistan as basically part of Akhand Bharat (Undivided India) over which some
day Hindu rule must be extended ’ 177 .

President General Ayub Khan also had similar views toward India. In his Presidential address on the eve of the 1 965- war he remarked that,

‘ Today they [India] have given final proof of the evil intentions which India has always harboured against Pakistan since its inception. The Indian
rulers were never reconciled to the establishment of an independent Pakistan where Mtslims could build a homeland of their own. All their military
preparations during the last 18 years have been directed against us [Pakistan] ’178 .

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was spontaneous when he mentioned the aggressive Indian approach toward Pakistan in his famous address to the United Nations Security
Council on 22 nd September 1 965 . He stated that: ‘ We are facing a great monster, a great aggressor always given to aggr-ession. During the eighteen
years of our independence we have seen India commit aggression time and again. Ever since 1947, India has followed the road of aggr-ession … It
has committed aggression against Junagadh, against Mancn’adar, against Mangrol, against Hyderabad and against Goa. . . From 1947 we have
been faced with this situation. We have always known that India is determined to annihilate Pakistan ’ 179 .

Despite knowing the Indian aims, the gpvemment of Pakistan looked weak, as compared to the hegemonic India, especially in 1 97 1 . However, Pakistan still
remains a main hurdle in the Indian route to regional supremacy.

All in all, the Indian intentions for Pakistan’s disintegration were exposed immediately after Partition. With the aim of occupying most of the subcontinent, the
imperialistic India launched her campaign. Hie first preys were the autonomous princely states.

1 7 ‘ Interview, K. Subramanyam; Indian Council of World Affairs, Symposium31 March, 1971.

 

1 77 Mehmood.Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd.Lahore, 1984, p.143

* 78 Nayar,Knldip, Distant Neighbors A tale ofthe Subcontinent, Vikas Publications House, Uttar Pardesh 1972, p. 145
1 77 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, The great Tragedy, Pakistan Peoples Party Publications Vision Publications, Karachi, 1971.p.4.

175 Ibid, p. 5.

1 77 Rose,Sission Richard and Leo E., War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, Berkely,LA,1990,p.44

1 77 Editorial, Dawn news, 1961 Accessed on 15’* 1 April 2016

178 Khan,Ayub, Archives 1 st September 1965

https://archives.org/streanyPakistan_201505/Pakistan-djvu.txt accessed on 15 April
2016

Annexation of Princely States: (Actions of Imperialistic India)

The hegemonic attitude oflndia developed further after her independence. The worst illustration of the imperialistic attitude of India immediately after Partition
of 1 947, is clearly visible by evaluating the Indian policy towards the princely states. As per the Indian Act of July 1 947, the independent states were allowed
to decide their future fortune by either joining India or Pakistan Although, superficially, India accepted this policy but, intrinsically she was conspiring for the
annexation of these states. Ignoring the basic democratic right and the demographic structure of the independent states, India adopted a policy of strong,
anned persuasion and the actual use of brute force to quench her imperialistic thirst.

Sardar VaJabhbhai Patel, therefore, was appointed as Minister of Home Affairs by tire Congress to accomplish India’s vicious dreams of supremacy. Sardar
Patel, along with V. P. Menon (Secretary of the Home and States Ministry), initiated to fomnulate a decisive policy of the annexation. They used tire carrot
and stick policy to pursue the rulers of tire independent princely states, deceiving them with promises ofthe preservation of their sovereignty. They also utilized
the rhetoric oflndian patriotism and guaranteed retaining them as the constitutional heads. Falling prey to India’s devious machinations, about forty states
annexed to India.

The process initiated with the ‘merger agreement’ , with air assurance of an annual sum for their ‘Privy purse’, private property, personal privileges, titles, and
dignities to the Princes. By 1st January 1948, the first agreement brought thirty- nine states ofOrissa (the Eastern state on the BayofBengpI) and Chhattisgarh
(a central Indian state), spread over 56,000 square milesl80 . In February 1948, the small state ofMakrai was also included in tire merger agreement.
Additionally, Mayurbbanj with a population of one million, covering an area of 4,034 square miles, was merged with tire Indian union by 9th November
1948.181

1 77 Speech in UNSC, 22 IK ‘ September 1965.Bhutto.org September 1965,Bhutto.org 1965_speech49.php accessed 15 April 2016.

The same process continued in the states of Deccan and Gujarat which were merged in the province of Bombay. A strict supervision was enforced specially in
the case of Kolhapur (a large Deccan state) where a population of one million opposed against the merger plan Nevertheless, tire shrewd Indian diplomacy
forced the integration of Kolhapur in Bombay province by 1 st March 1948. Likewise, Gujarat’s premier state ofBaroda, having a population of three million
and covering an area of 8, 236 square miles was forced to sign the merger agreement. Subsequently on April 1951, Maharaja ofBaroda was deprived of his
privileges, title, and dignitaries by the Government of India. In addition to this, many states like Pudukkottai, Sandur, Madras and Bagqnapalle were merged
with the adjacent provinces.

The imperialistic face of India was further exposed in her campaign against the more autonomous princely states ofthe United States of Raj asthan, East
Punjab State Union, Patiala, Madya Bharat, Saura Shtra, United State ofTravancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Mysore. By July 1947, states inside
the geographical orbit oflndia and at a distance from Pakistan were left with no other option than to accede to India. Despite the Indian hegemonic campaign,
many states preferred their accession to Pakistan. To elucidate, Indore, under the State of Central India agency, Jodhpur tire largest under the Rajputana
Agency, Jaisalmer British Protectorate in Rajasthan region, and the Nawab ofBbopal, Hamidullalr Khan, were negotiating with Mr Jinnah for a possible
accession to Pakistan Likewise, the states of Hyderabad and Travaneore announced their desire for gaining independence. Ignoring the call of the Indian Act
of 1947, the Indian Congressites crushed the legitimate desires ofthese peaceful princely states, proving their imperialistic intentions. The nastiest illustration of
Indian viciousness was demonstrated in the case of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir. A separate explanation would be required for each ofthese states.

180 p ur h cr _ Holden. The Unification oflndia 1947-1951, Pacific Affairs December 1951, p. 352

181 Ibid p. 356

Occupation of Junagadh

 

Junagadh, a small princely state in Gujarat, was part of a larger Kathiawar Agency (in the western part of the subcontinent), with a population of 67,000
covered an area of 3, 337 square miles. Junagadh was under Muslim rule, while its 85 per cent ofthe population was Hindus. After the partition plan was
introduced, the Nawab of Junagadh desired to integrate with Pakistan and thus declined to sign the Instrument of Accession and the standstill agreement. On
1 5 th August, the then Chief Minister, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, through a government communique, announced the accession to Pakistan It activated the
Congressites to alter this accession The Indian government, initially, called for a plebiscite in Junagadh under its supervision for this crucial decision Albeit,
that the plebiscite was under consideration, the government of India launched a brutal military campaign and sent troops to occupy Junagadh. The troops
blocked the air communication, postal and telegraph services and installed a provisional gpvemment under the leadership of Shamaldas Gandhi, a nephew of
Gandhi The provisional government was quick in raising a volunteer amy and transferred its headquarters to Rajkot. This occupation was part of the Indian
adventurous campaign. The government of Pakistan lambasted the occupation and called for the withdrawal of troops and an organisation of a peaceful
plebiscite to decide the future of Junagadh. The Indian gpvemment refused to withdraw the troops, which resulted fa a military clash between the Indian and
Nawab ’s troops. Subsequently, the Nawab along with his family fled to Karachi

Additionally, the Indian army came into Manavadar and imposed a military-backed occupation. Similarly, the areas of Mangrol and Babariaward were also
forcefully occupied. In response to this, Liaquat Ali Khan sent a telegram to the Indian government and protested agqinst the occupation of Junagadh. The
Indian adventurous campaign was not only a violation ofthe integrity ofthe legitimate Pakistani territory, but also a clear breach of International Law. In order
to put a garb on the illegitimate occupation, a farcical government-backed plebiscite was organized by the gpvemment oflndia on 20 th February 1948, which
resulted fa an overall majority vote for accession to India.

 

Adventurism in Hyderabad

 

With a population of 1 6 million and an area of 82,000 square miles, Hyderabad was one of the largest states in India. Located in the centre of the southern
peninsula, it was ruledbyaMuslimnawab. After the announcement of the 3 rd June Plan, the NizamofHyderabad announced his intentions of remaining as an
independent state and not acceding to either Pakistan or India. His aims roused frustration and anger in the Indian government. Thus, all available resources
were directed to merge Hyderabad into the Indian union The Indian government, under the direction of the C ongress, ibnnulated a strategy to merge the
Hyderabad state. The Muslim community ofHyderabad was targeted by looting and arson oftheir property. Trained, anred personnel from the Indian police
with ammunition were infiltrated from the provinces of Madras and Bombay in the state ofHyderabad. The economic stagnation and violence-based
campaign compelled the Nizam to sign an interim Standstill Agreement on 29th Novenber 1947 with India. K. M. Munshi a staunch believer in Indian Union,
was appointed as AgentGeneral in Hyderabad. He deliberately adopted such measures to weaken the gpvemment. Pressure was built on the Nizam through
economic strangulation and destructive propaganda by the Indian press to force him to accede to India. After the departure ofBritish, the Indian gpvemment
increased further pressures on Hyderabad. Eventually, on 9 th September 1948, Indian troops entered Hyderabad to seal its freedom. Despite its weak armed
forces, the State Government was detennined to give a tough fight to the Indian forces. They were also expecting a helping hand from Pakistan, but engulfed
with internal crisis, Pakistan could not provide enough support. In order to gpin international support, tire State Ministry ofHyderabad sent a delegation to the
United Nations, but before the United Nations Security Council could initiate any arrangement, India geared up her military campaign by launching an
offensive attack from all three sides ofHyderabad. As the state forces of Nizam were no match against the fully equipped forces of India, they surrendered on
17 th September 1948. The conquest ofHyderabad elucidates the brutal occupation campaign oflndia.

 

Barbaric Campaign in Kashmir

 

The beautiful geostrategic valley of Kashmir in tire north- western region of the Indian subcontinent is tarnished and disfigured by tire blood of its helpless,
brave inhabitants fighting for their freedom Until today the sun sets in Kashmir with the hue and cry of widows, orphaned children, mothers, and sisters. The
state of Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state in British India and had a heterogeneous demography. According to the 1941 census, its total population
was 4,021,616 in which 80 percent were Muslims. It was ruled by an autocratic Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh The persecution of Muslims was a routine
practice and since then, the persecution has never stopped only the occqpier has changed. Kashmir was bought by Gulab Singh from the British Government
in 1846 under the notorious ‘Treaty of Amritsar’. Since then Muslims have been victims ofHindu suppression and persecution After the Partition of 1947,
Kashmir became the bone of contention between Pakistan and India and still continues to haunt Pak-Indo relations.

On the eve of Partition, Hari Singh dismissed the Muslims’ desire to merge Kashmir into Pakistan, inciting the Muslims to revolt against the Maharaja.
Therefore, in August and September 1947, the situation worsened and the Muslim subjects of Maharaja’s rule started a military revolt to liberate Kashmir
from the atrocious rule of Hari Singh Soon, accompanied by the tribesmen ofNWFP, the Muslims attained initial success and ejqpelled the state forces from
the districts ofPoonch and Mirpur. On 22nd October 1947, tire Muslim forces readied the borders of Srinagur. The terrified Maharaja fled to Jammu and
sent his accession consent to the Indian gpvemment, and asked for military help for saving his throne. India waiting for any such opportunity quickly
dispatched a battalion of Sikh troops to Srinagur. Almost 10,000 troops took part in the barbaric reoccupation of Kashmir. Upon receiving the news of
Indian occupational operation, Mr Jinnah ordered Pakistan’s Commander- in-Chief General Gracey to send Pakistani troops to Kashmir, which he did not
follow. On the other hand, Indian occupation continued in which thousands of innocent Muslims were killed, hundreds of girls and women were deprived of
their honour and Muslimhouses and properties were set on fire. Thus, the Indian occupation came at the price of genocide ofKashmiri Muslims.

On 1 st January 1948, the Indians played another trick by taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations. This was done only to conceal the Indian
imperialistic desires. However, after thorough discussion in the United Nations Security Council, a resolution was passed on 21st April 1948 (Instrument of
Accession attached as Annexure-1 & UNSC 1948 Kashmir Resolution attached as Annexure – 2) , calling for holding a plebiscite to decide the
future status of Jammu and Kashmirl82 182 1 948 ceased on the promise of holding a plebiscite for allowing the Kashmiris to decide their own destiny.
However, India never made any effort to hold the plebiscite and continued her inhumane occupation of Kashmir. Until today, Kashmir’s occupation illustrates
the superficial Indian claims of democracy. After occupying most of the princely states, India’s greed for expansion turned her attention towards her weak
neighbours.

India and her Immediate Neighbours: A Relationship of Hegemony and Forced Dependency

India shares borders with most of the states of South Asia. It shares its border with Nepal on the north-eastern side and with Bhutan on the western, eastern,
and southern side. While Bangladesh lies on India’s eastern border, China is located on the northern border and Pakistan on the western border. Sri Lanka
lies on the southern border oflndia. In addition to this, Myanmar also shares borders with the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagpland, and Manipur
Mizoram

The Indian expansionist, hegemonic, and aggressive policies have been reported in most of the cases in her relationships with immediate neighbours. Nehru,
“considered the Indian subcontinent as an exclusive sphere of influence for Delhi” 183 .With such a consideration, India’s relationship with Pakistan,
Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and China are marked by continued mistrust. Sire has entered in conventional wars with Pakistan in (1948, 1965,
1971, 1998/99) and with China in 1962. To strengthen her hegemonic status, Indian external policies are formulated to weaken her neighbours into
dependency. In pursuance of her voracious interests, India has been expeditious in manipulating favourable situations. Allegedly, India has indulged in
sponsoring various insurgencies particularly, in her neighbouring countries, like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. To elucidate India’s hegemonic
attitude, the cases of Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka would be discussed in the following sections.

^ Please see the Annexure No. 1

Malone, David M, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, New York. Oxford University Press, 201 1, p.104.

Invasion of Sikkim

Sikkim was a small sovereign state until 1975. Being part of the larger Himalayan Kingdom, it was located between N epal and Bhutan having an area of
2,739 square miles. During the British rule, Sikkim had an autonomous status, as the relationship between Sikkim and British were governed by separate
treaties. Under these treaties, British had the administrative control over it, therefore, it was considered as a British protectorate. Following the British
withdrawal, Sikkim, attained independence. Nevertheless, Sikkim soon fell prey to the Indian imperialistic desires. India increased her interference in Sikkim
coercing her to enter in a treaty, the ‘Indian- SikkimPeace Treaty’, in December 1950. Under the treaty, Sikkim continued to be a protectorate oflndia. The

 

treaty, widely accepted as a forced agreement, authorized India to interfere in the state affairs of Sikkim. Under the Article IV of the treaty, the external
relations of Sikkim whether political, economic or financial, shall be conducted and regulated solely by the government of India, and the
Government of Sikkim shall not have any dealing with foreign Powers 184 . This treaty is enclosed at Annexation.

Similarly, under Article III, the government of India shall have the right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim 185 . With the treaty of 1950, Sikkim
almost lost her autonomous status, but die Indian greed was not satiated, as its policymakers were aiming for the annexation of the tiny nation with India.
Eventually, the task was given to R&AW which adopted the same modus operandi which it followed to accomplish the creation of Bangladesh. To fertilize the
ground for an Indian annexation, an ethnic confrontation was created, thereafter, as soon as an etiinic conflict erupted, Indian troops crossed the border on die
premise of humanitarian intervention. Hence, in September 1974, die Indian parliament passed a resolution calling for making Sikkim an associate state (within
India) of India 186 . Therefore, when King Chogyal (the Sikkim Monarch) opposed the Indian desires, the Indians removed Chogyal tirough a planted
assembly resolution of Sikkim and called for Indian annexation. Thus to avoid global criticism, a referendum under the surveillance of occupying Indian troops
was conducted, and on 29th April 1975, Sikkim was annexed widi India.

^ (India-Sikkim Treaty 1950) 1116 (India-Sikkim Treaty 1950)

Indian Gamble with China 1962

 

Carried away by her imperialistic desires, India also tried to interfere in China but tailed miserably. In 1950, the Autonomous Tibetan region was formed
under the influence of China which remains unacceptable to India. Thus, India promoted separatism by training and financing the Tibetan rebels. Historically,
Indian expansionist modus operandi has been to promote separatism and sponsor extremism In the year of 1959, it was widely accepted that die rebels of
Tibet are being funded and trained by America’s CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) in Indian West Bengal hill station of Kalimpongl87 . Despite die fomnal
Chinese request for expelling and sippressing die rebels and their activities, the Indians continued their support. In March 1 959, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan
spiritual leader, leading an uprising against the Chinese government, escaped to India and formed an exile provincial government there in Dharamsala. The
Chinese army in pursuit of the Tibetan rebels reached Longju, where the Indian and Chinese anned forces met in combat, hi N ovenber 1961, under her
Forward Policy India established military posts near the McMahon Line (die agreed line between Britain and Tibet). The Indian military posts were positioned
to north of die Chinese military posts. By establishing military posts on the disputed territories, the Indian military aimed to choke the Chinese sipply lines to
pressurize die Chinese forces to withdraw. The bone of contention between India and China was the territory of the eastern section. Indians refer to this
territory as the North East Frontier Aggney, while China calls it the Soutii Tibet. The dispute extends to the western sector which includes the Aksai Chin
plateau, bordering Tibet, Kashmir and Xinjiang. Hie Indian Forward Policy added fuel to fire of an already embittered dispute witii China. These border
disputes and the Indian Forward policy succeeding in sparking an armed conflict between China and India. Consequently, on20th October 1961 China
attacked the Indian posts simultaneously in the eastern and western sectors. It took thirty- two days of armed conflict to a unilateral ceasefire, to be initiated
and enforced by China on 2 1st November 1962.

1116 Kumar Satish,”India and the Himalayan States”, Handbook of the India’s International Relations. Routledge, 201 l,p.80.

1 Malone, David M, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, New York. Oxford University Press, 201 l.,p. 133.

This war ended with the defeat of India, especially in the western sector where China retained control of Aksai Chin. Despite her defeat, India still continues
to lay claim on the Aksai Chin territory, while China asserts ownership on the Indian state of Arunacbal Pradesh. In tire contemporary arena, India still
continues to perceive China as a potential enemy, and recognizes it as the main hurdle in her route to regional hegemony.

 

India-Nepal Relations

 

Located in the Himalayan mountain range, Nepal is a landlocked country bounded by India on her eastern, western, and soudiem side, with China bordering
its northern side. Indian relations witii Nepal have always been marked by muscularity. Nepal has always been duty reprimanded whenever she exploited her
geographical compulsion or opposed her Indian dictate. Historically, India has imposed economic embargoes on Nepal on several occasions. To illustrate, the
first economic embargo onNepalbytiie Indian gpvemment was imposed in 1969, as a retribution for Nepal’s decision of removal of the ‘Indian Surveillance
Unit’ from her common border with China. In 1969 Nepal committed yet another gpucherie by stepping on India’s toes as a Non-Permanent Member of die
UNSC.

In 1975, the illegitimate occupation of Sikkim was anotiier extreme validation of the Indian expansionist polices. As another example ofindia’s hegemonic
attitude, she imposed another major economic embargo in 1975 against Nepal, on her import of anus from China for strengthening her domestic defence.
Whenever, die Nepalese gpvemment increases her ties with China, she laces blockade from India. In 1989, most of die Indo-Nepal border crossings were
blocked just because of her advancing relationship with China. Most recently, Nepalese faced another blockade by India on 23 rd September 20 1 5 188 . This
blockade was carried out by India in order to force the Nepalese government to amend their newlyadopted Constitution. As claimed by Kanak Mani Dixit
(die editor of Himal Soutbasian),

“ India ‘s interference in Nepal ’s domestic politics and its alleged fuel and economic blockade of the Country probably stemmed from the Modi
government ‘s failed attempts to steer the Nepalese constitution to be more “friendly towards India ”189 .

Accordingly, KP Sbarma Oli, the Nepalese Premier, vocalized his discontent at the Indian involvement, warning of dire consequences if she continued witii
her meddling tactics 190 . The Indian blockade was a sign of her desire to manipulate her economic relationships to incite domestic political change in her
landlocked neighbour, Nepal Moreover, through the blockade, New Delhi attempted to demonstrate die Indian sphere of influence in the domestic affairs of
Kathmandu Apart from the heinous economic blockade politics, India is also encouraging the southern-based ethnic community ofMadhesis in their agitation
agqinst the central government of Nepal Representing nearly 40 per cent of the Nepalese population, Madhesi are being supported by die Indian authorities
to amend the Nepalese polices in accordance to her interests. The everlasting Indian desire oiAkhand Bharat has also influenced her relationship with Nepal
Currently, 14,000 hectares of Nepal’s land in Susta, 37,000 hectares in Kalapani, and 12,000 hectares in 7 1 other parts of India-Nepal border are under the
Indian occipation since 1962191 . Moreover, the RSS pushes for the constitutional declaration of Nepal as a ‘Hindu Rashtra’ which is anotiier source of
Indian agitation towards her dependent, neighbour.

The Indian expansionist attitude is discemable witii her continued interference in the domestic aflairs and indulgence in the political aflairs of her neighbours, to
the extent of orgpnizing agitation in their territories. In the broader picture, the real Indian aim is to convert these sovereign states into satellite states in order to
pursue her interest of regional supremacy.

 

1 ^ The Kathmandu Post edition 23/09/2015 http://kathunandupost.ekantipur.com accessed on 16 April 2016.

***9 Dawn edition 06 November 2015,http://www.dawn.com , news/1217707 accessed on 16 April, 2016.

1^0 Asian Times edition 02 November 2015, http://atimes.com’2015/l l/l-injured-infiring-after-nepal-police-clear-protesters-from-key-crossing-into-india/ accessed on 16 April
2016.

191 Dr. Bishnu Hari, Nepal foreign Affairs h tl|y//ncpal foreign a flairs .conVnepal-ch in atics -in -thc-tinre-of-indian -expansion ism accessed on 16 April 2016.

Indo-Bhutan Ties

 

Bhutan shares borders with India to the east, west, and south, while sharing its northern border with China. Bhutan’s concerns erupted alter the British
departure in 1 947. Hence, in order to restore her sovereign status, Bhutan entered into a treaty with India entitled as ‘India- Bhutan Friendship Treaty’ of
1 949, which is enclosed as Annexure-3 . Under Article II of die treaty, “The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the
internal administration of Bhutan. On its part, the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard
to its external relations” 19 – . It is very much clear ffomtiie language of the treaty diat Bhutan’s foreign policy would be India driven However, the treaty of
1 949 was revised in 2007 (Annexure^t) . Under the new treaty Bhutan now enjoys more liberty in her external affairs but still is not autonomous in
fonnulating her own policies. The 2007 treaty still demands Bhutan’s foreign policy to not to hann the Indian interests. With a landlocked geographical status,
Bhutan is almost 95 per cent dependent on India for her hade. Bhutan’s landlocked status makes her reliant on India for an access to the rest ofthe world.
Mainly, all ofthe oil consumption ofBhutan is controlled by India; in addition to this, her 90 per cent ofhydropower is also controlled by India. This
dependency has compelled Bhutan to compromise her sovereignty, thus, victimized viciously by India’s imperialistic designs.

The Indian interference in the domestic politics ofBhutan has always been a great concern for the Bhutanese people. During the second Parliamentarian
elections held in 2013, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ofBhutan won the election by defeating the ruling Peace and Prosperity Party (PPP). The Indian
involvement in the national elections ofBhutan can never be neglected. In the first phase of the election, PPP was leading the polls, but when the Indian
government cut off the subsidies on kerosene and liquefied petroleum gps, tire consequent rocketing fuel prices expectedly invoked public angpr resulting in
PPP’s demise. Therefore, in the second round of the elections, the PDP was declared victorious. The timing of the Indian subsidy withdrawal anid the
elections changed the fete of the parties. Another aspect of the Indian involvement in the 2013 national elections ofBhutan is Chinese oriented. Bhutan being a
buffer state between India and China, always feces the Indian wrath whenever it tries to build ties with China. Hie government of PPP, under tire Premiership
of Jigmi Y. Tbinley, was punished owing to his increasing affebility with Chinal93 , unacceptable to the Indian establishment. This exemplifies tire intense nature
of India’s involvement in Bhutan’s affairs. It has been a routine practice of the Indian policymakers to use her economic stranglehold to interfere in the political
affoirs of her neighbours. Bhutan always remains under the looming threat of Indian annexation. Although, the concepts of tire protectorate and satellite states
have disappeared in the twenlyfirst century, nevertheless, the nature of the Indo-Bhutan relationship can still be viewed with the same lens.

1 9- (Refworld)

Indian polices have also compelled the Bhutanese regime to have her own army. Without having airy air force, the Bhutan army is highly dependent on India
for her arms and troops training. Indian influences on Bhutan’s external polices are reflected in Nehru’s statement in 1 954. He stated,

‘ Bhutan is a semi-independent state whose foreign policy has to be conducted in consultation with us [India], Tire state receives a subsidy from us
also. They> are very anxious to preseive their Independence but they ha\’e to rely on India. We have no desire to interfere internally in Bhutan, but
we ha\’e made it clear that, so far as external matters are concerned or any defence matter, India is intensely interested and must ha\>e a say, this is
the position ’194 .

 

India and Sri Lanka

 

Sri Lanka, a small island nation in the south of India, has always been under the Indian shadow owing to her geostrategic positioning Given the weak political
and military structure of Sri Lanka, it has always been under the Indian influence. Its political dynamics and the defence policies are India dominated. The
Indian- Sri Lankan relationship Iras always been speckled by the Indian influence in its internal and external policies. Internally, India has been greatly involved
in the Sri Lankan civil war, by exploiting the ethnic gulf between tire Sinhalese and the Tamils. Admittedly, the Indian regime under Indira Gandhi armed tire
Tamils and helped in formation of the LLTE [Liberation Tigprs of Tamil Eelam], hr 1 987, when the Sri Lankan government initiated an operation agpinst the
Tamil Insurgency, the Indian intervention fended off tire Sri Lankan operation agpinst LTTE. Prior to the Indian intervention, the Sri Lankan government was
warned of suffering dire consequences if the operation agpinst LLTE was not abandoned. The Sri Lankan President, J. R. Jayawardene remarked on tire
Indian intervention in 1987 as “ the 1 7th invasion of Sri Lanka by India in her 2500 years of history’ ” 195 .

1 9-‘ Minstry ofForeign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China. 22 June 2012, accessed on 19 April 2016.

*94 Kumar Satish, “India and the Himalayan States”, Handbook of the India’s International Relations. Routledge, 201 l,p.77.

A glance on the Indo-Lankan accord signed (enclosed at Annexure-5 ) after the Indian intervention explains the Indian involvement at length The Indian
intervention under the rhetoric of ‘ Peace Keeping’ was nothing more than the imposition of its hegemony over its small island neighbour.

The massacre carried out by tire Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) hr Jaflba Teaching Hospital on 2 1 st and 22 nd October 1987, is an exemplification of
the brutal and barbaric activities of the IPKF. More than sixty-eight people including doctors, nurses, and patients were killed hr the bloody campaign of the
IPKF 196 . Allegedly, the IPKF perpetrated numerous rapes and cases of plunder, inflating the list of its heinous activities. However, the Indian intervention
ended as a failure agpinst her nurtured monster LLTE. Ironically hr a chicken came home to roost situation, the monstrous LLTE assassinated Indian Premier,
Rajiv Gandhi on 21 st May 1991. However, the Sri Lankan government gpt rid of the LLTE in 2009 with the help of brotherly countries, including Pakistan

The Indian involvement in Sri Lanka was not limited to its internal affairs only, it extended to Sri Lanka’s external affeirs also. In 1980s, the Indian
policymakers had been actively keeping Sri Lanka isolated from Pakistan and the western countries. To distract Sri Lanka from having a functional foreign
policy, New Delhi used the ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils to involve her internally. At present, the Sri Lankan proximity with Chinese has been
a major concern for India. China has been involved in financing major development projects in Sri Lanka such as funding for the development of an airport
and tire Hanbantota port, tire construction of expressways, and tire expansion of the Colombo port, etc. Furthermore, China is also building the Norocbeholai
power plant. New Delhi considers the Chinese presence in Sri Lanka as an evolving national security threat for India. The Indian policymakers in New Delhi
perceive the South Asian region as an area of Indian influence, therefore, in order to maintain her regional hegemony, it has to block the entry of any other

 

power. So, it would not be inappropriate to foresee another ethnic conflict erupting in Sri Lanka. Historically, India lias always used the Tamil trump card to
dictate the Sri Lankan government, therefore history can be repeated if the Chinese and Sri Lankan proximity continues.

1 97 Soya, Ranjit, Asian Tribune 30-07-2013 http://www.asiantribune.com / node/63316accessed on 19 April 2016.

* 99 Tamil Guardian, Jajjfim Hospital Massacre 1 968

http://www.tamilguardian.com’article.asp?articleid=3735 accessed on 19 ApriI2016.

All in all, to maintain her regional hegemony, India is fuelling indigenous ethnic conflicts in most of the South Asian states, with maximum success in Pakistan.

Indian Involvement in Pakistan

The insecure Indian state came under a security dilemma alter her defeat in war of 1 965 with Pakistan. The geographical positioning of East and West
Pakistan was always conceived as a threat by India, which became more imminent after her defeat in the 1 965-war. This war dispelled any Indian notions of
Pakistan’s military inability or weakness, convincing India of reformulating its strategy for achieving the dismemberment of Pakistan Therefore, she searched
for opportune political solutions to fulfil her dream of Pakistan’s dismemberment. Consequently, the most feasible option was to utilize the geographical
partitioning of the Eastern and the Western wings of Pakistan With devious machinations, India managed to exploit in its lavour the prevailing alienation
between West and East Pakistan

The conditions in East Pakistan were also favourable to India’s ffl- intentions. The physical separation of twelve hundred miles, tire predominance of Bengali
nationalism and the disgruntled presence ofthe 15 per cent of Hindu minority 197 in tire populace were propitious prospects for infiltrating in the socio-political
sphere of East Pakistan The favourable ties between the Hindus of East Pakistan and Calcutta, paved the way for Indian objectives. Along with this, the
prevailing ethnic-based grievances of Ben^lis further fertilized the ground for Indian stratagems.

The creation of Bangladesh is generally perceived as a consequence of West Pakistan’s partisan policies towards East Pakistan, without any
acknowledgement ofthe Indian involvement. An effort has been made in this book to explore the Indian role in the dismemberment of Pakistan. On numerous
occasions, the Indian and Bangladeshi Leadership and intellectuals have also accepted and regretted Indian involvement.

Shawkat Ali (Ex- Deputy Speaker ofBangladeshi Parliament] in a Victory day celebration in 201 1 remarked, ‘ India stood beside us when we required
them . We shall always remember this the gesture. We are so grateful I would give hundred percent credit to India for liberation of Bangladesh ’ 198
. Similarly in an interview, Major General (retd) Z. A. Khan, former Director, DGF1 (Bangladeshi Intelligence) stated that,

‘ There is no doubt that RA W played a vital role during our liberation war, but their motive was to divide Pakistan at any cost to weaken their arch
rival [Pakistan], Their hidden objective is to establish undivided India, which they call “Akhand Bharat Mata In this direction, they have been
taking a lot of initiative from the veiy beginning. When they saw that it was not possible to proceed in the normal course, then they first decided to
divide Pakistan into two small parts ’199 .

Hie confessions of the Indian leadership are also on record. F or instance, Indian Premier Indira Gandhi gloated after the fall of Dhaka with these arrogpnt
words,

‘ We have taken the revenge of a thousand years ‘ and ‘we have drowned the Two-Nation theory > in the Bay of Bengal ’ 200 . Likewise, Rahul Gandhi
in his election campaign of 2007 proudly remarked,

197 William, LF. Rnshbrook. “ The East Pakistan Tragedy ” , TomStacey Ltd., London 1972, p. 77.

198 Thaindian News 16/12/201 1 http ://www.thamdian.conynewsporta]/uncategorized/indianbangladeshi-war-heroes-celebrate-victory -day_100584488.html accessed on 19 April
2016.

199 Rashid,Abu, Raw in Bangladesh-Portrait of an Aggressive Intelligence, Dakka,

2005, p. 303.

799 Times of India 16 December 2003, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com / pakistanpostcard/Dont-judge-jean-clad-women/articleshow/363994.cms accessed on 19 April
2016.

‘ You know, when our [Nehru] family commits to a task, it also completes it. In the past too, members of the Gandhi family ha\>e achie\’ed the
goals they have initiated like the freedom of the country, dividing Pakistan into two, and leading the nation into the 21st century ’ 201 .

Most recently, Prime Minister Modi, during his visit to Bangladesh’ in his speech on receiving the War of Liberation award on behalf of the former Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Bangladesh, on 7th June 20 1 5 stated’

‘ We fought for Bangladesh’s ‘swabhimaan’ (honour)… alongside Mukti Jodhas (Mukti Bahini)… for Bangladesh…. Indians were fighting side-by-
side with them and in a way’ helped realize the dream of Bangladesh ’ 202 . Although it’s a known fact that Indians were instrumental in the
dismemberment of Pakistan, these remarks are only a glimpse of the confessions made by both Bengsli and Indian leadership.

India’s Grand Strategy

In pursuance of her goal, India launched a massive campaign. The multi- pronged Indian grand strategy was as follows. Firstly , to make the ground
favourable, the Indians sophisticatedly constructed the discourse of marginalization and deprivation of East Pakistan Under this policy, they aimed to sow the
seeds of separatist and biased sentiments in the Bengali populace. Secondly , India launched a psychological war with the use of variegated media and
multiple forums, which succeeded in building a narrative against the unity of Pakistan Thirdly , on the political front by the installation of puppet political
organizations, they altered the bases of ideological orientation from Islamic nationalism to ethnic nationalism Fourthly , to isolate Pakistan’s central
government, India launched a diplomatic mission to sideline the Pakistani stance on the eastern quagmire. Fifthly , in order to provide a legitimate garb to her
illegitimate aims, the Indian viciously created the refugee conundrum. Sixthly , inducting a paramilitary force ‘Mukti Bahini’, which at a later stage introduced
an atrocious and barbaric angle to the creation of Bangladesh

791 The Telegraph Calcutta, 16 April 2007,

 

http://www.telegraphindia.com , 1070416/asp/nation/story_7651518.asp accessed on
19 April 2016.

2®2 F or details See. The Indiatoday June 7^’ 2015

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/tnDdi-receives-award-on-behah-of-vajpayee-inbangladesh/ l/442748.html accessed on 17 April 2016.
The Bengali Marginalization: An Indian Construct

 

In order to pursue her interest ofPakistan’s disinenbennent, India launched her campaign by first constructing the discourse of Bengali deprivation and
marginalization By this fabrication of tales of the Bengali deprivation, the Indians sowed the seeds of separatism and encouraged the slogans for partition It
lias always been wrongly believed that the economic disparity and the partial polices of West Pakistan had been the major factors contributing to Pakistan
disinenbennent. Nevertheless, little concern has been given to the actual disparity between West and East Pakistan Undeniably, the disparity did exist
between both the wings of Pakistan but it was relentlessly exaggerated by the Indian propagandists and the Awami League. Actually, the economic disparity
provided the Indian propagandists a powerful tool to attract popular support. Therefore, in order to gain popular support, the economic inequality was
exaggerated. Indian propaganda can be gauged by looking into the remarks made by K. Subramanyan [Leading Indian defense and political analyst] when he
remarked on the phenomena as ‘Internal Colonialism’203 . hi the same manner, East Pakistan was propagated as a colony of West Pakistan Indian
propaganda also influenced the western world’s views that showed concerns on East Pakistan’s economic status. Indians are reported to have actually paid
journalists in East Bengal and also in West Pakistan to overemphasize the negative effects of the economic disparity. The Hindus of East Pakistan also played
a significant part in this vilification campaign

Indubitably, the economic differences between West Pakistan (particularly Punjab) and East Pakistan did exist but it was a continued legacy of the British As
argued by Raunaq Jaban in her book, ‘ Pakistan . The failure of National Integration ’, that much of the economic disparity was due to a historical
legacy 204 . Irrefutably, there were differences and gaps in industrial development and living standards between the East and the West Pakistan, even before
independence. For instance, before Partition, there were 1,414 factories in undivided Bengal and after Partition 3 14 were inherited by East Bengal Out of
3 14, most of these factories were owned by the Hindu industrialists who eventually closed their business after the creation ofPakistan205 . Likewise, the
Bengali Muslims did not own a single finn in 1 947 and by 1 95 9 they were the owners of 1 1 per cent of all the industrial assets206 .

202 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p.79.

2 (| f Jahan, Raunaq, Pakistan- The Failure of National Integration, Columbia University Press 1972,

Therefore, a question arises can we blame Pakistan only for the century-old poor economic status of East Pakistan? The answer would be a film negative.
Even Sir Fredrick Bunow (last gpvemor of Bengal) forecasted that ‘ East Bengal was condemned in the event of India ’s partition to turn into the
greatest slum in history ’ 207 . However, his prediction was proved wrong as East Bengal made reasonable progress during the short period of twenty- four
years. In order to support the above-mentioned claim an overview of the major development projects initiated by the Central Government of Pakistan should
be considered. For instance, tire Kaptai dam, a major irrigation project, was completed in 1962 . Additionally, tire East Pakistan Steel mill in Cbittagpng was
constructed even though. West Pakistan did not have one at that time. Dacca’s main railway station was also built before the creation of Bangladesh; similarly,
the second largest port in Bangladesh (Mongla Port) was also constructed before her creation. The diplomatic enclave which is even functional today was
developed before the creation of Bangladesh208 . FurthemDre, an excerpt from Tajammrl Hussian’s book, {Bangladesh: Victim of Black Propaganda
Intrigue and Indian Hegemony) would also endorse tire established notion

“Statistical figure s were put forward by some short-sighted writers stating that East Pakistan received a lower quota of investment for
development from the central revenue sources. Apparently, some figures were right, although the truth was that allotments gap was reducing
during late 1960s. Thus the figures mentioned by the so called economists of standing, like Rehman Sobhan who failed to obtain a higher degree in
a foreign university were flawed by jaundiced views. . . Historical evidence shows clearly that East Bengal [which latter become East Pakistan and
then Bangladesh] had nothing of an industrial base prior to 1947. . . East Bengal was the largest producer of jute to the tone of 80% in the world
but it had not a single jute mill. They were all based around Calcutta in West Bengal (India). . . . The rapid industrial development that took place
during the Pakistan period was not done by local people, but by experienced business houses like the Adamjees, Isphanis, etc.209

2® 5 Ali, Tariq, Can Pakistan Survive, Penguin Book, Chaucer Press Ltd. SufflockUK,

1983, P.43

20® Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p.80

202 Collins, Larry; Dominque Lapieire, Freedom at Midnight, Pan Books Ltd. London,

1977, p. 129

20^ Alias iab, 1971: Fact and Fiction. Lahore: Makhdoom Printing Press (Pvt) Ltd,2015,p.l35.

It is true that economic grievances did exist in East Pakistan, but were exaggerated by the Indian media and the Awami League to fuel separatism in Pakistan
This viewpoint is endorsed by Samrila Bose in her book, Dead Reckoning, she writes,

‘ There is no doubt that Bengalis perceived themselves as victim of longstanding discriminatory and exploitative policies, e\>en though they
sometimes cited the wrong statistic to prove it — that is, statistic that showed “disparity ‘ but not necessarily discrimination ”, East Pakistan was
poorer and economically weaker than West Pakistan at the formation of the countiy in 1947, and there were historically few East Pakistan in the
civil services, the aimed forces and managerial position. Disparity, therefore, was a reality, and it could not vanish overnight. The question that
whether there was discrimination required the scrutiny of other statistics— for instance, ones that would show whether opportunities were being
fairly opened up to East Pakistan ’210 .

She also acknowledges that ‘the true extent of ‘discrimination is a matter of controversy’.

Apart from the discourse of economic disparity, ignoring Bengalis for political positions in the state institutions was also considered as another source of
hostility between West and East Pakistan

Although, there is definite evidence available, contrary to the prevailing ones, that in twenty-three-year period, when East Pakistan was part of Pakistan, many
Bengali leaders occupied top positions. To illustrate, Khawaja Nazinuddin (gpvemor general in 1948 ), Mohammad Ali Bogra (PM in 1953 ), Hussain

 

Shaheed Suhrawardy (PM in 1 956), even Iskandar Mirza, the first Pakistani President in 1 956 was a Bengali. Another attention is about the limited number
of Bengali officials in the civil services. It is believed that West Pakistan did not provide equal job opportunities to the Bengalis. In order to respond to this
allegation a comparison mist be carried out of the number of Bengali officers before and afier Partition. Nurunnabi Chowdhary was the only Bengali Muslim
civil servant (ICS officer) in East Pakistan before Pakistan’s inception; additionally, there were a little more than ten officers from Bengal serving in various
ranks in the Royal Indian army, navy, and the airforce in 1947211 . But, in 1971, when Bangladesh was created, a thousand civil servants from East Pakistan
were working at different levels in tire various civil service departments. East Bengalis were employed as per requirements which can also be ascertained by
the feet that East Bengali scientists were doing research in the field of nuclear energy as well Moreover, it’ s an established feet that, in terms of employment,
East Pakistan was getting much more shares as compared to Balocbistan, Sindh and Southern Punjab. From 1947 to 1958 the power structure was equally
shared between both the wings of Pakistan

– (|C> Hussain, Mohammad Tajammul, Banglsdesh Yictimof Black Propoganda Intrigue and Indian Hegemony, The Hilal Publishers Ltd, London 1996. 23-24
2I() Bose, Sannila, Dead Reckoning Memories ofthe 1971 Bangladesh War. C.Hurts & CO, London, 201 l,p.20

Power Structure between the two Wings 212 , [1947- 1958]

West Pakistan East Pakistan Head of State 02 02

Prime Minster 03 04 Members of Constituent Assemblies 27 27

It is reiterated that this effort is not to conceal the political partiality carried out by the political elites of the central government, but its an attempt to unearth die
role of the Indian government and die Awami League in constructing the exaggerated notion ofthe Bengali deprivation Indisputably, the Bengalis were
marginalized economically and politically, but these marginalized sentiments were exploited and blown out of proportion through the sophisticated propaganda
of India and her cronies.

21’ Afrasiab, 1971: Fact and Fiction. Lahore: Makhdoom Printing Press (Pvt) Ltd,20 15, p. 134-135
2 1 – Source: Jahan, Raunaq, Pakistan. The failure ofNational Integration. Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 25.

Hindu Media: the Indian propaganda Machine

 

Indian print media was the most effective weapon in her psychological campaign against united Pakistan, which India initiated soon after Partition, hi 1 947,
there were no newspapers in East Pakistan, as before Partition, Maulana Muhammad Akram Khan’s daily ‘ Azad ’ (published from Calcutta) was the only
reliable source of news for Muslims. The Indian establishment, fully aware of Daily Azad ’ s influence, after Partition demanded an unfair amount of income tax
as a plot to render it financially unviable. Maulana cornered, abandoned his printing house, property, and house, and fled to East Pakistan. Thus, the Indian
establishment successfully banished the only source of accurate news ofthe Muslims 213 . Another Muslim- owned newspaper, Has Morning News , met with
the same fete. As part of their malign canpaign, the Hindu newspapers launched a tirade against the call of Partition, which continued in post-Partition period
also. Some of the popular newspapers were: Ananda Bazar Patrika (Bengali), The Jngantar (Bengali), and those published in English, namely, The Amrita
Bazar Patrika , The Hindustan Standard, The Nationalist, The Advance, and The Eastern Express . All these newspapers were the mouthpiece of the
Indian government. From the very inception of Pakistan these newspapers spumed negative propaganda against the unity ofPakistan.

The role of Indian journalists in the creation of Bangladesh can be gauged from the feet that in 2012, fifty Indians were awarded the ‘Bangladesh Liberation
War Honour’ and the ‘Friends of Liberation War Honour’ for their services in Bangladesh’s creation; 10 of these 50 awardees were Indian Journalists 2 14 .
The Indian media initiated its powerful rhetoric after the emergence of agitation in East Bengal against President Ayub Khan in 1969. The All India Radio
(AIR) from its Calcutta’s station, broadcast a daily program titled ‘Apper Bangla, Oupar Bangla ’ (this side of Bengal and the other side of Bengal) which
openly endorsed the Bangladeshi cause 215 . Moreover, the AIR also broadcast a regular show endorsing and propagating Mujib’s 6- Point foimila for
attaining East Pakistan’s autonomy. The AIR also broadcast programs by entitling them as ‘Exploitation of East Bengal’ by West Pakistan; such programs
were aired regularly to sow the seeds of ethnic confrontation between Bengalis and Punjabis. Another tool of the Indian propaganda was installed in Calcutta
entitled ‘Radio Bangladesh’. The prime aim was to propagate hatred against West Pakistan and the Pakistani army. Even in April 1971, th e Hindustan
Standard reported the ‘Fall ofDacca’ in its banner headline 216 . hi the most part of 1970, the Indian newspapers highlighted the economic disparity between
the West and East Pakistan vehemently constructing the image of East Pakistan as an epitome of the deprivation of all political rights.

213

213

94

For details See, Daily Star 21 October 2012, http://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail
254693 accessed on 20 April,2016

The effective use of the Indian propaganda machine won compassion for the Bangladeshi cause from all over the world, by making their baseless and fictional
stories immensely believable. For instance, the All India Radio broadcast that all economic activity, including the erqport and functionality of the jute mills, had
halted. But this baseless report was proved wrong in the April report of the Daily Telegraph 2\l . The Indian print and Radio were exaggerating almost every
feet. They attributed every criminal act to Pakistan’s central government and army. The Indian mass media would publish fictional stories, to promote their
cause of Pakistan’s dismerrberment. For case in point, tire All India Radio reported that several Bengali professors had been killed by the Pakistani anny. But
interestingly, those professors who were claimed to be killed not only denied this report by themselves but even appealed on the Dacca Television to prove
their fallacy 218 . The Indian media not only reported baseless news but also defined every killing on ethnic and religious grounds. It was widely propagated
that the Bengali Hindus were feeing genocide by tire Muslim forces of West Pakistan India legitimized its physical intervention in East Pakistan by convincing
its masses of the impending danger, confronting the Hindus in East Pakistan In many cases, it was reported that several Hindu teachers and professors bad
been killed by the Pakistani army. Such stories were also disseminated through the international media. However, Masud Mufti (fonner Education Minister in
East Bengal) revealed inhis article (published in the Urdu digest, the 1974 Efecenber edition) that, ‘Immediately after March 1971 Anny action, almost all
Hindu professors and teachers had resumed their duties and that twenty-five Hindu Professors of the Dacca University were given protection by
the government when they > demanded’ 219 . Accordingly Kuldip Nayar (Indian Journalist) observed that, ‘ Newspapers reported battles that were ne\’er
there ’ 220

2 ^ Choudhaiy ,GW The Last Days of United Pakistan C.Hurts & Co. Ltd, London,! 977, p. 89.

 

Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p.284.

2 1 3 Mehmood,Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd, Lahore, 1984, p.144
218 Ibid.

Apart from the newspaper and radio propaganda, books were also utilized as a source of Indian propaganda against the unity of Pakistan. The Bengali
society was flooded with hundreds and thousands of books published in Calcutta written by Hindus, injecting hatred in the Bengali youth against West
Pakistan Even the word ‘Bangladesh’ was first used by a novelist ‘Bimal Mitra’, whose novels enjoyed immense popularity among the Bengali youth 221 .The
educational institutions in East Bengal provided the Elindu teachers and professors another platform to indoctrinate tire Bengali youth with their rebellious
views. The Hindu teachers and instructors played a leading and a vital role in poisoning the East Pakistani youth against the central government. Most of the
books recommended by the Elindu teachers were against the ideology of Pakistan. Instead of Jirmah’s photograph, the images ofNehru and Gandhi were
displayed in the educational institutions 222 . The Congress leaders were idealized by the Bengali students due to the teachings of their Hindu teachers.
Particularly, Dacca University was the centre of such indoctrination For instance, in the context of the language issue, the Hindu instructors and professors
told their students that,

‘ If they [Bengalis] allow a little ground in the matter of language, the Urdu speaking non-Bengalis would iisuip their rights straight away, and rule
over East Pakistan as a colony ’ 223 .

2111 For details, see Article by Masud Mufti, former Education Secretary of East Pakistan, Urdu Digest(Monthly), December 1974, p.35.

— f! Matinuddin, [ 1 . Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p.285

221 Maswani, A.M.K Subversion in East Pakistan, Amir Publications, Lahore, 1 979, p. 110.

222 Mehmood,Safdar, Pakistan Divided, Ferozsons I id. Lahore, 1984p. 7.

223 Maswani, A.M.K Subversion in East Pakistan, Amir Publications, Lahore, 1979,p. 110.

Such a level ofpropagpnda indicates that the Indian government was quick enough to infiltrate in the Pakistani society. Without having any effective means, the
government of East Pakistan was unable to halt such views and propagpnda. Consequently, the toxic ideas implanted by the Indian government and the local
Hindus, gradually started to hann the unity of Pakistan The negligence of the central government further encouraged the propagandist India to launch more
effective campaigns targeting the integrity and notion of a united Pakistan

The international media, influenced by the Indian gpvemment and the Indian media, published the Indian concocted ideas of the suppression of the people of
East Pakistan To demonstrate, the stories carried out by the BBC were misrepresented in such a manner that people aware of the reality nicknamed it as the
‘ Bharat Broadcasting Corporation ’ 224 . The international print media was also highlighting only the lialf- truths. It presented fabricated stories blaming the
Pakistani forces for instigating barbaric killings. The Indian news agencies to strengthen the Indian baseless propaganda, provided biased reports to the
foreign-owned new agencies. The Indian gpvemment would arrange visits of international news reporters to the refiigpe camps or^nized by the Indian
government. These refugee camps were exclusively set-up to legitimize the Indian claims and propaganda. Maharaj Krishan Rasgptra (Indian Ambassador in
Washington) wrote two books known as the Green and Red books and published them in USA. These books were distributed widely to students, the press,
and the US congress. He also convinced forty US senators to visit the refugee camps in India. These senators visited the refiigee camps and returned
staunchly endorsing the Indian stance. Likewise, almost all of Indian foreign diplomatic missions were given the same task to propagate the Indian stance. In
response to the Indian and foreign propaganda, Pakistan’s leading newspapers such as Dawn , Jang (Urdu newspaper), and the Pakistan Observer were
presented a totally different story. The masses in West Pakistan were kept in dark and only the news of Pakistan army’s battles and victories were highlighted.
But, they Med to accentuate the atrocities of tire Mukti Bahini, unable to counter the Indian genocidal rhetoric.

223 WilliamEF. Rushbrook, The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd. London 1972, p. 82

AH in all, the Indian media vigorously propagsted her case against the unity of Pakistan by circulating baseless and fictional stories to raise ethnic confrontation
in Pakistan. The Indian propaganda succeeded in seeding and promoting the sentiments of separatism and regionalism, which in the future, provided the base
for tire creation of Bangladesh The Indian media was equally supported by the anti-state elements in East Pakistan in her campaign against Pakistan’s unity.
The role of the international media in support of India also played a vital role in the disintegration of Pakistan The support of the international media supported
the Indian propaganda. Thus, through her newspapers, books, radio broadcasting and effective use of the diplomatic channels, India accomplished success in
fertilizing the ground for statutory intervention in East Pakistan To sum up, General Tikka Khan was accurately in his remarks on Indian propaganda in his
interview with The Newsweek of 1 0 th April 1 972 when he said: ‘to this day the world still believes we started everything. This is a complete distortion
of history . . . Mijib wanted a showdown. During the stnrggle that followed, the Bengalis exaggerated their causalities by a thousand percent or
more. Mujib says there were 200,000 rapes. A Roman Catholic organization, which the press has chosen not to quote, comes up with a figure of
4, 000. We hcn’e been the victims of a propaganda machine ’225 .

 

The Political Landscape

 

Hie Indian interference in the political landscape of East Pakistan was another important source of generating confrontation between East and West Pakistan
Mujib ’s intentions for the disintegration of Pakistan emerged soon after the establishment of Pakistan This reality was endorsed by Syed Badrul Ahsan
(leading Bangladeshi intellectual) in an article published on 1 5 th August 2014. He writes,

“ Tire irony in the Mujib story is that having come into politics, like thousands of others, on the bandwagon of Mislim League politics in the 1940s;
he quickly determined that he did not need to be like the others. Within a year of the establishment of Pakistan, he knew that the new state was a
threat to Bengali ’226 .

223 General Tikka Khan’s Interview, The Newsweek, 10 April 1972.

226 226 a Nations ’s Nadir, Dhakkacourier, https://www.highbeamcom , doc/lP3-3404866491.html 15 August 2014, accessed on 21 April, 2016
Likewise, in another article published earlier in the Daily Star on 14 th August 2012, he stated that,

‘ sometime in the later part of the 1950s, Sheikh Mijib, then a young politician, threw a question at the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Huseyn

 

Shaheed Suhrawardy (Suhrawardy was from East Pakistan). He asked, “Is it not possible for East Pakistan to become independent someday? ” In
a state of disbelief the Prime Minister admonished Mujib, saying, “Do not ever entertain such thoughts. Pakistan has been achieved at a huge cost
and its unity needs to be presetted”. Mujib murmured, almost muttered: “We shall do our job when the time comes ’227 .

Mujib’s approach was wholeheartedly endorsed by the Indians. The initial Indian involvement in East Pakistan started in 1963. The Indians, reaping the
benefits of the propaganda of economic disparity, pursued the disgruntled Bengali servicemen and established contacts with them After gaining initial support,
they encouraggd the Bengali servicemen to set up contacts to widen their network for starting a revolutionary movement. The most successful contact
established was with Mujib, which was sustained by his frequent meeting? with the Indian officials. Mr K. Subramanyam accepted that Mujib had regular
meeting? with Indira Gandhi 228 . One of such meeting was held at Agartala (Indian town) which in history is famous because of the Agartala Conspiracy case.

 

Agartala Conspiracy

 

It was July 1 966, when the counter intelligence section of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate of Pakistan through one of its sources came to know
that an organization lias been created and was assigned to separate East Pakistan from West Pakistan The head of the counter intelligence. Lieutenant
Colonel Muhammad Amir Khan (a Bengali citizen of East Pakistan), was flabbergasted when he leamt that Lieutenant Commander Muazzam Hussein
(Pakistan Navy) and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman were the key participants of the newly- fonned organization 229 . Therefore, Colonel Amir continued to follow-
up the lead with several trips to East Pakistan Eventually, he succeeded in seeking out a tape of a conversation between the suspected persons. He also
noted that frequent meeting? between the Indian High Commission officials and the Awarni League leadership were taking place at Agprtala230 . The
occurrence of such covert meeting? was admitted by both Muj ib and the Indian authorities after the creation of Bangladesli23 1 . Such meeting? were taking
place since 1962. To illustrate, Subir Bbaumik in his book The Agartala Doctrine asserts that,

— 1 Ahsan Syed Badrul, Image of the Father, Daily Star,

http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print_news ,php?nid=246146 15 August, 2012 accessed on 21 April,2016.

•yyo 990

Interview, K. Subramanyan; Indian Council of World Affairs, Symposium31 March, 1971. Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kama! The Tragedy ofGreat Errors: East Pakistan

Crisis 1968-1971, p.276-277

‘ An entry in the diary of the late Smarajit Choudhaty, then the sub divisional officer of Khowai, is perhaps the only document cn’ailable that helps
us to establish the date and time of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib-urRehman 5 visit to Agartala. The diary’ entry’ dated Monday’, 5 th February 1962
says: Today at about 1300 hrs, M- Mujib-ur-Rehman, Amir Hussain and T. Choudhaty arrived through Asharambari. They have been sent to
Teliamura under an instruction from District Magistrate. From Teliamura, Mijib and two of his associates were driven to Agartala in two jeeps by
Umesh Chandra Singha, brother of CM Schindralal Singha ’ 232 .

The Indians assured the members of the Awami League and the disgruntled elements of the armed forces that India would provide the needed arms and
ammunitions for their struggle against united Pakistan Such promises were made by Mr P. N. Ojba in September 1966233 . Thereafter, a meeting was fixed
on 1 2th July 1 967 in which members of the Indian intelligence and conspirators from East Pakistan met at Agartala for talks on Indian military aid. Meanwhile,
after gathering insightful infonnation about these meeting?, tire Ayub regime ordered the apprehending of all those involved directly. Consequently, forty- six
East Pakistanis were held on the charges of antistate activities and planning for East Pakistan’ s secession. The East Pakistani press lambasted the plotters and
demanded punishment for them The real trouble started after Mujib’s name was included as an accomplice. Subsequent to this claim, the press of East
Pakistan asked for open trials. The Awami League went for strikes and instigated students to hold demonstrations against tire inclusion of then’ leader’s name.
Mujib’s popularity at that time can be gauged by looking at the number of protestors. Safdar Mahmood n his book Pakistan Divided writes that, ‘ the
demonstration was not joined by more than 150 students. It seemed that the reaction was not as expected ’234 . Although, Mujib’s popularity
dwindled after his involvement in the Agartala Case, but the unfortunate mishandling of tire Agartala case by the Ayub’s government generated sympathizers
for Mujib which allowed his group of traitors to grow gradually. The political chaos and uprising against Ayub’s regime in late 1 965 diverted the government’s
attention away from Mujib. In the whole month of January 1969, demonstrations were staged in East Pakistan against Mujib’s arrest.

230 Ibid.

23 * Rose,Sission Richard and Leo E., War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, Berkely,LA,1990p.42.

232 Bhaumik, Subir, The Agartala Doctrine. Oxford University Press, NewDelhi,2016,p,13.

233 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kama! The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p278.

An important aspect of the Agartala case has always been kept in dark. It has been an established fact that the prosecution had strong evidences against the
accused. For instance, the confession statements of Lt Muzamil Hussain, Mirza Mohammad Rameez, Seraj-elalslam and Ameer Hussain Miy’a were
enough to charge Mujib and others for treason. One such confession of Lt Muzamil Hussain submitted to the court was:

‘ lam from Memon singh and was recruited in Navy in 1944. 1 myself confess without any torture that I along with my comrades had done many
meetings for the liberation of East Pakistan. During these meetings it was decided that for economic prosperity of East Pakistan, it has to be
separated from West Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman assured us of all kinds of support and that including economic aid ”235 . Similarly, another
confession statement made by Ameer Hussain Miya stated: A meeting took place in March 1966 in which Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and Lt Muazzim
Hussein along with others were present. Miazzim Hussein briefed us that after receiving weapons from India the operation would be storied and
the general public would support our mission. He also said that nothing would satisfy’ us other than the Independence of Bangladesh 236 .

Despite having concrete evidence against Mujib and other accused, the government mishandled the case and had to withdraw the treason case against Mujib.
Ayub Khan’s strong desire for re- election and the lethargic approach of the state institutions, eventually made Mujib a free mail Eventually, the Ayub
government made Mujib a hero out of his treacherous conduct. Accordingly, opined by Abdul Hafeez Kardar (Prominent PPP Leader) ‘Ayub made a
martyr of Mijib by insinuating the Agartala conspiracy’ ’237 . The Agartala case actually increased Mujib’s popularity. After gaining the required
popularity Mujib-led Awami League entered the General election of 1970.

233 Mehmood, Safdar, Pakistan Divided,FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984,p.48.

235 Translated from Rana Rehman Zafar, “Mashriqi Pakistani ke aledagee ke Dardnaak kahani”, Asian Publishers Lahore, 1974, p. 50.

236 Ibid, p.51-52

 

General Elections 1970 and its Aftermath: (India backed Campaign of Awami League)

 

The Awami league entered die election campaign of 1 970 on the basis of spreading hatred against West Pakistan Exploiting the economic grievances of die
Bengali populace, Mujib made West Pakistan the sole author of every wrong in East Pakistan In his speeches, Mujib lambasted die central government being
a tool for East Pakistan’s exploitation He would blame West Pakistan for robbing East Pakistan of her capital, foreign exchange, and economic progress. He
spoke the same language, which was being used in the Indian newspapers, and thus provided legitimacy to India’s baseless claims.

The Awami League organized its party workers from early 1970 and under the leadership ofMujib; the party covered almost all of the East Pakistan and
poisoned the simple Bengali people in considering West Pakistan is their sole enemy. The whole campaign ofMujib resembled die Indian campaign against
Pakistan. He convinced his listeners to believe tiiat only he and his party could end their economic marginalization. He claimed that his six points are the only
solution for East Pakistan’s problems. Another important aspect of Mujib’s election campaign has always been neglected; the sources of finance for the
election campaign of the Awami league. His and his party leaders’ extensive travelling, propaganda campaign, payment to party supporters, etc., in lact the
whole election campaign was quite expensive. Most of the finances for Mujib’s campaign were from the Hindu community who had direct links with the Indian
establishments .

222 Kardar, Abdul Hafeez, Pakistan’s Soldiers of Fortune, Ferozsons Ltd, Lahore, 1988, p. 133.

222 WilliamLF. Rushbrook., The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd, London
1972, p.44.

The elections were scheduled in October 1 970, but a disastrous flood struck East Pakistan in September. The flood resulted in the displacement of millions of
people and disruption of the communication means. The Awani League leadership exploited the situation and provoked the Bengali sentiments further, against
the central government. Mujib travelled the affected areas and led a hatred campaign against West Pakistan. The election atmosphere was marked by the
slogans of regionalism and nationalism The presence of the political bigotry in teirns of regionalism may be seen by the feet that, only eight candidates were
nominated by the Awami league in West Pakistan, whereas, from the Bhutto- led PPP no tickets were awarded to any candidates in East Pakistan.

Anid regionalism, hatred for West Pakistan and natural disasters, Pakistan went to polls on 7 th December 1970. The Awami League scored a convincing
victory in East Pakistan, by securingl 60 out of 1 62 reserved seats for East Pakistan. While PPP managed to get 8 1 seats against the 1 3 8 allocated seats for
West Pakistan. Here, an analysis of the election results, provided by Safdar Mehmood in his book, Pakistan Divided would reveal the popularity of Mujib’s
mandate. He writes,

‘According to the announcement of the Election Commission, 5 7% of the total enrolled voters actually participated in the polls and the Awami
league secured 75% of the votes cast. In other words, the Awami league secured 42%> of the total registered votes, out of which the Hindus
constituted 15% of the total and, it ’s belie\’ed, Hindu voted for the Awami League. If the number of bogus votes is placed at 10% which is a very
reasonable figure, the Awami League secured only 17%>of the Muslim votes in East Pakistan. Moreover, it is also beyond doubt that a very great
majority of the Muslims in East Pakistan did not participate in the polls .

The statistics of the election results demonstrate vividly that tire majority of Muslims in East Pakistan were not supporting the mandate of the Awami League.
As such, an important role was played by the Hindu community in Mujib’s victory. The majority ofthe Hindu community had contacts with their counterparts
in Calcutta. Therefore, the Indian influence, in the shape of the Hindu support ofMujib, demonstrates that the Indians covertly funded the Awami League
election campaign and also influenced the election results. Although, the election of 1970 were considered as free and feir, there were reports ofa mass
rigging taking place particularly in East Pakistan To illustrate, a large numbers of the registered voters in East Pakistan had reportedly confessed that their
votes were cast even before they could reach the polling station240 . Apart from the actual rigging by the Awami League volunteers, violence was also used as
a tool to get more support. Pressure of every kind was exerted by the fanatic volunteers of the Awami League. The situation reported after the elections
proves that, organized violent campaigns were led by the Awami League volunteers to terrorize the common people. Moreover, those who rejected Mujib’s
mandate were targeted, murdered, and looted in the riots and killings of early 1971 241 .

22 ® Mehmood, Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984,p,90.

Since the landslide victory of the Awami League was not even expected by its leadership, Mujib became more rigid with arrogance and confidence. The post-
election scenario further deteriorated when power struggle surfaced between Mujib and Bhutto. The central government, led by President Yahya tried its best
to reach a conclusive decision, but a decision could not be reached owing to the rigidity of both Mujib and Bhutto. Mujib was invited to West Pakistan on
several occasions to settle the ongoing power crisis, to which he refused. His rigid response made President Yahya visit East Pakistan himself Even Bhutto
along with other West Pakistani leadership visited East Pakistan for settling the power issue. However, owing to Mujib’s uncompromising attitude, the efforts
and visits made by the West Pakistani leadership remained futile. Indira Gandhi meanwhile shrewdly exploited the political crisis by using her diplomatic
channels. In order to get the support of the Western democratic regimes, she propagated that the military regime in Pakistan is not ready to transfer power to
the elected parties 242 . The Pakistani government, indulged in the ongoing power race remained unable to counter such Indian propaganda.

FromMujib’s inflexible attitude, it looked like he was following a certain script. He was so rigid with his six-point demand that he sent a message to President
Yahya that if the six points were not accepted entirely ‘ rivers of blood will flow ~ 43 . And his claim proved to be true as he made blood flow in the streets of
Dacca after President Yahya postponed the National Asserrbly session in early Marchl 97 1 .

240 Ibid,

241 WilliamLF. Rushbrook. The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd, London 1972,p 45.

242 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, p.296

Indian flight Hijacking Drama

 

On 30 th January 1 971 , an Indian Fokker friendship aircraft made an emergency landing at the Lahore airport. Following the landing, it was declared that the
plane has been hijacked by two Kashmiris for registering their outrage against the Indian-backed Kashmiri government. Consequently, breaching the ICAO
(International Civil Aviation Organization) rules and convention, India on 2 February 1971 banned Pakistani civil and military flights over the Indian Territory

 

lying between West and East Pakistan. The Indian media and politicians accused the Pakistani government for engineering the incident. Later it was learnt that
it was, in tact, an Indian engineered hijacking which was blamed on Pakistan. The case took an interesting turn when a letter from Sheikh Abdullah, a
prominent Kashmiri leader, to Mr JayaPrakashNarayan, Indian humanist, was published in the Indian Express on 15th February 1971. In the letter Sheikh
Abdullah clearly accused Hashim (the prime suspect in the hijacking) being an Indian agent and mentioned that his plan and activities were entirely
collaborated with the Indian authorities in New Delhi and Srinagar244 . In light of this letter, the Pakistani government formed a judicial commission under Mr
Justice NoorulArfin. The inquiry commission presented its report on 15th April 1971 (Annexure-7) . After thorough examinations of tire incident, the
Commission reportedly found that the principal accused, Hashim had continuous contacts with and was being supervised by the Indian Intelligence agencies.
Furthermore, the anns consisting of a revolver and a grenade which were used in the hijacking were dummies. The Commission concluded that the whole
incident was an Indian engineered activity to disrupt the air comminication between West and East Pakistan, amid the political crisis in the central government
245 . Another confirmation of the Indian engineered hijacking drama came from R. K. Yadav, former R&AW Officer’s book Mission R&A W where he
confessed that,

242 William,LF. Rnshbrook. The East Pakistan Tragedy, Tom Stacey Ltd, London
1972, p.48.

244 Ibid, p. 52.

245 For details see: Findings of Judicial enquiry commission on “Fhjacking of Indian plane to Lahore”,April 20,1971

‘On January > 30, 1971 Hashim Onreshi along with another operative Ashraf Qureshi, his relative was allowed to hijack a Fokker Friendship plane,
Ganga of Indian Airlines with 26 passengers on board from Srinagar aiiport, and to force Captain Kachru, the pilot of the plane, to take the plane
to Lahore aiiport. R&A W allowed him to cany a grenade and a toy pistol inside the plane ’246 .

 

Refugee Conundrum and Indian Propaganda: (The Mystery of the East Pakistan Refugees)

 

The Indian establishment launched another propaganda campaign by establishing refugee camps in West Bengal after the military operation in East Pakistan.
On 25 th March 1 97 1 , the central government in Pakistan called for a military operation to control the ongoing riots and chaos initiated by the militant wing of
the Awani League. India had created the refugee camps in areas bordering East Pakistan to achieve her nefarious plans. These refugee camps were utilized to
attract international support and to provide legitimacy to the Indian interference in East Pakistan. The refugee card was widely used by the Indian media to
provide a humanistic shield to her vicious aims. Furthermore, these refugee camps were also used as military training camps, where the Indian military trained
and armed the militants of Mujib. A resolution was passed in the Indian parliament on 27th March 197 1 which assured the Indian support and sympathy to
the militants of the Awani League247 . By the resolution and the directives of Indira Gandhi, the Indian borders were opened. Kuldip Nayar, a prominent
Indian journalist, noted in his book Distant Neighbours, remarked that,

‘ Eighty five percent of those Bengalis who left East Pakistan were Hindus who would have gone away to West Bengal after partition in 1947 in
any case ’ 24S . Additionally, the Hindu- Muslim ratio of refugees was 8020, Hhidu being 80 per cent and Muslins 20 per cent 249 . Such figures demonstrate
that even the so-called refugees that crossed the Indian border were actually Hindus, who were against the creation of Pakistan since Partition Leading her
propaganda campaign, Indira Gandhi on 14 th May 1 97 1 practically wrote to all the heads of governments and the head of states to pressurize Pakistan250 .
After establishing the refugee camps, Indira Gandhi directed all her foreign missions for propagating the Indian cause. In the coming months, the Indian foreign
missions launched a well- crafted diplomatic mission to peruse the international community against the central government of Pakistan. Special Indian
representatives and ministers travelled to the capitals of West and East Asia, Europe, America, and Northern Africa. Swaran Singh, the then foreign minister,
made visits to major capitals, including Moscow, Washington, Ottawa, Paris, Bonn, and London. Apart from diplomats, human right activists and civil society
representatives such as Jayaparkash Narayan, were also dispatched to the world’s major capitals to mould the public opinion Their aim was not to generate
help and assistance for refugees but they were actually directed to build public awareness and were made to pressurize their host gpvemments to endorse the
Indian approach. In this whole campaign, India presented herself as an unselfish, humanitarian power. Similarly, numerous visits of the foreign delegations,
parliamentarians, journalists, and government officials were airanged to the refugee camps. Unaware of the normal low living standards in parts of the
subcontinent and particularly in the rural areas of Bengal, the foreign delegates had a devastating experience. Consequently, all these visitors concluded that
they must pressurize their gpvemments to build economic, political, and moral pressure on government of Pakistan. The Democratic Party in the United States
called for the termination of all aid to Pakistan, and the Canadian government’s attitude in her aid to Pakistan also changed accordingly 251 . Another important
aspect of the Indian policy toward these refugee carrps also demonstrates her conspiracy behind the installation of these camps.

2411 Yadav RK, Mission R&AW Voll, Manas Publications, New Dehli, 2014, p.228.

247 Salik Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1978, p. 97.

24 * Nayar, Kuldip, Distant Neighbors, Vikas publication house, New Dehli p. 155

249 Srinath Raghavan,1971 A Global Flistory of the Creation of Bangladesh Harvard University Press, London 2013, p.76

An important question on the Indian policy towards the Bengali refugees arises that, if the Indian headache was the refugee conundrum, then why the Indian
government did not permit Prince Aga Khan, tire United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to visit these camps in order to assess the help India
required? On what logical grounds the Indian foreign Secretary T. K. Kaul told the United States on 1 6 th July 1 97 1 that, ‘ India would not accept UN
personnel on its side of the border even to handle refugees ’ 252 . The answer can be found in the same speech where he clearly mentions that these
camps were actually the centre for guerrilla training camps and used for organizing the militants and terrorists of Mukti Bahinis against the Pakistan army. He
stated, ‘India would not accept any proposal which would curb guenilla activity from its teniloty ’ 253 . Such a blunt confession by the Indian Foreign
Secretary exposes how India constructed the humanitarian crisis of refugees to alter world opinion against Pakistan. It not only stopped the UN ’ s way to
reach these camps but World Health Organization (WHO) was also not pennitted to reach these camps. The Indian Parliamentarian from Alipore Shri Indraji
Gupta, remarked in the Lok Sabha, the Indian parliament, ‘ that relief goods coming from Denmark, Canada and UN were not being cleared from Dum
Dum airport, Calcutta ’ 254 . The Indian aims were not to accommodate the so-caled refugees but in feet she used this as a trump card to gamer
international sipport and to clear her way for a military intervention The Pakistani government even approached the Indian government in November 1971 to
solve the entire East Pakistan issue including the return of the refugees255 , but the rigid Indian posture was to accept nothing short of the dismemberment of
Pakistan. The Indian government propagated in tire refugee camps that it will be a life-threatening risk to return. And if anybody tried to go, they were forcibly
stopped. Many returnees reported that Indian forces had opened fire on their caravans256 . Even Indira Gandhi openly confessed in a television interview to a
French television on 8 November 1971; she remarked, ‘ Independence of Bangladesh. Free Bangladesh was inevitable. . . . India would not pemit the
return of Refugees until Sheikh Mujib was released ’ 257 .

 

250 Ibid, p.77

– s 1 WilliamLF. Rushbrook. The East Pakistan Tragedy, TomStacey Ltd, London 1972,p
48.

252 Dr Henry Kissinger, White House years, Little Brown and Company, Boston USA,

1979,p.863.

253 Ibid.

23 ^ 2 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt)Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis 1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p. 82.

255 Ibid

236 Mehmood.Safdar, Pakistan Divided,FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984,pl48
257 Ibid.pg 148

To conclude, the refugee conundrum was a mere Indian construct, to win over the international support and to organize the Mukti Bahini to effectively carry
out terrorist activities in East Pakistan.

India in Search of Allies (lndo-USSR friendship treaty August 1971)

Amid the Cold War, the bipartite international political stage was led by two super powers- the US and the USSR. The global politics revolved around the
policies of both these mighty superpowers. India aiming for military intervention in East Pakistan searched for ales to isolate Pakistan. She approached almost
all the major capitals to pursue their governments to support the Indian policies. Through her diplomatic channels, she tried to isolate Pakistan, and when die
National Asseirbly session was postponed by President Yahya, India launched her diplomatic offensive specifically in the West. Indian diplomats exploited
the political chaos in Pakistan, by presenting it as a deliberate postponement by the military regime ofPresident Yahya. In October and November 1971,
Indira Gandhi visited USA and twelve other western capitals to win over their governments, and to portray Pakistan as a colonial state258 . Exploiting the
miseries of refugees generated by her own government, she also portrayed the Pakistani government as an inhuman and atrocious government. The real aim
was to generate support for her upcoming military adventurism The obstacles in her way were Pakistan’s relationship with China and USA To neutralize die
Chinese threat, India exploited the already deteriorating relationship between China and USSRin 1971, and in no time reached out to USSR. Consequently, a
treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation was signed on 7 th August 1971 (Annexure-6) . Aticle IX of the treaty stated,

‘ Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the
other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof the high contracting Parties shall immediately enter into
mutual consultation in order to remove such threats and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries
’259 .

25 ® Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p.297.

259 See the Annexure 6 treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between the republic of India and the union of soviet socialist republics.

The above-mentioned article clearly defines the scope of the treaty which basically encouragpd India to advance her military adventurisms agpinst Pakistan.
The Indian diplomatic campaign had succeeded in shape ofthe lndo-USSR treaty and it also enabled her to acquire military aid, support and backing in the
United Nation Security Council and most importantly she acquired the Soviet guarantee to intervene if China intervened on Pakistan’s behalf Furthermore, the
treaty made it clear to deter any sort of war against India.

 

R&AWin East Pakistan (The Creation ofthe Mukti Bahini)

 

In 1968, the Indian establishment fonned R&AW- the Research and Analysis Wing to initiate a covert operation for Pakistan’s dismeirbennent. Babukutunbi
Raman- fonner head ofthe counterterrorism division of R&AW in his book, ‘The Kaoboys of R&AW ’, confessed that,

The late Rameshwar Nath Kao, who heads the external intelligence division of the IB, was appointed by Indira Gandhi as the head of the R&A W,

‘ when it was formed on 21st September, 1968. In the first few months after its formation, he gave it two priority tasks; to strengthen its capability
for the collection of intelligence about Pakistan and China and for covert actions in East Pakistan ’260 .

Thus, the Indian military started its campaign for the installation of a paramilitary force in 1968. The first task was to build a network in East Pakistan
Therefore, the Indian were quick in forming a network of relationships with the Bengali political leaders and government officials in East Pakistan According
to B. Raman, the R&AW’s operations were five fold.

‘ Provision of intelligence to the policy makers and the armed forces; to train the Bengali freedom fighters in clandestine training camps; to
network with Bengali public servant from East Pakistan posted in West Pakistan and in Pakistan ’s diplomatic missions abroad and persuade them
to co-operate with the freedom-fighters and to help in the freedom stniggle by providing intelligence; to mount a special operation in the CHT
against the sanctuaries and training camps of the Naga and Mzo hostiles; and to organize a psychological warfare campaign against the Pakistani
rulers by disseminating reports about the massacres of the Bengalis in Pakistan and the exodus of refugees ’ 261 .

2 ®* I i. Raman The kaoboys of R&AW .Lancer Publishers and Distributors, New Dehli,2013.

The blunt confession made by B. Raman clearly demonstrates the level of involvement of India in tire dismeirbennent of Pakistan The foremost job of
R&AW was the installation ofthe Mukti Babinis. With Indian assistance the militant wing ofthe Awami League later known as the Mukti Bahini was
established in July 1970. It was then a terrorizing force that forced people to support the Awami League in the elections of 1970262 . After the session of
National Assembly was postponed in March 1971, the Awami League conveyed to R&AW their need for ammunition for creating chaos. It called for
mortal’s and machine guns, medicine, 3 million tons of food supplies, transportation, and comnunication equipment for collaboration and quick movement
within India. It also asked for a helicopter, a small passenger aircraft, and a radio transmitter for broadcasting purposes 263 . As accepted by Brigadier Jagdev
Singh, ‘ The resistance needed planning weapons training, and leadership and only India could provide them ’ 264 . Therefore, a full-scale training
campaign was launched. Initially, six training camps were set-up in India. Each camp was under the command of an Indian Brigsdier 265 . In these training
camps, the militants of Mukti Bahini were provided anns and ammunition and were trained for guenilla activities. In die first phase, Indian forces trained these

 

militants to create chaos in East Pakistan and to engage the Pakistani amry in East Pakistan; the second phase was the Indian intervention which she carried
out at the later stagp. The extremists ofMukti Bahini entered in East Bengal after getting initial training and thus a reign of terror was unleashed. The extremists
launched a massive gpnocidal campaign. Their indiscriminate killings carqpaign was overtly and covertly supported by the Indian establishment. The detail
account of this atrocious reign of terror collectively led by tire Mukti Bahini and India would be discussed in the next chapter.

261 Ibid.

– i) – Afrasiab, 1971: Fact and Fiction. Lahore: Makhdoom Printing Press (Pvt) Ltd, 2015, p. 77.

Srinath Raghavan, “1971-A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh” Harvard University Press London, 2013, p.57-58
Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p. 230.

265 Ibid.

Conclusion

To conclude, India Mowed a multi- prong grand strategy to dismenirer Pakistan in 1971. She utilized tire political, economic, social, and geographical gap
between East and West Pakistan to materialize her ancestral dream of Pakistan’s dismenirenirent. India engineered the whole process of creation of
Bangladesh By getting support from the anti- state elements of East Bengal, India succeeded in dismerrbering Pakistan Today, it has been almost forty- five
years that India created her illegitimate progeny, but the wounds in the hearts of Pakistanis remain fresh The contemporary policies of expansionist India are
identical to her past polices. She is still interfering in tire internal affairs of almost al her neighbours. In case of Pakistan, Balochistan and Karachi remain tire
main areas susceptible to Indian influence. The confessions of Kulbhushan Yadav (a serving R&AW agent, arrested by Pakistani forces in Balochistan on 24th
March 2016) clearly demonstrate tire Indian involvement in Pakistan Tie confessed,

‘ I was picked up by R&A W in 2013. Ever since I have been directing various activities in Balochistan and Karachi at the behest of R&A W and
deteriorating law and order situation in Karachi . . . My puipose was to hold meetings with Baloch insurgents and cany out activities with their
collaboration These activities have been of criminal nature, leading to killing or maiming of Pakistani citizens ’ 266 .

The Indian polices in Balochistan are very much identical to her polices in Bangladesh To illustrate, in Bangladesh, India erqploited the ethnic gulf which she is
repeating in Balochistan Similarly, India financed the separatist’s movement in East Bengal and currently is doing the same in the case of Balochistan
Furthermore, India trained and organized Bengalis and Mukti Bahinis to launch guerrilla operations. She is following the same policy hr Balochistan, by
liaisoning with the Baloch militant organizations. As such the Indian polices remain the same. It’s not only Pakistan where India is promoting insurgencies in
tact, the India’s similar involvement in the whole region of South Asia is an open secret.

2 ^6 For detail see “Transcript of RAW agent Kulbhushan’s confessional statement’ Published in Dawn March 30, 2016.

 

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A

t the end ofAyub Khan’s regime in early 1969, the assumption ofauthority by Yahya Khan only represented tire replacement of one authoritarian rule by
another. Yahya Khan’s

role in politics was complicated. He maintained that he did not want
to keep power, yet manipulated in a manner to sustain his power. He
recognized the necessity ofboth politics and politicians, and decided
to play the role of an arbitrator among the conflicting political
groups.

Yahya Khan felt that none of the political parties would be able
to win a clear-cut majority in the National Assembly, if elections were
held. He felt Iris military regime could play the role of the power
broker and stay in power. To his surprise and the surprise of major
ruling elites, apart from the Punjab, the choice of the people of the
provinces in the elections was based on their ethnic or regional
interests. This was the first time that almost all mainstream parties
were regionalized. Both East and West Pakistan had acquired leaders
of their own, while their very different mandates had been apparently
legitimized by the people through their votes.

The two main political players of 1971, Mujib and Bhutto, had
two opposing viewpoints. Mujib wanted autonomy for East Pakistan,
while Bhutto wanted the restoration of civilian rule and the
restructuring of the economy on socialist lines. Both of them
succeeded on the basis of negative appeals to the illiterate voters of
Pakistan, one by whipping up negative feelings against the Punjabi
domination, and the other by exploiting the demands brought to the

surface, during the mass movement of 1968-69 for social reforms. 267 Neither had a constructive or a positive approach, nor they wanted to share power,
making their political collision inevitable. Adding the Indian ill- intentions in the mix, it became the perfect recipe for creating a chaos, incurring major losses.
The predicted catastrophe occurred with the 1970 elections, bringing the leadership of East and West Pakistan in a head on collision, resulting in the ultimate
culmination of the dismemberment of Pakistan

7f)7 Jahan R, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, 1972, p. 189-190

The Elections of 1970 and their Aftermath

Ayub ’s fall and the rise of Yahya

 

Earlier, when President Ayub Khan had begun to make preparations for the coming Presidential election in 1 969, the majority of the opposition parties,
including Mujib’s Awami League in East Pakistan, decided to boycott it. Bhutto’s Peoples Party, since late 1 967, had been stirring anti- Ayub sentiments in
West Pakistan turning the anti- Ayub climate into a mass movement.

In a last bid to save his rule, Ayub had convened a Round Table Conference in which all major political parties, except the PPP and the NAP (Bhashani
Group), were represented under the forum of a grand alliance of the Democratic Action C ommittee (DAC) opposing the Ayub regime. Bhutto did not
participate in the C onferenee as he did not see any benefit in compromising with Ayub, while Bhashani preferred gping to the masses. 268

 

 

Mujib proposed a fonruk for the resolution of the crisis, which included the proportional representation for East Pakistan, shifting of the capital to Dacca, the
abolition of One Unit, direct elections on the basis of universal suffrage, and a parliamentary form of government. Ayub Khan showed his willingness to accept
all other demands ofDAC, except the alteration of the federal structure of the country. However, the DAC lost its legitimacy in the eyes ofthe masses in
favour of the two non-participants, Bhutto andBbasbani, as well as Mujib, who soon pulled out ofthe DAC, and was thus saved from the mass accusation of
being a sell-out. 269 Consequently, the political situation of tire country took a more violent turn.

2 ® Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, NIPS, 1972-1988, pp73 269 M. Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, NIHCR, 1994, pp 222

The anti- Ayub mass movement continued vigorously for over lour months, and violence erupted in East Pakistan. 270 The government machinery Med
miserably to suppress the uprising in the province, and Ayub finally, realized the separatist dimensions ofthe movement. The final phase ofthe mass movement
reached its climax with the arrest of many political leaders including Bhutto and NAP’s Wali Khan. Ayub Khan had no alternative but to turn to the army to
restore law and order, but the chiefs were unwilling to support an ‘unpopular’ president. Ultimately, on 25th March 1969, Ayub resigned as a president, but
instead of transferring power under the Constitution to the speaker of the National Assembly, Ayub Khan handed over the power to General Yahya Khan, by
appointing him as the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).

 

Elections for the People

On assuming power, General Yahya Khan set upon conducting elections as soon as possible. The elections were originally scheduled for October 1970, but
the devastating cyclone in East Pakistan upset the plans. The natural calamity was one of tire worst in tire history of the world and killed, according to the
official estimates, over 200,000 people. According to unofficial sources, about one million people died. It affected over three million people and destroyed 90
per cent of the crops and houses hr a 3,000 square mile area. 27 1 The Awami League fully exploited this calamity to prove that East Pakistan had been treated
unjustly by the central administration One grievance put forward was that no warning had been issued in these areas, although there was a storm warning
system in East Pakistan Further allegffiions of slow and inadequate response and relief operation were extended, emulsifying the smouldering Bengali angpr to
an outrage. Tire majority of the politicians from East Pakistan openly accused West Pakistanis of undisguised hostility. According to Mujib, ‘A million people
had died in the cyclone, and another million would lay down their lives willingly to thwart a conspiracy against Bengalis by bureaucrats, vested
interests, the ruling clique and a coterie of old politicians. ’ 272

276 Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Macmillan, 1976, p. 209

271 271

1971, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 265.

272 The Guardian, November 27, 1970

The deteriorating political situation forced tire government of Pakistan to announce a new date for the elections. According to the new schedule, the elections
to the National and Provincial Assemblies were to be held on 7th and 1 7th December 1970, respectively.273 As it was the main demand of most of the
political parties, all of them decided to participate in the elections. However, when nominations for the elections to the National Assembly were received, it
became obvious that there was no possibility of any party securing an overall majority in the Centre, based on the national territorial status.

For the 300 National Assembly seats, there were almost 1,957 candidates. However, after the rejection and withdrawal ofthe nomination papers, 1,579
candidates (including 3 19 independent candidates) were left in the field. For East Pakistan’s Provincial Assembly, 1,850 candidates, and for West Pakistan,
1,385 candidates from different political parties and groups, with conflicting ideologies, were left to take part in the elections.

The following table shows how each party approached the elections based on the territories of East and West Pakistan: 274 Table 1
Candidates of Major Political Parties Sr. Name of Party

1. Awami League

2. Pakistan Peoples Party

3. Jamaat-i-Islami

4. Muslim League
Conventional

5. Muslim League Qayyum

6. MuslimLeague Council

7. Pakistan Democratic Party

Candidates in East Pakistan 162

0

69

93

Candidates in West Pakistan 4

119

79

31

65

50

81

67 69 27

During the election campaign, it became obvious that ‘national’ parties bad Me grass- root support, while the regional parties enjoyed mass support. On one
hand, there were ‘rightists’ like the Pakistan Muslim League and all of its three factions, Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam(JUl),

Jamiat Ulema- i-Pakistan (JUP) and Jamaat-i-Islani Pakistan (JIP), who were gradually losing popular support, and on the other, there were ‘leftists’ including
National Awani Party (NAP) of Wali Khan and Sindh United Front (SUF) of G. M. Syed.275

 

272 L. Ziring, Pakistan, The Enigma of Political Development, Kent Dawson Westview,

1980, p. 101

274 Herbert Feldman, The End and Beginning of Pakistan, 1969-1972, Oxford University Press, p. 72

Before elections, Yahya Khan had issued MLR 60, which, ‘ prohibited anti-Pakistan ideological propaganda, violent attempts to mould public opinion,
excursions of undue pressure on newspapers, interference with the activities of other parties, exhibition of weapons at public meetings 276 The
election campaign which started in January 1 970, went on for almost a foil year and turned out to be the longest election campaign ever in the parliamentary
history of Pakistan.

The main issue in the election campaign in East Pakistan was tire question of provincial autonomy, and tire political scene, from the beginning was dominated
by Mujib of the Awami League. Awarni League had organizations of student, labourers, and peasants to support its objectives. However, it was Mujib’s
growing stature as a leader that contributed to its emergence as the dominant party in East Pakistan Upon H S. Suhrawardy’s death in 1 963, Mujib had left
the National Democratic Front and revived the Awami League in January 1964.277 Although, Mujib was an eloquent speaker with tire ability to mesmerize the
crowd, his success was owed greatly to his finning of the anti- West Pakistan feelings The poor and biased role and mishandling by West Pakistani
establishment, as discussed in tire previous chapter, also contributed to this. The people of East Pakistan were unhappy, when three prime ministers hailing
from the Eastern wings, ie. Klrawaja Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali Bogra, and H. S. Suhrawardy, were unceremoniously dismissed. Moreover, the failure of
the central government to introduce Bengali as the national language and the economic disparity between the two wings, among other issues, were deeply
resented in East Pakistan

The Awami League had a fiirly sound base in East Pakistan at the start of elections. However, tire boycott of the elections by Maulana Bbashani and by the
National Progressive League and Krishak Saramik Party in East Pakistan left the League virtually alone in tire field. Traditional parties, like the Muslim League
and the Jamaat-e- Island or the Nizam- i- Islam Party, which put up candidates in both wings, mistered no sqpport in East Pakistan278 The Awami League’s
campaign soon turned itself into a movement of Bengali resurgence with Mujib, using his six- point program to further his cause. We will discuss these six
points later hr this chapter, but it is worth noting that tire central government never prohibited their propagation.

275 Ibid, p. 73

27 ^ Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Militaiy State and Soceity, Macmillan, 2000, p. 125

277 Khawaja Alqama, Bengali Elites Perceptions of Pakistan, Royal Book Company, 1997, p. 170

Awami league’s leaders did visit West Pakistan on occasion, but these visits were aimed at formulating a front against Punjab. Mujib’s collaborators in West
Pakistan were G. M. Syed, Hyder Bakbsh Jatoi and Abdus Samad Achakzai 279 He claimed that West Pakistan had been developed by East Pakistan’s
resources and the six-point fomrula, portrayed as the ‘Magna Carta’ for the Bengalis, would turn East Pakistan into Sonar Bangla 280

Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party was the second largest party at the time. Bhutto’s enigmatic personality, his socialist ideas and his slogan of Rod, Kapra, aur
Makan (food, clothing, and shelter) were tire factors that contributed to the popularity of the PPP. Bhutto introduced a new angle to politics, focusing on the
local issues related to industrial labour and their conflicts with tire industrialists, landlord- tenant conflicts and demand from the government for the provision of
shelter for tire working class. Tire PPP also developed new means to reach its voters who were looking for a major social and economic change, even though
in a provincial context.

In Punjab, to the delight of the locals, Bhutto vented his venomous ragg against India, hr the province of Sindh, he relied on the local power of influential
personalities like Mir Rasool Bakhsh Talpur ofHyderabad, MakhdoomTalib-ul-Maula of Hala, GhulamMustafe Jatoi of Nawabshalr, Pir ofRanipur and
other pirs and waderas of Sindh. 281

278 Syed Mujawar Hussain Shah, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, 1972-1980, NIPS,

1996, p.73

279 M. Ramzan, The Role of Religio Political Parties in Elections of 1970, p. 90

289 M. Rafique Afeal, Pakistan History and Politics, 1947-1971, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 392
281 SherbazKhan Mazari, A Journey to Disillusionment, Oxford University Press, 1999,p.

172-173

However, his advocacy of socialism meant that he was supported largely by tire working class. During the campaign, Bhutto was criticized by some religious
parties for preaching ‘socialism which they claimed to be ‘anti- Islamic’. Bhutto’s own popularity as a native Sindhifroma powerful landed family greatly
buttressed his success in the elections in Sindh.

Bhutto ’ s type of populism was an avant-garde phenomenon for Pakistan. Before him, West Pakistani politicians had followed a lowkey approach towards
politics, preferring to negotiate among themselves rather than use popular support to further their aims and ambitions. 282 Bhutto changed the rules of the
political game completely, soaking in unprecedented public adulation in the process.

Bhutto had wanted a republican form of government based on adult franchise. He demanded civil liberties, fixed minimum wagps and health facilities for the
workers, elimination of illiteracy, equal rights for women, independence of judiciary and its separation from the executive, academic freedom, etc. Bhutto, who
showed no interest in East Pakistan, concentrated on the economic exploitation of the capitalists and land owners in West Pakistan. Hence, he won the
support of the western wing on the basis of his demand and support of individual and economic and social equality.283

The Pakistan Muslim League, and all its fictions, stood for common ideals; a strong Centre with provincial autonomy consistent with national integrity,
promotion of Muslim nationalism and economic justice in line with Islamic teachings. However, tire PML had lost its appeal in East Pakistan after it was
soundly defeated in 1 954, when Bengali nationalism had pushed it into the background.

Hie religious parties including Jamiat Ulema-i- Islam, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami denounced socialism and advocated an Islamic system for
Pakistan According to them, ‘ Socialism was an un-Islamic ideology and regional autonomy a threat to the basis of Pakistan ’ 284 Some prominent
ulema in their ranks even issued fatwas , declaring socialism as anti- Islamic. Yet, the religious parties as a whole failed to unite on one platform

 

282 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: the Continuing Search for Nationhood, Boulder Westview Press, 1991, p. 59
S. Mahmood, Pakistan Divided, Ferozesons, 1984, p. 78
284 Jang, 26 February, 1970

Election Results

 

The elections of 1970 resulted in an overwhelming victory for Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League in East Pakistan. The Awami League won an absolute majority
in the National Assembly by securing 160 out of300 seats.

Table 2

Election Results of 1970

Party Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan East Pak. Total Awami League 1 60 1 60 Pakistan Peoples Party 62 1 8 1 – – 8 1 PML- Qayyum 117 —

9

Conventional Muslim

League 7 7

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam- – 6 1 – 7
Markazi Jamiat-ul

Ulema 4 3 7

National Awami Party
Wali 3 3 6

Jamaat Islami Pakistan 1 2 1 – – 4
Pakistan Muslim

League Council 2 2

Pakistan Democratic
Patty 11

Independents 5 3 7 – 1 16 Total 82 27 25 4 162 300 Source: Pakistan Observer, January 20, 1971

The Awami League also won all seven seats reserved for women from East Pakistan. The elections set the Bengplis on the route that was to take them toward
complete independence a year later.285

The Peoples Party emerged as the second largest party in the N ational Assembly of Pakistan. It secured 81 out of 1 3 8 seats allocated for West Pakistan,
although Bhutto never really expected the electoral landslide he eventually received in the western wing. The rightist / Islamic parties were badly routed as they
could secure only 37 out of300 seats ofthe National Assembly. The performance ofthe lefiists/socialists was even worse. 286

In the provincial assembly elections, the reflection of the National Asserrfoly was almost repeated. Awami League’s strength in the East Pakistan Assembly
was 288 out of 300 seats but it had no representation in the Provincial Assemblies in West Pakistan In West Pakistan, the Peoples Party won a majority in
Punjab ( 1 1 3 out of 1 80 seats) and Sindh (28 out of 60 seats) assemblies. The election results showed that no East Pakistan -based party won a single seat in
West Pakistan and similarly, no West Pakistan-based party in East Pakistan, the situation thus crystallized the polarization between East and West
Pakistan287

28 ^ Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan the Continuing Search for Nationhood, 1986, p. 59 284 Pakistan Observer, January 20, 1971

By any criteria, as majority believes, elections of 1970 were free and lair. The sweep ofthe Awami league in East Pakistan was about as complete as it could
have been, whereas, the Peoples Party acquired a clear majority of seats of West Pakistani provinces in the National Assembly.

President Yahya Khan’s decision to hold the first general elections in the political history of Pakistan is generally taken as the first step towards a
democratically- elected civilian government. Yet, as noted above, it is still thought that the establishment believed that the elections would see the emergence of
a large number of political parties in the Assembly. Thus, no party would have a commanding majority, leaving the initiative in the hands of the President and
as a consequence, a coalition government.

The results of the elections clearly indicated a degree of political change in Pakistan. Old- school politics was badly routed. The founding party of Pakistan
MuslimLeague, including its lactions, had lost out completely. The Awami League, led by Mujib, emerged as the sole representative ofEast Pakistan,
eliminating all religious and leftist parties from the constitutional struggle. Similarly, the PPP, led by Bhutto, won nearly by a two- third majority, establishing its
claim on West Pakistan

Aftermath of the Elections

 

The state of affairs that the elections of 1970 created required careful handling and it was a tragedy that the three major players in the dram did not feel the
intensity of the situation Mujib had not expected the massive mandate that he received. His bargaining position was now strong and it was foolish to ignore the
realities of the situation .288 Mujib’s total victory made him confident of assuming power. However, his position seemed to also seal the doors of compromise.
Prudently, confronted with this situation, Yahya Khan and his fellow generals became closer to Bhutto.

282 Craig Baxter, Pakistan Votes, 1971, p. 21 1

288 M. Asghar Khan, We’ve Learnt Nothing lfomHistory Pakistan: Politics and Military

If the six-points, in their frill rigpr pointed towards the separation ofEast Pakistan, Bhutto’s own attention seems to have been confined to West Pakistan
alone. On the question of six-points, Bhutto had maintained silence, however, with the unexpected magnitude of Mujib’s victory in the Eastern Wing, Bhutto
tactfully projected the Awami League as the party of one wing only which was not to be allowed to rule on the basis of their landslide victory.

Taking this plea, Bhutto made it clear that the authority at the C entre would have to be shared between the Awami League and the PPP to enable the two to
execute their respective mandates. 289 Admittedly, he had attained a large electoral victory within the bounds of West Pakistan; however, PPP’s 8 1 seats

 

were nowhere close to the Awami League’s majority of 1 60 seats in the National Assembly. Yet, it seems that Bhutto did not wish to assume responsibility
for forming provincial governments in the Punjab and Sindh without control of the Centre. 290 Under the Legpl Framework Order (LFO) (Annexure-9), the
new C onstitution would require only a simple majority in the N ational Assembly.

The Awami League had a position to frame the Constitution single-handedly, leaving the PPP with no role to play in its framing. And more importantly, Bhutto
could be restricted to playing a limited rote as the leader of the opposition Mujib declared that since the sixpoint program got approval of the people in the
elections, it was corrpulsory that the constitution should be framed on the basis of the program

Sheikh Mujib’s Six Points come to the Fore

Evaluation of the Six-Point program

 

Tire position of the Awami League on provincial autonomy and the constitutional structure was embodied in the now ferrous six points. In summary, the points
were:

2 ^ 9 Dawn, December 25, 1970

290 M. Asghar Khan, We’ve Leamt Nothing fromHistoiy Pakistan: Politics and Military

‘ The Government shall be parliamentary inform, at the centre and in the provinces, governed by a directly elected legislature chosen on the basis
of population by universal adult franchise. The central government shall be responsible only for defence and foreign affairs and, under certain
conditions, currency. There shall be separate but freely convertible currencies for each wing, or, a single currency be used there shall be means to
prevent the transfer of resources from one wing to the other. Fiscal policy will be vested in the provinces which, in turn, will provide requisite
resources to the central government, for it, to cany out its responsibilities in the defence and foreign affairs areas, separate accounts will be
maintained for the foreign exchange earnings of each province and the provinces will provide foreign exchange, as necessary to the central
government in a similar manner as internal revenues are to be provided under point ,Each province shall be permitted to maintain a militia \ 291

Hie third, fourth, and fifth point of the six-point Program purely dealt with the economic issues of East Pakistan. The third point demanded,

‘ Two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings may be introduced and furthermore one currency’ for the whole country may’ be
maintained. In this case effective constitutional provisions are to be made to stop flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking
Reserve is to be made and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan \292

Mujib had basically concluded that since Pakistan had two economic units, one in the East and die other in the West, and because of the distance between the
two parts, there was no mobility of labour and capital between the two wings. He thought that the flight of capital from East Pakistan to West Pakistan could
not be prevented because of having the same currency.

West Pakistan had along been the centre of all important government offices like the head office of the State Bank of Pakistan, which was responsible for
issuing currency. Also, all the head offices of all public and private institutions and national and foreign industrial organizations were located in West Pakistan
Consequently, the transfer of money transactions from East to West wing was a natural occurrence. All deposits of banks, all government resources, all
earnings, profits and savings of trade and industry, operating in East Pakistan, would move in a matter of minutes to West Pakistan

291 David Dunbar, Pakistan: The Failure of Political Negotiations, Asian Survey Vol 12, No. 5, 1972

292 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, p.237

90 per cent of the bank deposits or savings were generally invested, and this investment was also naturally done in West Pakistan This was how the capital
fonnation in West Pakistan was so rapid. The immediate benefit of investment, re. employment and industrialization were also, consequently, derived by West
Pakistan293

Mujib suggested that the only way to save East Pakistan from immense economic exploitation from West Pakistan was by creating a separate Reserve Bank
for East Pakistan This measure would ensure that capital investment stays there. This refonn in the currency system, he maintained, would save East Pakistan
from economic deprivation and at the same time, keep cumeney a central subject as a symbol of unity and oneness ofthe people ofPakistan

The fourth point stated,

”The power of taxation and revenue collection shall vest in the federating
units and that the federal centre will have no such power. The federation will have
a share in the state taxes for meeting their required expenditure. The consolidated

Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage on all state taxes ’ .294 Mujib naively claimed that such an arrangement would make the
federation stronger and that tax-collecting was a liability not a source
of power. Not surprisingly, this point attracted maximum criticism
from what Mujib called tire ‘unitariarists’ and ‘pseudo- federalists’.

Mujib was of the view that the central government would be

constitutionally guaranteed of the required amount they needed. The

right and power concerned did not rest in the act of tax collection

but in the distribution of money collected. The constitution would

provide that, ‘a certain percentage of the revenue collection on all heads shall

automatically be credited to the Federal Fund by the reserve banks, on which

amount the unit/provincial governments shall ha\’e no control \ 295

Mujib was of the view that off-quoted economic inequalities were

actually man-made inequities and remediable. He suggested some

remedies to that effect as well 296

The fifth point of the six-point program had sub- five points:

‘ Tlrere shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings of the two

wings, earning of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West

 

Pakistan Government, foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be
fixed, indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings. The constitution shall empower the unit Governments to establish trade and
commercial relations with, set up trade

missions in and enter into agreements with, foreign countries 297
Mujib’s proposals regprding the fifth point were to draw
attention to the feet that East Pakistan had earned a lot of the annual
foreign exchange for Pakistan which was unfitly utilized for the
industrialization of West Pakistan. And to compound the unfairness,
the earnings from those industries were reinvested in West Pakistan
agqin onty. Another grievance was the tipping of inports in West
Pakistan’s fevour, with the assertion that West Pakistan lacked capital
formation to justify imports. And, imports to East Pakistan were less
compared to exports, whereas, imports to West Pakistan were more
than exports. Two- thirds of Pakistan’s foreign exchange were
generated through the export of jute, which was the main cash crop
of the eastern wing, but those foreign earnings were used neither for
the development of the jute growers or planters nor for the common
people ofEast Pakistan. The unfitness didn’t cease here as almost
all the foreign aid and loans were taken agpinst the foreign exchange
earned by die eastern wing but were used in the western wing.

Moreover, the irony was that instalments and interest in foreign

currency on these bans were being paid by East Pakistan.298 Mujib had put the six-point program before the West Pakistanis

in a simpler and appealing form Tie addressed the people of West

Pakistan precisely using the lines that the six points were not

formulated in the interest ofEast Pakistan only. Secondly, he claimed

that the practice that the eastern wing’s wealth was being transferred

to and concentrated in the western wing has led to regional

imbalance. It did not only mean that tire common masses of West

Pakistan were receiving this wealth, as opposed to the people ofEast

Pakistan, but the entire wealth of the country was controlled by just a

few fimilies. He frirther added that the 62 per cent of the revenue of

East Pakistan that was being spent on defence and the 32 per cent of

the revenue that was being spent on central administration should be

spent in East Pakistan instead of West Pakistan

Bhutto and other West Pakistani leaders believed that Mujib’s

six- point program was actually an agenda of secession, which might

well be true. This argument is a perfect example of scapegrating

others to deflect blame. Even the media and academic circles in the

West Pakistan regarded the six- point program as nothing more than

just a dangerous slogan There appeared to be little understanding of

the emergence of new dynamics in the polities of Pakistan, which

required a reordering of erstwhile established systems.299

293 Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy 1950-1971, p. 81

294 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, p.238

293 Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest fir Autonomy’- 1950-1971, p.82
293 Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, p.239

Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest fir Autonomy– 1950-1971, p.83

Yahya ’s View of the Six Points

 

President Yahya followed the policy of his predecessor, regarding the six-point program, and did not give any importance to this burning issue. In a very
desperate bid to retain power and to validate his military operation in East Pakistan, he made a speech on 26 th March 1 97 1 , but all he could blame Muj ib
was for ‘obstinacy’, obduracy and refusal to talk sense ’ . 30 °

Here are some insights fromHamoodur Rehman Commission Report about Yahya’s casual attitude towards the six- point program Justice A R Cornelius, a
retired chief justice of Pakistan who also served as a constitutional expert in Yahya’s military regime, told the Hamoodur Rahman Commission, ‘that he
(Yahya) was familiar with them (Six Points) and he used to talk about them from time to time but he never asked for an analysis of these, but
according to my mind, I think that about four of them were quite easily acceptable and I said in a meeting of the cabinet that it would be easily
possible to amend the Constitution so as to give effect to most of the Six Points and that would perhaps ease the political situation ’ 301

In the same report, it is stated that on 6 tfl January 1971, Lieutenant General Peerzada, the Principal Staff Officer to President General Yahya, called on tire
Governor ofEast Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, and asked him to obtain a copy of the six-point program because lie and the President would be discussing it with
Mujib and his colleagues the next day. It is quite shocking that even at this stage the presidential team did not have so much as a copy of the six-point
301

program

299 Hasan Zaheer, The Separation ofEast Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali MuslimNationalism, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 146.

299 Syed Shahid Husain, What Was Once East Pakistan, p.21

3 ®* The Report of the Hamood-ur-Rahman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War, p.72

 

The failure on the part of President Yahya and his advisers to critically examine the Six Points of Mujib and to pemit the latter to campaign on their basis, and
declaring that the elections were actually a referendum on the Six Points, seems to suggest that neither the President nor any one of his advisers were ever
bothered about what the result of the election would be.303

The Hamoodur Rebman Commission concluded that the government’s approach to Mujib’s Six Points was ‘off hands’. It is also stated that Yahya was totally
unprepared for talks with Mujib, while Mujib was ready to negotiate. He once even said that ‘Six Points are not the words of God’ . 304 Privately, before
elections, Mujib bad reassured Yahya that the Six Points were his bargaining position. However, the Yahya regime tried its level best to fan propaganda and
create an impression that it was a plan to divide the country.

The feet of the matter is that die Six Points were never properly studied for understanding or development of alternate proposals by the Federal and Provincial
Governments or even the politicians. This had become a necessity after the election, when it became the official policy of die majority party. Yahya simply did
not understand the issue. Although on closer examination, die Six Points, as they stand may have been damaging for national integration, but it was never
brought up for discussion or consideration in the cabinet or before the President. 305

 

Bhutto and the Six Points

 

Throughout the election campaign of 1970, Bhutto did not accept the six-point program. He neither negotiated with Mujib, nor developed a critique of the
same. He also did not develop any alternative to it. On the other hand, the East Pakistanis had used, first the rebellion of 1 969 and then the elections of 1 970
to popularize the six-point program as something heretic and agffinst the dignity of Pakistan So, when both sides later came together on the negotiating table
after the elections, tiiey had vastly different attitudes which were less congenial 306

303 Ibid, p. 343

304 Syed Shahid Husain, What Was Once East Pakistan, p.20

303 Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali MuslimNationalism,p. 147
306 Aijaz Ahmad, The Great Farce, 1972, p. 14

Hie negotiations occurred in a vacuum By 1 97 1 , the pulse in East Pakistan was not to consider the preservation of Pakistan’s unity as a priority, the highest
priority for the East Pakistani leadership was to safeguard the distinct interests of only their own region. On the surface, they did not wish to break ip
Pakistan. A majority party bad no reasons to do that. Nonetheless, the continued existence of a unified Pakistan was subject, in the Bengffii view, to the
successful realization of the Bengali agendas. Their interests had been betrayed in the past. The ones who had betrayed them were still in power, thus if (rust
was not being an option anymore, future arrangements had to be guaranteed structurally to them

Bhutto was ofthe view that Mujib’s intentions were for separation. In the Six Points, he saw India’s conspiratorial hand. Throughout the negotiations, Bhutto
believed that the Awami League was moving, in feet, toward independence. 307

Bhutto criticized the six- points program on grounds that, firstly, the provincial control of aid and trade, in addition to the Awami League’s idea of separate
currencies for the two provinces, would have meant separate and exclusive economies for the two wings that would have turned Pakistan into a hotbed of
‘imperialist intrigues’. Secondly, aid and trade are so bound up with ‘Foreign Policy and Defense’ that the central gpvemment’s control over these areas would
have been undoubtedly impaired. Thirdly, new constitution cannot be unilaterally imposed by any one ofthe federating units, as Mujib wished to do with his
draft based on the Six-points, rather it has to be acceptable to all the units in the federation, irrespective of their relative size.308

 

Politics of the Six Points

 

Although Mujib’s Six Points, by any stretch of imagination, could not be termed as an act of secession, yet, Awami League’s policy pronouncement after the
elections caused great anguish among the military elite. Caught in the middle, Yahya Khan visited Dacca in mid- January 1971, in order to start dialogue with
Mujib. While considering the right and the technical ability of tire Awami League to forma central government by its own party strength, Yahya Khan advised
Mujib to include some persons from West Pakistan also in his cabinet for a smoother conduct of the state affairs.

307 Ibid, p. 14.

30 ® Safdar Mehmood, Pakistan Divided, p.lOl

Mujib agreed to meet the West Pakistani politicians, including Bhutto, but maintained that his personal status vastly differed from that of the PPP leader. He
made it clear, ‘While I am the sole elected representative of East Pakistan and enjoying total support and M ■ Bhutto ‘s position is different in West
Pakistan. Other parties have won a considerable number of seats in the Western Wing and we can associate them with us ’.309

Yahya Khan wished to insert a clause which permitted independent foreign trade and aid dealings provided such dealings were ‘not agpinst tire fundamentals
of the country’s foreign policy’. Although, Mujib did not show flexibility on the Six Points, nor did he compromise on the constitution- making process,
however, he agreed to let Yahya Khan stay on as President after the national government was formed under the new constitution 310 hr the meantime, Bhutto,
on Yahya’s suggestion, flew to Dacca on 27 th January 1971 for negotiations with Mujib to work out a solution ofthe constitutional dilemma which would be
acceptable to both tire political parties. He had several days of discussions with Mujib on the Six Points, however, tire Awami League leadership was not
prepared to accept any amendment in the six-point fomrula and the PPP was not ready to concede all the Six Points. It is believed that instead of making
attempts to solve the impasse, Bhutto offered his personal services. He mentioned that he would be content with the portfolios of deputy prime minister .311
Consequently, Bhutto returned empty-handed to West Pakistan.

General Rao Fanuan Ali, the Principal Staff Officer Civil Affeirs, in the government of East Pakistan, met Mujib shortly after Bhutto’s departure and stated,
‘Mujib told me there was no disagreement about the Six Points between them. The dispute that arose was about power-sharing in the new

, 2/7

government .

Soon after his return from Dacca, Bhutto en^ged himself in solidifying his personal position within West Pakistan. During tire first two weeks, Ire conferred
with his party notables and took air ‘official’ mandate from them to seek amendments to the SixPoints from the Awami League. Bhutto also met Yahya Khan
and explained his position on the Awami League’s program. During his meeting with the President, he reiterated that his party would not gp to the Assembly
merely to ‘rubber stamp’ a constitution that Mujib had prepared.313

 

KM. Arif, Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997, Oxford University Press, p. 1 10, 2001
3 1 11 A.R. Siddique, East Pakistan: The Endgame: An Onlooker’s Journal 69- 71,Oxford University Press, p.54, 2005
31’ Takbeer, January 11, 1996, p 26

312 H.S. Anwar, The Discourse and Politics ofZulfikar Ali Bhutto, Macmillan, p. 100

However, Bhutto hoped that by mobilizing the anti- Six Points sentiments in West Pakistan; he could put pressure on Mujib to share power with his party. He
held talks with Qayyum Khan, Mufti Mahmud, Wali Khan and others to persuade them to develop a consensus on the constitutional issue. This consensus
meant unanimity on amendments to the Six Points, and unity in opposing the transfer of power until the Awami League agreed to modify the Six Points
according to their demands. 314

Yahya Khan, in order to break the deadlock, intervened on 9 th February 1971, by inviting Mujib for a meeting in Islamabad. However, Mujib reiused to
obey as he wanted the inaugural session to be held at Dacca on 1 5 th F ebruary 1971.

Yahya and the Military Action

Yahya Khan ’s Efforts to Escalate the Tension

 

Yahya Khan met with Bhutto on 1 1 th February 1971, and announced that the National Assembly would meet at Dacca for its inaugural session on 3 March
1971. However, Bhutto, while addressing a press conference in Peshawar, expressed his inability to join the National Asserrbly session in the absence of an
understanding, compromise or adjustment of the six-point fcnnula. He said, 7 cannot put my party men in a position of double jeopardy (by sending
them to Dacca)” , he said and threatened ‘a revolution from Khyber to Karachi, ’ if the Peoples Party was left out.” 315

Yahya Khan made an attempt to break the deadlock by inviting Mujib again to meet him in Islamabad on 17th February 1971 . However, Mujib expressed his
inability to travel to the capital to meet the President. His insistent refusal for a dialogue made his intentions doubtful. In the meantime, Bhutto met die President
on 19 February, and showed his reservations about East Pakistan’s Governor Admiral Ahsan, being a ‘pliable tool in the hands of Awami League’ f 16
Two days after Bhutto’s press conference in Peshawar, Yahya took the easier route, dismissing his civilian cabinet and reverted to Martial Law.

313 Ibid, p. 100

314 Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 30

315 M. Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers , 1989, p. 276,

General Y aqub and Admiral Ahsan were summoned from East Pakistan to Rawalpindi to meet on 22 F ebruary. Before their departure. General Y aqub and
Admiral Ahsan met Mujib who assured them that the Six Points were negptiable.317 Yahya, who took exception to Mujib’s refusal to visit the capital, wanted
linn action against him. However, both General Yaqub and Admiral Ahsan explained that this would be unwise. They explained that the people of East
Pakistan felt betrayed and had risen in revolt to protect their rights.

By realizing the bitter realities, both opposed the use of force against the Awami Leaguers because, in their assessment, the use of force would bring the
situation to an undesired climax and might head to the disintegration of the country. 318 In light of Bhutto’s demand that the limit of 120- day for National
Asserrbly should be removed, Yahya Khan stated that the polarized political climate was inappropriate to hold the National Assembly session on 3 rd March
1971, and the postponement would enable the political leaders to arrive at some settlement. Mujib was shocked when he came to know that the National
Assembly session, which was due two days later, had been postponed. Many political leaders from West Pakistan, including Asghar Khan, Akbar Bugti,
Maulana Hazarvi, Malik Ghulam J ilani and Mumtaz Daultana also supported Muj ib ’ s stance and condemned Bhutto for his role in the postponement of the
Asserrbly session. 319 However, public reaction in East Pakistan was spontaneous and hostile. An instant wave of public angpr swept the whole ofEast
Pakistan which provoked a serious political stonn as discussed in detail in the next chapter.

In an attempt to conciliate Bengali sentiment, Y ahya Khan declared that the postponed secession of the Assembly would meet on 25 th March 1 97 1 , but the
announcement did not have any effect. By realizing die intensity of die situation, at last, he belatedly arrived in Dacca on 1 5 th March 1971. However, his
reception line at the Tejgaon airport did not include any Bengali politician or bureaucrats. 320 The government and Awami League negotiations were held
between 1 6th and 24th of March 1971. On the invitation of President Yahya, some elected members of the National Asserrbly from West Pakistan, bad
already assembled there, notably Mufii Mahmud, Abdul Wali Khan, Abdul QayyumKhan, Ghous Bakbsh Bizenjo and Maulana Shall Ahmad Noorani. Yet,
they did not have any role in the talks because Yahya Khan gave them a general idea about the negotiations but did not keep them in the loop.

31 ® Pakistan Observer, 1971, March 16

317 Ibid.

318 The Dawn, 1971, April 1

319 The Dawn, 1971, April 9

Mr Bhutto joined the negotiations at Dacca on 22 nd March 1971, afier Mujib agreed to meet him The meeting, however, made no progress and all common
grounds between Yahya’s military regime and Mujib’s Awami League disappeared, hi the middle of the negotiations, the Awami League celebrated 23 rd
March, the Pakistan Resolution Day, as the ‘Resistance Day’.

 

Declaration of Independence

 

Meanwhile, the general strike in East Pakistan became a noncooperation movement. The Awami League was in full control ofEast Pakistan’s economic and
political life. Mujib had started issuing orders like a de lacto ruler; a parallel government of the Awami League was practically operating The East Bengal
Regiment and the East Pakistan Rifles had switched over their loyalties to the Awami League.321

After loot, plunder, and massacre of the people loyal to Pakistan, the military crackdown finally began on 25 th March 1971. The Bengali officers at Jessore
and Chittagong massacred their own former colleagues and then – families. The Awami League attacked wherever the Pakistani Army was weak. It was
designed to provoke the Army, enabling Mujib to drive a wedge between the Bengali and the nonBengali population 322

 

Mujib formally declared the independence of Bangladesh at midnight on 25 March and on 27 th March, Major General Ziaur Reiman, second in command of
the East Bengal Regiment, announced the formation of die provisional government ofBangladesh from Chittagpng Radio Station. 323 Yet another declaration
of independence was issued by Tajuddin Ahmad, prime minister ofthe exiled government at Mujib Nagar, Calcutta, India on 17 April 1971 saying, ‘ Pakistan
is now dead and buried under a mountain of corpses ’ .

32(3 R. Jackson, South Asian Crises, Chatto and Windus, 1975, p. 171
323 HafizMalik, The ProblemofRegionalismin Pakistan, 1975, p. 112-113

322 Matiur Re h man. Bangladesh Today, An Indictment or a Lament, University of Islamabad Press, 1981, p. 95-%

Operation Searchlight

 

On the afternoon of 24 th March, General Yahya Khan ordered General Tikka Khan to launch the already planned ‘Operation Searchlight’, a military
contingency plan, for restoring normalcy. 324 However, with the military intervention, the whole complexion of tire problem in East Pakistan changed, as it
shattered the last hope of saving die united Pakistan.

Military action in East Pakistan started indie early hours of26 th March, with clear objectives. The long-teimand short- tenn aims ofthe ‘Operation
Searchlight’ were:

The long-term goals were:

To seal-off die borders

To create conditions for creating a civilian set-up To regain die administration of the province To accommodate the non- radical elements of the elected
representatives into a new political arrangement

The Immediate goals were:

Disarming all Bengali troops-six East Bengal Regiments, 30,000 personnel of East Pakistan Rifles and die Police. Arrest die Awani League Leadership.

Imposition of the Martial Law

Taking over airfields

Taking over Chittagpng N aval Base

Ensure security of all towns

Cut off communication links of East Pakistan witii other parts of the world.

Take over Radio and TV stations

323 General J.F.R. Jacob, Surrender of Decca, Birth of a Nation, 1997, p. 34 324 Pakistan Observer, 29 June, 1971

When military operation was due it was just in time to tackle the pre-planned takeover by Colonel Osmani of important strategic locations like the Dacca
airfield, the Chittagpng seaport, the Dacca cantonment and border outposts. Colonel Osmani’s plans to take over strategic locations witiiin East Pakistan,
especially near Dacca, had its complete reliance on the defected EBR and EPR personnel. The mutiny was planned for the early morning of 26th March
1971.

The Dacca University had been the centre stone of anti- state activities for the past many days. The 1 8 Punjab Regiment, part of 57 Infantry Brigade was sent
there. When the army reached the University, it had to clear blockades before reaching and entering the university premises. The army entered the campus
with Tanks and Artillery, ready for a light. The fighting came to a halt at 4.00 a.m The army had lost four (4) personnel, sixty-six (66) attackers were killed
and thirty-one (31) were injured.

In the course of Operation Searchlight, simultaneous actions also took place to capture the leadership of the Awami League. Within the first ten days, the
anny successfully achieved its objective in tire main urban centres. The whole province took six weeks to come under government control The 25/26 March
action by the Army is also known as Dacca Crackdown. Dacca, Comilla Cantonment, the Sylhet airport, Rangpur, the Saidpur cantonment, Khulna and
Rajsbahi came under the martial law authorities, with two days of fighting with the terrorist elements; defectors, university residents, and the Awami Leaguers.
Hie control over these strategic locations was not enough; communication links also had to be restored within the province through rail road, and river
transport. The provincial capital Dacca and Chittagpng, Comilla, Sylhet, Rangpur, Rajshabi, Jessore and Khulna cantonments had air links only and no road
communication

Overall the military action was successful in establishing the Martial Law authority. The other objectives of the action remained partially accomplished. The
arrest of the Awami League leadership was almost a complete failure, only Mujib and Kamal Hussain, who had not tried to escape, were arrested while all of
the other prominent leaders escaped to India. According to accounts, the Awami League leadership had been alerted when Wing Commander Kliondkar had
seen President Yahya leaving Dacca. The leadership disguised as peasants, left Dacca for India where they were received with open anns. However, it is
worth noting that the houses ofthe Awami League leadership were marked by government agents prior to the crackdown Such an escape of important
political targets must be attributed to the Amy’s limitations. There was no one within the officer ranks who could recognize the Awami League leaders. The
Police, on die other hand, could not be trusted with die operation as they were to be disanned themselves.

The nature of the operation which had to be surgical became aggressive as difficulties started. The Bengali troops, under the political spell of Mujib and the
Awami League workers, were actively interacting with the Bengali units. Military action started not only throughout the province but also within the
cantonments, because six East Bengal regiments out of the ten stationed in East Pakistan had to be disanned.

In Jessore, the First East Bengal Regiment was attacked by die 22 nd and 25 th Baloch, accompanying die Brigade Commander to overpower the defectors.
Two infantry battalions along with die 55 Field Regiment overcame the 1 st East Bengal Regiment, after hours of fighting, in which one hundred and thirty (130)
Bengali defectors were killed.

In Joydebpur, the Second East Pakistan Regiment was led by Major K. M. Safiullah, who had political affiliations widi the Awami League. The Regiment had
blown up bridges, attacked the amy and remained in die forests of Mymensingh for days, before leaving for India through Rajshabi. The unit incurred no
damage while all ofthe West Pakistani soldiers and officers of the Regiment were killed.

 

The Third East Bengal Regiment was stationed at Saidpur. Almost 30-40 personnel of the Regiment were arrested, while 69 defectors died at Parbatipur
Railway station. By that time, Third East Bengal Regiment had started to join the other defector’s of East Pakistan Rifles and overtook Dinajpur. They killed all
West Pakistani soldiers and officers in their ranks. By the time Pakistani forces reached Dinjapur, it had become a slaughter house.

Lt Colonel Khizar Hayat, a West Pakistani officer, commanding the Fourth East Bengal Regiment, had not been successful in disarming Iris regiment. His
second- in- command, Klralid Musharraf took his commanding officer under arrest and along with his fully equipped and intact battalion entered into Agartala,
India.

Hie Commanding Officer Lt Colonel Abdur Rasheed Janjua, a West Pakistani officer, headed the Eighth East Bengal Regiment. His second in command, Zia-
ur-Rehman, took his commanding officer under arrest. Zia-ur-Rehman, along with his own regiment and rebels from East Pakistan Rifles, put up resistance
against 20 l11 Baloch stationed at Chittagong. Chittagpng was in chaos until reinforcements came to the fore.

Commanding officer Brigadier Mazumdar, a Bengali officer, supporter ofMujib had to be replaced from the command of2,500 Bengali personnel. Hie task
was done before the start of the operation when General Khadim Hussain Raja came to Chittagpng and skilfully convinced the Brigadier to join his new duty
at Dacca.

Hie Army disanned Tenth East Bengal Regiment stationed at Dacca but the clash cost ten lives.

Hie Army successfully disanned 10,000 personnel ofEast Pakistan Rifles at Peelkhana Dacca without any casualties. However, the other parts ofthe
province were not peaceful in this regard. At Rajshabi, East Pakistan Rifles had attacked two companies of the 25 th Punjab and killed everyone. Three
columns were moved to Rajshabi, which was under the rebels’ control, separated ffomDacca by Ganges and Yarmna and a border area. Brigade
headquarters, a battalion and two companies moved en route from Raj shalii, another Battalion moved through the water channel and the last column was
moved to Rajsbahi through helicopters. At Tbakurgaon, the rebels ofthe East Pakistan Rifles killed their West Pakistani Commanding officer. While in
Rangpur, the 29th Cavalry was disarmed without any resistance.

 

Success and failures ofthe Operation Searchlight

 

Almost all of the East Bengal Regiments were about to defect when the military action took place. But still tire situation got out of hand. Hie defectors escaped
with their weapons, commanding officers were killed and arrested, etc. These trained soldiers of Pakistan were gping to cross the border into India and return
as die Mukti Baliini, after a season of training Hie eleven sectors of the Mukti Babini were mostly under die command of diese defected soldier’s ofEast
Pakistan Along will die Mukti Bahinis, the gpvemment officials also defected.

Hie military action came as a shock to the Bengali personnel stationed at West Pakistan The first news tiiey got about the military action against Awami
League was its ban and a stricter Martial Law for East Pakistan Consequently, they started making plans for defection There was a plan to move the Hiird
East Bengal Regiment stationed at Sialkot, into India. Before they could defect along with die stationed Regiment, it was moved to Kbarian Hiere were
officers who were propagating among their Bengali officer’s to defect and escape from West Pakistan The mastenninds ofMujib’s murder plot were two of
these defectors. One of them deserted his gulf stationed unit while die odier crossed die border into India.

Amy and Air Force defected and escaped to India, some taking with tbemmilitary secrets like strategic maps, etc. Many officer’s of the East Pakistani
descent faced difficulties due to the mistrusting attitude towards East Pakistanis. In one such instance, Lt General Wasi-uddin, an East Pakistani officer was a
corps commander and was removed from an important task. In protest, he resigned from die amy and preferred to remain in internment given to die East
Pakistan officers/soldiers. However, diere were also people who were pro-Pakistan before die military action but later defected.

Hie military action had not started when foreign journalists were asked to leave East Pakistan. Hiirty-five of diese journalists left East Pakistan and stalled
reporting die news about East Pakistan from die hostile soil of India. The advice to deport die Foreign Press was given by Brigadier A R Siddiqui, editor of
the Defence Journal General Tikka Khan later accepted this move as a mistake. For the foreign journalists, dieir expulsion raised doubts and they gathered
reports from clandestine radio stations and odier pro- Indian news agencies. Hiose reporters could not have reported the exaggerated casualties, if they had
been allowed to stay in East Pakistan. Hie reporters were not willing to believe die casualties reports provided by die government. All the White Papers’
were published in the month of August, by then die dominant perception had become antiPakistan

Little had been done to know about the general mood after the military action, which somehow had targeted an ethnic majority of the province. The sentiments
were strong for the Awami League leadership and tiiose who revolted, mostly supporters of Awami League were in the police or die amy. hi short, die
military action had achieved its objectives for die imposition of Martial Law by securing die airfields, the naval bases, restoring law and order, the expulsion of
the press and the takeover of radio and television stations.

But the two odier important objectives were not achieved, one the Awami League leadership, odier dian two leaders, who had escaped to India and second,
many of the Bengali troops were not disarmed. These were die immediate goals, however, out of die longterm goals, which officially perished widi sun’ender,
all die amy successfully achieved was regaining die partial administrative control of the province.

As Lt General (Retd) Kamal Matiuddin says in his book,

‘before taking such a drastic step which would certainly have had far reaching repercussions, both within the country and without, a careful
assessment and appreciation of the situation was necessary. The pros and cons of using force should have been thoroughly discussed and clear cut
instructions about the quantum of force to be used should ha\’e been spelt out. No evaluation was carried out the consequences of the military
action on the reaction of all Bengalis elements in the armed forces and in the civil departments. Neither was any thought given to the attitude of
those sitting on the fence who were most likely to turn against the armed forces and the central government in Islamabad. The desertion of the
Bengalis lock, stock and barrel and their going across to India was, incorrectly, not visualized or not considered as a major drawback. The
response by friendly countries was also not. properly analysed. The ach’antage accruing to India and how easily they would capitalize on the
resentment of the [ common] Bengalis was not taken into account ’.325

 

Recovering after the Operation

 

During the military operation, die loss of life, property, and infrastructure was immense but the real loss was die widespread feelings of alienation among the
Bengalis. To counter die publicity of the Bangladesh movement, die Martial Law regime stalled external publicity. Foreign journalists, who were dirown out of

 

Dacca on 25 March 1971, were invited to return. 326 Similarly, amnesty was granted to returning refugees fromlndia and much- publicized (but not effective)
reception centres were opened to welcome them back. On 28 June 1971, Yahya Khan announced his long-awaited plan for political settlement. Although he
promised a constitutional government and the restoration of civilian rule in the next three or four months, the Awami League was yet to be banned as a political
organization. 327 Such a settlement was obviously not acceptable to the leadership of the Awami League. Politically, in West Pakistan, it appeared that a
measure of opposition, publicly and privately, gradually developed against the Martial Law regime.

323 K. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crises 1968-71, 1994, 326 New York Time, 1971, December 15

In the next three months, the regime continued its plan of ‘civilianization’ of its administration. A long list of names of the Awami League members of the
National Assembly was published against whom the regime brought specific ‘criminar charges similarly, the by-election dates fcr the vacant seats were
armounced.328 In early September, Yahya Khan replaced the military governor in East Pakistan, General Tikka Khan with a civilian gpvemor, Abdul Motaleb
Malik and a civilian cabinet was installed as an interim arrangement to facilitate the by-elections but the situation in East Pakistan continued to deteriorate.

Insurgency and Dismemberment

Insurgency starts

 

The people of East Pakistan felt that they were getting a carrotand- stick treatment after the military action. Their hostility increased along with the threat of
defectors joining the Mukti Bahini. On General Tikka Khan’s request, fresh reinforcements were sent from West Pakistan.

Lt General A A K. Niazi was handed over the Eastern Command on 7 th April, while General Tikka Khan remained the Martial Law Administrator and
Governor of East Pakistan When Lt General Niazi came to East Pakistan, the situation was under control and the government’s authority had been
established to a large extent. Anned forces comprising of the West Pakistani personnel were lacking heavy weaponry and engineering equipment. In these
times, operational plans were made for handling an internal insurgency, but the Indian threat had not been considered in their plans.

By September 1971, military strategists felt that the increasing number of Indian forces around the borders was alanning. The Eastern Command of East
Pakistan analysed the Indian threat but it was thought that if the Pakistani troops could concentrate on the Mukti Bahini, retaining the operations within the
borders, then it would be unlikely that India could justify aggression on Pakistan Under these considerations, light forces were left to guard the borders, while
stronger forces were used to build fortresses in strategically important points within East Pakistan agfynst Mukti Bahini

327 New York Time, 1971, 16 December

323 Salik, Witness to Surrender, Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 207

Niazi concentrated his efforts on pushing the terrorist Mukti Bahinis across the Indian borders.329 hi October 1971, India had agpin successfully increased the
number of Mukti Bahinis in terms of fighters and equipment. The Mukti Bahini started new attempts to infiltrate the porous borders and theft aim was to
engpgg the Pakistani troops in fighting long enough to lose morale.

In early October 1971, Mukti Bahinis along with the disguised Indian forces as Mukti Bahinis started theft attacks on the Ninth Division stationed in the
Jessore-Jhendia sector. The Fourteenth Division stationed in the SyDiet-Bhramanbaria sector and the Thirtysixth Division in tire Comilla sector also came
under attacks 330 These formations lacked artillery, engineering support, and armour. The attacks on the Pakistani forces caused theft dispersion on the vastly
spread border.

On 15 th November, the General Headquarters (GHQ) asked the Eastern Command to present operational plans. Major General Jamshed and the Chief of
Staff; Brigadier Baqir Siddiqui, presented tire new operational plan at GHQ, Rawalpindi Lt General N iazi had a delaying action strategy in which troops
would acquire time to secure theft defensive positions. For this, he asked GHQ for an additional eight battalions, to which the GHQ also promised the
reinforcements for the Eastern Command. Lt General Niazi working on his previous operational plan of driving out the Mukti Bahinis had already incurred a
loss of 7,700 square kilometres since 12 th October. 331 Furthermore, he left Dacca almost undefended under tire impression that reinforcements were
expected to arrive and if they did not, he would send a few of the formations to guard Dacca. The GHQ did not send the number of troops as promised;
rather it sent only two agfynst the demand for eight battalions. Until 1 9 th November, Lt General Niazi had been posturing and directing his troops that there
would be no withdrawal till 75 per cent causalities were suffered. 332 Unfortunately, this posturing was not realistic bearing in mind the unprotected capital, the
vast border, and the small number of troops he had to fight with

326 Matinuddin, Tragedy of &rors, p. 345

330 Ibid, p. 347

331 Ibid p.347

This excerpt from his book The Betrayal of East Pakistan gives you a sneak peek into his boastful personality. Ironically, lie was the one who threw down
his weapons.

‘ From Commander Eastern Command to C-in-C. Pakistan Army: Reassuring you and pledging afresh at the critical juncture of our history, we
will lnsha Allah fully honour the great confidence that has been reposed in us and no sacrifice will be considered too gyeat in defending our scared
fatherland. By the grace of Almighty Allah, the initial Bharii onslaught has been blunted. God willing, we will take the war on to Indian Soil to
finally crush the very spirit of the non-believers through the supreme force of Islam. Pray and believe that ultimate victory will be ours. Insha
Allah’. 333

In East Pakistan, the Eastern Command would indulge in breaking and making formations, unable to comprehend the fighting conditions it was facing. In some
cases where a battalion should have been covering one mile of the border line, it had been covering thirty miles. The Pakistan Aft force in East Pakistan had
twelve F-86 fighters with only two functional airfields in Dacca, Tejgaon and Kumitola.334 The worst situation was for the Navy, which had no warships to
guard the Chittagong port. A few gunboats were all that the naval forces deployed.

The situation on the other side of border was quite different. India was well prepared for a full- scale war. In April 1971, Indira Gandhi informed the Indian
forces to prepare for war on Pakistan ipon which, Manekshaw asked for funds to buy tanks and aircrafts. Manekshaw was quoted as: ’if you want me to

 

go in now, 1 can guarantee you 100 percent defeat, but if you give me some time, I can guarantee you 100 percent success ‘ . He said later, 7 got
evety thing I wanted. I got money and 1 went to the Soviet Union and got the tanks and aircrafts’ .

In peace time, Indian forces on Eastern Command were one Corps consisting of three infantry divisions at Calcutta. With Indira Gandhi’s decision to go to
war, the Indian Eastern Command started concentrating its forces in West Bengal, Meghalaya, Assam and Tripura. Whereas, on the northern border, covered
in snow, spare mountain divisions were re-equipped and a new Corps headquarters was raised. Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander Eastern
Command, engaged against an insurgency within north-east India, had withdrawn his troops towards East Pakistan as weE335 All these military activities
could be detected. To avoid suspicion, it was said that the military was requested in the Indian Eastern Command due to the prevailing internal unrest.

332 Ibid p. 348

333 AAKNiazi, Betrayal of East Pakistan, p. 128

334 Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, p. 350

By September 1971, there were seven divisions and a communication zone, fully equipped and holding strategic locations with sorted strategies on the East
Pakistani border. By November 1971, the Indian Eastern Command had raised three Corps. The Indian capabilities were enhanced, two companies could be
airlifted instantly and another regiment of the Hovercraft capable to move battalions across die rivers was also employed. 336 The total strength of the Indian
army surrounding East Pakistan became 400,000 while five airfields were operational for the Indian Air Force. The Indian Navy was also far stronger
compared to the East Pakistan’ naval forces. The entire fire power available, in all of East Pakistan with Pakistan forces was less than one division of the
Indian force.337

The relative strength of tire forces in tire two Eastern C ommairds may be seen from the table below:

Table 3

Strength of Forces on Eastern Command

Indian Forces Pakistani Forces Ratio Corps Headquarters 3 13:1 Infantry Divisions 8 3 2.5 : 1 Infantry Brigades 28 9 3 : 1 Para- Brigade 1-1:0
Infantry Battalions 72 34 2.5 : 1 Anmour Regiments 6 16:1 Independent Anrred Squadrons 313:1 Artillery Regiments 46 6 8 : 1

335 Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors, p.341-342

336 Ibid p. 352

337 Rao Farman Ali, How Pakistan Got Divided, p. 1 1 6

Indian Forces Pakistani Forces Ratio Anti-Aircraft Regiments 414:1
Para-Military Forces 32 13 3 : 1

Mukti Bahini 100,000 – – Air Force Squadrons 111*11:1 Navy – Aircraft Carrier 1 – – Destroyers/Frigates 8 – – Landing Ship Tanks 3 – – Source: K. Matinuddin, Tragedy of Errors:
East Pakistan Crises 1968-71, 1994

 

The Indian interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs bad increased in the form of terrorist activities in East Pakistan In August 1971, a team of doctors visiting
for tire medical inspection of Pakistani soldiers, concluded in their report that tire troops were exhausted and it was recommended to send them on leave.338
Untileary November 1971, East Pakistan had been terrorized by the terrorists of Mukti Bahinis, regular Indian soldiers, and other proxy fighters.

Generally, it is considered that Pakistan stalled the war with a pre-emptive strike on the Indian Airfields. But the leadership in West Pakistan had not moved a
finggr against the aggression which had been initiated by India on 2 1 st November 1 97 1 , 339 On that day, Pakistani troops in East Pakistan came under attack
from the Indian artillery, tanks, and air raids. When India cried out that Pakistan had attacked therm East Pakistan in reality had already been under Indian
attack for some time. West Pakistan had only opened another war front by attacking the airfields. The Indian government waiting for such a moment blamed
the act of aggression on Pakistan F inally, Y ahya Khan accepted the declaration of war in his speech.

Yahya Khan was fully aware of the situation, yet he waited for 3 rd December to declare to the world that Pakistan was at war only to be labelled as
aggressors. Even Nixon was alanned by the Indian aggression but President Yahya upon receiving the news said, ‘ What can I do for East Pakistan? 1 can
only pray’. 340

33 ® Niazi, Betrayal of East Pakistan, p. 1 14

339 Muqeem, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, National Book Foundation, 1973,p.l68

340 Ibid. p. 160

Bhutto on the other hand, continued to manipulate the situation for his own gain. When Bhutto returned from China in N ovember 1971 after high- level talks,
lie triumphantly declared that the Chinese would support Pakistan in the war against India. Although, the Indian intelligence had correctly reported that Bhutto
was given a cold reception and Chou Enlai’s promise was for anus and amnunitions only. This intelligence was proved correct later. Henry Kissinger and
Richard Nixon, echoing Bhutto’s words vowed that their ally Pakistan would not be alone, even if they could not intervene from thousands ofmiles away.341

On the night of 20 th and 21 st November 1971, the Muslim world was celebrating the end of Ramadan and Eid. On this night taking advantage of the festive
occasion of Eid, India attacked East Pakistan.

‘Tire scope of Indian Military involvement increased substantially in the first three weeks of November 1971 but in most instances the Indian units
would hit their objectives in East Pakistan and then withdraw to Indian Territory. After the night of 21 st November, however, tactics changed in
one significant way; Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 st November several Indian Army divisions divided into small tactical units launched
simultaneous military actions on all key border regions of East Pakistan from all directions with both armour and air support …’.342

By that time, India started blaming Pakistan for inciting the war on 3rd December. By now Pakistan had almost already lost the battle since it bad sustained
4,000 causalities and nearly the same number of injured; additionally twelve tanks and three aircrafts had also been destroyed, rendering Pakistan in a
precarious position

 

The Indian forces moved into East Pakistan from all directions in Jessore, Rangpur, Mymensingh, Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Hilli,
Lalmonirhat, Comilla and Feni Three Corps and the 101 ComnunicationZone, the equivalent ofa corps, also attacked the Pakistani troops. The Indian Lt
General Jacob states, ‘ whenever we attacked the Pakistanis in their prepared defences, they fought with courage and doggedness ’. 34 ~’ Indian troops
were lacing difficulties in advancing through the defences, thus strategically they chose to bypass the Pakistani troops attacking them from behind.

341 Blood Telegram, Chapter 17

343 Niazi, Betrayal of East Pakistan, p. 194

343 Jacob, ‘’Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, p. 73

The defence of Kamalpur is reminisced for its legendary heroic and brave fight, put up by the valiant Pakistani soldiers agpinst two attacks of the N inety- five
Mountain Brigpde. They only surrendered when they were ambushed from the rear resulting in their aninunition supply running dry. Captain Ahsan Malik, the
Commander, had been praised by Indian troops to the extent that General Sam Manekshaw recommended him to the Pakistani Chief for a gqllantry award.

Teliakhali post fell into the Indian hands at tire cost of 23 soldiers’ lives and 35 wounded. Klralai post, defended by one Pakistani platoon, reinforced to two
companies, retained their post in continuous attacks until an Indian brigade action was called in to defeat them Three East Pakistani F-86 Sabres were
destroyed when 9 infantry division, on 20 th November, entered Bayra where the full battle cost Pakistan 14 tanks and many soldiers. By 3 rd December, the
Indians had come to know that the war would take a dong time and a great cost ’, if they were unable to bypass the Pakistani troops. This ‘bypass
strategy’ was successful because the Pakistan Air Force had weakened significantly in East Pakistan 344

By 2 nd December, the Indian forces had gpiired territories in North- West Jessore, North and North-West Dinajpur, areas in the Sylhet district, and areas in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts. On 3rd December, when Pakistan Air lbrce attacked Indian Airfields, from West Pakistan, the Eastern Command and the
governor had no prior information about an opening of the Western Front. After this, on 4th December, the Indian attacks came from new launching pads
established in the captured territories since 21st November. The Indian Air Force ferociously attacked Dacca airfields where the light anti-aircraft guns
supported by the Pakistani fighter jets destroyed 28 Indian aircrafts. 345

On 5 dl December, news of the sumender ofa battalion came to tire Eastern Command while it was also reported that the Indian troops were advancing from
all directions. On 6 th December, the Dacca airfield was damaged beyond repair and the East Pakistan airspace come under the Indian control 346 The Indian
airfields across the border were taking part in these air operations, as was the Indian aircraft carrier ‘ Vikrant’ which had already erected a naval blockade.

The Pakistan Navy and Air Force were both outgunned and outclassed, and were in no position to fight an outrageously huge number of Indian fighter planes
and naval forces. The Army was left unaided to fight the Indian troops.347 The communication links had broken-down to the extent that civilian telephones
were being used for military comnunications. The disorgqnized communication and persistent attacks on the forces caused further exhaustion in the forces.

344 Ibid, p. 75

345 Rao Farman Ali, How Pakistan Got Divided, p. 120

346 Ibid.

Lt General Niazi, on the perusal of the situation was, was advised by Major General Rao Farman Ali to pull back his troops from Dinajpur, Tbakurgpon and
Rangpur to Bogra, and also those in Comilla to be stationed near the Meghan River. He responded to this advice by saying, ‘ that the troops stationed there
had not been attacked, so it would be unnecessaty to move them ’. Lt General Niazi, rather than issuing a withdrawal ordered a ‘no retreat’ until 75 per
cent casualties were sustained. 348

After 6 dl December, the Indian forces had two tasks to achieve. First, not to allow the retreating Pakistani forces to cross the rivers into Dacca. Second,
Dacca should be captured before the Pakistani reinforcements arrive. These two tasks were easily achieved by the Indian army because the East Pakistani
formations lacked the required engineers for crossing huge and mighty rivers. Furthermore, the Indian Air Force, having complete air control was the death
knell for united Pakistan’s future.

On 7 th December, Hilli was captured by the Indian Forces where the Pakistani troops were too exhausted to defend. General Nazar’s Sixteenth Division in
the Bogra Sector came under decisive attack, making him flee to avoid capture. The Indian troops captured Jessore without any resistance as the cantonment
was found abandoned with intact ammunition dump. The people of West Pakistan remained ignorant about tire M of Jessore into the Indian hands for two
days, because as alleged by Major General Rao Farman Ali, Niazi was hiding his failures. Niazi instructed Brigadier Hayat to secure tire Khulna Port for tire
erqpected US fleet, thus leaving the route to Dacca clear and Jessore foolishly undefended. 349

347 Muqeem, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, National Book Foundation, 1973, p.169 348 Rao Fannan Ali, How Pakistan Got Divided, p.125

The governor, on Major General Rao FamianAli’s reminder, approached the Eastern Commander Niazi for a brief about the war situation at the Corps HQ.
In the meeting, Niazi falsely reassured to the gpvemor that the situation was completely under the army’s control. He advised, giving the impression that
everything was normal, the government ministers to visit different areas to calm down the general public offering the military helicopters for this purpose. This
impression was dispelled the very next day, when the Corps HQ refused to arrange the helicopters for the ministers’ visit claiming the non-availability of the six
helicopters, f ulfillin g the essential military needs. Niazi’s offer was ludicrous revealing his naivety or deviousness, considering the lull-blown war situation on his
hands.

The governor, Chief Secretary Mr Muzafiar Hussain, and Major General Rao Farman Ali invited Niazi to the Governor House to discuss the ground realities.
The governor started the conversation with, ‘when two sides fight one wins and the other may lose. At times a commander may have to smrender and
at other. . . ’ But before he could finish his sentence, Niazi was in tears and weeping It was evident that the Eastern Commander had lost the will and courage
to fight, unable to stand up to his own directive ‘last man and last round’.350 A desperate telex was sent to President Yahya, demanding that an urgent
ceasefire resolution should be raised in the UN to salvage tire downward spiralling situation of East Pakistan. On Niazi’s request, the message was sent from
the Governor House so that he could protect himself and shift tire blame onto tire governor in case of any unfortunate event.

Major General Rahim whilst pulling back his troops to Dacca came under attack from the Indian aircrafts while crossing tire Meghna River, hi the raid, many
officers and soldiers died, and Rahimbimself got badly injured along with many other soldiers. On 8 th December, Indian troops advanced towards
Mymensingh with new reinforcements, while in Sylhet, they supplemented with helicopter support. The sanguine Indian Amy Chief of Staff started

 

broadcasting the demand for surrender.

 

Major General Rao Farman consulted Lt General Niazi about the withdrawal of the troops, and duly informed him that the troops were unable to pull back as
they were surrounded by the enemy from all sides. The reply of the telex message sent on 7 th December received a reply informing about the delegation
rushed to the United Nations (UN) to achieve the requested. The delegation included Bhutto, travelled to New York on a circuitous route, taking sixty hours
to reach to accomplish their ‘rushed’ assignment. The delegation first travelled to Kabul by road, then flew to Frankfurt, Rome, and London before finally
landing at New York. This was allegedly done on Bhutto’s insistence as he was quite reluctant to present the united Pakistan case in the UN.

On 9 th Decenber, in Sylhet, Pakistani troops captured seven Indian tanks. Lt General Niazi sent a Signal (No. G- 1255) to GHQ on 9 th Decenber stating
that:

One (. ) regrouping readjustment is not possible due to enemy mastery of skies (. ) population getting extremely hostile and providing all-out help to
enemy (. ) rebels guiding enemy through gaps and rear (. ) Airfield damaged extensively, * no mission in last three days and not possible in future (. )
All jetties, ferries and river crafts destroyed due enemy air action (.) bridges demolished by rebels (.) even extrication most difficult (.) Two (.)
extensive damage to heavy weapons and equipment due to enemy air action (. ) troops fighting extremely well but stress and strain now telling hard
(. ) Not slept for last 20 days (. ) are under constant fire air artillery’ and tanks (. ) Three (.) situation extremely critical, we will go on fighting and do
our best (.) Four (.) request following (.) immediate strike all enemy air bases this theatre (.) if possible reinforcement airborne troops for protection
Dacca (.) Message ends.

The airborne demand of Niazi was picked up by the news agencies. This news destroyed the morale of the rest of the troops, who on 1 1 th Decenber ran
towards the Indian airborne landing near Dacca and surrendered to become their prisoners.

A panicked Governor Tikka Khan sent a message to the President asking for a political settlement and ceasefire. In reply, the following signal was sent:

FLASH Dated 092300 (9 Dec, 1100 hrs P.M) FROM: HQ CMLA
TO: GOVERNOR EAST PAKISTAN AND
EASTERN COMMAND

TOPSEC (. ) G-0001 (. ) From President to Governor repeated to Eastern Command (.) your flash message A4660 of 9 dec received and thoroughly
understood (. ) you hcn’e my permission to take decision on your proposals to me (.) I ha\’e and am continuing to take all measures internationally
but in view of our complete isolation from each other decision about East Pakistan 1 leave entirely to your good sense and j udgment (.) I will
approve of any decision you take and 1 am instructing Gen Niazi simultaneously to accept your decision and arrange things accordingly (. )
Whate\’er efforts you take in your decision to sa\’e senseless destruction of the kind of civilians you have mentioned, in particular the safety of our
armed forces, you may go ahead and ensure safety of our aimed forces by all political means that you will adopt with our opponent.

On 1 0 th Decenber, Pakistani troops at Mymensingh retreated towards Dacca, upon orders from the Eastern Command. In the north of Mymensingh, 3 1
Baloch regiment, under the command ofLt Colonel Sultan Mahmood, fought with such valour that the Indian opponent had to send him a messenger asking
him to surrender. The following messages are testament to the preparedness of the Pakistani forces to hold out, if they were given the proper support.35 1

[FromBrigadierHardat Singh Kler] To, The Commander Jamalpur Garrison

lam directed to inform you that your garrison has been cut off from all sides and you ha\>e no escape route available to you. One brigade with full
compliment of artillery has already been built up and another will be striking by the morning. In addition you ha\’e been given a foretaste of a small
element of our airforce with a lot more to come. The situation as far as you are concerned is hopeless. Your higher commanders hcwe already’
ditched you.

I expect your reply before 6-30 pm today failing which 1 will be constrained to deliver the final blow for which purpose 40 of MGs have been
allotted to me.

* Matinuddin, Tragedy of Brora, p.417

In this morning ‘s action the prisoners, captured by us hcwe given your strength and dispositions, and are well looked after.

The treatment 1 expect to be given to this civil messenger should be according to a gentlemanly code of honour and no harm should come to him.

An immediate reply is solicited. Brig H. S. Kler
10 DEC 197COMD

Reply of Commanding Officer 3 1 Baloch, Lt Colonel Sultan Mahmood:

Dear Brig.

Hope this finds you in high spirits. Your letter asking us to surrender has been received. I want to tell you that the fighting you have seen so far is
very little, in fact the fighting has not even started. So let us stop negotiating and start the fight.

40 sorties, I may point out, are inadequate. As for many more.

Your point about treating your messenger well was superfluous. It shows how you underestimate my boys. I hope he likes his tea.

Give my love to the Mukties. Let me see you with a Sten in your hand next time instead of the pen you seem to have so much master over.

Now get on and Fight Your Sincerely,

10 DEC 71. (COMMANDER JAMALPUR FORTRESS)

Another signal (No. G-1265) sent from the Eastern Command, on 10 DEC to state that:

One (. ) alfa (.) all formations this command in e\ >ery sector this theater under extreme pressure (. ) bravo (. ) formations/troops mostly isolated in
fortresses which initially invested by enemy cmm now under heavy attacks and may’ be liquidated due overwhelming strength of enemy (. ) Charlie

 

(.) enemy possess mastery of air and freedom to destroy all vehicles at will and with full concentration of effort (. ) delta (. ) local population and
rebels not only hostile but all-out to destroy own troops in entire area (. ) echo (. ) all communication road/river out (. ) Two (. ) orders to own troops
issued to hold on last man last round which may not be too long to veiy prolonged fighting cmm troops totally tired (.) anyway will be difficult to
hold on when weapons/ammunition exhaust in the next few day’s (.) supplies/ammunition also continue to the destroyed by enemy/rebels actions
besides intense rate battle expenditure (.) Three (.) submitted for information and advice.

On 1 1 th Decenber, the troops could find no way back into Dacca and were constantly fighting in Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra and Nator until the surrender on
1 6th Deceirber. Concurrently the news of the landing of 5000 Indian paratroopers near Dacca emerged, convincing N iazi of being outnumbered, vanquishing
arty hope of defending Dacca. 352

On 12 th December, the Chief of General Staff sent a message in Pashto – Gul Hassan spoke out the message to the Eastern Commander, ‘yellows coming
from the north and whites from the south ’ . This illuminates their expectation that the Chinese and Americans would come to their help on the 13 th of
Deceirber.

On 13 th Deceirber, the GHQ sent a message that foreign help would come in tire next 48 hours. Niazi was also ordered to defend Dacca until a ceasefire
resolution was passed. Indian troops were approaching Dacca from the north, the northeast, tire east and the south-east; Dacca was an urgent target for the
Indians before the ceasefire resolution was passed.

352 Jabob, “Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, p. 127

Consequently, the Indian troops bypassing Dinajpur, Rangpur, Sylhet, Mainamati Cantonment, Khulna and Cbittagpng, reached the outskirts of Dacca.
Contemporaneously, the Soviets informed the Indians of their inability to veto the UN resolution anymore. This development alarmed the Indian Army Chief
Manekshaw, because by this time Indians had just successfiilly captured Comilla and Jessore, where the Pakistani troops withdrew on their own. At this time,
the Indian military was also cognizant of the East Pakistan Command’s desire to end the hostilities. Taking advantage of the opportunity, Niazi was contacted
to which he asked for, ‘ if they would be guaranteed their rights under the Geneva Convention and if the safety of military and paramilitary
personnel and ethnic minorities would be protected upon suirender ’.

Niazi sent a signal to President Yahya Khan requesting pennission while the Indians embarked on drafting the instrument of Suirender (Annexure-8) , 353

On 14 th December, the Indian Air Force bombed the Governor House, achieving the resignations of the governor and his cabinet even before the airraid
ended. The Indian intelligenee interceptions were so efficient that almost every message was intercepted. The bombing of the Governor House was decided
because President Yahya and the Governor’s signal was intercepted in which Yahya clearly rejected the proposal calling for ‘ immediate cease-fire,
repatriation of other East Pakistanis desirous of returning, safety of persons settled in East Pakistan since 1947, and guarantees that there would
be no reprisals ’. Yahya was still hoping for the American carrier ‘ Enterprise ’ to come to their help. Even though, the carrier had entered the Bay ofBengal,
the US refrained from enggging in the war. 354

General Niazi was in constant contact with the GHQ, receiving President Yahya’s signal

‘ You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possibly nor will it serve any useful purpose. It will only lead to a
further loss of life and destruction. You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting ’ , 355

353 Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, p. 128-129

354 Blood Telegram, p. 230

355 Jacob, “Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, p. 136

As Niazi received the signal he along with Major General Rao Fannan Ali, went to the US Consulate General, to present a ceasefire proposal to Mr Herbert
Spivack. Spivack, in no position to negotiate the ceasefire, promised to send the message to Indians. The proposal stated:

“To put an end to further loss of human lives a nd destruction we are willing to ceasefire under honourable conditions:

A. Ceasefire and stop all hostilities immediately in East Pakistan.

B. Hand over peacefully the administration of East Pakistan as arranged by the UN.

C. The UN should ensure:

1) Safety and security of all Anned Forces personnel of both militaiy and paramilitary forces of Pakistan pending their return to West Pakistan.

2) Safety of all West Pakistan . . . civilians and civil sen’ ants, pending their return to West Pakistan. 3) Safety of non-locals settled in East Pakistan
since 1947.

4) Guarantee of no reprisal against those who helped and sawed the Government and the cause of Pakistan since March 1971. “356

The Indians were informed that Niazi had visited the US Consulate General for negotiating the surrender. However, Indians had not received the message until
15 th Decenber. It went to Washington and Henry Kissinger delayed it assuming that his effort could help Pakistan gqin territories in West.

On 1 5 th December, Niazi received the reply of Field Marshall Manekshaw. BBC announced the news at 8 p.m that India had agreed on a ceasefire from 5
p.m to 9 a.m, on Lt General Niazi’s request and surrender negotiations would take place during the ceasefire. At night, the Army Aviation Squadron
helicopters escaped to Burma and from there to West Pakistan.357

356 Ibid, p. 137

333 Muqeem, Pakistan’s Crisis in leadership. National Book Foundation, 1973,p. 189

On 16 th December, at 8:30 a.m the Indian authorities were contacted and the Indian jeeps entered Dacca at midday. Lt General Niazi symbolically
surrendered his pistol at the Race Course to General Jagjit Singh Arora.358

 

Separation of East Pakistan

 

Bhutto, as a Deputy Prime Minister and at the same time as a Foreign Minister, was the one that had been sent to New York to represent Pakistan’s case
before the UN. At this critical stagp, China remained fan in its support against the Indian aggression The Chinese Premier, Chou- En- Lai assured President
Yahya Khan, In case of Indian involvement in the Pakistani affairs, China would not be an idle spectator but will support Pakistan

However, Pakistan had to lace the Soviet anger for its cooperation with China. All the members of the UN, except USSR and India, were unanimous on the
immediate ceasefire. On 6 th December 1971, the Soviet Union had imposed its first veto, thus thwarting the Security Council’s resolution calling for a
ceasefire. However, Poland, with Soviet support, had moved a resolution in the Security Council on 14 th December, which called for – the release of Sheikh
Muj ibur Rehman, transfer of power to the elected representatives headed by him, an initial ceasefire for seventy-two hours, withdrawal of the
Pakistani forces to preset positions for their evacuations, return of West Pakistani civilian personnel and withdrawal of Indian forces after
consulting the newly recognized authorities.

With repeated Soviet vetoes facilitating India’s movement in East Pakistan, Bhutto’s attitude changed and he rejected the idea of a ceasefire.

Weeping openly, he said, 7 find it disgraceful to my person and my country to remain here. . .Legalize aggression, legalize occupation, I will not be a
party to it ’.359

In a gesture of angry protest, he tore up a Security Council paper and stormed out of the Security Council. The day Bhutto walked out of the debate the
Indian forces had reached Dacca and the Eastern Command surrendered to avoid ‘fiirther bloodshed’.

Muqeem, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, National Book Foundation, 1973,p. 190 Jacob “Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, p. 152

Hie involvement of the Indian army in the last phase had been decisive. At 14.30 hours GMT on tire 1 7th December, a ceasefire was signed and Yahya Khan
sent a message to Bhutto to return. He was carefully monitoring the situation, landed at Islamabad airport on 20th December, and drove straight to the
President’s House, where Yahya and his colleague were waiting for him Yahya was still hoping to get away with something and return to his previous Chief of
Staff position in the army.

However, Bhutto afier assuming the office of President and a Civilian Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) had other plans; first he wanted all powers for
himself and second he did not want Yahya Khan anywhere near the seat of power. Consequently, in the evening of the same day, in a radio broadcast, he
announced the retirement from service of Yahya Khan and six other senior generals ending the embarrassing tbirtythree months of Yahya Khan’s rule. Yahya
Khan, after an unsuccessful effort to cling to power, made way for Bhutto to assume authority in the remaining Pakistan. On his part, Yahya blamed the
dismemberment on Bhutto in his signed affidavit (attached as Annexure-10) .

Mujib, who had been previously arrested, tried and sentenced to death by a military court, was later released on a remitted sentence at the behest of Bhutto
and sent to East Pakistan Bhutto also recognized Bangladesh as an independent state, as the final legitimation act, on 23rd February 1974.

Conclusion

The elections of 1970, a landmark in the political history of Pakistan, produced a result that few political analysts or the contesting parties had anticipated.
Mujib’s Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan on one hand while Bhutto’s PPP won the majority seats in the Western Wing on the other. However,
the impetuous Bhutto and the unfaithful Mujib share considerable blame for the disintegration of the country. Ultimately, the reins of ‘new Pakistan’ came into
the hands ofBhutto, who embarked on the forrnationofgpvernrnent at the Centre and in the provinces. Armed with the powers of the President and the Chief
Martial Law Administrator, Bhutto made swift and resolute moves. All of Bhutto’s actions appeared to have been aimed at emphasizing the radical change in
circumstances and at consolidating his own position This further complicated the existing problem in East Pakistan at the time.

It would be right to conclude that the events that led to the separation of East Pakistan were a series of mishaps and selfish decisions by all concerned that
were cleverly and cunningly manipulated and exploited by a hostile India. We have already discussed the role of India and her machinations in the previous
chapters.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MUKTI BA HIN I – ITS TRUE FACE Introduction

T

 

lie creation of Bangladesh paints in one’s mind, a picture of a series of barbaric and atrocious activities. With deliberate efforts and a propagandist
construction, the Pakistani government and army are blamed for violating every nonn of humanity. Amid such constructed myths agpinst Pakistan and her
army, few accounts have been written to show the reality behind one of the worst examples of human brutalities, where, the indoctrinated fanatic members of
Indian- backed Mukti Babinis killed, raped, and looted innocent people. Men were butchered, women were raped and their naked bodies were thrown out on
the streets, children were hanged and their heads were nailed and dashed agqinst walls, hospitals and villages were burnt, animals and eatables were set on fire
and almost eveiy source of human life was destroyed. This barbaric campaign of the Mukti Babinis lias always been concealed under the gqrb of the so-called
liberation war of Bangladesh The reality of the atrocities committed by die Indian backed and manned Mukti Babinis also cannot be justified or concealed
under the gqrb of liberation. A rational mind would always question cruelty no matter what its justification is. Can the rapes, lootings, and the murders of
innocent souls be rationalized as a collateral damage for an ostensible war of liberation? It is indeed a question for history to answer that, was this ‘a war of
liberation’ or ‘an Indian backed insurgency’?

In the previous chapters substantial evidence has been presented to ascertain it as to be an Indian backed insurgency presented as a war of liberation to
dismember united Pakistan. Thus, no sane mind can legitimize the inhuman campaign of Mukti Babinis as required for the creation of Bangladesh The
genocide of poor pro-Pakistani Bengalis and especially the non-Bengqlis remains one of the worst examples in the shameful history of the genocides of the
world. This chapter would reveal the atrocities committed by the ‘forgptten terrorists’ of the Mukti Bahinis who need to be tried as criminals agqinst humanity
and punished mercilessly. This chapter will give a detailed account of the Mukti Babini as a terrorist group. Its formation, aims and objectives, members,
weapons, source of funding, training, military strategies, the modus operandi for operations, the organizational structure, and its reign of terror will be
discussed in some prolixity.

The fanatic militants of the fascist Award League started their operation soon after the postponement of Pakistan’s National Assembly sessiom on 1 st March
1971. Within an hour of President Yabya’s announcement, fifty to sixty thousand militants of the Award League rushed to the streets of Dacca, holding iron
rods and bamboo sticks. The militants’ mob burnt the Pakistani flag and pictures of Mr linnah 360 . From early March 1971 it became evident that planned
agitations were taking place under the supervision of Mujib with the guidance and support of tire Indian R&AW.

Mukti Bahini- R&AWs Brain Child

The contacts between Mujib led Award League and the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) was established in the early 1960s. These contacts were unearthed in
the famous Agartala Conspiracy Case in 1967 which has been discussed in the previous chapter. Initially, the Award League and the IB were tasked to
fertilize the ground for Indian intervention After the establishment ofR&AW on 21st September 1968, it was specifically assigned to train and raise a militant
outfit of the Bengqlis which would pave the way for Indian military intervention Accordingly, after tire Indian enforced exodus of the Hindu Bengali refugees
from East Pakistan, brought about by the planned attacks of the Mukti Bahid in early 1971, Indira Gandhi called on General Sam Maneksbaw the then Army
Chief for discussing the modus operandi for the dismemberment of Pakistan In his book Mission RAW, R. K. Yadav the former R&AW official asserts that,

3 ®* Bose,Sarrrdla, Dead Rockoning, C. Hurst & Co, London 201 l,p.23.

‘ M’s. Gandhi told General Mcmekshaw that she wanted to take military action against Pakistan army to liberate this wing (East Pakistan) of
Pakistan. Manekshaw replied her that If Indian Army was to put in an action in East Pakistan, special riverine operation equipment and training
was required for them wherein we are lacking. When M’s. Gandhi asked the General as to how much time the Indian Army would take for the
offensive inside East Pakistan, he replied at least Six months. Since, the Indian army was not prepared and wellequipped for an immediate army
action at that point of time, it was planned to raise and train a guerrilla outfit of the Bengali refugees of East Pakistan by R&A W which would
harass the Pakistani army till the Indian army would be ready for the final assault for the liberation of East Pakistan ’ 361 .

In pursuance of the orders of Indira Gandhi, it was decided to set-up a provincial exile government of East Pakistan/Bangladesh in Calcutta. It was in the later
part of March 1971, when the Pakistani aimed forces initiated a targeted military operation agqinst the terrorists of the Awami League and the Mukti Bahini,

 

who through agitation and terrorist attacks had paralyzed the East Pakistani gpvemment. With fear of being apprehended due to their involvement in spreading
chaos, the top leadership of the Awani League excluding Muj ib escaped to C alcutta. These included the Vice President of tire Awami League Syed N azrul
Islam, Kliondaker Moshtaq Ahmed, Qamar-uz-zaman Mansur Ali, and Tajuddin Ahmed. After reaching Calcutta they came under the complete command
and control of R&AW362 . Under the guidance of the Indira Gandhi led Indian government, the leadership of the Awani League was asked and facilitated to
form a Provincial Bangladesh Government. It was 14th April 1971 that the exile provincial Bangladeshi government was fonned in a house at ‘8 Theatre Road
Calcutta’ and this house was named as ‘Mujib Nagpr’ giving an impression that it was a separate territory. To propagate the stance of the provincial
government of Bangladesh, a separate Bangladesh radio ‘ Free Bengal Bet al Kendra ’ was also established under tire supervision ofR&AW. Tajjudin
Ahmad was nominated as the prime minister, and Syed Nazarul Islam was nominated as the president in Mujib’s absence 363 . Colonel M. A G. Osmani was
made the chief of staff of the Bangladesh provincial force (Mukti Bahinis). Here it is vital to understand that the creation of Mujib Nagar and all the drama of
the Bangladeshi government was merely staged to provide legitimacy to the forthcoming Indian military action The formal establishment of the Mukti Bahini
was taking place in the so-called refugee camps; even the Awami League leadership escaped East Pakistan under the shield ofbeing refugees 364 . Here, the
moral grounds of the supposed refugees can be gauged, where, the terrorists of the Mukti Bahinis were being raised to kill and rape innocent East Pakistanis.
Nevertheless, the formal establishment of the Mukti Bahinis took place in April 1 97 1 structured and nourished by R&AW, but its roots may be traced back
to 1960s. In the various meetings between the Indian establishment and the Awami League leadership, the fonner encouraged the latter to initiate their
independence campaign, promising and then actually providing funds, weapons, ammunitions, and other needed support 365 . For this purpose, initially it was
the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) which started giving essential sabotage training to the terrorists ofthe Awami League. However, after Indira Gandhi’s
instructions, R&AW operatives along with BSF and other paramilitary forces of India started training the terrorists of the Awami League and the Mukti
Bahinis at the Hindu- dominated refugee camps. B. Raman, the exR&AW official in his book The Kaoboys ofR&A W also confesses that India assisted and
supported the formation of the Mukti Bahinis. He acknowledges that, ‘ Indira Gandhi decided to assist the Bengali-speaking people of East Pakistan to
separate it from Pakistan and achm’e an Independent state to be called Bangladesh ’366 . Giving more details lie also mentions that, The Indian armed
forces under the leadership of Field Marshal Manekshaw and the Border Security Force (BSF) headed by the late K. F. Rustomj i overtly and the
R&A W and the IB covertly ensured this ’ 367 .

3 ®1 Yadav RK, Mission RAW, Manas Publications,New Dehli,2014,p.231. 367 Ibid, p.232

From the confessions of Mr Raman, it is evident that India launched all its anned forces to train and prepare the Mukti Bahinis to spread terror and to clear
the route for India’s military intervention in East Pakistan

364 Ibid, p. 232.

343 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy ofGreat Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p278.

366 Raman B, The Kaoboys ofR&AW, Lancer ,New Delhi , 2013,

Objectives and Operations

As mentioned earlier, the main objective ofthe Mukti Bahinis was to prepare a ground for the Indian military intervention in East Pakistan The Mukti Bahini’s
mandate and objectives were crafted in very ‘patriotic terms’ and phrases like Independent State , SelfDetemination and Liberation were widely echoed
in their slogans. But these phrases were mere Indian constructs to gamer domestic support for their heinous designs and crimes. The real intent behind the
fonuation ofthe Mukti Bahinis was to harass the Pakistani forces and to spread terror in the general population of East Pakistan However, according to the
Ambassador Lt Colonel (Retd) Sharif Haq DalimBir Uttam, one ofthe famous commanders of the Mukti Bahinis, and later the Bangladeshi senior diplomat,
the objectives and die operational mechanisms of die Mukti Bahinis were;

a. Arrangements -would have to be made to induct large number of guerrillas inside East Pakistan through most favourable ways and to route fight
the Pakistan army from all direction.

b. No industry will be allowed to function. By destroying the power stations, substations and demolishing the pylons electric supply system, has to
be disrupted.

c. Export of any raw material or finished products to be totally stopped.

All godowns are to be destroyed.

d. All means of communications such as transports, roads and rail
communication, riverine communication, bridges, etc. to be destroyed, so
that enemy cannot maintain the line of supply.

e. Tactical operation should be so planned that the enemy is forced to
disperse into isolate pockets.

f. The guerrilla bands should be trained to live among the people like
fish in water and fight Pakistan army from all directions 368 .

Exclusively, the R&AW dictated operational objectives of the Mukti Bahinis were, firstly to demoralize the pro-Pakistani forces. Secondly, it aimed at
shattering the economy of East Pakistan Thirdly, the Mukti Bahinis were tasked to destroy all sorts of communication sources. Fourthly, they were to engpge
the Pakistani forces in long hit- and- mn battles to spread fatigue and desperation to incur desertion in the ranks of the Pakistani army. Finally, the most vital
objective was to pave the ground for the Indian military attack.

368 Dalim, Lt. Col. (Retd) Shariful Haq, “ Bangladesh Untold Facts “, Jumhoori Publications, Lahore, 2011, p.250

Keeping in view die abovementioned objectives, it’s evident that through terrorists of the Mukti Bahini, die Indian establishment spread chaos through
sabotage campaigns and accomplished destruction of die comrmnications system By shattering die economy and destruction of the gpdowns, the Mukti
Bahinis exploited the already weakened economy of East Pakistan and further spread hatred agpinst the Pakistani amned forces. Here an equally important
aspect would be to highlight the Indian intentions for supporting and orgpnizing the Mukti Bahinis. Apart from materializing her dream of Pakistan’s
dismemberment, the hegemonic India aimed to convert East Pakistan into an Indian satellite state after its creation Such Indian intentions may be witnessed in

 

the reported treaty between the so-called provincial government of Bangladesh at Mujib Nagar and the Indian establishment signed in October 1971 369 .

The 7-point secret treaty is reproduced below:

a. After establishment of Bangladesh, the administrative officers who actively participated in the war of liberation would remain in their posts. The
rest would be terminated and vacant posts would be filled up by the Indian administrative officers.

b. After the liberation of Bangladesh the required number of Indian soldiers would remain in Bangladesh.

c. Bangladesh would not form and maintain any formal Indian regular Armed Forces.

d. To maintain internal security and law and order a militia would be formed comprising of the Mukti Bahinis.

e. The chief of Indian Armed Forces would lead to the probable war with Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini would work under the Indian Armed Forces.

f. Trade transactions between the two countries would be free and open. The volume of trade would be calculated once in a year and the price
would be paid in pound-sterlings.

3 ® Abedin, Zainal, RAW and Bangladesh, Madina Printers, 1995, p. 9.

g. The Foreign Ministry of Bangladesh would maintain a close liaison with External Affairs of Ministry of India and the latter would assist the
former as far as possible 370 .

The text and language of the above-mentioned treaty clearly demonstrates that, India was not the helping hand in the so-called liberation war of the Bengalis,
but actually was following her own plan for the dismemberment of Pakistan. And, additionally was aiming to convert the newlycreated state into a ‘satellite
state’ to pursue her expansionist interests. Intoxicated with the constructed myth of national liberation, the Mukti Bahinis were actually fighting the war for
India. The Indian operative measures to pursue her evil designs have been finlher described by B. Raman in his Kaoboys of R&A W. According to him, ‘the
R&A W’s operations were fivefold Provision of intelligence to the policymakers and the armed forces; to train the Bengali freedom fighters in
clandestine training camps; to network with Bengali public servants from East Pakistan posted in West Pakistan and in Pakistan ’s diplomatic
missions abroad and persuade them to co-operate with the freedomfighters and to help in the freedom struggle by providing intelligence; to mount
a special operation in the CHT against the sanctuaries and training camps of the Naga and Mzo hostiles; and to organize a psychological warfare
campaign against the Pakistani mlers by disseminating reports about the massacres of the Bengalis in Pakistan and the exodus of refugees ‘ 371 .

Organizational Structure

The military crackdown of the Pakistan army, necessitated by the agitation and sabotage activities of the terrorists of the Awani League in early March 1971,
resulted in a large-scale migration of the Bengalis – mostly Hindus to India, who were used to broaden the training campaign. The Awami League and the
ten’orists under the cover of refigees reached the Indian based refugee camps. These refugee canps were covertly transfonned into training camps for the
militants of the Awami League and the Mukti Bahini With the help of R&A W and tire Indian army, the terrorist outfit Mukti Bahini was launched formally
under the command of Colonel Osmani in April 1 97 1 . By middle of July 1971, Colonel Osmani with the help of the head of R&AW, R. N . Kao, Deputy K.
Sankaran, and regional officers of tire Indian Boarder Security Forces implemented a comprehensive guerrilla operation in all the regions ofEast Pakistan A
terrorist force of one hundred thousand was organized; recruited and trained collectively by R&AW, BSF, Assam Rifles and other Indian military and
paramilitary forces372 .

379 Abedin, Zainal, RAW and Bangladesh, Madina Printers, 1995, p.9. 371 Raman B, The Kaoboys of R&AW, Lancer , New Delhi , 2013,

The Mukti Bahinis were divided into many groups briefly discussed below:

The Niamit Bahini:

Consisting of regular forces, this group was assigned to wage guerrilla war against the troops of the Pakistani army. The group members were mostly from the
East Pakistan Rifles, Ansars, Mujahid Corps and police. Most ofthe members were already trained but still many of them were given special training by the
Indians for sabotage and specific hit- and- mm attacks.

Sector Troops:

The members of sector troops were mostly instructors, subcommanders and guerrilla commanders. These were from the regular forces of the Niamit Bahini
These were known as the sector troops owing to their positioning in different areas/sectors ofEast Pakistan.

The Gona Bahini:

These were the irregular terrorist forces assigned for laying mines, blowing up bridges, culverts, ambushes, sabotage operations, blowing power houses and
strategic nerve centers. Most members of this group were students. This group was especially trained by R&AW for covert campaigns. The group was
tasked to destroy the communication set-ip and blow up the routes used by the Pakistani armed forces. Gram Paris hads :

Apart from the above main forces, another important groip was tire GramParishads. It was established inmost ofthe villages ofEast Pakistan These were
structured as small units. They worked as informers and would provide information about the movements of the Pakistani forces. Besudesm they would assist
the Mukti Bahini’ s terrorist forces to organize rural sanctuaries for them

Naval Wing:

A small naval wing was established by R&AW which was assigned for conducting naval operations. With the hejp and support of R&AW, this naval wing
conducted operations against the Pakistani forces and in few cases succeeded in sinking the Pakistani vessels. They also tried to cut the supply lines ofthe
Pakistani forces. All this was covertly managed by R&AW 373 .

373 Yadav RK, Mission RAW, Manas Publications,NewDehli,2014,p.235

Arid these groups there were other clusters of terrorists which were categorized on the basis of their functions.

Action Group:

This group was 50 to 100 per cent armed by Indian weapons and were required to engage in direct hit-and-run attacks on the Pakistani forces.

Intelligence Group:

This group was established under the command ofthe intelligence cell based in C-nC’s secretariat in the headquarters of Mujib Nagpr in Calcutta. The group
was assigned to gather information about tire Pakistani forces and their movements. The group was thirty to fifty per cent aimed with Indian small arms as they
were not to carry out attacks on the forces. The remaining arms were of Soviet or Israeli origin.

Terrorist Bases:

The sector troops would establish and maintain these terrorist bases. All arrangements for food, and training were made available in these bases. Medical

 

teams were also present to provide medical assistance, duly supported with Indian equipment and supplies.

 

373 Ibid, p. 236.

On geographical basis, all forces of the Mukti Babinis were divided in eleven sectors 374 .These sectors were further divided into sub-sectors and were
orgqnized under a sector commander and sector headquarter. According to Lt Colonel (Retd) Shariful Haq Dalim, following were die eleven sectors of die
Mukti Bahini

Sector 1:

This sector was formed in Chittagong, and covered the areas of hill tracts part of Noakhali and River Fein. Linder the command of Major Ziaur-
Rehman this sector was divided into 5 sub-sectors. The sector had twenty one hundred Bengali soldiers from East Pakistan Rifles, Police, Navy and
Airforce and had twenty thousand guerrillas out of which eight thousand were organized members of the action group.

Sector 2:

This sector covered the areas of Faridpur, Comilla, Noakhali and part of Dacca. Major Khaled was the sector commander. Divided into 6
subsectors it had four thousand soldiers (4, 000) and about thirty thousand (30, 000) guerrillas.

Sector 3:

This sector was formed in Nary an Ganj, Maulvi Bazar, Brahmanbaria and Kerani Ganj. This sector composed of 10 subsectors hewing the strength
of ten thousand (10, 000) guerrillas. The sector was commanded by Major Shafiullah.

Sector 4:

This sector was spread over the areas of Sylhet Saddar in north, Hobignaj in south and Patharia range was at its eastern border. Under the
command of Major Chitta Ranjan Dutta this sector had further 6 sub-sectors. It had twelve thousand (12, 000) gierrillas and three thousand
(3,000) regular troops.

Sector 5:

Sector 5 was formed of the northern parts of the Sylhet district. Divided in further 6 sub-sectors, this sector was under the command of Major
Shawkat Ali. It had eight hundred (800) regular soldiers and five thousand (5, 000) gierrillas.

Sector 6:

Sector 6 was formed of Rangpur and Dinajpur districts. This sector was under the command of Wing Commander M K. Bashar and had more sub-
sectors than any other. It had twelve hundred (1200) regular troops and six thousand (6,000) gierrillas.

37 ^ Dalim, Lt. Col. (Retd) ShaiifiilHaq, “Bangladesh Untold Facts”, Jumhoori Publications, Lahore, 2011, p. 251

Sector 7:

Sector 7 comprised of Pabna, Rajshahi, and parts of Dinajpur. Sector was under the command of Major Nazamul Haq. The regular troops were
two thousand (2, 000) and the gienillas were four thousand (4, 000). This sector was divided into further 8 sub-sectors.

Sector 8:

Sector 8 was formed in Kusthia, Jessore, and part Khulna. It had further 7 sub-sectors. Initially was under the command of Major M A.

Osman Choudhary and later Major Manzoor was made the commander. It had three thousand (3, 000) regilar troops and eight thousand (8, 000)
gierrillas.

Sector 9:

This sector covered parts of Faridpur and Khulan, Barishal Patuakhali and Shunderban. Captain M A. Jalil was the sector commander. It had 8
sub-sectors. The strengh of this sector had fifteen hundred (1500) regilar troops and fifteen thousand (15,000) gierrillas.

Sector 10:

Sector 10 was composed of na\’al commandos and had no geographical boundary. They were sent in different sectors for operating against the
na\’al and maritime shipping vessels of Pakistani forces.

Sector 11:

The Northern Western areas like the Turn and Garo Hill formed this sector. Major Abu Taher was the sector commander and had twenty five
thousand (25,000) gierrillas and had 8 sub-sectors 375 .

Apart from the Mukti Bahinis, there were two other organizations trained and orgpnized by R&AW. These groups were trained collectively by the Special
Frontier Force (SFF), an Indian commando task force, and R&AW.

Mujib Bahini:

These were the student leaders of die Awani League who were considered to be very loyal to Mujib. The prominent members of this group were Sheikh
Jamal, the younger son ofMujib, Sheikh Fazal Haque Moni, Tuiail Ahmed, Shiraz; Abdul Razak, and Asraf 376 . R N. Kao, the R&AW cbiefj placed diese
indoctrinated young men under the command of Major General S. S. Ubban, head of (SFF). These 1 0,000 youth most of them being university and school
students were trained by the SFF in die hilly terrain of Chittagpng They were later named as the Mujib Bahini and were given die Chittagong area for
perpetrating terrorist actions.

375 Dalim, Lt. Col. (Retd) ShaiifiilHaq, “Bangladesh Untold Facts”. Jumhoori Publications, Lahore, 2011, p.250-252.

Kader Bahini:

Under the leadership of Abdul Kader Siddique (Ex-member of Pakistan Army) anotiier organization was established and trained by R&AW. According to R
K. Yadav, ‘ Kader was the main operative o/’R&W in the most vital areas of Strategic operation around Dacca ’ 377 . Kader Bahini had guerrilla

 

forces of sixteen thousand (16,000) of local Bengalis. The main operative area of this terrorist organization was the Tangail district but it also conducted
operations in the Ibanas of Dacca and the Mymensingh district.

Apart from these organizations, two other organizations were also formed, the Tohfaan Bahini and the Beman Bahini . The Beman Babini was
considered to be the Bangladeshi Air force. It was also reported that India with financial and technical support of the Soviet Union was constructing an airfield
for the rebels in Betai 378 . All in all, the organizational structure of the Mukti Babinis was sketched and organized entirely by R&AW and the Indian military. It
was shaped as a guerrilla outfit and was divided into different groups on the basis of their function and area of geographical operations. The sectors were
organized in all of East Pakistan to carry out different sorts of temoiist attacks. The study of the training of the Mukti Bahini further reveals that R&AW
indoctrinated thousands of immature minds and aimed them against their own army for conducting terrorist operations.

37 ® Yadav RK, Mission RAW, Manas Publications, New Dehli, 2014, p.239.

377 Ibid, p.242.

378 Niazi, General A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 71

Training

As discussed above, prior to the Indian military intervention in East Pakistan, the Mukti Bahinis were raised and trained by R&AW and the Indian military to
harass the Pakistani anny and to pave the ground for the Indian military action in East Pakistan when opportune. Hence, in early May 1971, proper training of
the Awani League’s militants and terrorists started on a very large scale. As asserted by Brigadier Jagdev Singh, ‘The resistance needed planning weapons
and leadership and only India could provide them ’ 379 . Therefore, India planned a large-scale training campaign soon after the Pakistan army started
operation in March 1971. India launched Operation Jackpot to provide assistance and appropriate training to the militants of the Awani League and to fully
orgqnize the terrorists ofthe Mukti Bahinis 380 . SankaranNair, R&AW’s deputy chief and in charge oftbe Pakistani desk, was joined by P. N. Baneijee,
head of Bangladesh operations in R&AW and M. B. K. Nair, head of technical division, visited tire R&AW-controlled check posts, where the commandos of
the Security Frontier Force were stationed to training the alleged ‘refugees ofEast Pakistan’. Many monitoring stations were established on the border
cbeckposts and few inside East Pakistan during this visit. These stations helped in the coordination of R&AW offices in Calcutta and its headquarters in New
Delhi for these training operations38l .

By the end of July 1 97 1 , under the Operation Jackpot , a long course of framing was orgpnized by the Mukti Bahini in various guerrilla bands, which were
than allocated different tasks and operational areas. The Indian army with the help of R&AW had established 59 training camps where the ‘refugees’ were
indoctrinated and motivated for operating agpinst the Pakistan army. A serving Major General of tire Indian army was appointed for organizing these training
camps 382 . Mujib Nagpr was declared as the headquarters ofthe Mukti Bahini

37<7 Singh, Jagdev, Brig, Dismemberment of Pakistan, Indo-Pakistan war, 1971, Lancer International New, Dehli, 1988, p.69.

38 ® Jacob, LT Gen JFR, “Surrender at Dacca, Birth of a Nation”, Monahar Publicaters, New Delhi, 201 1, .p. 90.

38 1 Yadav RK, Mission RAW, Manas Publications, New Dehli, 2014, p.233.

382 Niazi, General A.A.K, The Betrayal ofEast Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1998,

There were different types of trainings, keeping in view the age and educational background of the terrorists.

Science Graduates: The science graduates were trained in technical areas of sabotage for two months.

Undergraduates: The young undergraduate students
were trained specifically in using small arms, rocket
launchers, and mortars and map- reading and commando
tactics.

Non-Matriculates: In this category, they were trained in
sabotage, use of various types of mines, explosives, and
grenades. More specifically, they were trained in
destroying the infrastructure including bridges and
culverts.

The recruits were given training of three months and an additional period of training was given for specialized subversive tasks. After die completion of training
the terrorists were helped to penetrate in East Pakistan to cany out heinous crimes under different cells and sectors. Excluding the police, the Indian military
had a total of 70,000 Bengali dissidents. With such strength it didn’t fake much time for the Indians to establish eight fully trained and equipped Mukti Bahini
battalions, hi addition, the following six training camps were established in different areas of India383 .

Serial Designation Location Commander

1 Alpha Sector

2 Bravo Sector

3 Charlie Sector

4 Delta Sector

5 Echo Sector

6 Foxtrot Sector Moorti Camp, West Bengal Raiganj, West Bengal
Chakulia, Bihar

Decta Mura, Tripura
Masipur, Assam
Tura, Meghalaya
Brigadier Joshi

Brigadier Prem Singh Brigadier N. A. Naik Brigadier Shah Beg Singh Brigadier B. Wadia
Brigadier Sant Singh

Apart from these training camps, six to eight hundred members of the Mukti Bahini were trained inside India in various Indian military institutions. Even the

 

doors of Indian military academy were opened fcr the Mukti Babini 384 . It was reported that after every six weeks two thousand Mukti Babini were trained
for guerrilla operations 385 . Moreover, three hundred menbers of the Mukti Bahini were sent to Cochin for underwater saboteurs training and another three
hundred recruits, most of them being students, were similarly trained as frogmen at Plassey on the Bbargirathi River in West Benggl386 .

383 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East: Pakistan Crisis 1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994, p 230-231

To sum up, the entire Indian establishment including the Indian government, the civil and military agencies, the Indian navy, air Ibrce and anny were involved in
training and raising the terrorists of the Mukti Bahinis. Through a close look into their training period and their military strategy, it becomes evident that
basically it was the Indian force which was fighting the Pakistani anned forces under the cover of the Mukti Bahini from early March 1971. The scale of their
training and the involvement of R&AW and the Indian military does not confomi to the claims of entitling the Mukti Bahini as freedom fighters. The Mukti
Bahini were the product of R&AW and the Indian military to accomplish their plan of tire dismerrbennent of Pakistan

Membership and Strength

The Mukti Bahini membership composed of the dissidents of the East Bengal Regiments, the East Pakistan Rifles, the Razakars (home guards), the militants of
the Awami League, the brainwashed Bengali students and most prominently the members of tire Indian anny. According to Lt General A. A. K. N iazi, ‘ The
strength of Bengali armed force which rebelled after 25 March 1971, was 162, 000. Tire number of civilian trained by the Russians and Indians was
about 125,000. Thus the total number of Bengalis in Mukti Bahini was 287,500. Add 50,000 personnel of the Indian army who joined them in the
garb of Muktis, which swells the total to a formidable number ’ 387 .

384 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors East: Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p 230.

383 Palit, D.K., Maj.Gen., The Lighting Campaign, Compton Press, Salisbury, 1972, p.57.

384 Rose, Sission Richard and Leo E, War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the creation of Bangladesh, University of California Press, Berkely, LA, 1990, p. 184.

387 Niazi, General A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1998,

It has always remained an open secret that the members of the Indian military had conducted operations in East Pakistan under the cover of the Mukti Bahini
prior to the Indian military intervention Moraiji Desai, the former Indian Prime Minister, confessed that, The war with Pakistan was willed and provoked
by M’s. Gandhi., .she dispatched to East Pakistan thousand and thousand of Indian soldiers out of uniform disguised as Mukti Bahini and that five
thousand of them died in the enterprise between April and December 1971 ’ 388 . In an interview with Oriana Fallaci, a prominent Italian journalist, Mr
Desai repeated his confession and remarked, ‘ Regular Indian soldiers disguised as the Mukti Bahini hcwe been fighting the Pakistani Anny in East
Pakistan from April till December 1971 when after losing 5, 000 men in covert operations, Indira ordered open war ’. 389

General V. K. Singh in his book Courage and convection writes, ‘ we routinely went with the Mukti Bahinis to register targets. Usually we would have
a sprinkling of our boys mixed with freedom fighter (Mikti Bahini) and on one occasion I found myself on a reconnaissance of a bridge with the
Mukti Bahinis ’ 390 .

Buttressing this expose’ ofthe Indian military’s involvement in East Pakistan prior to the Indian intervention of December 1971, S. Brata, a Bengali Hindu
journalist stated that, “Muktis were, in fact, Indian soldiers and that if he had written about it “while he was in India, he would undoubtedly have
been arrested’” 391 .

Apart from the direct presence ofthe Indian military men among the ranks ofthe Mukti Bahini, tire recruited students and the youth were also another source
of the Mukti Bahini’ s strength. Anid the political destabilization, the Awami League and the other hidianoriented political organizations gradually organized
their militant underground wings. Such militant wings constituted of the students and the immature youth who were indoctrinated by the leaders of the Awami
League. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Hindudominated media of East Pakistan had started propagating separatist ideas soon after the creation of
Pakistan.

388 Ibid, p.75.

389 Mehmood.Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984, p.152.

399 Singh, General VK, Courage and Conviction Aleph Book Company, New Delhi,

2013, p. 54.

391 Mehmood.Safdar, Pakistan Divided, FerozsonsLtd,Lahore,1984, p.152

Colonel Osmani was responsible for the training, recruitment and selection of the Mukti Bahinis. The ages of the recruits were between sixteen and twentyfive
years. Before the Pakistan army’s operation in East Pakistan, five thousand (5,000) Bengali soldiers were serving in the East Bengal Regiment and sixteen
thousand (16,000) in the East Pakistan rifles. Additionally, forty- five thousand (45,000) were serving in the Police and fifty thousand (50,000) were the
Razakars392 . Prior to the Pakistan anny-led operation in March 1971 a total of one hundred and sixteen thousand (1 16,000) Bengalis were serving in civil
and military forces. After two months of file operation, almost seventy thousand (70,000) of the Bengali dissidents from Army, Police, and Razakars joined
the Indian forces and supported the Awami League’s stance. Therefore, the dissidents, the terrorists of file Awani League, the indoctrinated youth, the
students, the Awami League-backed professors and intellectuals under file command of Colonel Osmani, formally established the Mukti Bahini on 11 th April
1971.

Different accounts were given in the international press on the total strength of the Mukti Bahini For instance, according to file Guardian , ‘Impartial
analysis credit the guerrilla organization with hewing expanded within seven months from zero to a force of eighty thousand 80, 000 to one hundred
thousand (1 00, 000), a figure roughly equal to the number of regular Pakistani soldiers deployed against them ’ 393 . According to the estimate of The
Daily Telegraph, ‘ their strength was at fifty thousand (50, 000) men and 150, 000 active supporters ’ 394 .

It is vital to investigate the date ofthe Mukti Bahini ’s formal establishment, the Pakistan anny- led operation started on 25th March 1971, hardly 15 days
prior to the formation of the Mukti Babini Those who consider the Mukti Bahini as a reactionary force established as a reaction to the Pakistani military
operation must revisit their approach, and mull over how a large force of hundreds and thousands of trained terrorists was created, anned, and trained in the
short span of fifteen days?

 

393 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy ofGreat Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis, Lahore 1994,p 230

393 The Guardian, 3 November 1971.

394 The Daily Telegraph, 24 November 1971.

Military Strategy

The military strategy adopted by the Mukti Bahini was planned by the Indian military and R&AW. The threefold strategy adopted by the Mukti Bahini was
basically a gradual move towards the Indian military intervention The three- phased operations of the Mukti Bahini were:

First Phase :

From March to April 1 97 1 , the Mukti Bahini operated collectively with die Indian Boarder Security Forces in order to keep the Pakistani forces away from
the border region and help the Indian forces to get a better understanding of the transborder terrain

Second Phase:

In the second phase which was from May to June 1 97 1 , the Mukti Bahini penetrated deep inside East Pakistan to carry out subversive activities. The
terrorists of the Mukti Bahini including the Indian soldiers in civil disguise mixed with the local civilians, earned out terrorist acts such as ambushing conveys,
blowing up bridges, destruction of infrastructure, blocking roads and other communication and transportation channels, and assassination of isolated armed
personnel In one such incident 38 jute mills were attacked and destroyed in Mymensingh and Khulna 395 . Similarly, in another incident the Mukti Bahini with
the support of the Indian regular forces attacked and captured Bariab Bazaar on 20th June 1 97 1 396 . Most of these terrorist attacks occurred between May
and June 1971.

Third Phase:

The third phase of the Mukti Bahini operations stalled after August 1971. This phase was an overt phase, where the Mukti Bahini with a support of the Indian
artillery attacked Pakistani border checkposts and other vulnerable enclaves brazenly. By tire end of October 1 97 1 , the Mukti Bahini carried out extensive
explosions on both public and private places. This phase was marked by more heinous crimes committed by the Mukti Bahini, where everybody including old
men, women, and children were killed even if an iota of suspicion was found against their collaboration with the Pakistani forces. The main objective of this
phase was to capture strategic positions and to fertile the terrain for the Indian military intervention India openly helped the Mukti Bahini throughout their
operation, particularly in the final phase. The Mukti Bahini were supported by the Indian artillery, tanks, and even tire Indian Air Force 397 .

395 Economic Times, May 7, 1971.

399 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal. The Tragedy ofGreat Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p. 235.

The entire military strategy of tire Mukti Bahinis was drawn by the Indian military and R&AW to exhaust the Pakistani army before India’s direct intervention

Weaponry

Irrefutably, India remained the main arms supplier of tire Mukti Bahini, several historical evidences supporting a vivid demonstration of this feet. The
Telegraph reported on 14th April 1971 that, ‘a train load of Indian weapons has apparently reached the secessionist force near Madaripur ’ 398 .
Similarly Washington Post and The New York Tones reported that, ‘ Reports ha\>e likewise confirmed that ams were supplied “directly by India ” ’ 399
. The Bihar Chief Minister confessed that, ‘He was firm on the point of supply of arms and ammunition to Bangladesh ’ 400 . Lt General A. A. K. Niazi
asserted in his book, Tire betrayal of East Pakistan that, ‘ the Mukti Bahini bought weapons from foreign sources sympathetic to them such as Israel,
USSR, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia and from Eastern Markets like Hong Kong. …. Limpet mines of Russian origin were captured from rebel
frogmen. . . . American arms were also recovered from rebels … An American 5 7 mm RR was captured at Chittagong ’ 401 . The

397 Ibid, p. 236.

39 ^ The Telegrapgh, 14 April 1971.

399 The Washington Post, 13 September 1971, and The New York Times, 10 and 13 October 1971
499 Matinuddin, Lt. Gen (Redt) Kamal, The Tragedy of Great Errors: East Pakistan Crisis
1968-1971, Wajidalis .Lahore 1994, p 232.

391 Niazi, General A.A.K, The Betrayal of East Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1998, p.72.

Israeli support has also been revealed by Srinath Raghavan in his book, 1971: A global history of the Creation of Bangladesh. His research based on the
P. N. Haksar papers, (the official papers of P. N. Haksar, tire principal secretary of Indira Gandhi) reveals, ‘ India ’s ambassador to France D. N.
Chatterjee began the process to get Israeli amis with a note to the external affairs ministiy on July 6, 1971, saying assistance from Israel for
“propaganda, finance and even procurement of armament and oil” would be “invaluable ’”402 , this policy was covertly supported by Indira Gandhi
Ragvan further revealed that, ‘ Mrs Gandhi reached out to Israel with a request for vital weapons and ammunitions especially heavy mortars to
support the Mukti Bahini ’s-operations ’ 403 .

Reign of Terror

Winston Churchill rightly c laims that Histoiy is written by the Victors ’ . The unfortunate state of affeirs in the 1 97 1 – insurgency allowed the Indians and their
patrons to win over and create Bangladesh. Thus the history of Bangladesh lias also been written and propagated by the victors. These forces have
constructed a vicious and barbaric image of Pakistan and her army, where they are accused of massacre, raping, and looting. However, the reality still remains
untold. Very few altruistic accounts have been written to find out the real culprits behind the ghastly genocide and rapes of those, who wished and
endeavoured to preserve Jinnah’s dream ofunity. This book attempts to portray the reality of the monstrosities of the Mukti Bahini as debt owed to the
Bengali and non- Bengali Muslims deprived of their lives and honours. The Mukti Bahini reign of terror remains one of most barbaric and vicious chapters of
human miseries, hi this most gruesome chapter humanity wept as men were beheaded in front of their wives, children were lynched and murdered in their
mothers’ wombs, women were brutally raped and their naked bodies mutilated in streets, mosques were transformed into slaughterhouses, and copies of the
Holy Quran were burnt and disrespected. These abominable acts were committed by the so-called Muslims of the Mukti Bahini. A chronological account of

 

the atrocities committed by the Mukti Bahini would be presented in the following sections to highligh t the reality behind the so- called ‘Bangladesh War of
Liberation’.

403 Raghavan, Srinath, “1971 A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh”, Harvard University Press, 2013, p. 181-182.

403 Ibid,

Hie following section discusses the atrocious crimes committed by the Mukti Bahini terrorists, their Indian masters, and the Awami League miscreants. The
first section will shed light on tire events that took place in various parts of East Pakistan, before zero hour, afier the postponement of the assembly session.
The second subsection will delve into the massacres, rapes, loots, and arson committed by the Mukti Bahini and the Awami League, with die testimonies of
the witnesses repatriated to Karachi The third section presents details related to the figh ters, supporters, and sympathizers of the Mukti Bahini who were
involved in heinous crimes against the state, federal troops, and peaceful citizens.

 

Loot, Murder, and Arson committed

1st March 1971.

To avoid die political confrontation between East and West
Pakistan, President Yahya Khan announced postponement of the
National Assembly session The Mukti Bahini, politically brainwashed
by the fescists of the Awami League, seized the moment on 1st March
1971 and called for province- wide agitation and formally launched
their assault against united Pakistan Within hours, the cases of loot,
arson, vandalism and otiier acts of violence were reported. The
incidents of loot and arson increased throughout Dacca. The
Narayanganj Rifle Club depots were raided and the terrorists seized
the aims and ammunition required for their plans of hijacking Dacca.

The headquarters of these terrorists was Dacca University where they
prepared themselves for the attacks in two hostels: Jagarmath Hall
and Iqbal HalL These aimed terrorists roamed freely on the streets of
Dacca, casting a shadow of their terror over the city 404 .

2nd March 1971.

The militants looted the fireanns shops and transported the ammunition to Dacca University. In different parts of East Pakistan, the national flag of Pakistan
was burnt by a violent mob which was an organized group of terrorists receiving proper instructions from the leadership of the Awami League. When the
violence escalated and gpt out of the hands of the local authorities, the army was called to control the grave situation.

404 Government of Pakistan. (1971).“White Papers”, p.5

Hie once serene Jagprmath and Iqbal Halls of Dacca University, had become training centers for the terrorists of the Mukti Bahini, and echoed with firearm
sounds prior to tire military targeted operation at the University campus 405 .A gun battle between the Pakistan amny and militants of tire Awami League was
also reported at the Sadarghat TV station (Dacca), for thwarting its forceful capture by the militants of the Mukti Bahini406 .

3rd March 1971.

Mujib held a press conference to declare a strike tiiroughout East
Pakistan – a stronghold of the Awami League- initiating a civil
disobedience movement. During the conference, Mujib deflected the
question about tire burning of the Pakistani national flag at tire Dacca
University with a terse ‘No Comment ’. Islampur, Patuakhali Bazar,

Nawabpur, and other suburbs of Dacca came under violent attacks
of the Mukti Bahini. The loot and plunder of the shops, including a
general store, a watch shop, and firearms shops, on Jirmah Avenue
was reported. The horrifying incident of the burning of fifty huts also
occurred on this feteful day. This hellish day witnessed tire killing of
five people and wounding of sixty two in the widespread wave of
violence throughout Dacca. Schools and colleges were closed down;
the TV station stopped playing the Pakistani national anthem
replacing it with the controversial ‘Bangladesh’ 407 .

In Khulna, a local telephone exchange was attacked by an alleged
mob, in reality they were the militants of the Awami League, armed
with sticks and spears. The security guards guarding the telephone
exchange opened fire against the militants of the Awami League, only
killing two and injuring nine, while, the telephone exchange lost
several of its innocent employees in the attack 408 .

The Mukti Bahini in their terrorist campaign in Comilla and
Chittagong set a local train on fire. The telephone exchanges in both
the cities were attacked, damaged, and closed down at various places.

405 Ibid,

406 Ibid, p.5, 6.

407 Ibid ,p.6,p.7

408 Sannila Bose. (2012). “Dead Reckoning”, Oxford University Press. Karachi., p.30

 

4th March 1971.

Incidents of lootings and arson took place in Dbamnadi and
Nawabpur districts, including the looting ofa firearms shop, hi
Khulna, the Pakistani flag was desecrated and a hand grenade was
thrown in Deputy ConTnissioners , office. The railway tracks were

damaged and passengers of derailed train were butchered. Before the Anny could restore the government’s authority, on

the night of 3rd – 4th March in Chittagong, the non- Bengali residents

of different localities were attacked, murdered, and were burnt to

death Seven hundred houses were set on file with such a speed and

ferocity that the sleeping residents could not escape and those who

did manage were killed or wounded by the terrorists of the Mukti

Bahini The Mukti Baliini killed three hunched people apart from the

ones they scorched to death 409 .

5 th March 1971.

The comrrunication system between East and West Pakistan was brought down on the orders of Mujib. The telegraph and telephone employees were
stopped from working, as a measure to achieve comrrunication blackout with the world. Even the British Council was not spared by the violent students of the
Salinullah MuslimHaH, however, arrival ofthe troops time saved the property from being burnt dowrrtto . hi Kbalispur and Daulatpur ofKhulna, fifty seven
people (probably non- Berths) were mercilessly killed and mutilated with daos (meat- cleavers), spears, and hand bombs. Various incidents of arson and loot
were also reported in the Khulna towntl 1 .

6th March 1971.

The jailbreak of the Central Prison of Dacca was executed by the terrorists of the Mukti Bahini, causing death of seven prisoners, the wounding of the
employees including a sergeant, and six wardens. Three hundred and forty one (341) prisoners took advantage of the chaos of the arrbush and escaped.
Vocal agitation echoed throughout Dacca with processions chanting anti-state and racial slogans. The lawlessness continued with laboratories being raided for
explosive chemicals to be used in Mukti Bahini’ s violent excursions.

409 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.7

410 Ibid, p.7, 8

91 * Sannila Bose. (2012), “Dead Reckoning”, Oxford University Press, Karachi., p.30

An attack on the Polytechnic Institute was made unsuccessful by the Pakistan amry 412 . In Khulna, the Rajendra College University Offices and the Training
Corps came under a mob raid for tire possession of ten rifles and fifteen bayonets. The fireamrs shopkeepers opened fire at a mob, attempting to loot one of
them, killing and injuring seven4l3 . The cases of stabbing burning looting and arson were continuously and widely reported. Reports of several houses and
huts being forcefully emptied from their owners were rampant but without any reprimand from the authorities. The attackers used sniper rifles at various
locations openly4l4 . In Rajshahi, City Magistrate’s office was set on fire as a glaring example ofthe prevailing misrule

7th March 1971.

On 7 th March 1971, Mujib announced his program of parallel government consisting of secessionist directives. Numerous episodes of looting and arson of
cars, jeeps, trucks and micro-buses 415 , occurred continuously without any respite for the innocent civilians. Radio Pakistan’s building was attacked with
explosives and orders were given to set-up Revolutionary Councils. As an act of ultimate disrespect the Pakistani national flag was desecrated and burnt at
Bargana, Khulna.

8th March 1971.

Processions and meeting? of the Awami League and the Mukti
Bahini were being held, with the directives issued from the high
command to the workers. Alongside the firearms shops’ lootings,
licensed anus were also taken from the people. Under this
lawlessness, people were left vulnerable and the only option left for
their protection was to join the Mukti Bahini or the Pakistani side 416 .

9th March 1971.

Under Mujib ’s directives, ‘ No money shall leave East Pakistan ’ was enforced in banks and checkpoints were setup in various parts of Dacca to make
sure no holdings or assets in any fonn leave East Pakistan The established checkpoints remained for many days and sometimes tire purpose was to intimidate
the non- Mujib supporters. Kenneth Clarke of London’s Daily Telegraph reported that, ‘ Mujib brought the situation near to secession ’ 417 .

412 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.8

413 Ibid.

414 Ibid.

415 Ibid, p.8, 9.

416 Ibid,p.9.

The residents of Rangpur and other localities were attacked by the Awami Leaguers, with a local train too coming under a vicious attack. The passengers of
the train were physically harassed on political and racial basis, ringing anarchy bells for days to come. The new ‘Bangladesh’ flag was hoisted over the City
Town Hall as a reminder of the secessionist dream 418 .

 

12th March 1971.

 

Disturbance was reported in the tea gardens of Comilk. Three hundred jail prisoners attempted an escape, on whom the police opened fire killing two and
injuring eighteen Five anny ration trucks were stopped and looted at Brahmanbaria by an anned mob. There were successful jaibreaks in Bogra and
Barisal 419 .

 

Abdul Rashid , an employee of the East Bengal Railways at Parbatipur rekted that the train from Ishurdi was kte for ten hours and when it arrived at the
Parbatipur railway station, it had one hundred and seventy dead bodies. The passengers were intercepted en route to Parbatipur; an men women and children
became victims of the Awami League militants. The merciless attackers stabbed the breastfeeding babies to death along with their mothers. There were
seventy- five seriously injured victims who were shifted to the hospital420 .

13th March 1971.

At railway stations, passengers were harassed, interrogated and called dalals (pimps) of West Pakistan. The stolen chemicals were used in attacks on
government buildings near Kakrai (Dacca) 421 . The ‘Bangk Desh’ fkg was hoisted also at the Deputy Commissioner’s office in Jessore, Khulna. In Comilk
and Chittagong, the Awami leaguers protested outside tire Jail for the release of jailed prisoners who had allegedly burned the national fkg at Sbamshemagpr.

412 Government ofPakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.9, p.10

418 Ibid, p.10

419 Ibid.

429 Qutubuddin Aziz. (1974), “Blood and Tears”, United Press ofPakistan Ltd., p. 1 15

421 Government ofPakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.10- 1 1

14th March 1971.

Mujib issued new directives addressed to deputy commissioners and sub-officers to stop working.

15th March 1971.

Mujib issued another directive that army pressure should not be accepted regarding the civil disobedience movement and taxes should be paid to the East
Pakistani regime. The violence of ‘non-violent and non-cooperation movement’ kept increasing with people being harassed and humilkted on the basis oftheir
rackl and political backgrounds 422 . The anny field unit was surrounded and attacked by an armed mob in Cbittagpng.

16th March 1971.

In Chittagong, firearms shops were met with the same fate being looted for its anns. The kboratory was raided and chemicals were taken away from the
Mahraj High School in Natore, in Rangpur.

17th March 1971.

Acids and stolen chemicals were used in attacks on government offices in Dacca. The power house, in Jessore and Khulna, came under attack and tire
electric supply was interrupted. Road blockades were erected for disrupting nonnalcy and creating chaos. The 5th March-attack survivors were threatened
and twelve houses in Rangpur were attacked and burnt by the Awanri League students.

18th March 1971.

The Central Government High School in Motijheel was raided and its kboratory’s chemicals were looted. In Jessore, the attackers threw acid-bottles at the
anny personnel in a camp.

19th March 1971.

An army vehicle came under ambush and six (6) occupants were abducted with their weapons.

422 Ibid, p. 11-12

20th March 1971.

According to The Far Eastern Economic Review , ‘Mujib said, “This is the final round ” and repeated the slogan “ Joy Shadin Bangla ” (Long Live
independent Bengal) 423 . In Bagerliat Town, according to Qazi Anwar I lussain , the Awami League militants were involved in the killings of non- Bengalis
from the first week ofMarch The targets of the Awami League militants were not only the Biharis and the West Pakistanis but also the Bengali Muslim
League members or proPakistan (at that time West Pakistan) Bengalis. He stated that tire Awami League militants raided the house of the well-known Bengali
Muslim Leaguer, Muhammad Qasim, taking valuable items and burning the house to ashes in his absence. These vicious Awami League volunteers and
extremists discouraged Bengalis to provide shelter to non- Bengalis, and those not pledging acquiescence were killed along with the non- Bengalis. The
ten’oirsts mercilessly blocked the roads and highways impeding escape of the lucky or unlucky non- Bengalis left 424 . According to Qazi Anwar Hussain ,
five hunch ed innocent non- Bengalis and Bengalis were killed. In the Taranganj Colony, five hundred people were killed and four hundred remained missing,
when the East Pakistan Rifles and tire Awami League militants attacked the colony. The attack turned the houses into debris and the colony an adobe of dead
bodies425 .

From20 th March to 10th April 1971, inKushtia town, the East Pakistan Regiment (EPR) Rebels, Mujahids and the Awami League terrorists attacked the
anned forces. The tyranny of killers accounted killings of one thousand to fifteen hundred ( 1 000 – 1 500) including army personnel 426 . It can be
comprehended from this diat if die anry personnel were rendered helpless in this carnage, the civilians never stood a chance.

21st March 1971.

On 20/21 March, Indian amis and ammunitions were smuggled into East Pakistan into Satkhira (Khulna Division) and to Chittagong Division from India.

There are reports of die same fromChittagpngto Comilla 427 .

422 Government ofPakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p. 13

424 Qutubuddin Aziz (1974), “Blood and Tears”, United Press ofPakistan Ltd., p.92-93

 

423 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.24

426 Ibid, p.25

22nd March 1971.

The Indian anns smuggling was also reported in the tea gardens of Sylhet. The Awami League led violent rallies in Dinajpur against President Yahya Khan In
Sitarampur locality of Mymensingh, according to Fahim Siddiqi tire Awami league militants stormed the locality with ‘ Loot , Bum and Kill the Menfolk .
Faliim Siddiqi lost his two brothers in the raid, surviving by hiding in the deserted building for days until the federal troops recaptured the locality 428 .

23nl March 1971.

The ‘Pakistan Day’ was celebrated as ‘Resistance Day’, with numerous events ofthe desecration of the Pakistani national flag and its replacement with the
‘Bangladesh’ flag book place. The passengers at the Dacca airport were beaten up and ill-treated by an armed mob 429 . hi Mirpur Khulna division, the
situation became tense when die residents refused to hoist the ‘Bangladesh’ flag at their houses. Numerous cases of the abduction of West Pakistani
businessmen for ransom were also reported. In Halishahar, Cbittagpng, according to Falmikla Begum w/o GhulamNabi , her family members, husband,
three sons and a daughter, were slaughtered in front of her. She said that her husband became victim of a machine gunfire of an anned Bengali gang (Mukti
Bahini). Her three sons were beheaded and their decapitated heads were kicked around like football, her daughter was bayoneted to death while she was a
reluctant audience to these heart- wrenching sights.

From 23 rd to 29 th March 1971, in Klialispur Khulna, according to A. S. Saifullah, the Awami League miscreants and terrorists were on a killing rampage,
resembling mad elephants, ofthe non- Bengalis. The hundreds of non- Bengalis ofthe locality were taken to the Crescent Jute Mill, where the terrorists had
built a slaughterhouse for their murder. This slaughterhouse witnessed the medieval torture ofthe gouging of the eyes ofthe Non- Bengali victims 430 . In
Sirajganj, the Awami League militants took non- Bengalis – men, women, and children – in a building, setting it on fire and ensuring the survival of no one 43 1 .

427 Ibid, p. 13

428 Ibid, p. 188

429 Ibid, p. 14

430 Qutubuddin Aziz. (1974). “Blood and Tears”. United Press of Pakistan Ltd., p.88

24th March 1971.

As another propaganda technique, pamphlets were distributed among the people calling for an armed resistance. In the pamphlets, instructions were given to
resist the army through any means possible: block the roads, bridges and rail- links; keep yourselves armed with weapons and bombs432 . In Dacca University,
according to Mohammed Hanif , Bengali students kidnapped non- Bengalis for ransom; those who failed to provide ransom were tortured and beheaded.
Mohammed Hanif himself was abducted and made to write a letter to his family for ransom of Rs. 3000. The federal troops came into action for his release
on the night of 25 dl March and he was saved before his deadline of 26 th March for ransom expired 433 .

25 th March 1971.

The bonb factory came in existence on the Dacca University campus – Jagarmath Hall and Iqbal Hall – to manufacture acid bombs on a large scale. Likewise
the Engineering College established its own set-up to produce acid bombs. To further paralyze tire city barriers were set up all over Dacca. The miscreant ex-
Colonel Osmani took the charge ns the Commander of ‘the Revolutionary Forces’ and erected blockades on the roads ofthe Chittagong Port to hinder army
transport of personnel and arms. As an endeavour to disrupt tire traffic flow, the roads were damaged by digging holes; similarly, roadblocks were created
with carts, lorries, and trucks 4 ‘’ 4 .

In Rangpur, fifty houses were burnt by an armed nrob of eight thousand people equipped with sticks, rifles, shotguns, and knives. In another incident, three
people were killed and seventeen were injured, of these seven were wounded by shotguns while two were hit by the bullets of other guns. The army troops
came on the scene to disperse the violent crowd and necessarily opened fire injuring three people. An attack on army personnel in Saidpur from shotguns
caused retaliation and five people were injured 435 . hr Saidpur, a post office van was attacked; the conductor was killed and the driver sustained serious
injuries.

43 1 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.26

432 Ibid p. 14

433 Ibid, p.25-26

434 Government ofPakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p. 15

According to the witness, Noor Jahan w/o Abdur Rashid , her husband was shot dead in the attack on their house. Men were shot dead while women were
made prisoners and taken to another village. She said that more titan two-hundred and fifty Pathans – men, women and children were killed. The sadistic
Awami League terrorists would slice flesh from the Pathan victim’ body, rubbing the wound with dust continuously till the victim lost consciousness or life. The
abducted women were raped every night and those who resisted were killed, their bodies were tom into pieces while their breasts amputated and ‘Joi Bangla’
was carved on their foreheads. She along with other victims was rescued by tire Pakistan Amy on 1 0 th April 436 .

The areas where amy could not do a rapid action, people found themselves trapped with Mukti Bahinis and the undisposed dead bodies of their loved ones.
People were trapped for days and weeks in their burnt houses, in bushes, water tanks, and any place they could find to hide, helplessly witnessing the rotting
of their unburied loved ones. Those who did give a burial were helped by the Pakistani amy (federal troops). The merciless killings, massacre, rapes, and
tortures were meted out to unanned and defenceless people who were only guilty of being non- Bengalis.

30th March 1971 .

In Pachchum Tengri of Ishurdi, three thousand armed Mukti
Bahini raided the locality. According to Ainul Haque , the Awami
League militants, dissidents of the East Pakistan Rifles and the

 

Ansars killed 90 per cent of the population of the non- Bengalis. His
whole family was among those butchered in this pogrom On 1 1 th
April 1971, federal troops entered in the locality when it had already
become a ‘ghost colony’. He was helped with tire burial of his family
and shifted to Ishurdi hospital to recover 437 .

In Chittagong around 10,000-12,000 people were killed. A

mutiny took place in the East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) and they slaughtered innocent men, women and children with their
service weaponry. One of the most horrifying acts committed was the ‘ syringe massacre ’ , in which the victim’ s blood was drained through syringes till death
gained mercy, deriving sadistic pleasure fcr the killers. The terrorists practiced equality in killing

innocent men, women, and children to satisfy the evil witbin438 . In Chuadanga from 26th March to 1 st of April 1971, five hundred

people were killed, while a hundred people went missing. The

terrorists killed Bibaris and West Pakistanis, gathering them together,

without prejudice. A West Pakistani SIX) was tortured and his

pregnant wife was badly beaten 439 . In Naogaon and Santabar from

26 th March to 22 nd April 1971, around fifteen thousand people were

annihilated. The Awani league militants blocked die movement of

the Bibari people. The banks of the localities were looted 440 . The

women were separated from their male family members, raped and

paraded naked in the street to be killed when the abusers gpt bored

or found new victims to replace them Their male relatives were

killed, sparing them the ordeal of watching their women being

dishonoured. The dead bodies were scattered all over the area,

turning human dwelling? in open graveyards 441 . The other torture

tactics used in the locality were burning to death, nailing or being

shot to death Even the devil must have shuddered when the mothers

were forced to drink their children’s blood at gunpoint-442 .

435 Ibid, p. 15

43 ® Qutubuddin Aziz. (1974), “Blood and Tears”, United Press of Pakistan Ltd., p.98-99

Between 26th March and 23rd April 1971

Two thousand people were killed during this hellish period. The Awami League terrorists and liberated criminals were roaming around and were not willing to
leave a single non- Bengali alive. The Pakistan Army action in the district saved the lives of seven thousand people – men, women, and children were brought
and lodged inside a jail for protection The unrelenting killers had planted dynamites and were planning to blow up the jail, but tire Pakistan Army didn’t allow
them to succeed. The survivors narrated heinous acts of murder, rape, loot and arson against the non- Bengalis 443 .

4311 Extract FromDacca Gazette [August To December 1971] Gazette Page No. 771

439 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.25

440 Ibid, p.26

441 Extract FromDacca Gazette [August To December 1971] Gazette Page No. 653

In Shankipara of Mymensingh, according to Sheikh Habibullah , his family members were murdered, house was looted and he could not even think of giving
a burial to his family in the midst of the madness surrounding the locality. He said that, ‘ except for a few aged stragglers like myself all traces of human
habitation had vanished from these once thriving colonies (Chalisbari, Cbattisbari, Islamabad and Ikya)’. Young women of locality attempted suicide to
save themselves from tire shameful late ofbecoiriirg sex slaves. One hundred and seventy- five non- Bengalis were murdered inside a mosque – where they
gathered in a vain attempt to save themselves from the frenzied nrob. Three hundred non- Bengalis were killed in a primary school where they had taken
refugp. A Bengali, pesh imam – prayer leader – had saved lives of five hundred Bibaris from the inhuman mutineers. He also came to know about the fate of
West Pakistani personnel and their families, who were butchered in the night of 25 th /26 th March by the mutineers’ of the East Bengal Regiment 444 .

27th March 1971

In Mymensingh Cantonment, West Pakistani army men were killed. When East Bengal Regiment (EBR) and East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) mutinied, they had not
just left their barracks to join the ranks of tire Mukti Bahini but to anyone’s astonishment they started massacring their West Pakistani colleagues, in barracks
and in residential quarters445 . The Amy men from West Pakistan were murdered in cold blood in their sleep 446 .At Hafiz Jute Mills, between 27 th and 28 th
March, one hundred and fifty people were burnt alive. However, only the minor children were able to escape from this dreadful fate 447 .

443 Ibid, p.26

444 Ibid, p.185-187

445 Ibid, p.28

446 Qutubuddin Aziz. (1974), “Blood and Tears”, United Press of Pakistan Ltd., p. 187

447 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”. P.23

28th -29 th March 1971

In various localities of Khulna Town, Crescent Jute Mills,

Kbalispur, Star Jute Mills, and Cbandi Mahal, around five thousand
people were killed. The massacre was unleashed on the ‘ dalals ’

(pimps) of West Pakistan by the trained Awami League terrorists.

The houses were destroyed and men, women, and children – were
murdered448 . The victims were tortured and then guillotined. The

 

men, adult or male children were mostly treated with the ‘shoot at
sight’, while the women and children were meted out the treatment
of being ‘dragged on die roads’. The killers were so obsessed with
killing that for the surety of death they would throw the victims in
rivers, and the unfortunate ones retaining some breath were dragged
out for their stomachs to be slit as punishment for not dying soon
enough The dissected victims were thrown back into tire river with
their blood tainting the water red 449 .

In Dinajpur Town from 28 th March to 1 st April 1971, around five
thousand people were killed. One of the most barbaric bloodbatbs
occurred here. Those few, who survived luckily, were old women and
children. Those who died in the attack were beheaded and the heads
were hung on tree tops. The abducted girls were taken to India for a
life worse than death

In Thakurgaon, around three thousand people were killed. The
East Bengal Regiment (EBR) attacked the Bihari people. The aim
was not anything less than ethnic cleansing of the Bihari people. The
women were raped; young ones were abducted while the pregnant
and older women were murdered. The pregnant women were not
shot dead but viciously bayoneted to death Wonts were tom apart
and the unborn babies were cut into pieces. The raped and killed
women’s naked bodies were dragged in streets for a show animals
were too human to watch

29th -30 th March 1971

In Jhumjhurrpur Colony, around three thousand people lost their lives while two thousand people were kidnapped and to this day remained missing The East
Pakistan Regiment (EPR) was on a killing frenzy sparing only the Bengalis. The general criterion for such massacre was to attack colonies and localities where
non- Bengali inhabitants were residing. The East Pakistan Rifles kidnapped women and children and dragged towards die river. The river route was mostly
used for smuggling, utilized by the Indians in building a naval force for the Mukti Babini The attackers took 400 — 500 women to India450 . From 29th March
– 1 0th April 1 97 1 , in Kushtia town, the East Pakistan Regiment (EPR) Rebels, Mujahids and the Awami League terrorists attacked the armed forces. The
tyranny of die killers accounted for die deaths of 1000- 1500, including armymen45l .

44 ^ Extract FromDacca Gazette [August To December 1971] Gazette Page No. 697 449 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.25

30th March 1971

In Taranganj Colony, five hundred people were killed and four hundred remained missing. The EPR and Awami League militants attacked the colony, burning
houses decorated with the dead 452 .

According to Saida Khatoon Wo Zafar Alam Malik living in Thanapara, Kushtia, the terrorists of the Awami League took away non- Bengali men on
gunpoint to the Kushtia Jafl. She was later informed that her husband was killed along with other non- Bengalis. The naked dead bodies were found with
cigarette marks on them The non- Bengali women were abducted to unknown places and the pregnant women with their unborn babies were mutilated to
death in the most barbaric way. The Bengali terrorists would force nonBengalis to donate blood for their injured rebel fellows; the donor was promised his
safe release; unfortunately, which was never the case453 .

In another account, ofRasoolan w/o Mohammed Shakoor , the Awami League terrorists attacked their locality and took away hundreds of non- Bengali
men. All of tire non- Bengali men were killed in Kushtia Jail before tire federal troops recaptured tire locality. The Bengali shopkeeper had erected sign boards,
stating that, ‘ Don ’t sell food to the Biharis ’ . She and her remaining family – her mother and three children – had to drink water for days to remain alive. And
second attack on her house forced her to live hr fields for many days until the federal forces arrived 454 .

450 Ibid, p.24

451 Ibid, p.25

452 Ibid, p.24

455 Qutubuddin Aziz (1974). “Blood and Tears”. United P Qutubuddin Aziz (1974). “Blood and Tears”. United P
129

4th April 1971

In Sylhet district tire situation remained far better than other districts; it can be attributed to its low Bengali population. The deaths reported from Sylhet in
March 1971, were five hundred. According to Mrs Wahida Khatoon, her son and daughter- in-law were killed in front of her and sire received a bullet
injury on her skill ‘ The killers said they’ were shooting us because we did not belong to Bengal and because Urdu was our mother tongue. They
looted our house ’455

10th April 1971

InPaksey, two thousand people were deceitfully murdered. The railway colony residents were called to a meeting to fonna Peace Committee ofBengalis
and Non- Bengalis. The people, who did attend the meeting in the High School building were locked inside and the school was set on fire; resulting in the
death of al entrapped people (most probably all non- Bengalis) 456 .

The killers of non- Bengalis were using different tactics to get non- Bengalis to a single place; call of meetings, calling them at government officials’ offices,
making peace committees and gathering them in schools, jails and mosques, with promises that they would be safe.

 

23nl April 1971

 

In Afar Kandy, five hundred people were killed. Bibari- populated colonies were attacked, looted properties were set on fire and every non- Bengali was put
to death. The men were killed on sight while women were ravished and later killed. The atrocious rapists and killers had mercilessly mutilated the bodies of
their female victims; bodies were in pieces, breasts were sliced off and their wombs were slit open. The delirious killers ravished the women, slicing their
breasts off when they had some breath left in them 457 .

 

Prominent Mukti Bahini Terrorists

file Mukti Bahini fighters, supporters, and sympathizers’ list had been provided by the Dacca Gazette of August to December 1971. 455 Ibid, p. 142
456 Government of Pakistan. (1971). “White Papers”, p.27

file Gazette list had clearly stated tire culprits and their involvement in crimes against tire state. Only a few culprits are listed below. A detailed list is given in
the Annexures-11, 12 & 13 .

Advocate Mustafa Ali s/o Haji Moab Ali

The Mukti Bahini supporter from Sylhet had been involved in the loot of 5 1 6 rifles from Habitant and its handing over to the Mukti Bahini in India. He was
also involved in raids on government properties; on21 st April, 1971, he had looted Rs. 1.44 crore from the National Bank of Pakistan 458 .

Muhammad Siddique Hussain s/o Khayer-uddin

An elected MPA from Rangpur, was involved in the crimes of loot and arson. On 3rd March 1 97 1 , he organized plundering and burning of shops and houses
in his non- Bengali locality. He had organized village councils to resist the army and also led an attack on the Rangpur Cantonment, on 28th March 1971459 .

M. Abdur Rahim s/o Ismail Sarkar

An elected MPA from District Dinajpur, made regular tours of India and was also involved in collecting anns and amnunitions for secessionists. He was also
involved in the kidnappings of proPakistanis 460 .

Advocate Muhammad Nurul Islam

An elected MPA from Jessore had organized gangs for the pillage of properties in Jessore Sadar area. He supported secessionists’ activities and helped
volunteers in looting guns from police stations 461 .

Muhammad Sirajul Islam s/o Habibur Re liman

An elected MPA from Dacca had organized mobs to block roads and parts of the city to hamper the movement of troops. Besides, they terrorized other
locaMes462 .

Mohiuddin Ahmed s/o Ramizuddin Ahmad

An elected MPA fromBakergang had forcefully deprived people of their precious possessions, mostly money, gold ornaments, etc. The Barisal police
annoury attack and loot was also organized by him. In District Bakerganj he had organized mob gangs to disrupt the law and order situation and also to loot
nonlocals 463 .

Showgatul Alam s/o Moslemuddin Ahmed

An elected MPA from Bakergang had actively been involved in organizing activities against the federal troops, in Barisal region 464 .

Abdul Aziz Khondker s/o Mobarak Ali

An elected MPA of Patuakhali, had desecrated the national flag, was involved in anti- state activities and disrupted the law and order situation to overthrow
the authority of Pakistan465 . Basid Siddiki

An elected MPA of Tangail had taken up arms against state troops in the Gbatail forest area and was terrorizing civilians 466 . Md Insan Ali Mukhtiar s/o
Adaruddin Sarker

An elected MPA of Tangail had been organizing rebels in Char, District Pabna to resist the army and other Law enforcement ageneies467 .

Jamaluddin Chowdhury s/o Kazimuddin Chowdhury A resident of village Kazirbag, District Dacca, and elected MPA, was organizing resistance groups in
MunshiGanj, against the army, in months of March and April These organized groups were also involved in the plunder of shops and houses of
proPakistanis 468 .

Hamidur Rahman s/o Haji Md Musa

A resident of village Doleswar of District Dacca, an elected MPA, had organized groups to resist anny movements and supervised attacks on non- locals and
non-confonning citizens in different localities 469 .

Hedayatul Islam s/o Haji Momrej Khan

A resident of Tejgaon, District Dacca, an elected MPA, had been involved in inciting agitation against non- locals and nonconfonning citizens. Under his
st^pervision factories and mills were closed down and burnt in Tejgaon 470 .

Abdul Hakim Master s/o Hazi Omar Ali

A resident of village Kakil, District Dacca, an elected MPA, had organized rebels and mob groups to fulfill Mujib’s sadistic demands. In March 1971,
factories were closed down causing economic unrest and movements of railway trains were disrupted from time to time. Organized rebels and terrorists had to
fight the army when it arrived to rescue the civilians in tire area 471 . Muhammad Sajid Ali Mukhtear s/o Mia Abdul Dalai A resident of village Fulbaria,
District Dacca and Afzal Hossain s/o Haji Mozaaflar Ali Mian, resident of Narayanganj, both elected MPAs, had organized mob gangs in their respective
areas to resist the army and for committing loot and arson The blockades were erected on roads and different parts of the city472 . Businessman Abdul
Wahab s/o Haji Khalilur Rahman A resident of villagp Maizpati, District Chittagong, an elected MPA, bad been involved in organizing rebels and
disrupting the law and order situation He incited EBR and EPR personnel in Chittagpng to defect and join the rebels 473 .

Muhammad Rashed Mosharrah s/o Mosharaf Hossain A resident of village Teghoria, District Mymensingh, an elected MPA, had been engaged in
sabotaging activities agtinst the state and had been collaborating with Major Kbalid Mosbarraf 474 . Kudrat ullah Mondal s/o Saminiddin Mondal
A resident ofMobakbali, District Mymensingh, an elected MPA, had close collaboration with the Mukti Bahini The infiltrations of rebels from Indian borders
near Haluaghat, District Mymensingh, had been taking place under his supervisiont75 . Shams ul Haque s/o Samiruddin Ahmed
A resident of District Mymensingh, an elected MPA, had organized mob gangs and rebels. The Mymensingh Police armoury had been attacked under his
command and looted arms were handed over to the rebels 476 .

Abdur Rais s/o Haji Md. Asmat Sholaghar Hasannagar A resident ofSunanganj. District Sylhet, an elected MPA, had organized rebels and mob gangs.
The organized groups had raided the Sunarrganj Tbana and the anns were handed over to terrorists. The terrorists had attacked the jail and set free the
ciiminals. He had been involved in other anti- state and seditious activities 477 .

Shams u Mia Chowdhury s/o Moyana Mia

 

A resident of village Bagpari, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, had organized rebels. The rebels were organized to resist the army in Chhattak and for loot and
arson478 .

Muhammad Abdul Zahur s/o Md. Thakurdlian Mia A resident of village Binnaguri, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, took over the focal government
administration – Mujib’s instructions to run a parallel government. Abdul Zahur had been collaborating with rebels against the army. Under his guidance, anti-
state and seditious activities had taken place to disrupt peace operations ofthe army to restore government authority 479 . Masud Ahmed Chowdhury s/o
Abdus Samad Chowdhury A resident of village Rankeli, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, took over the focal government administration and became a self
declared SDO ofthe subdivision The food and grain gpdowns were footed. The infiltrators from India were helped to figh t federal troops in April 1971 480 .
Taymus Ali s/o Haji Mojor Ali

A resident of village Bhabanipur, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, became a self-declared SDO ofthe Maulvi Bazar subdivision and overtook control of focal
government. He had participated in the foot of Rs. 2.74 crores (27.4 million) from the National Bank of Pakistan The footed vehicles, machinery, food grains,
and money were sent to India. He had an active role in anti- state and seditious activities in East Pakistan’s district, Sylhet 481 .

Azizur Rahman s/o Abdus Sattar

A resident of village Gujarai, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, had collaborated in a jailbreak releasing 132 prisoners from Maulvi Bazar Sub- Jail in April
1971. He took part in a foot raid on National Bank of Pakistan and took awayRs. 2.74 crores (Rs 27.4 million). The foot was handed over to terrorists in
India, to carry out anti-state and seditious activities in East Pakistan 482 . Ena mill Hoque s/o Abdul Hoque

A resident ofHabiganj town committee, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, accompanied by Mostafa Ali MNA (NE- 120) and mob gang, took away 516 rifles
and 17,388 ammunition rounds from the Habiganj Armoury. He took part in the National Bank ofPakistan looting in which terrorists took awayRs 1.44
crores (Rs 14.4 million). The amount was sent to India to finance the anti-state and seditious activities 483 .

Gopal Chris hna Maharatna s/o Hore Krishna Maharatna A resident of village Rupraj Karpara, District Sylhet, an elected MPA, had been involved in
the collection of sums of money from loots and checkpoints. The extorted money had been collected for anti-state and seditious activities.484

4311 Extract FromDacca Gazette [August To December 1971] Gazette p. 739

 

459

Ibid, p

00

460

Ibid, p

.861

461

Ibid,p.

919

463

Ibid,p.

949

464

Ibid,p.

955

465

Ibid,p.

969

466

Ibid,p.

977

467

Ibid,p.

981

468

Ibid,p.’

987

470

Ibid,p.

1001

471

Ibid,p.

1003

472

Ibid,p.

1021

473

Ibid,p.

1045

474

Ibid,p.

1063

476

Ibid,p.

1073

477

Ibid,p.

1097

478

Ibid,p.

1099

479

Ibid,p.

1101

481

Ibid,p.

1107

482

Ibid,p.

1115

483

Ibid,p.

1117

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

POST – DISMEMBERMENT
Introduction

 

Hopes of unity were still alive when General N iazi was signing the surrender document on the fateful day of 1 6 th December 1 97 1 . Despite her military failure,
Pakistan was still united on the basis of Laa Ilaaha which always remained the ultimate bond between the both wings of Pakistan. Nevertheless, the
pessimistic and opportunist political leaders in West Pakistan considered the military’ s defeat as die decisive end of Pakistan’s unity and started to consolidate
their own political positions. Bhutto, who became the president after December 1971, was shrewd enough to exploit the prevailing conditions and position
himself in the driving seat. He astutely replaced President Yahya, released Mujib on 8th January 1972 and thus secured his regime from all possible hurdles.
Pakistan was not bifurcated on 1 6 th December 1 97 1 , in fact the surrender in East Pakistan, was only a military defeat. East Pakistan was actually lost when
we politically surrendered and withdrew from our struggle for united Pakistan Thus in December 1971, we did not only lay down our arms but we also
surrendered Iqbal’s dream and Jirmah’s struggle. In addition to this, the recognition of Bangladesh by Bhutto on 22 nd February 1974 was the final nail in the
coffin of united Pakistan

On the other hand, in East Pakistan the indoctrinated dream of Amar Sonar Bangla was the rallying cry of the masses. The Indianbacked terrorists of the
Awami League and Mukti Bahini bad promised a ‘utopian state’ for Bengalis, where the streams of milk and honey would flow. They made the naive Bengalis
believe that once Bangladesh is created, their problems would vanish in no time. Neither would anybody be poor, nor would anybody be deprived of his/her
basic rights, thus Bangladesh would transform the fate of poor Bengalis. Further, fancy and attractive slogans of democracy, secularism, and socialism were
used to mesmerize the educated youth. Underlying all promises was the guaranteed prosperity of East Pakistan after its separation from West Pakistan All
these high claims remain unrealized, even though Bangladesh has been in existence for over four decades. It was the immediate rule of the Awami league
which exposed its intentions. Hundreds and thousands of non- Bengalis were killed, starved, and raped. Instead of the promised streams of milk and honey,
the streams ofblood of the non- Bengalis flowed.

The Golden Bengal promised by Mujib did not glitter, but in actuality was rusted copper. Since, the autocratic mile of Mujib, the innocent Bengalis have not
yet seen the prosperity which they were promised. Soon after Bangladesh’s creation, Mujib predicted that rice, the staple diet of Bengalis, would be sold at
half the price than in Pakistan but in 1 975 , the prices in Bangladesh were ten times higher than in Pakistan 485 .

This chapter would investigate how East Pakistan was lost politically after Pakistan’s military surrender. Further, it would give a detailed account of the
political history ofBangladesh and would endeavour to unearth the conspiracy of the deception of the innocent Bengalis in the name of prosperity. Further, the
Indian interference since the creation ofBangladesh would also be discussed to expose, how the Indian establishment used the humanitarian shield to create a

 

vassal state in her neighbourhood in pursuance of her desire for Pakistan’s dismembennent.

Post-Dismemberment & Bhutto

Bhutto’s role in the bifurcation of Pakistan has always remained controversial Fromhis slogan of W/iar turn, idharhum ’ (you there and we here) to his
recognition of Bangladesh in 1 974, Bhutto’s policies toward East Pakistan and then Bangladesh had remained questionable. Elis polices were based on his
personal power interests. Before the creation of Bangladesh, he remained critical of Bengalis and political parties of East Pakistan but took a U-tum after the
creation of Bangladesh. Bhutto was reluctant to hand over power to the majority party, the Awani League, after the election of 1 970, but his desire to
recognize Bangladesh after assuming power in 1971 is a contradiction to his earlier actions. Such fluctuating polices demonstrate, that Bhutto’s foremost
interest was to consolidate his own power base and to legitimize his rule.

485 Lifshultz, Lawrence, Bangladesh, The Unfinished Resolution, Zed press, London, 1979, p.6.

Power Politics

 

After the military surrender on 1 6 th December 1 97 1 , the central government in West Pakistan under President Yahya lost its legitimacy. The demoralized
President transferred power to Bhutto, the Chairman of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), which had remained victorious in die general elections of 1970 in West
Pakistan. Bhutto assumed the presidential charge on 20th December 1 97 1 , in addition to it; he also assumed the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator.
Soon after assuming power, he adopted policies to consolidate Iris position. All hurdles were to be eliminated for guaranteeing a stable government under his
leadership. These main hurdles were President Yayba and Mujib of East Pakistan.

Bhutto’s first prey was ex -President Yahya Khan, as he did not want any sort of interference fromhimin his regime. Therefore, he sidelined Yahya Khan by
putting him under house arrest. Yahya Khan in an interview with Munir Ahmed remarked, ‘ Bhutto has placed me under house airest and I am not allowed
to meet press, neither can I issue any statement and I am banned for taking any direct and indirect part in politics ’ 486 . After getting rid of Yahya
Khan, he strengthened his position in West Pakistan.

 

Releases Mujib

 

The Mujib-led Awani League organized agitation and political chaos after Yahya’s postponement of tire scheduled meeting ofthe National Assembly on 1st
March 1971, as stated earlier in the previous chapters. The demonstrations and armed agitation resulted in a total chaos in East Pakistan In the course of2nd
to 26th March 1 97 1 , the terrorists ofthe Awani League and Mukti Baliini were involved in killing, looting, burning ambushing and molestation of non-
Bengalis. According to one report, one-hundred thousand were killed, burnt, and raped between 2 nd and 26 th March 487 . Following the anarchy organized
under the orders of Mujib, the central government under President Yahya called for military action to restore law and order. Consequently, Mujib was
arrested at 01.30 hours on 26th March 1971 fromhis Dbanmandi residence in Dacca488 .

48d Translated form, Munir, Munir Ahmed, Almiy-a-Mashriki Pakistan; Paanch Kirdard, Aatish-phisha Publications Lahore, 1976, p. 47.

After taking over the reins of power from President Y ahya Khan, Bhutto released the man who ordered the spread of chaos that had paralyzed the Eastern
Wing of Pakistan, and the man who was arrested for traitorous charges, hi his interview with TIME Magazine correspondent Dan Cogging in January 1 972,
Bhutto remarked, “I plan to release him unconditionally in a couple of days, with hope and faith that the fire of Pakistan still burns in his heart He
will be free to go. I am not extracting any promise from him. I’m not talking to him under duress, but between elected leaders of the two parts of
Pakistan ’ 489 . Nevertheless, Bhutto’s foremost intention behind releasing Mujib was to get rid of any possible threat to his regime. He knew that Mujib had
the majority in the National Assembly and if any sort of compromise was reached between East and West Pakistan, his powers would be shared. Blinded by
his greed for power, the so-called Quaid-e-Awam was hitting the final nail in the coffin of Jinnah’s united Pakistan

Bhutto was well aware that after Mujib’s release , he would not be able to bargain with him from any position of strength Symbolically, it was presented that
Bhutto has entered in a deal with Mujib under which, Mujib had agreed on having a united government. Sultan Mohammad Khan (former foreign Secretary) in
his book Memories and Reflections ’ of a Pakistan Diplomat narrates that he had heard a secret tape recording of the meeting between Bhutto and Mujib.
According to Sultan Mohammad, Mujib said, ‘ You [Bhutto] and I, my brother, must work closely to resolve all problems, and he [Miijib] swore on
Qnr ’an that he would keep his promise. Miijib was hysterical at times, saying I ha\’e excelled Fazul Haq and Suhrawardy, demanding Yahya Khan ’s
trial, and promising that as soon as he got rid of the Indians, he would propose a united government of East and West Pakistan with defence,
foreign affairs and currency held in common ’ 490 .

48 7 Khan, Fazal Muqeem, Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership, National Book Foundation,

1973, p. 33.

488 ibid, p. 72.

489 Interview by Dan Coggin, The World: Bhutto: The Voice of Pakistan, Time, I0 9 ‘ January, 1972.

Such am ag’eement was rejected by Mujib after his arrival in Dacca. In an interview with the prominent Indian Journalist Kuldip Nayar, Mujib stated that ‘ He
[Bhutto] wanted me to agree that the three subjects —foreign affairs, defense, and communication — would be managed jointly by Pakistan and
Bangladesh. I told him it was not possible, but when he went on pressing I said that it was difficult for me to decide anything without consulting my
people. There was yet another meeting, the last one between us. That time too he pressed for the same thing and asked me to tty my best. I replied:
“Let me see ” ’. 491 In the same interview Mujib clearly states that, He [Bhutto] really wanted the eastern wing to go its own way so that he could
become the president of what was left of Pakistan ’ 492 . Bhutto’s defenders often misguide the populace by arguing that Bhutto was compelled to release
Mujib because of the mounting international pressure. Here it is vital to understand that China vigorously supported Pakistan’s stance. To illustrate, China was
all along vetoing Bangladesh’s entry in the United Nations. With such a support in an international organization, it was entirety possible for Pakistan to have
sumnounted any diplomatic pressure possibly from India and its allies.

Bhutto wanted otherwise as stated by Mujib in the above interview, which elucidates that Bhutto’s intentions behind releasing Mujib were to get rid ofthe East
Pakistan conundrum once and for all The general masses in Pakistan, specialty the youth, had not accepted tire creation of Bangladesh and started a
movement to reject Bangladesh. This movement was known as Bangladesh Na-Manzoor Tehreek (Bangladesh Non-recognition Movement). The
movement was a countrywide demonstration of the true sentiment of the masses. Threatened by the growing agitation by the masses under the Bangladesh

 

non- recognition movement, Bhutto tactically created the Sindhi-Urdu language controversy by passing the Sindhi Language Bill in Sindh Assembly in July
1 972. This controversy was a deliberate effort by Bhutto’s regime to deviate the masses from the Bangladesh Na-Manzoor Tehrek. Did Bhutto not know
that the Bengulis had actually started to become unhappy when Urdu was introduced as the national language of Pakistan? He attempted to create a serious
controversy by introducing the Sindhi Language Bill at a time when the Pakistani nation could not afford any controversy. But he, perhaps needed such
controversies and issues to divert the attention of the public from Bangladesh

490 Khan, Sultan Mohammad, Memories c 6 Reflections’ of a Pakistani Diplomat , Paramount Enterprise Karachi, 2006, p. 406.

491 See, In their words: Bhutto and Mujib, December, 1971, Daily Star November IS 4 * 1, 2014 (http://www.thedailystar.net/in-their-words-bhutto-and-inujib-december-1971-50468)
accessed on 7 1 02 03 04 05 06 ‘ 1 June 2016.

492 Ibid.

Recognizes Bangladesh

 

The final blow to Jinnah’s united Pakistan came on 22 nd February 1 974 when Bhutto representing Pakistan in OIC’s (Organization of Islamic Conference)
summit recognized Bangladesh Bhutto, the then Premier of Pakistan was shrewd enough to create and exploit ary given opportunity. After diverting tire
masses internally by launching the Sindhi- Urdu language controversy it was now time to offer full recognition to Bangladesh internationally. Soon after
assuming power, Bhutto toured most of the Muslim states and tried to convince them not to recognize Bangladesh including Iran, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco,
Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and many other states 493 . In most of his tours he convinced the leaders of these countries not to recognize
Bangladesh The self contradicting policies of Bhutto can be observed that initially he toured the above states to not to recognize Bangladesh but after two
years he himself organized the Summit C onferenee of the Head of States of the OIC in Lahore and recognized Bangladesh He astutely used the presence of
the Heads of States of the Islamic countries as the opportune movement to achieve this.

Here, it is important to understand that initially to gather public support for consolidating his power, Bhutto represented the popular sentiment for non-
recognition of Bangladesh But, after eliminating all the possible threats to his government he recognized Bangladesh Such a move also uplifted his personal
position on tire international political scene, confirming him as an able leader of Pakistan. He chose the ceremony of OIC Summit Conference organized in
Lahore to recognize Bangladesh to avoid any agitation and chaos by the general masses. Thus, tire hopes of a united Pakistan perished after the recognition
with the Bangladesh Na-Manzoor Tehreek . The struggle of Jirmalr, dream of Iqbal, blood ofhundreds and thousands ofMuslims and specifically, the
resolution ofMaulvi Fazl-ii-Haq (The Tiger ofBengal) were buried for good. Pakistan accepted defeat from tire Indian and Bengali machinations, Jailing to
safeguard Jinnah’s united Pakistan.

493 Yunus, Mohammed, Bhutto and the Breakup of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.52.

Albeit, Bangladesh Iras been a reality for over firur decades but the wounds of this split are still fresh History would never forgive individuals like Bhutto,

Niazi, Yahya, and Mujib who compromised the national and public interest for their own

Recognition of Bangladesh

Tire case for tire recognition of Bangladesh greatly depended on the diplomatic ties of countries within the Pakistani and Indian bloc. Till September 1 973,
more than 100 countries had recognized Bangladesh thus leaving a weaker Pakistani bloc opposing its recognition The superpowers, Soviet Union and
United States of America, recognized Bangladesh in early 1972. The Pakistani leadership, depending on its diplomatic ties declared that its diplomatic ties
would cease with any country that would recognize Bangladesh The declaration resulted in the end of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland,
Burma, and some other countries. Pakistan showed no hesitation in ending ties with tire small states but United States and tire European Economic Community
countries made it more difficult, bereft of a choice Pakistan had to swallow the bitter pill of abandoning its declaration. Another declaration by Pakistan was
that Commonwealth membership should not be given to Bangladesh otherwise, Pakistan would give up her membership. And, unfortunately, Pakistan had to
lose her membership abiding by her declaration; Bangladesh became the member of the Commonwealth on 18 April 1972. Bangladesh opened a mission in
Cairo, Egypt without its recognition, which was a hint for Pakistan that Egypt, will not delay tire recognition any longer. Preceding this in Algiers, diring the
Non-Aligned Summit of September 1973, seventy- six states nearly two-thirds of the UN members proposed for the immediate recognition ofBangladesh
Bangladesh was able to convince so many countries for its recognition because it was constantly sending envoys, as Historian Dr. A R. Maffick was sent to
Algiers in June 1973, and to different countries to counter the prevalent propaganda that ‘ Bangladesh was a creation of India ’ 494 . Bangladesh was invited
to the Non-Aligned Summit that provided Mujib an opportunity to meet King Faisal, President Assad of Syria, President of Algier, Libyan leader Gaddafi and
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In October 1973, the Bangladeshi government sent tea as a military aid to the Egyptian army in Benghazi, and a medical
team for the Syrian army in Beirut. Egypt and Syria did not hesitate to recognize a country showing ready support for them in the war, as Bangladesh was also
one of the first countries to show solidarity as early as the news of the 1973 Arab-Israel war reached Dacca. The Egyptian and Syrian recognition was
followed by the Kuwaiti and Jordanian recognition

Pakistan recognized Bangladesh on 22 nd February 1974, at the Islamic Summit it was hosting in Lahore, and on the same day after Pakistan, Iran and Turkey
also extended their recognition to Bangladesh Later United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Libya also recognized Bangladesh The prominent recognition
within Pakistan bloc came, first from Pakistan on 22 nd February 1 974 then on 1 5 th August 1 975 after China and Saudi Arabia recognized Bangladesh after
the death of the pro- Indo- Soviet and non- Islamic bloc. The following table shows a list of countries who had recognized Bangladesh^ .

Table 1

list of Few Countries recognizing Bangladesh 496
Serial

Number Countries Recognition Date

01 India

02 Bhutan

03 German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

04 Bulgaria

05 Poland

06 Mongolia

 

07 Burma

6 th Decerrber 1971 6 th Decerrber 1 1 th January 1972

1 1 th January
12 th January
12 th January
13 th January

494 Hossain, Kama! (2013). “Bangladesh: Quest for Freedom”, Oxford University Press., p. 187

495 Ibid, p.185-191

496 Ibid., p.184-185

Serial

Number Countries Recognition Date

08 Nepal

09 Barbados

10 Yugoslavia

1 1 Soviet Union

12 Czechoslovakia

13 Hungpry

14 Cyprus

15 Australia

16 New Zealand

17 Fiji

18 Carrbodia

19 United Kingdom

20 West Germany

21 Denmark

22 Norway

23 Sweden

24 Finland

25 Iceland

26 Western Samoa

27 Tonga

28 Thailand

29 Japan

30 Cuba

31 Ireland

32 Belgium

33 The Netherlands

34 Luxerrburg

فرید

خواجہ غلام فرید ؒ
Posted on September 19, 2014 by qaraarsarhadi
تاریخ پیدائش : 26 نومبر 1845ء کوٹ مٹھن
تاریخ وفات : 24 جولائی 1901 ء کوٹ مٹھن
خواجہ غلام فرید (1845ء تا 1901ء)ہفت زبان خصوصاً سرائیکی کے عظیم شاعرہیں۔چاچڑان میں 26 نومبر 1845ء کو پیدا ہوئے۔والد کا نام خواجہ خدا بخش تھا۔منقبِ محبوبیہ(تصنیف۔خواجہ غلام فرید)کے مطابق آپ قریشی اورحضرت ابوبکرصدیق کی اولادمیں سے تھے۔لیکن عوام میں” کوریجہ” مشہور تھے۔تذکرہ نگاروں نے آپ کو فاروقی مشہورکررکھاہے۔جو سند سے درست نہیں ہے۔والدہ کاانتقال چارسال کی عمر میں اوروالدکاانتقال آٹھ سال کی عمر میں ہوا۔لیکن اس وقت تک آپ قرآن حفظ کرچکے تھے۔علومِ دینیہ(عربی،فارسی)کی تعلم اپنے دورکے فاضل علما سے حاصل کی۔۔وہ اپنے بڑے بھائی فخر جہان صاحب کے مرید تھے.
آپ نے کافی کی صنف میں ایسی باکمال شاعری کی ہے کہ بلاشبہ ان کی شاعری دنیاکے عظیم ترین ادب کااثاثہ ہے۔خواجہ صاحب عربی،فارسی،سندھی،سرائیکی اوردوسری بھاشازبانوں میں مہارت تامہ کے مالک تھے۔سرائیکی شاعری کو جس اعلیٰ مقام پر آپ چھوڑ کے گئے تھے۔آج بھی ان سے بہتر نہیں کہاجاسکا۔لطیف احساسات،جذبات اوراس میں وجدانی کیفیات کواس طرح ملادیناکہ شیروشکر ہوجائیں ،خواجہ کی شاعری کاادنیٰ کمال ہے۔4/فروری 1872ءمیں مرشدومربی فخرجہاں دائم آبادکوروانہ ہوئے تو نواب صادق محمدخاں عباسی رابع(فرماں روائے بہاول پور)نے چاچڑاں پہنچ کر دستاربندی میں شرکت کی۔علامہ رشیدطالوت رقم طرازہیں کہ:”ہزاروں نہیں بل کہ لاکھوں بندگانِ خدا حلقۂ ارادت میں داخل ہوہوکرآپ دستِ مبارک پر بیعت ہوتے رہے اورہندوسندھ کے عامۃ الناس کارجوع آپ کے عتبہ عالیہ کی طرف ہوگیا”۔ نظریہ تصوف سلسلہ چشتیہ کے عام مسلک کے مطابق آپ کا نظریہ بھی”ہمہ اوست”تھا۔یعنی آپ توحیدِ وجودی کے قائل تھے۔آپ کاتمام کلام اسی رنگ میں رنگاہواہے۔انھیں ہر رنگ اورانگ میں اللہ کے حسن کے جلوے نظرآتے۔بقول پروفیسر دل شاد کلانچوی”خواجہ صاحب عموماً حالت وجدمیں اشعارکہتے تھے۔یعنی حال وارد ہوتاتوکچھ کہتےتھے ورنہ نہیں۔ہروقت فکرِ سخن میں محورہناان کامعمول نہ تھا۔لکھنے پرآتے توالہام کی کیفیت ہوتی ۔بعض اوقات تولمبی لمبی کافیاں دس پندرہ منٹوں میں کہہ ڈالتے تھے۔”(مقدمہ دیوانِ خواجہ غلام فرید) موسیقیت اکثر کتب میں،علمااورفصحا اورعامۃ الناس سے سنا ہے کہ آپ علم موسیقی میں خاصادرک رکھتے تھے۔آپ کو 39 راگ ،راگنیوں پر عبورتھا۔آپ نے ان تمام راگنیوں میں کافیاں کہی ہیں۔جناب نشتر گوری لکھتے ہیں کہ اگر خواجہ صاحب کے کلام پرغورکیاجائے تو معلوم ہوتاہے کہآپ نے سنگیت کی تمام رمزوں اورلَے تال کی تمام خوبیوں سے استفادہ کیاہے۔اکثر کافیوں میں لفظوں کے تکرارسے ایسی ہم صوتی اورہم آ ہنگی پیداکی ہے کہ ہوااورپانی کی لہریں اپنے نغمے بھول جائیں۔شعروشاعری کے اسی گن کو”Alliteration”کہتے ہیں۔ کافی ایک مشکل فن ہے۔جوعربی زبان میں توملتاہے مگردوسری زبانوں میں نہ ہونے کے برابر ہے۔ کمالِ فن خواجہ فرید کاکلام ہررنگ ونسل،عوم وخواص،عالم وان پڑھ،خواندہ وناخواندہ اورعجم وعرب میں مشہورہے۔آپ الفاظ کے ساحر ہیں اورحافظ جیسا سوزِ عشق آپ کے کلام کاخاصہ ہے۔امیرخسرو جیسا راگ رس کلام کی جان ہے،قآنی کا زورِ بیاں رکھتے ہیں،رومی سی تڑپ کوٹ کوٹ کرروحِ شاعری میں بھری ہے،سعدی جیسا مشاہدہ اوراسلوبِ وانداز اشعارسے ٹپکتاہے،صدیوں کےطلسم کو اشعارمیں مقید کردیاہے۔وہ شاعرِ قال نہیں شاعرِ حال تھے۔ان کا کلام روح پر اس طرح اثر کرتاہے جیسے چشموں اورجھرنوں سے بہتاہوابھیوی راگ نہاں خانۂ دل میں اترتامحسوس ہوتاہے۔دنیامیں “الحسن” کاحسن ہے۔حسن وعشق لازم وملزوم ہیں۔”عشق اندردی پیڑ ڈاڈھاسخت ستایا”حسن کائنات کی اصل ہے باقی سب اسے کافیض وام ہے۔حسن ایک سرچشمہ ہے جہاں سے عشق،تمنا،طلب،خواہش،آرزو،امنگ،حسرت وغیرہ وغیرہ کے سوتے پھوٹتے ہیں۔ کنتُ کنزاً عشق گواہی پہلے حب خودذات نوں آہی جیں سانگے تھیاجمل جہاں
ہےعشق داجلوہ ہر ہر جا سبحان اللہ سبحان اللہ
ہرصورت وچ دیدار ڈٹھم کل یارکوں اغیارڈٹھم
خوجہ غلام فرید 24 جولائی1901ء میں دنیاسے پردہ فرماگئے۔خواجہ صاحب کے اپنے الفاظ میں”وصل وصال داویلہ آیا”۔ نمونہ کلام میڈی اج کل اکھ پڑکاندی ہے کُئی خبر وصال آندی ہے
انکھیاں بلکن مکھ ڈیکھن کوں گل لاون کو پتھکن باہیں
وہ بہاول پور میں انگریزی اثر رسوخ کے مخالف تھے انھوں نے نواب آف بہاول پور سے کہا تھا۔ ۔
اپنے ملک کوں ٓآپ وسا توں۔پٹ انگریزی تھانے
٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭
کتابیات ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
شعری مجموعہ خواجہ فرید ۔ اردو ۔ مرتب ۔ ارشاد احمد امین
دیوان فرید ۔ اردو
دیوان فرید ۔ سرائیکی
٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭٭
منتخب کلام ۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
خواب میں بھی نہیں ہے وصل نصیب
بے نصیبوں کے پیشوا ہیں ہم
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
اُجیاں لمیاں لال کھجوراں تہ پتر جنہاں دے ساویں
جس دم نال سانجھ ہے اساں کوں او دم نظر نہ آوے
گلیاں سنجیاں اُجاڑ دسن میں کو ،ویڑا کھاون آوے
غلام فریدا اُوتھے کی وسنا جتھے یار نظرنہ آوے
اُجیاں لمیاں لال کھجوراں تہ پتر جنہاں دے ساویں
ننگے پنڈے مینوں چمکن مارے، میرے روندے نیں نین نمانے
جنیاں تن میرے تے لگیاں ، تینوں اک لگے تے توں جانے
غلام فریدا دل اُوتھے دیئیے جتھے اگلا قدر وی جانے
اندروں ہی اندروں وگدا رہندا ،پانی درد حیاتی دا
ساڈی عمراں تو وی لمبی عمر وے تیری،ہالے ناں وس وے کالیا
عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار،عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار
پردیس گیوں پردیسی ہویوں تے نت وٹناں منہ موڑاں
کملی کر کہ چھوڑ دیتو ،تہ میں بیٹھی خاک گلیاں تے رو لاں
غلام فریدا میں تے دوزخ سرساں جے میں مکھ ماہی ولوں موڑاں
عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار،عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار
عزرایل آیا لین سسی دی جان ہے
جان سسی وچ نظر نہ آوندی
او تے لے گیا کیچ دا خان ہے
قسم قرآن ہے
اندروں ہی اندروں وگدا رہندا ،پانی درد حیاتی دا
ساڈی عمراں تو وی لمبی عمر وے تیری،ہالے ناں وس وے کالیا
عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار،عمراں لنگھیاں پھباں پار
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
میڈا عشقَ وی توں میڈا یار وی توں ۔میڈا دین وی توں ایمان وی توں ۔
میڈا جسم وی توں میڈا روح وی توں ۔میڈا قلب وی توں جند جان وی توں ۔
میڈا کعبہ قبلہ مسجد مندر ۔مسہپھ تے قرآن وی توں ۔
میڈے فرض فریزے حج زکواتاں ۔سوم سلوات اجان وی توں ۔
میڈی جہد عبادت تائت تکوا ۔علم وی توں عرفان وی توں ۔
میڈا ذکر وی توں میڈا فکر وی توں ۔میڈا ذوق وی توں وجدان وی توں ۔
میڈا سانول مٹھڑا شام سلونا ۔من موہن جانان وی توں ۔
میڈا مرشد ہادی پیر طریقت ۔شیخ ہکائکدان وی توں ۔
میڈا آس امید تے کھٹیا وٹیا ۔تکیا مان تے تران وی توں ۔
میڈا دھرم وی توں میڈا بھرم وی توں ۔میڈا شرم وی توں میڈا شان وی توں ۔
میڈا ڈکھّ سکھ روون کھلن وی توں ۔میڈا درد وی توں درمان وی توں ۔
میڈا خوشیاں دا اسباب وی توں ۔میڈے سولا دا سامان وی توں ۔
میڈا حسن تے بھاگ سہاگ وی توں ۔میڈا بخت تے نامو نشان وی توں ۔
میڈا دیکھن بھالن جاچن جوچن ۔سمجھن جان سنجان وی توں ۔
میڈے ٹھنڈڑے ساہ تے مونجھ منجھاری ۔ہنجنو دے طوفان وی توں ۔
میڈے تلک تلولے سیدھاں مانگاں ۔ناز نہورے تان وی توں ۔
میڈی مہندی کجل مساگ وی توں ۔میڈی سرخی بیڑا پان وی توں ۔
میڈا وہشت جوش جنونّ وی توں ۔میڈا گریا آہو فگان وی توں ۔
میڈا شیار عروض قوافی توں ۔میڈا بحر وی توں اؤزان وی توں ۔
میڈا اول آخر اندر باہر ۔ظاہر تے پنہان وی توں ۔
میڈا بادل برکھا کھمنیاں گاجاں ۔بارش تے باران وی توں ۔
میڈا ملک ملیر تے مارو تھلڑا ۔روہی چولستان وی توں ۔
جے یار فرید قبول کرے ۔سرکار وی توں سلطان وی توں ۔
ناتاں کہتر کمتر احقر ادنیٰ ۔لاشے لا امکان وی توں ۔
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
آ چنوں رل یار
پیلوں پکیاں نی وے
(پیلو پک گئی ہیں، میرے دوست آ جاؤ انہیں مل جل کر اکٹھا کریں)۔
کئی بگڑیاں کئی ساویاں پیلیاں
کئی بھوریاں کئی پھِکڑیاں نیلیاں
کئی اودیاں گلنار
کٹویاں رتیاں نی وے
(یہ بہت ہی خوبصورت رنگوں کی ہیں۔ ان میں کچھ سفید ہیں، کچھ سبز اور زرد ہیں، کئی بھوری اور ہلکے رنگ کی ہیں، کئی دودھیا رنگ کی ہیں اور کئی نہایت سرخ گل اناری رنگ کی ہیں)۔
بار تھئی ہے رشک ارم دی
سک سڑ گئی جڑ دکھ تے غم دی
ہر جا باغ و بہار
ساکھاں چکھیاں نی وے
(ان کی وجہ سے ویرانہ، رشکِ ارم بن گیا ہے۔ ہر طرف باغ و بہار کا سماں بندھ گیا ہے۔ غم و آلام کی بنیاد ختم ہو گئی ہے۔ سبھی لوگ اس پھل سے لطف اندوز ہو رہے ہیں، کیا تو نے بھی انہیں چکھا ہے)۔
پیلوں ڈیلھیاں دیاں گلزاراں
کہیں گل ٹوریاں کہیں سر کھاریاں
کئی لا بیٹھیاں بار
بھر بھر پچھیاں نی وے
(پیلوں اور کریر کے پھلوں نے ریگزار کو رشکِ گلزار بنا دیا ہے۔ انہیں چننے کے لئے کسی نے ہلکی ٹوکری گلے میں لٹکائی ہے اور کسی نے سر پر ٹوکرا رکھا ہوا ہے۔ کئی ٹوکریاں بھر بھر کر اور انبار بنا بنا کر بیٹھی ہیں)۔
جال جلوٹیں تھئی آبادی
پل پل خوشیاں دم دم شادی
لوکی سہنس ہزار
کل نے پھکیاں نی وے
(ہر جھاڑی کے پیچھے لوگوں کے ٹھکانے بن گئے ہیں، ہر طرف انبساط و مسرت کا دور دورہ ہے۔ سینکڑوں ہزاروں آدمی ان پیلوں کو مٹھیاں بھر بھر کر کھا رہے ہیں)۔
حوراں پریاں ٹولے ٹولے
حسن دیاں ہیلاں برہوں دے جھولے
راتیں ٹھڈیاں ٹھار
گوئلیں تتیاں نی وے
(یہاں کی مہ جبیں، حور شمائل، پری پیکر لڑکیاں ٹولیاں بنا کر پیلوں چن رہی ہیں۔ ہر طرف حسن و جمال اور عشق و محبت کی جلوہ آرائی ہے۔ راتیں سرد ترین لیکن گھر خاصے گرم ہیں)۔
رکھدے ناز حسن پروردے
ابرو تیغ تے تیر نظر دے
تیز تِکھے ہتھیار
دِلیاں پھٹیاں نی وے
(حسن و جمال کے پروردہ ہی “رہزن” تیغِ ابرو اور تیرِ نظر جیسے ہتھیاروں سے لیس ہو کر دلوں کو زخمی کر رہے ہیں)۔
کئی ڈیون ان نال برابر
کئی گھِن آون ڈیڈھے کر کر
کئی ویچن بازار
تلیاں تکیاں نی وے
(پیلوں کی خرید و فروخت بھی عجب رونق افزا ہے، کئی اناج کے بدلے فروخت کر رہی ہیں، کئی ڈیڑھ گنا زیادہ قیمت وصول کر رہی ہیں اور کئی وزن کر کے بازار میں بیچ رہی ہیں)۔
کئی ڈھپ وچ وی چنڈھیاں رھندیاں
کئی گھِن چھان چھنویرے بہندیاں
کئی چن چن پیاں ہار
ہٹیاں تھکیاں نی وے
(کئی عورتیں شدید تمازت کے باوجود پیلوں چنتی رہتی ہیں، کئی سائے میں بیٹھی سستا رہی ہوتی ہیں اور کئی چن چن کر تھک ہار بیٹھی ہیں)۔
ایڈوں عشوہ غمزے نخرے
اوڈوں یار خرایتی بکرے
کسن کان تیار
رانداں رسیاں نی وے
(اِدھر سے ناز و ادا ہیں، ادھر سے صاحبانِ نظر قربانی کے بکروں کی طرح ذبح ہونے کے لئے تیار کھڑے ہیں۔ کیسے مزے کے کھیل رچے ہوئے ہیں)۔
پیلوں چنڈیں بوچھن لیراں
چولا وی تھیا لیر کتیراں
گِلڑے کرن پچار
سینگیاں سکیاں نی وے
(پیلوں چنتے ہوئے کسی کا کا دوپٹہ پھٹ جاتا ہے، کسی کا کرتہ تار تار ہو جاتا ہے اور سہیلیوں کی ہنسی مذاق کا نشانہ بن جاتی ہے)۔
آیاں پیلوں چنن دے سانگے
اوڑک تھیاں فریدن وانگے
چھوڑ آرام قرار
ہکیاں بکیاں نی وے
(وہ آئیں تو پیلوں چننے کی خاطر تھیں لیکن فرید کی طرح تیرِ عشق سے ایسی گھائل ہوئیں کہ اپنا آرام سکون چھوڑ کر نقشِ حیرت بن گئیں)۔
۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔۔
دلڑی لٹی تئیں یار سجن
کدیں موڑ مہاراں تے آ وطن
روہی دے کنڈڑے کالیاں
میڈیاں ڈکھن کناں دیاں والیاں
اساں راتاں ڈکھاں وچ جالیاں
روہی بنائوئی چا وطن
روہی دی عجب بہار دسے
جتھے میں نمانی دا یار ڈسے
جتھاں عاشق لکھ‍ ہزار ڈسے
اتھاں میں مسافر بے وطن
دلڑی لٹی تئیں یار سجن
کدیں موڑ مہاراں تے آ سجن

اے حسن حقیقی نور ازل
تینوں واجب تے امکان کہوں

تینوں خالق ذات قدیم کہوں
تینوں حادث خلق جہان کہوں

تینوں مطلق محض وجود کہوں
تینوں علمیہ اعیان کہوں

ارواح نفوس عقول مثال
اشباح عیان نہان کہوں

تینوں عین حقیقت ماہیت
تینوں عرض صفت تے شان کہوں

انواع کہوں اوضاع کہوں
اطوار کہوں اوزان کہوں

تینوں عرش کہوں افلاک کہوں
تینوں ناز نعیم جنان کہوں

تینوں تت جماد نبات کہوں
حیوان کہوں انسان کہوں

تینوں مسجد مندر دیر کہوں
تینوں پوتھی تے قرآن کہوں

تسبیح کہوں زنار کہوں
تینوں کفر کہوں ایمان کہوں

تینوں بادل برکھا گاج کہوں
تینوں بجلی تے باران کہوں

تینوں آب کہوں تے خاک کہوں
تینوں باد کہوں نیران کہوں

تینوں وسرت لچھمن رام کہوں
تینوں سیتا جی جانان کہوں

بلدیو جسودا نند کہوں
تینوں کشن کنیہا کان کہوں

تینوں برما بشن گنیش کہوں
مہا دیو کہوں بھگوان کہوں

تینوں گیت گرنت تے بید کہوں
تینوں گیان کہوں اگیان کہوں

تینوں آدم حوا شیث کہوں
تینوں نوح کہوں طوفان کہوں

تینوں ابراہیم خلیل کہوں
تینوں موسی بن عمران کہوں

تینوں ہر دل دا دلدار کہوں
تینوں احمدؐ عالی شان کہوں

تینوں شاہد ملک حجاز کہوں
تینوں باعث کون مکان کہوں

تینوں ناز کہوں انداز کہوں
تینوں حور پری غلمان کہوں

تینوں نوک کہوں تینوں ٹوک کہوں
تینوں سرخی کجلہ پان کہوں

تینوں طبلہ تے تنبور کہوں
تینوں ڈھولک سر تے تان کہوں

تینوں حسن تے ہار سنگار کہوں
تینوں عشوہ غمزہ آن کہوں

تینون عشق کہوں تینوں علم کہوں
تینوں وہم یقین گمان کہوں

تینون حسن قوی ادراک کہوں
تینوں ذوق کہوں وجدان کہوں

تینوں سکر کہوں سکران کہوں
تینوں حیرت تے حیران کہوں

تسلیم کہوں تلوین کہوں
تمکین کہوں عرفان کہوں

تینون سنبل سوسن سرو کہوں
تینوں نرگس نافرمان کہوں

تینوں لالہ داغ تے باغ کہوں
گلزار کہون بستان کہوں

تینوں خنجر تیر تفنگ کہوں
تینوں برچھا بانک سنان کہوں

تینوں تیر خدنگ کمان کہوں
سوفار کہوں پیکان کہوں

بے رنگ کہوں بے مشل کہوں
بے صورت ہر ہر آن کہوں

سبوح کہوں قدوس کہوں
رحمان کہون سبحان کہوں

کر توبہ ترت فرید سدا
ہر شے نوں پر نقصان کہوں

اسے پاک الکھ بے عیب کہوں
اسے حق بے نام نشان کہوں
خواجہ

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Money talk Virginia woolf

MONEY TALKS
The literary icon who told the truth about how to be a thinking woman
Thu-Huong Ha3 hours ago
Virginia Woolf
A thought of one’s own. (Courtesy Wikimedia/George C. Beresford)
Virginia Woolf knew the enormous potential of a closed door.
The literary icon, the subject of today’s (Jan. 25) Google doodle, was a master of elevating domesticity through dizzying, non-linear novels, most famously Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse. But it’s her most literal work, a slim volume of essays published in 1928, through which she’s often memorialized in mainstream culture.
In A Room of One’s Own, the English writer, born 136 years ago this day, argued for what is simultaneously obvious and beyond reach today: For a woman to truly think and create, she has to be unshackled from the duties normally foisted on her because of her gender. That is, she needs paper. Woolf put the price of writing at an annual £500 (about $41,000 today) and “a lock on the door.” She famously summed up her case: “A woman must have money and a room of her own if she is to write fiction.”
The means to afford a private study in one own’s home allows a person to think and write away from prying eyes, fearlessly and calmly—in essence, said Woolf, like a man can. Jane Austen wrote “without hate, without bitterness, without fear, without protest, without preaching,” said Woolf, “That was how Shakespeare wrote.”
Steady income also allows a woman who wants to pursue the arts a freedom of movement, the permission to see the world as an explorer does. She wrote:
If only Mrs. Seton and her mother and her mother before her had learnt the great art of making money and had left their money, like their fathers and their grandfathers before them. … We might have been exploring or writing; mooning about the venerable places of the earth; sitting contemplatively on the steps of the Parthenon.
In Woolf’s mind, this lack of experience and constant struggle from an inferior position in society has consequences for fiction. In comparing Charlotte Brontë and Jane Austen, she points to a passage in Jane Eyre that she considers imperfect, writing:
The woman who wrote these pages had more genius in her than Jane Austen; but if one reads them over and marks that jerk in them, that indignation, one sees that she will never get her genius expressed full and entire. Her books will be deformed and twisted. She will write in a rage where she should write calmly. She will write foolishly where she should write wisely. She will write of herself where she should write of her characters. She is at war with her lot. How could she help but die young, cramped and thwarted?
One could not but play for a moment with the thought of what might have happened if Charlotte Brontë had possessed say three hundred a year.
And ultimately it was money, said Woolf, that allows women to be taken seriously as writers. “Money,” she said, “Dignifies what is frivolous if unpaid for.”

BOYS WILL BE BOYS
Why the financial world and big business will never have a #MeToo moment
Lianna Brinded4 hours ago
It’s unlikely that the finance industry and big business will ever have a #MeToo moment.
“It’s all just banter.” (Reuters/Lucy Nicholson)
The world took a collective, digital gasp when the Financial Times unloaded its jaw-dropping investigation into The Presidents Club—an annual men only charity fundraiser that features the (alleged) sexual harassment of hostesses as the plat du jour on its menu of events.
Under the pretext of a black-tie dinner and auction, around 130 young, female hostesses are hired to attend to the needs of the business barons who bid on things like lunch with UK foreign secretary Boris Johnson, and tea with Bank of England governor Mark Carney.
According to the article, the hostesses are told their job is merely to ensure their designated tables of attendees have all the alcohol they want. But as they try to get on with it, they are met with groping, come-ons, and other inappropriate behavior that only gets worse as the rich, privileged men get drunker; at the after party, one captain of industry encouraged a hostess to remove her underwear and dance on a table.
In the new era of gender politics, where there has been a paradigm shift in power across various industries following #MeToo movement, one would be forgiven in thinking the Financial Times investigation, which had seeming unequivocal evidence of heinous acts of harassment, would signal the end of this behavior.
But, any who know or have experienced the world of big business and finance know that it’s unlikely anything will actually change.
* * *
The Presidents Club has met for over 30 years and the results of the FT investigation are unlikely to be a one off. It’s only because it was caught on camera and snared in an investigation that this one party is shutting down. But, it is just one of myriad smaller and larger gatherings that take place on a daily basis. There’s been absolutely no consequence to the range of business executives, CEOs, and companies in attendance, or firms who sponsored a table that evening. Some have now withdrawn their support for the club—pats on the back all round.
Anyone who has ever witnessed similar events, numerous in the world of the rich and affluent, know that the newspaper’s description of the treatment of women is sadly typical.
In the financial world, lewd jokes, sexist language, even unwanted physical contact from hand holding or being pulled onto someone’s lap, as described in FT investigation between guests and hostesses, as well as groping are, well, normal. You don’t need a special event for that, you get this at some conferences during the mixer hour. This behavior is insidious and prevalent in an industry that is hated yet loved; envied for its power and excess. That envy feeds into the feeling among the powerful that these types of acts can be perpetuated without consequence. But that’s where the similarities between the financial world and the likes of Hollywood end.
When the #MeToo movement reemerged following the seismic revelations about Harvey Weinstein, it set up a domino effect of exposing individuals in Hollywood who stand of accused of rape, sexual harassment, and various illegal acts. Following suit, #MeToo gave courage for many to speak out against various titans of other industries, such as in publishing, technology, and the arts. As the toll of formerly-powerful, now disgraced men grew, there’s been one sector that has yet to see a single executive be apprehended—finance. That’s not because Wall Street and the Square Mile have a perfect track record with women.
It has been months since the first explosion of #MeToo. We’re now in the depressingly predictable stage of the backlash to the movement. We get traitorous women like Catherine Deneuve slamming the #MeToo movement as anti-male, we have Men’s Rights activists hijacking the campaign, tweeting #notallmen and calling it a witch hunt, we have critics co-opting the act of “knee-touching” as a way to say that women are being overly sensitive to men in their industries, and dialogue that has started to focus on wrongdoing and misconduct as only unacceptable if it is illegal.
All-in-all, this makes it even more unlikely that we’ll see headway in gaining justice within the financial world.
* * *
The (alleged) acts at The Presidents Club’s recent event are totally unshocking for the initiated, and the complicity is just part and the parcel, if you’re in big business.
Yes, Hollywood moguls are powerful in one way, but they don’t run banks, they don’t give financing to infrastructure projects, they aren’t able to take away your house, they aren’t players in global trade, and they don’t have the ability to manipulate the public into buying or not buying your goods. They also aren’t in charge of your oil and your electricity, or the jobs of millions of people, the country’s economy, or starting wars—financiers and big business control this. Women have always been their currency.
From the strip clubs brokers take traders to on client nights out to the high-end prostitutes bankers procure for big investors in the bar of a famous London hotel that everyone knows about, women have typically been exchanged like contracts. If a woman does make it into the world, in whatever capacity, she’s expected to dress and look a certain way.
Times are slightly changing, but not quick enough. That’s why it can seem so wholly offensive to some man in a suit if you’re at a major conference and you aren’t conforming. According to the FT report, hostesses (who were asked to apply if they were “tall, thin and pretty” were told to wear “black sexy shoes and black underwear” and to also “do their hair and make-up as they would to go to a ‘smart sexy place.’” Is it really that much of a surprise considering it’s entirely legal (and encouraged) for professional firms to force women to wear heels to work? Asking a hostess to do the same is just part of the deal.
* * *
At big events or conferences, you don’t have to be a waitress to be inappropriately touched or have lewd comments thrown at you. It’s pretty common ground. Although, as a waitress at these types of events, the kicks financiers must get from the huge imbalance in social stature is no doubt part of the allure.
As young as 16 years old, I used to waitress at black tie and elite events, which included many of these types of charitable dinners every week. There are too many to name but in manor houses in Surrey or wealthy golf clubs in the Queen’s county, I was there, serving wine and delivering silver service food to some of the country’s most powerful executives. I was also told to only ever wear skirts by the agency I worked for on behalf of clients, and that high heels were more “professional.” Lewd language was probably the easiest thing to deal with, but having your body parts touched by lecherous men was not. Once I had to defend myself to my events supervisor, who had received a complaint that I wasn’t smiling enough and that I should have a better sense of humor. It was the same person who had grabbed me while I was serving dessert. “Well, don’t you want any tips?” my supervisor replied.
As the #MeToo movement has shown, women don’t speak out because it’s rare that consequences will be brought onto people who have harassed them. Are you willing to become a professional pariah for reporting some old creepy fund manager kept trying to hold your hand at a conference, or some lecherous barrow boy stroked the inside of your thigh when you went to pick up your bag? Or, if you were perved on by a CEO, who has enough money to buy and sell your entire family generations over, would you be willing to take them on in public? Do you have enough money to pay for the lawyer’s fees? Furthermore, are you willing to give up your career for this?
After all, we are told that this is “boys will be boys” and this is workplace “banter,” and that whether you are finance professional or hired to serve food and drinks (which many are apparently confusing with sex work) at an event that involves financiers, “you knew what you were getting yourself into” so suck it up, buttercup.
Even if you don’t make a statement to the police, who do you complain to? Look at the system they’ve erected to safeguard themselves, perpetuating “your word against theirs.” It’s all about the language of legality, which ignores questions over basic human respect and decency.
The Dorchester said in a statement that “we are unaware of any allegations and should we be contacted we will work with the relevant authorities as necessary” while the (female) head of the company that procures hostesses for these events said “there is a code of conduct that we follow, I am not aware of any reports of sexual harassment and with the calibre of guest, I would be astonished.” On top of that, the brochure for the night itself apparently included a “full-page warning that no attendees or staff should be sexually harassed.” It might have well been written on toilet paper.
* * *
The closure of The Presidents Club means nothing.
It’s not uncommon for politicians or those involved in public office to quit over sex scandals, so the resignation of David Meller as a non-executive director at the UK’s Department for Education is really no big deal. Neither are the obviously predictable disingenuous actions, like the Bank of England revoking its auction prize of tea with governor Mark Carney, or WPP ending its support for the event. With the large amount of money being donated from The Presidents Club, charities like Great Ormond Street would know where the money is coming from. (Indeed, BBC TV reported that Great Ormond Street was previously warned about the nature of the event; yet they still took the money.) They may be giving the cash back now but it’s a sad state of affairs that they’d happily accepted the money before. (All the benefitting charities claim they didn’t know about the environment at The Presidents Club.)
This club’s failures weren’t due to one man or business. Every attendee was complicit. It’s the same with any event where money exchanges hands or power is traded—they are all implicitly complicit in making it happen.
Especially in Britain, with our society’s pathetic obsession with tradition, which actively prevents social progression and mobility, men only clubs are part of our DNA. Known originally as Gentlemen’s Clubs, these were set up in the 18th century by the affluent and the rich: aristocrats, businessmen, and financiers. The trend caught on later in the US and in commonwealth countries.
Men only clubs like The Presidents Club thrive on privacy, only bringing in women to serve food and drinks, or seemingly to be leached on. It’s hardly surprising that Gentlemen’s Clubs are now more commonly known as strip clubs. Perhaps the most recent pop culture representation was shown in Netflix’s The Crown, where the Duke of Edinburgh’s Thursday Club featured prominently. But in 2018, men only clubs still exist.
As with much wrongdoing by the wealthy, the President’s Club used goodwill as a fig leaf to get up to its real purpose, behind closed doors. The few attendees who responded questions from to the FT about the event almost instantly mentioned it took place in the name of charity and critics of the investigation are quick to talk about how raising money for the less fortunate trump all—as if throwing money around atones everyone from wrongdoing.
This investigation is going to burn bright in the media and then die out just as fast. It’s going to be talked about in an esoteric way to the elite in places like Davos and be sold in a way and spoken in a language that perpetuates the norm. For example, stopping sexual harassment being “good for business” or the fact men have been “left out of the conversation.” In Davos this week, it also didn’t take long for one panel participant to talk about how it’s not “just” about naming perpetrators or making a list of wrongdoers.
This is all music to the ears of the elite. It’s not going to change the day-to-day aggressions against women, it hasn’t led to a single person or company not related to public office being punished, let alone a “list” being made, nor has any attendee even so much as admitted that the events actually occurred.
The #MeToo movement has made a great strides for women across so many industries, but as for finance, I wouldn’t hold my breath.
Learn how to write for Quartz Ideas. We welcome your comments at ideas@qz.com.
Read more: The unexpected, paradigm-shifting power of #MeToo

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